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Re: [xmca] Operations
Martin, yes very relevant to our discussion of emotion.
I was actually reflecting on response as *addressed* but the history of
response does lead to unexpected readings.
This excerpt also suggests that the generally expressive (gestures?) are
primordial rather than objective elements which are derived from the
I will wait for the next instalment on this developing saga.
On Wed, Apr 10, 2013 at 6:28 PM, Martin Packer <firstname.lastname@example.org> wrote:
> Hi Larry,
> I think Marx's point was that consumption seeks to fill a lack or need, a
> negation. But first, production is necessary to obtain whatever will
> satisfy that need. Production too involves a negation: a negation of the
> current circumstances so as to transform them so that they come to contain
> what is needed. The two form a cycle - consumption defines the goal of
> production, which satisfies the needs of consumption.
> I think Carol is right, infants have needs that manifest themselves
> instinctively. Crying is, I suppose, a instinctive response to the felt
> need of hunger. I guess I'd prefer to avoid the term 'response' because
> it's so often paired with 'stimulus.' LSV did use the term 'stimulus' (or
> at least he's translated that way), but he was writing in the 1930s when
> behaviorism was the vogue. But he insisted that:
> "The initial perceptions of the child represent nonarticulated impressions
> of the situation as a whole where not only are separate objective moments
> of the situation not articulated, but elements of perception and sensation
> are not yet differentiated. The fact itself is remarkable that the newborn,
> long before he exhibits the ability to react to separately perceived,
> articulated elements of a situation, begins to react to intricate, complex,
> emotionally colored wholes. For example, the face of the mother and its
> expressive movements evoke a reaction in the child long before he is
> capable of distinct perception of form, color, or size. In the initial
> perception of the newborn, all external impressions appear as inseparably
> united with the affect or sensible tone of the perception that colors them.
> The child is more likely to perceive the affable or the threatening, that
> is, generally expressive rather than objective, elements of external
> activity as such."
> Very relevant to our discussion of emotion, I think. Not response
> associated with stimulus, but unified perception-emotion-action gestalts.
> But my next questions is, is the need that an infant manifests sufficient
> to define an activity, which will then have as its goal the satisfaction of
> that need?
> On Apr 10, 2013, at 5:04 PM, Larry Purss <email@example.com> wrote:
> > Martin,
> > Would it be accurate to consider that consumption *creates* or
> > *constitutes* a lack or negation as need, drive or purpose. I'm playing
> > with the notion of *response* to the fact of consumption which then
> > requires reproducing that which was consumed.
> > Then the question becomes, Does the infant form [as a mode of life] a
> > drive, or a purpose FROM lack or negation AS a response? Is this a more
> > accurate way to suggest the infant *responds* to what is lacking or
> > or *gaps* in their forms [modes] of life??
> > The concept of *participation* puts in question the understanding that
> > consumption necessarily generates all human subjectivity. Participation
> > not always consume resources but may be a form or mode of inter action
> > which generates motive energy. In the same way as participating in
> > experiences of *love* may be generative and not merely consumptive. It
> > depend on the *mode* of participation.
> > This is not to say love may become consumptive, and experienced as lack
> > does participation/love necessarily become consumptive? It may depend on
> > our modes of life.
> > Larry
> > On Wed, Apr 10, 2013 at 11:02 AM, Martin Packer <firstname.lastname@example.org> wrote:
> >> Our discussion of whether or not infants can participate in an
> >> (or 'project') seems to have centered around the question of whether an
> >> infant has the capability to "form a goal and then take appropriate
> >> premeditated action to realise that goal" (Andy), to form a "mental
> >> (Michael, though I think he was arguing against this), to have "an inner
> >> image of the future situation" (Manfred), to have a "psychic image" or a
> >> "conscious goal" (Leontiev).
> >> I think this is a misleading way of framing the issue, for several
> >> reasons. Some of them I've already mentioned, or at least hinted at.
> >> is another:
> >> What Marx actually wrote, in the Grundrise (at least as the English
> >> translation has it) was this: "consumption ideally posits the object of
> >> production as an internal image, as a need, as drive and as purpose. It
> >> creates the objects of production in a still subjective form. No
> >> without a need. But first consumption reproduces the need" (p. 92).
> >> This is in the context of a discussion of the teleological character of
> >> productive activity. Marx's central point is that the goal of
> production is
> >> always created by consumption (because reproduction is always
> >> In this passage he is describing the manners in which consumption can
> >> "posit" the object that is to be produced, and consequently the ways in
> >> which the goal of productive activity is defined.
> >> I read this as indicating that, for Marx, "internal image" is only *one*
> >> way in which consumption can posit the object that is to be produced.
> >> Consumption (that is, for example, the hungry person) can *also* posit
> >> object as a need, or as a drive, or as a purpose. These seem to me to be
> >> qualitatively quite distinct, from each other and from a "mental image".
> >> The question really ought to be, can an infant form a need, a drive, or
> >> purpose.
> >> Martin
> >> On Apr 9, 2013, at 3:27 PM, mike cole <email@example.com> wrote:
> >>> Thank you Manfred. I have the same understanding of
> >>> action/goals as you write about. It was a mistaken typo on my part in
> >>> orginal note that Andy kindly corrected, but in the flow
> >>> of messages its hard discern.
> >>> So starting with your clear statement my question becomes: how does it
> >> come
> >>> about that operations proceed actions in early infancy and in what
> >> sense(s)
> >>> is that true and why?
> >>> mike
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