This article examines the production of new history textbooks that appeared after the breakup of the Soviet Union. It is argued that the radical revisions in official history in this context are shaped by the Bakhtinian process of "hidden dialogicality," whereby new, post-Soviet narratives respond to earlier Soviet narratives in various ways. It is argued that different forms of hidden dialogicality are employed to revise official accounts of the Russian Civil War and World War II. In the former case, new texts respond to their Soviet precursors through processes of "re-employment," whereas in the case of World War II, the plot is left largely unchanged, but the main characters are changed. Although many political, cultural, and economic forces play a role in the revision of any official history, it is argued that the importance of hidden dialogicality between narrative forms needs to be taken into account as well.

Revising Russian History

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The year 1988 witnessed a landmark event in the status of official history in the USSR. During the spring of that year, the Soviet government announced that it was canceling nationwide history examinations for graduating high school students. The decision to do this grew out of the recognition that it was no longer possible to deny the "lies' contained in the official texts" (Efron, 1994, p. A1). In essence, the Soviet government was admitting openly that much of what students had learned about history in school was not true and never should have been considered as such.

This public announcement actually reflected long-standing doubt, cynicism, and "double consciousness" (Ahonen, 1992) about official information among many segments of the Soviet population. In

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recalling attitudes toward the press, for example, Boym (1996) reported, "Nobody believed it. . . We didn’t believe anything that was in the newspapers" (p. 32). Indeed, the media became so suspect in the eyes of many Soviet citizens that they assumed truth could be derived by calculating precisely the opposite of what was reported—one result being that Westerners sometimes found themselves in the ironic position of trying to convince Soviet friends that stories in newspapers such as Pravda ("Truth") really were true.

This attitude of doubt was nowhere more pronounced than in the case of "official history" (Tulviste & Wertsch, 1994)—something reflected in the adage that "Nothing is more unpredictable than Russia’s past." Soviet authorities viewed history instruction in schools as part of the effort to "bring up true sons of the Motherland, steadfast ideological fighters" (Smirnov, 1973, p. 274). It may be argued that some such formulation—perhaps in more temperate form—lies behind every state’s program of history instruction. However, at least two features of the Soviet case distinguished it from many others. First, the fervor and rigidity with which the goals of history teaching were stated are striking, suggesting that the balance between socializing loyal citizens and providing dispassionate analyses of the past was weighted heavily in favor of the former. Second, the sons and steadfast ideological fighters who were to emanate from this instruction were to be loyal to the Soviet Union—not to Russia, Ukraine, Estonia, Georgia, and so forth. In this respect, the goals of history instruction were very ambitious. They were part of the larger attempt to create Homo Sovieticus, or at least a "socialist type of personality" (Smirnov, 1973) that would no longer be susceptible to long-standing national identity claims.

Although belief in official history had been waning in the USSR for several years before 1988, it had retained at least a patina of acceptability. It could still be dangerous—at least to one's career prospects—to openly call into question official accounts of the past during the final years of the Soviet Union’s existence. This was a context in which much of the population accepted the official "frame" (Goffman, 1974) of Soviet ideology, at least in public, while feeling that it might soon be time to admit that the emperor had no clothes. In such a setting, the official acknowledgment that what had been taught about the past was not true was a watershed event. It unleashed a torrent of public discussion about truth in history. Countless books and movies made a great deal of the fact that they were based on archival materials.
never before available, and people everywhere began to ask about events from the past that had been shrouded in official silence.

In what follows, I outline some of the ways that individuals and institutions responded to this set of events. Specifically, I focus on the production of the new history textbooks used in Russian schools. Although recognizing that textbooks provide only one channel of information about the past, I have chosen to focus on them for two reasons. First, they reflect in a relatively direct fashion the perspective of the state. Indeed, as Mendeloff (1996) noted, textbooks may be interpreted as mirroring the general perspective a culture has of its past and present. Second, because history textbooks are part of school curricula, it is possible to have some degree of certainty about the extent to which people (in this case young people) are exposed to them.

