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[Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities
Hi Huw,
Integrating systems and systems-functional views with dialectical/historical materialism is not a problem at all because of their objectivist nature. In addition, dialectical/historical materialists claim that the founders of their philosophy are precursors of systems thinking. Several of their capital writings are usually cited as examples. There is a huge difference between Positivism and Dialectical/Historical Materialism regarding their foundational axioms and principles, as well as their attitudes to the role of induction/deduction in the process of knowledge production. However, at lower levels of abstraction, they exchange knowledge with ease. I already mentioned this regarding field research methods. However, it happens also when borrowing theoretical products.
Now, try to integrate systems thinking with the humanistic paradigms. I am very interested in good examples of such work. I mean epistemologically sound examples, not eclectic attempts to put together their concepts in one text.
It is interesting to study how ideas about holistic presentation of reality are operationalized/concretized in Dialectical Materialism and in the humanist approaches. I see a huge difference in preferred topics, concepts, and terminology. All this makes the translation of knowledge from one tradition to the other very complicated, complex, and prone with errors. People interpret the words (the terms are always paradigm and discipline specific) the way they want, with full disregard to the original intentions and the habitual interpretation of these terms in their original paradigmatic environment. I have seen that very often. I myself have experienced such states of mind many times. You will be astonished, but many historical materialist concept are interpreted very differently by authors outside that community. The background for interpretation is different; there are huge inaccuracies in translating words instead of terms and concepts; many of the terms and concepts simply cannot be translated; and so on. Usually, the definitions of terms and concepts cover only their core. The "mantle" around the core cannot be explicated because it is very fluid, requires a lot of text, and actually, there is no full agreement about it. Researches develop a sense about the periphery by constantly reading authors that are very close in thinking. This is one example of tacit knowledge (we talked about that yesterday).
Let me stop here...
Lubomir
Lubo
-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Huw Lloyd
Sent: Tuesday, August 20, 2013 5:16 PM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities
On 20 August 2013 22:03, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> wrote:
> Huw,
> I wonder if it might be worthwhile to add another "aspect" to it. And
> again, to Lubomir's point, I wonder if this is even possible - to
> bring in something from a different tradition.
> -greg
>
If you're willing to do the philosophical and theoretic work, I see no reason why not. The world we are referring to is one. If one of your systems of thought doesn't recognise that, then "repairing" that may be your starting place.
For example, in recent work I have been studying the integration of natural systems/functional views with Russian Marxian dialectics. They are compatible but ones needs to a good amount of work to identify their relations (to the degree of precision one requires).
Huw
>
>
>
> On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 4:52 PM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
> >wrote:
>
> > On 19 August 2013 22:57, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >
> > > Huw,
> > > I like the way that you point to your point indirectly here.
> > > So, to answer in kind, yes, the explicit articulation of motives
> > > are sometimes helpful for activity (particularly when the activity
> > > has at
> its
> > > goal the furthering of the desires and motivations of individuals
> > > -
> and,
> > > thank you for taking my interests into account here!!).
> > > I guess I just don't see motivation as necessary to a definition
> > > of "activity."
> > > -greg
> > > p.s. just in case the question was serious, I think Larry
> > > described
> > nicely
> > > what I am trying to achieve - a notion of activity that does not
> > > have
> at
> > > its center a sovereign subject.
> >
> >
> > You disagree with it? Or you wish to go beyond it?
> >
> > Do you want a genetic theory or a descriptive method?
> >
> >
> > > My post questioning the merging of phenomenology with activity
> > > theory speaks to the central intellectual concern and the "for
> > > what" of what I'm hoping to do in my work.
> > >
> >
> > The "the notion of sensory fabric" email? That seems fine to me. I
> would
> > call that memory.
> >
> > Best,
> > Huw
> >
> >
> > >
> > >
> > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 2:34 PM, Huw Lloyd
> > > <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
> > > >wrote:
> > >
> > > > I don't mind the chatter. :)
> > > >
> > > > But I am not clear on what you're trying to achieve. Is there
> > something
> > > > you wish to reveal or analyse, or is this more about
> > > > understanding
> > social
> > > > situations.
> > > >
> > > > Huw
> > > >
> > > > On 19 August 2013 21:27, Greg Thompson
> > > > <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
> > > wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > Larry,
> > > > > This is great.
> > > > > So I'm still a little confused at the notion of voice. You write:
> > > > > "John argues there are many other forms of talk currently
> > > > > without a
> > > > *voice*
> > > > > which have their own properties. If these modes of talking
> > > > > were to
> > > gain a
> > > > > *voice* it could transform our lives. This special kind of
> *unvoiced*
> > > > > knowledge is NOT formalized into theoretical knowledge.
