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Re: [xmca] Operations

Would it be accurate to consider  that consumption *creates* or
*constitutes* a lack or negation as need, drive or purpose. I'm playing
with the notion of *response* to the fact of consumption which then
requires reproducing that which was consumed.

Then the question becomes, Does the infant form [as a mode of life] a need,
drive, or a purpose FROM lack or negation AS a response? Is this a more
accurate way to suggest the infant *responds* to what is lacking or negated
or *gaps* in their forms [modes] of life??

The concept of *participation* puts in question the understanding that
consumption necessarily generates all human subjectivity. Participation may
not always consume resources but may be a form or mode of inter action
which generates motive energy. In the same way as participating in
experiences of *love* may be generative and not merely consumptive. It may
depend on the *mode* of participation.
This is not to say love may become consumptive, and experienced as lack but
does participation/love necessarily become consumptive? It may depend on
our modes of life.


On Wed, Apr 10, 2013 at 11:02 AM, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> wrote:

> Our discussion of whether or not infants can participate in an 'activity'
> (or 'project') seems to have centered around the question of whether an
> infant has the capability to "form a goal and then take appropriate
> premeditated action to realise that goal" (Andy), to form a "mental image"
> (Michael, though I think he was arguing against this), to have "an inner
> image of the future situation" (Manfred), to have a "psychic image" or a
> "conscious goal" (Leontiev).
> I think this is a misleading way of framing the issue, for several
> reasons. Some of them I've already mentioned, or at least hinted at. Here
> is another:
> What Marx actually wrote, in the Grundrise (at least as the English
> translation has it) was this: "consumption ideally posits the object of
> production as an internal image, as a need, as drive and as purpose. It
> creates the objects of production in a still subjective form. No production
> without a need. But first consumption reproduces the need" (p. 92).
> This is in the context of a discussion of the teleological character of
> productive activity. Marx's central point is that the goal of production is
> always created by consumption (because reproduction is always necessary).
> In this passage he is describing the manners in which consumption can
> "posit" the object that is to be produced, and consequently the ways in
> which the goal of productive activity is defined.
> I read this as indicating that, for Marx, "internal image" is only *one*
> way in which consumption can posit the object that is to be produced.
> Consumption (that is, for example, the hungry person) can *also* posit that
> object as a need, or as a drive, or as a purpose. These seem to me to be
> qualitatively quite distinct, from each other and from a "mental image".
> The question really ought to be, can an infant form a need, a drive, or a
> purpose.
> Martin
> On Apr 9, 2013, at 3:27 PM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
> > Thank you Manfred. I have the same understanding of operation/conditions
> > action/goals as you write about. It was a mistaken typo on my part in the
> > orginal note that Andy kindly corrected, but in the flow
> > of messages its hard discern.
> >
> > So starting with your clear statement my question becomes: how does it
> come
> > about that operations proceed actions in early infancy and in what
> sense(s)
> > is that true and why?
> >
> > mike
> >
> >
> >
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