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Re: [xmca] Polls are closed: Manfred Holodynsk's article is choice
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- Subject: Re: [xmca] Polls are closed: Manfred Holodynsk's article is choice
- From: Martin Packer <firstname.lastname@example.org>
- Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2013 00:22:56 +0000
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- Thread-topic: [xmca] Polls are closed: Manfred Holodynsk's article is choice
Andy, the whole point of my previous posts was to make the case that internal states and intentions are not fundamental. I am glad that we are apparently in agreement on that issue.
But as I was trying to say, Andy, there are multiple ways of understanding an action such as opening a window. In what sense can you say that "the meaning" of the action lies in the activity? I agree that the way an action is understood is not immediately given. It requires an act of interpretation. But for that reason I don't see that we can say there is simply a meaning "in" the activity. First, how is "the activity" to be grasped? What (on earth) is "the activity" in which someone opens the window as a moral leader? And what emotion would I need to have in order to identify opening a window as being an action of a moral leader in this activity? Perhaps you will explain how an emotion locates an action in relation to an activity. This is not how I read Manfred's article.
On Mar 21, 2013, at 6:45 PM, Andy Blunden <email@example.com> wrote:
> Think of your illustration,Martin, about whether, in opening the window, you were acting as a technician or moral leader. I.e., the meaning of the action lies in the activity of which it is a part, which is not immediately given. Manfred does not refer this to "intention" or "belief". Manfred is quite specific that the signalising and self-perception of an action in relation to an activity - i.e., an action's being of this and not that activity - is a function played by emotion. Concepts like internal state and intention are derivative from operation/action/activity, not fundamental.
> Martin Packer wrote:
>> Hi Mike,
>> Yes, I'm not clear how exactly Manfred is proposing that emotions regulate an activity system. I can see that they can regulate an activity in the everyday sense.
>> On Mar 21, 2013, at 2:45 PM, mike cole <firstname.lastname@example.org> wrote:
>>> My reading is very similar to yours, Martin. I wonder though, in both your
>>> quotation from Manfred and elsewhere in the article about how consistently
>>> the word, activity, is used. In your quoted example, is activity the word
>>> of choice, or action? This question relates to Andy's earlier invocation of
>>> operation/action/ activity.
>>> On Sunday, March 17, 2013, Martin Packer wrote:
>>>> Perhaps it's helpful to add that emotions are classic System X processes,
>>>> especially at the start of ontogenesis. As Holodynski says, "emotions have
>>>> an activity regulating function." What he then offers, on my reading, is a
>>>> detailed account of how over the course of ontogenesis System C comes to
>>>> play a role in emotionality. Key to this at the start of ontogenesis is
>>>> that the dependence of an infant on adult caregivers means that the link
>>>> between need and satisfaction must pass through the adult. The adults'
>>>> interpretations of the infant's emotion signals thus mediate the outcome.
>>>> This provides the (social) condition for (individual) development.
>>>> At the other end of the ontogenetic trajectory - well, we had a discussion
>>>> recently about LSV's analysis of the way a cultural artifact -- a play. for
>>>> example - can educate the emotions.
>>>> xmca mailing list
>>> xmca mailing list
>> xmca mailing list
> *Andy Blunden*
> Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
> Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts
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