> > > > > [Knowing
> that
> > > in
> > > > > Ryle's term for theoretical knowledge.]"
> > > > >
> > > > > In the first sentence, did you mean to say that forms of talk
> > > > > have
> a
> > > > > "voice"? That kind of threw me. I'm used to people talking
> > > > > about
> > people
> > > > > having voices or people being able to call upon voices that
> > > > > exist
> in
> > > some
> > > > > cultural real. If forms of talk can have "voices", then I'd
> certainly
> > > > like
> > > > > to hear more about that. What exactly does Shotter mean by "voice"?
> > > > >
> > > > > -greg
> > > > > p.s. I'm wondering if this conversation should move off the
> > > > > list
> > since
> > > > this
> > > > > is probably review (or of little relevance) for many people on
> > > > > the
> > > list.
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 1:23 PM, Larry Purss
> > > > > <lpscholar2@gmail.com
> >
> > > > wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > > Greg,
> > > > > > John, wrote a book titled *Conversational Realities* He
> > > > > > suggests three realms of knowing.
> > > > > > 1] knowing that
> > > > > > 2] knowing how
> > > > > > 3] knowing from or knowing within.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Here is a comment from Annika's paper describing *learning
> > activity*.
> > > > > > "Learning activity as a concept REFERS to the meaning making
> > > > > > AS
> how
> > > > > > students engage in collaborative tasks and not what they learn."
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Greg, I *read* this explanation as a form of conversational
> knowing
> > > > > > addressing knowing as a knowing HOW.
> > > > > > John would say this explanation is composed in a
> > > > > > *referential-representational* mode of knowing. Knowing of
> > > > > > the
> > second
> > > > > kind.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > On page 18 of John's book in a section titled "knowing of
> > > > > > the
> third
> > > > kind:
> > > > > > Knowing from WITHIN" he elaborates the distinction between
> realms.
> > > > > Knowing
> > > > > > how is participating and collaborating and instituting
> > > > > > various
> > > centers
> > > > of
> > > > > > institutionalized social life and knowing how is knowing the
> > > permitted
> > > > > > forms of talk within the institution [discursive discourses]
> > > > > >
> > > > > > John argues there are many other forms of talk currently
> > > > > > without
> a
> > > > > *voice*
> > > > > > which have their own properties. If these modes of talking
> > > > > > were
> to
> > > > gain a
> > > > > > *voice* it could transform our lives. This special kind of
> > *unvoiced*
> > > > > > knowledge is NOT formalized into theoretical knowledge.
> > > > > > [Knowing
> > that
> > > > in
> > > > > > Ryle's term for theoretical knowledge.]
> > > > > >
> > > > > > This *unvoiced* knowledge is knowledge of a third kind that
> cannot
> > be
> > > > > > reduced to either knowing-that or knowing-how [skillful knowing].
> > > This
> > > > > > third kind of knowledge is knowing FROM-WITHIN a situation,
> > > institution
> > > > > or
> > > > > > society.
> > > > > > Greg, John Shotter's book explores the various implications
> > > > > > of
> > giving
> > > > > this
> > > > > > knowing from-within a clear and distinct voice.
> > > > > > Wittgenstein used the metaphor of *crisscrossing* to explore
> > > > > > the
> > > > > > *language-games* that have developed within the relatively
> bounded
> > > and
> > > > > > sedimented multiple CENTERS of institutionalized discourse
> > > > > > as
> > already
> > > > > > FORMED. [framed analysis of formed knowing-how]. John is
> fascinated
> > > by
> > > > > the
> > > > > > disorganized, uncertain, unformulated ways of talking that
> > > > > > are
> > > > negotiated
> > > > > > as common *sense* beyond the centers of already formed discourse.
> > > > > > He is suggesting this is a rhetorical-RESPONSIVE third realm
> > > > > > of
> > > > practical
> > > > > > knowing [Gadamer's phronesis]. It is the realm of *voice*
> distinct
> > > from
> > > > > the
> > > > > > realm of *framing*.
> > > > > > John suggests it is within this third realm of *joint
> > > > > > action*
> that
> > > the
> > > > > FELT
> > > > > > MOVEMENT [experienced as vitality] emerges within perception
> > > > > > and
> > > > action.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Greg, I hope this was clear?
> > > > > > His book also has a section on *Vico* and the concept of
> *communis
> > > > > sensus*
> > > > > > A section on Bahktin and dialogue.
