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[Xmca-l] Re: is the mind a function of the brain?
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- Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: is the mind a function of the brain?
- From: larry smolucha <email@example.com>
- Date: Wed, 15 Jan 2014 12:04:56 -0600
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The mind might be a function of the brain but the soul is not.
> Date: Wed, 15 Jan 2014 10:35:39 +0200
> From: firstname.lastname@example.org
> To: email@example.com
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: is the mind a function of the brain?
> Hi Jose,
> more from a natural science perspective on the question of "the mind" I
> would recommend you works of Daniel C. Dennett.
> - Jaana Pirkkalainen
> 15.01.2014 06:11, Larry Purss kirjoitti:
> > The consensus seems to be that there is a long history and multiple
> > *traditions* explaining what mind *is*. It may be that *mind* as an *is*
> > object is an abstraction from the continually developing genres describing
> > what mind *is*. By tracing the multiple explanations [and interpretations,
> > and evaluations] of mind as an *is* we may gain a deeper perspective on
> > this abstracting process itself that points beyond *mind* and extends
> > *mind* into emerging sociohistorical figurations [and re-figurations] of
> > what mind *is*.
> > The book [Between Ourselves] by Evan Thompson offers another alternative
> > thesis explaining that mind as a scientific *object* is an abstraction from
> > [and therefore presupposes] consciousness as implicitly an intersubjective
> > phenomena. [second person perspective.]
> > It may be that 1st person and 2nd person and 3rd person accounts are all
> > abstractions from a process that extends beyond any of these reductions.
> > Therefore, we return to *traditions* of mind as multiple genres and the
> > modern scientific explanations of *mind* as needing to be re-figured in
> > dialogue with these multiple genres that have become sedimented artifacts
> > of what mind *is*
> > As Martin said,
> > "you pays your money, you make your choice"
> > On Tue, Jan 14, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Greg Thompson <firstname.lastname@example.org>wrote:
> >> Jose,
> >> I've always thought a strength of SCT/CHAT has been the commitment to a
> >> non-dualist ontology - meaning that mind and body (ideal and material) are
> >> not split apart. In some ways this sounds similar to SFL, but I would also
> >> suspect that the SFL approach is more of a materialist approach, but I may
> >> be wrong about that. SCT's other great strength is that it isn't
> >> reductively materialist. Rather, SCT/CHAT includes the social and
> >> historical in the mind/brain.
> >> But having said that, you could probably talk to 10 different SCT/CHAT
> >> folks and get 10 different theories of mind.
> >> One of my favorite explanations, though, can be found in Martin Packer's
> >> book The Science of Qualitative Research. In it you will find an engagement
> >> with the long history of dualist and non-dualist ontologies. There isn't as
> >> much explicitly about mind in the book, but it's in there.
> >> -greg
> >> On Tue, Jan 14, 2014 at 7:47 AM, jose david herazo <email@example.com
> >>> wrote:
> >>> Dear all,
> >>> I'm writing the final chapter of my PhD dissertation about the role of
> >>> academic concepts in students' oral production and development of a
> >> second
> >>> language (L2 ). Since my study is grounded on both sociocultural theory
> >> and
> >>> systemic functional linguistics (SFL), one of my committee members
> >>> suggested a possible contradiction in what each theory views as mind.
> >>> SFLers, for instance, consider that there is no need for something called
> >>> the mind that is different from the brain. They prefer to talk in terms
> >> of
> >>> 'higher order semiotic consciousness' (HAlliday, 2004: The language of
> >>> science) rather than mind. On their terms, the mind is a function of the
> >>> brain. What is the mind for SCT? Is it the inner plane, consciousness?
> >> Has
> >>> anybody discussed what this concept refers to in sociocultural theory?
> >>> Any suggestions and comments are welcome,
> >>> JOSE DAVID HERAZO RIVERA
> >>> Foreign Languages Department, Universidad de Córdoba
> >>> (Montería - Colombia)
> >>> Carrera 6 No. 76-103. Tel: 7860500 - 7909800
> >>> www.unicordoba.edu.co
> >> --
> >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> >> Visiting Assistant Professor
> >> Department of Anthropology
> >> 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> >> Brigham Young University
> >> Provo, UT 84602
> >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson