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[Xmca-l] article request
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- Subject: [Xmca-l] article request
- From: Kris Gutierrez <firstname.lastname@example.org>
- Date: Sun, 22 Sep 2013 19:09:29 -0600
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Does anyone have a pdf of
Problems of developmental teaching : the experience of theoretical and experimental psychological research
Davydov, V. V. 1988
I can't seem to find my copy. thanks.
Kris D. Gutiérrez, Ph.D.
Inaugural Provost's Chair
Professor of Learning Sciences and Literacy
School of Education
University of Colorado at Boulder
Boulder, CO 80309-0249
Social Research Methodology
On Sep 22, 2013, at 9:31 AM, Larry Purss <firstname.lastname@example.org> wrote:
> I have been waiting to hear further reflections on this months article.
> I have noticed that as I am reading other articles I hear Jennifer's voice
> calling me to listen for distinctions within unities and not reify these
> fluid distinctions into discrete dichotomies.
> I would like to offer further reflections on my musings.
> Dewey wrote a book titled "Experience AND Nature* as conductive concepts.
> I have read Vygotskian commentary suggesting *nature* does not capture the
> centrality of tools and artifacts. Would the title "Experience AND
> Artifacts" be a useful working title?
> Other titles that came to mind were "Experience AND Mediation" or
> "Experience AND Activity".
> I am proposing that *experience* and the conjunctive concepts as
> distinctions can be played with in our models of human nature.
> I am also aware that Dewey re-considered [analepsis] the choice of the
> concept *experience* in his model. However, with the exploration of the
> unity of cognition AND feeling I wonder if *experience* can still be a
> concept which we can *live through* as a meaningfully shared concept to
> explore analytical distinctions WITHIN unities?
> The concept *word meaning* was proposed as a central concept used by
> Vygotsky which as an aspect of experience unifies cognition and affect
> WITHIN experience as situated.
> This insight is exploring the place of *concepts* within experience [as
> Calvin Schrag has explored Merleau-Ponty's theme of the centrality of the
> *visual FIELD* and proposes that M-P's insights exploring the visual field
> within experience can be extended to other *fields* such as the other
> perceptual fields [touch hearing, taste] AND conceptual fields, and
> valuational fields.
> The key insight M-P offers is that these multiple fields [perceptual,
> conceptual, valuational] WITHIN experience are neither "outer worlds* of
> re-presented or re-constituted objective properties and relations on the
> one hand, nor are these multiple fields [perceptual, conceptual,
> valuational] an "abstracted inner world" as transcendentally accessed.
> The experiential world [as situated] M-P describes as a *lived-through
> Consciousness, [the theme Vygotsky was turning towards before his early
> death], is NEVER ENCLOSED WITHIN ITSELF. It is from the beginning lodged
> within the world as an intentional unity with figures [and con-figurations]
> positioned or located against backgrounds [Gestalts]. Gestalt has also been
> proposed on this xmca site as where Vygotsky was turning.
> Schrag suggests M-P privileged the *visual field* but his key insight can
> be expanded beyond the visual to multiple fields. Schrag suggests the
> visual field is not *truer* or displays a *richer* structure than do the
> other multiple fields. The visual field of sight does have the advantage of
> providing more direct conditions for objectification. I would add that the
> conceptual field also has this distinct benefit of distanciation of figure
> and ground. Schrag points out that this benefit however, by virtue of the
> distant and disembodied potential of the visual sense [I would add
> conceptual field as sense] is prone to become separated from the concrete
> *experiencer* and the dynamic fields [as Gestalts]
> Schrag highlights a word [aisthesis] which points to the phenomena which
> MEDIATES all the senses. THIS full bodied is most overtly displayed and
> manifested particularly WITHIN the perceptual field of touch AS tactile
> This is Schrag's key point [and may also be put in conjunction with the
> unity of cognition and affect].
> Full-bodied aisthesis CONTINUES TO BE OPERATIVE in the visual [and
> conceptual] fields, and by virtue of aisthesis retains a unity WITHIN
> This insight not does mean an inversion of visual and conceptual fields to
> the nonvisual tactile or auditory fields. Touch and hearing are neither
> truer or richer in structure than sight or concepts. No sense should be
> elevated above the others. Sight and concepts without the full bodied
> aisthesis of the other senses divests *experience* of its vibrancy, as the
> other senses without the visual and conceptual which provide distance tend
> to enslave experience within immediacy.
> Schrag and the current article are emphasizing unity and the
> multidimensional texture of experience as cognition AND affect. As Schrag
> "The multidimensional texture of experience is displayed not only in the
> plurality of perceptual fields, but also in the variegated deployment of
> conceptual and valuational fields. Conceiving and valuing, as assuredly as
> perceiving, occur WITHIN a figure-ground context. Experience is always
> broader in its reach than perceptual fields."
> M-P's privileging the visual sense is not his central insight. His central
> insight is that the multiple fields of sense DISPLAYS a figure-ground
> relation AND an intentional structure REVEALING its intended figures at
> EVERY level of experience.
> Jennifer, I enjoyed crisscrossing your insights and extensions of the unity
> of cognition AND affect with Schrag's descriptions within a phenomenology
> of experience.
> I apologize if this is going off topic but your article is *in my mind* as
> I am reading Schrag's theme of unity of the senses.