> > > > > > And a section on Vygotsky.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > All contributing to bring to *voice* knowing FROM WITHIN
> > > > > > joint
> > > action.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Larry
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 11:19 AM, Greg Thompson
> > > > > > <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > Larry,
> > > > > > > Many thanks for this. These are wonderful connections.
> > > > > > > Don't know if I have the Shotter you are referring to. Do
> > > > > > > you
> > have
> > > a
> > > > > > cite?
> > > > > > > or perhaps could email me a paper offline?
> > > > > > > Also, I'm wondering if you could say more about Shotter's
> > > > > > > idea
> > of a
> > > > > third
> > > > > > > realm. Again, I'm a little slow here - I didn't catch what
> > > > > > > the
> > > first
> > > > > and
> > > > > > > second realms were?
> > > > > > > And finally, could you elaborate a bit on what the third
> > > > > > > realm
> > is?
> > > > > > > Thanks,
> > > > > > > -greg
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 11:06 AM, Larry Purss <
> > > lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> > > > > > > wrote:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Anti,
> > > > > > > > I have downloaded Annika's paper and will listen to how
> > > > > > > > she
> > > weaves
> > > > > > > together
> > > > > > > > CHAT and frame analysis.
> > > > > > > > Two quick comments.
> > > > > > > > Greg asked about how we understand *agency* and if there
> > > > > > > > are
> > > > > > alternatives
> > > > > > > > to *sovereign possessive agency* that continue to
> > > > > > > > confirm
> > > *agency*
> > > > > but
> > > > > > a
> > > > > > > > less emphatic agency more receptive to emerging and
> > participating
> > > > > > within
> > > > > > > > conversations. He also asked if settings or contexts
> > > > > > > > also
> > exhibit
> > > > > > > *agency*
> > > > > > > > I believe this concept of agency has relevance.
> > > > > > > > 2nd
> > > > > > > > Metaphors may not be merely *vehicles* to carry *sense*.
> > > Metaphors
> > > > > may
> > > > > > > > actually *be* ways of thinking [as modes, genres,
> > > > > > > > tropes, or
> > > > kinds].
> > > > > > > > Therefore Goffman's metaphor of *framing* biases us to
> > > > > > > > modes
> of
> > > > > > *seeing*
> > > > > > > > and *perceiving* what PREVIOUSLY FORMED and this framing
> guides
> > > our
> > > > > > > > anticipations going forward.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > John Shorter is *turning* our attention away from
> > > > > > > > *framing*
> > [not
> > > as
> > > > > > > > misleading but as biased to understand as picturing] He
> > > > > > > > is suggesting there is another realm [what he calls a
> third
> > > > realm]
> > > > > > > that
> > > > > > > > has remained invisible in plain sight.
> > > > > > > > He calls this realm *conversational realities* which he
> > suggests
> > > is
> > > > > > > entered
> > > > > > > > through alternative metaphors AS *talking*.
> > > > > > > > The central metaphor of *voice* as distinct from the
> > > > > > > > metaphor
> > of
> > > > > > > *framing*.
> > > > > > > > Voice as metaphor moves to Bahktin and dialogue as
> > > > > > > > emerging
> > > within
> > > > > > micro
> > > > > > > > processes. Mike cautions we are referring to different
> > > > > > > > time
> > > > scales.
> > > > > > > > Shorter is also calling our attention to what is hidden
> > > > > > > > in
> > plain
> > > > > view.
> > > > > > > When
> > > > > > > > talking we pay attention to processes of collaboration
> [Andy's
> > 3
> > > > > > types].
> > > > > > > I
> > > > > > > > find Shotter's turning our attention to this third realm
> > > [captured
> > > > in
> > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > metaphor of voice] adding a realm to Goffman's metaphor
> > > > > > > > of
> > > framing
> > > > > [as
> > > > > > > > previously FORMED frames]
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > If these two alternative metaphors are making distinct a
> > > difference
> > > > > > then
> > > > > > > a
> > > > > > > > gap opens within which agency may enter as creative
> reflection.
> > > > > > > > Question 1 on agency I hope can be further elaborated
> > > > > > > > Larry
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 7:32 AM, Antti Rajala <
> > > ajrajala@gmail.com>
> > > > > > > wrote:
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > Lubomir, thanks for suggesting symbolic interactionism
> > > > > > > > > as a
> > > frame
> > > > > of
> > > > > > > > > incorporating these ideas. Anna-Maija Puroila
> > > > > > > > > discusses the
> > > > > legacies
> > > > > > of
> > > > > > > > > Goffman in her dissertation (in Finnish) and mentions
> > > > > > > > > that
> > > there
> > > > > are
> > > > > > > many
> > > > > > > > > competing and contested interpretation's of Goffman's work.
