Fw: [xmca] http://marxismocritico.com/category/psicologia-marxista/

[Haydi Zulfei <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>]

sorry ! monad ! Haydi
----- Forwarded Message -----
From: Haydi Zulfei <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> 
Sent: Sunday, 16 December 2012, 17:57:51
Subject: Re: [xmca] http://marxismocritico.com/category/psicologia-marxista/
 

Dear all 

I really wouldn't like to return anybody to what went on previously but trying to understand is not , sort of , a sin . I'm reading the 'crisis' to the end again . This is taken from chapter 13 . There are all sorts of quotations from Marx , Engels (many times) , Luria (as an eclectic) , materialists (including himself as an staunch one) . idealists (especially phenomenologists as a prior-o-tists) , Spinoza , et all . In his 'Thinking and Speech' , at least in one place (I don't have the collected works and cannot quote) , he refers to man first dealing with the outside world , then and secondarily and of necessity and of the very nature of the dealing with Nature which necessitates , regardless of man's will , the dealing with 'othering' --as a matter of fact , we need not mention and consider 'collectivity' while there's talk of dealing with Nature historically , containing the 'manhood conversion itself') ; on many occasions , he talks of 'activities'

but he does not give great and due weight to them maybe because he is conscious of the fact that his province is not a province of tying the 'word meaning' with 'life' itself but more with 'thinking' and 'cognition' which are not necessarily the life province proper . In Leontiev's preface/introduction to one of the collected volumes , we see the same thing .  

Here we see lots of stuff dealing with and appraising 'phenomenology' and 'idealistic approches' and epistemologies . Are we really discussing a mixture of 'idea' and 'matter' as one nomad ? Are they identical or just distinct ? while our beloved is a non-stop believer in 'materialism' at the least account ? To end , he even talks of 'base' and 'superstructure' either in 'Problems of ...' or 'history of the higher mental functions' . 


 In Russia it is also asked: if you will study thinking as such and not the thinking of thinking; the act as such and not the act for me; the objective and not the subjective – who, then, will study the subjective itself, the subjective distortion of objects? In physics we try to eliminate the subjective factor from what we perceive as an object. In psychology, when we study perception it is again required to separate perception as such, as it is, from how it seems to me. Who will study what has been eliminated both times, this appearance?

But the problem of appearance is an apparent problem. After all, in science we want to learn about the real and not the apparent cause of appearance. This means that we must take the phenomena as they exist independently from me. The appearance itself is an illusion (in Titchener’s basic example: Muller-Lyer’s lines are physically equal, psychologically one of them is longer). This is the difference between the viewpoints of physics and psychology. Itdoes not exist in reality, but results from two non-coincidences of two really existing processes. If I would know the physical nature of the two lines and the objective laws of the eye, as they are in themselves, I would get the explanation of the appearance, of the illusion as a result. The study of the subjective factor in the knowledge of this illusion is a subject of logic and the historical theory of knowledge: just like being, the subjective is the result of two processes which are objective

in themselves. The mind is not always a subject. In introspection it is split into object and subject. The question is whether in introspection phenomenon and being coincide. One has only to apply the epistemological formula of materialism, given by Lenin (a similar one can be found in Plekhanov) for the psychological subject-object, in order to see what is the matter:

the only ‘property’ of matter connected with philosophical materialism is the property of being an objective reality, of existing outside of our consciousness ... Epistemologically the concept of matter means nothing other than objective reality, existing independently from human consciousness and reflected by it. [Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism]

Elsewhere Lenin says that this is, essentially, the principle of realism, but that he avoids this word, because it has been captured by inconsistent thinkers.

And would 'objective reality' mean 'corporeality' ? 


________________________________

From: Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>

To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> 

Sent: Sunday, 16 December 2012, 10:00:08

Subject: Re: [xmca] http://marxismocritico.com/category/psicologia-marxista/



Jack



I wanted to acknowledge our shared interest in John Shotter's way of


focusing on language as gesture. My work in schools each day interacting


with children validates John's way of perceiving "spontaneous


responsiveness" as central to how we learn to orient and go on together.


I do believe that his understanding of "joint action" as "spontaneous


responsiveness" [as dialogical understandings] contributes an alternative


way of understanding the ZPD.



Jack, you commented,



Dear Larry (and all), I'm wondering if the following response might be


helpful in relation to your need to ask if tacit presentations are 'merely


interactional' as Andy suggests or is it potentially possible to expand


this interactional 'picture' to also engage cultural historical artifacts


within our presentational understandings? Presentations which are tacitly


shared while participating in 'joint action' or dialogical enactments.



I think that the reason I don't feel a need to ask these questions is


because I've already answered them to my satisfaction (although I'm open to


being shown that my answers are not adequate).



Jack, it was in this spirit of generating questions and inviting


"answerability" as a way of continuing the conversation, that I posed the


question.  I personally continue to reflect on these questions, as a way of


deepening my own understanding. However, my ethical orientation aligns with


your committments and with John Shotter's way of understanding joint


action.



Jack, I am going to look through some of the articles you have suggested,


but I wanted to acknowledge the ethical disposition you are cultivating in


your students and in the world.



Larry






On Sat, Dec 15, 2012 at 11:07 AM, Jack Whitehead <jack@actionresearch.net>wrote:



> Dear Larry (and all),  I'm wondering if the following response might be


> helpful in relation to your need to ask if tacit presentations are 'merely


> interactional' as Andy suggests or is it potentially possible to expand


> this interactional 'picture' to also engaged cultural historical artifacts


> within this presentational understandings? Presentations which are tacitly


> shared while participating in 'joint action' or dialogical enactments.


>


> I think that the reason I don't feel a need to ask these questions is


> because I've already answered them to my satisfaction (although I'm open to


> being shown that my answers are not adequate).


>


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