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Re: [xmca] Re: Polls are closed: Manfred Holodynsk's article is choice



I took motive in Leontiev in the way it is used in logic (as in "well-motivated argument" or "these conditions motivate this outcome."):  
So motive is a relation among elements in a system.  
In the abbreviated situation (where action doesn't appear) activity directly motivates actions.  
But when action/goal/mind appear in the elaborated situation, action mediates between activity and action.
I think this is consistent with (but maybe more extreme than) what you are saying and with much of the work in Hedegaard, Edwards & Fleer (2012) "Motives in children's development: Cultural-Historical approaches."

--- On Thu, 3/21/13, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:


From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
Subject: [xmca] Re: Polls are closed: Manfred Holodynsk's article is choice
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Date: Thursday, March 21, 2013, 11:13 PM


Mike, Manfred gets his Activity Theory from AN Leontyev, rather than Engestrom's "systems of activity."
So actions and activities are defined by their goals and motives. So Manfred's article needs to be read with attention to motivation and how the structure of an activity is related to motives and goals. Because motives are not given to immediate perception; they have to be inferred/learnt. Emotional expression and experience signal the success, failure, frustration, expectation, etc. of goals and motives for both participant/observers and the individual subject themself, emotion is tied up with motives and goals and therefore with the structure of an activity. One and the same action could be part of different actions. It is the emotions which signal (internally and externally) the success, etc., etc., that is, in an action's furthering an activity, and it is this which makes manifest and actual that connection between action and activity, for both the observer/participant and the individual subject. So there is no metaphysics here. No hypothetical
 "states of mind", or intelligent infants, etc.

It's all in there.

Andy

mike cole wrote:
> Hi Andy - and here I was wondering why operation/action/activity were not prominent in Manfred's article. Where does he lay out the views in this note? Am I reading too superficially as usual? Seems important for me to get clear about!
> Mike
> 
> On Thursday, March 21, 2013, Andy Blunden wrote:
> 
>     Think of your illustration,Martin, about whether, in opening the
>     window, you were acting as a technician or moral leader. I.e., the
>     meaning of the action lies in the activity of which it is a part,
>     which is not immediately given. Manfred does not refer this to
>     "intention" or "belief". Manfred is quite specific that the
>     signalising and self-perception of an action in relation to an
>     activity - i.e., an action's being of this and not that activity -
>     is a function played by emotion. Concepts like internal state and
>     intention are derivative from operation/action/activity, not
>     fundamental.
> 
>     Andy
> 


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