> > > Some
> > > > > say
> > > > > > > that
> > > > > > > > > his work was structuralist but more often he is
> > > > > > > > > associated
> > with
> > > > > > > symbolic
> > > > > > > > > interactionism, ethnomethodology, or phenomenological
> > > sociology.
> > > > > > Where
> > > > > > > > > would activity theory fit in among these?
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > To me Goffman's student's Goodwin's
> > > > > > > > > ethno-methdological
> > > approach
> > > > > > seems
> > > > > > > > > partly compatible with CHAT. In his paper, Action and
> > > embodiment
> > > > > > within
> > > > > > > > > situated human interaction (2000), Goodwin writes:
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > "This emphasis on cognition as a public, social
> > > > > > > > > process
> > > embedded
> > > > > > within
> > > > > > > > an
> > > > > > > > > historically
> > > > > > > > > shaped material world is quite consistent with both
> > Vygotskian
> > > > > > > > perspectives
> > > > > > > > > and
> > > > > > > > > recent work in the social and anthropological study of
> > > scientific
> > > > > and
> > > > > > > > > workplace practice
> > > > > > > > > ..., but adds to such perspectives an equally strong
> > > > > > > > > focus
> on
> > > the
> > > > > > > details
> > > > > > > > > of language
> > > > > > > > > use and conversational organization."
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > Like Goodwin, I believe that this attention to details
> > > > > > > > > of
> > > > language
> > > > > > use
> > > > > > > > and
> > > > > > > > > conversational organization, and to embodied
> > > > > > > > > interactions,
> in
> > > > > > > particular,
> > > > > > > > > can enrich CHAT analyses. After all, in many classical
> > > > > > > > > CHAT
> > > work,
> > > > > we
> > > > > > > > mainly
> > > > > > > > > see analyses of spoken interaction. Greg, to me
> > > > > > > > > Goodwin's
> > work
> > > on
> > > > > > > > > professional vision gives an elaborate account on the
> > > > relationships
> > > > > > > > between
> > > > > > > > > meanings and sensory fabric. In particular, in my case
> > > > > > > > > of
> > > > students
> > > > > > in a
> > > > > > > > > bird-watching field trip the way he analyzes
> > > > > > > > > expert-novice
> > > > > > interaction
> > > > > > > is
> > > > > > > > > very valuable. I can, for example, see lots of
> > > > > > > > > highlighting
> > on
> > > > the
> > > > > > part
> > > > > > > > of
> > > > > > > > > the bird expert.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > Goodwin's focus on the practices of seeing seems to me
> > > > > > > > > very
> > > > > > compatible
> > > > > > > > with
> > > > > > > > > Leontiev's theorizing of sensory fabric as
> > > > > > > > > constituting and
> > > being
> > > > > > > > > constituted of action. Yet, in Goodwin's work the
> > > socio-emotional
> > > > > > > issues
> > > > > > > > > brought in with the Leontiev's personal sense - in
> > > > > > > > > line
> with
> > > what
> > > > > > Larry
> > > > > > > > has
> > > > > > > > > written - seems to be given less attention in Goodwin.
> > > > > > > > > I
> > wonder
> > > > > > whether
> > > > > > > > > Goodwin's approach contradicts Leontiev's approach
> > > > > > > > > that
> > > > emphasizes
> > > > > > such
> > > > > > > > > internal issues as goals and motives. In my
> > > > > > > > > understanding ethnomethdologists do not usually focus on goals and such.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > The Gothenburg center lead by Roger Säljö has explored
> > > > > > > > ethnomethodological
> > > > > > > > > inspired aspects of Goffman in relation to their
> > > > > > > > > version of
> > > > > > > sociocultural
> > > > > > > > > perspective. See e.g the dissertation of Annika
> > > Lantz-Andersson:
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > >
> https://gupea.ub.gu.se/bitstream/2077/19736/1/gupea_2077_19736_1.pdf
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > Greg, Greeno has theorized the ways in which frames
> > > > > > > > > "create
> > > > certain
> > > > > > > > > affordances that solicit various types of behavior
> > > > > > > > > (whether
> > > > > > > 'cognitive',
> > > > > > > > > 'emotional', or some other emically named type)." To
> > > > > > > > > my
> > > knowledge
> > > > > > > > Greeno's
> > > > > > > > > work here focuses more on cognitive aspects and not
> > > > > > > > > that
> much
> > > on
> > > > > > > > emotional
> > > > > > > > > aspects. He uses the notion of positioning in
> > > > > > > > > association
> > with
> > > > > frames
> > > > > > > > > (which he relates to Goffman). "This refers to ways
> > > > > > > > > in
> which
> > > an
> > > > > > > > individual
> > > > > > > > > is
> > > > > > > > > entitled, expected, or perhaps obligated to
> > > > > > > > > participate in
> > > > > > interactions
> > > > > > > > of
> > > > > > > > > an activity system, such as a classroom or an
> > > > > > > > > experimental
> > > > session
> > > > > > > > > involving interaction with a computer program." (see,
> > > > > > > > > A
> > Theory
> > > > Bite
> > > > > > on
> > > > > > > > > Contextualizing, Framing, and Positioning: A Companion
> > > > > > > > > to
> Son
> > > and
> > > > > > > > > Goldstone,
> > > > > > > > > http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07370000903014386)
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > Greg wrote:
> > > > > > > > > "I might add to this that Goffman speaks of the way in
> which
> > > > > > > motivations
> > > > > > > > > are, to a certain extent, entailed by frames (yes, "to
> > > > > > > > > a
> > > certain
> > > > > > > extent"
> > > > > > > > -
> > > > > > > > > this does not mean the frames determine them!). Thus,
> frames
> > > > bring
> > > > > > with
> > > > > > > > > them motivational relevancies as much as individuals do!"
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > I wonder if this interplay between collective frames
> > > > > > > > > and
> > > > > individuals
> > > > > > > can
> > > > > > > > be
> > > > > > > > > conceptualized with meaning and sense. Object of an
> activity
> > is
> > > > > > framed
> > > > > > > in
> > > > > > > > > terms of collectively shared meanings. Yet, each
> > > > > > > > > individual
> > > > > develops
> > > > > > a
> > > > > > > > > personal relationship to the object, that is, a
> > > > > > > > > personal
> > sense.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > By the way, thanks Mike for pointing out this
> > > > > > > > > overstatement
> > of
> > > > > > > stability
> > > > > > > > > with respect to meanings. This has bothered me a lot, too.
> A
> > > > > > colleague
> > > > > > > of
> > > > > > > > > mine even asserts that sense is never shared enough to
> become
> > > > > > > > legitimately
> > > > > > > > > called a shared meaning in Vygotsky/Leontiev sense.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > Antti
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 3:01 AM, mike cole <
> > lchcmike@gmail.com
> > > >
> > > > > > wrote:
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > I agree, very clearly statements of the
> > > > > > > > > > sense/meaning
> > > relation,
> > > > > > along
> > > > > > > > > with
> > > > > > > > > > the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I
> > > > > > > > > > wanted to
> > say,
> > > > and
> > > > > > > > > thought,
> > > > > > > > > > unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows."
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > In the quote here, I think LSV is somewhat
> > > > > > > > > > overstating
> the
> > > > > > stability
> > > > > > > of
> > > > > > > > > > meaning across contexts; yes relative to the
> > > > > > > > > > microgenetic
> > > > > processes
> > > > > > > of
> > > > > > > > > > sense making capturable with modern technologies,
> > > > > > > > > > but not totally "context
> independent."
> > > > Even
> > > > > > > > > dictionary
> > > > > > > > > > meanings change, as LSV was well aware from his
> > > > > > > > > > interest
> in
> > > the
> > > > > > > history
> > > > > > > > > of
> > > > > > > > > > words in relation to their appearance in children's
> > > > vocabularies
> > > > > in
> > > > > > > > > > ontogeny.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > Keeping the simultaneous relevance of several time
> > > > > > > > > > scales
> > in
> > > > mind
> > > > > > in
> > > > > > > > > these
> > > > > > > > > > discussions seems really important, as hard as it is
> > > > > > > > > > to
> do.
> > > > > > > > > > mike
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > --
> > > > > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> > > > > > > Visiting Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology
> > > > > > > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University
> > > > > > > Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> > > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > --
> > > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> > > > > Visiting Assistant Professor
> > > > > Department of Anthropology
> > > > > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> > > > > Brigham Young University
> > > > > Provo, UT 84602
> > > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> > > > >
> > > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > --
> > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> > > Visiting Assistant Professor
> > > Department of Anthropology
> > > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> > > Brigham Young University
> > > Provo, UT 84602
> > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> > >
> >
>
>
>
> --
> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> Visiting Assistant Professor
> Department of Anthropology
> 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> Brigham Young University
> Provo, UT 84602
> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
>