When reflecting on the massive effort to rewrite history after the breakup of the Soviet Union, a common claim is that it was motivated primarily by the availability of newly unearthed information. Countless discussions suggest this. For example, the dust jacket of a recent best-selling biography of Stalin states that the author was "granted privileged access to Russia's secret archives" and, as a result, was able to produce "the first full-scale life of Stalin to have what no previous biography has entirely gotten hold of: the facts" (Radzinsky, 1996).

Such claims suggest that by using information that has recently been brought to light, authors have been able to rewrite Soviet and Russian history in a completely new way. An analysis of post-Soviet Russian history textbooks, however, suggests that another dynamic of text production played an even more important role. The production of post-Soviet accounts of history seems to have been shaped primarily by a dialogic encounter with earlier accounts. Specifically, post-Soviet texts tend to be more concerned with rebutting their Soviet predecessors than with building novel accounts on the basis of newly disclosed information.

**DIALOGIC ENCOUNTERS BETWEEN NARRATIVES**

The processes that have given rise to new official histories in post-Soviet Russia fall under the heading of what Bakhtin (1984) termed "hidden dialogicality":

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Imagine a dialogue of two persons in which the statements of the second speaker are omitted, but in such a way that the general sense is not at all violated. The second speaker is present invisibly, his words are not there, but deep traces left by these words have a determining influence on all the present and visible words of the first speaker. We sense that this is a conversation, although only one person is speaking, and it is a conversation of the most intense kind, for each present, uttered word responds and reacts with its every fiber to the invisible speaker, points to something outside itself, beyond its own limits, to the unspoken words of another person. (p. 197)

When examining Soviet and post-Soviet textbooks, I am concerned with how texts function in the capacity of Bakhtin’s “speakers.” Specifically, I am concerned with how Soviet texts seem to be “present invisibly” and leave “deep traces” on post-Soviet Russian texts. As I hope to make clear, the dialogue involved in this case is of “the most intense kind,” a dialogue in which “each present uttered word [in post-Soviet historical narratives] responds and reacts with its every fiber to the invisible speaker.”

Bakhtin’s analysis of dialogism (Bakhtin, 1981, 1984; Holquist, 1990) provides a useful general framework for understanding the dynamics of official history production. However, to deal with some of the concrete issues in what follows, this analysis needs to be supplemented with some observations about narrative and its role in organizing historical texts. This is so because the cases examined involve hidden dialogicality between narrative texts.

Smith (1981) outlined this phenomenon in her critique of the “lingering strain of naive Platonism” she sees in narrative theory. This form of Platonism analyzes narratives primarily in terms of how they correspond to a reality of events, and hence misses the ways in which narratives are shaped by their communicative context. Beginning with the observation that “No narrative version can be independent of a particular teller and occasion of telling” (p. 215), Smith reminds us that “Every narrative version has been constructed in accord with some set of purposes or interests” (p. 215). Of course, a wide range of purposes and interests may be involved, but I focus on one in particular: responding to other narratives. From this perspective, one can expect insights into the form and content of narratives to derive from an understanding of their relation to other narratives in their “semiosphere” (Lotman, 1990). This relation may take several forms, ranging from hostile retort to friendly elaboration, from studied attempts to ignore another narrative to its celebration, and so forth.
As I have argued elsewhere, Soviet attempts to apply the principles of scientific communism to history resulted in a kind of "de-narrativized" account of the past (Wertsch & Rozin, 1998). For example, rather than focusing on unique actors carrying out acts that obtain their meaning from how they fit into a well-developed plot, attempts were made to present history in terms of the scientific principles of Marxism-Leninism, principles having to do with class struggle and its inevitable, scientifically predictable outcome. Instead of focusing on unique individuals who are subject to the "vicissitudes of human intention" (Bruner, 1990), the authors of these materials often attempted to present historical actors—even Lenin—as simply carrying out the mandates of where they were positioned as a "collective individual" (Ahonen, 1997).

Even in this context, however, accounts found in history textbooks continued to be largely narrative in form. This is perhaps inevitable, given the crucial role that narrative plays in understanding the past (White, 1981) and in human consciousness in general (Bruner, 1990). Under this general heading of narrative, it is essential to consider the particular form employed, for example, tragedy as opposed to comedy (White, 1973). Furthermore, specific historical narratives typically are modeled after an item from the "stock of stories" (MacIntyre, 1984) provided by a sociocultural setting.

As outlined by Ricoeur (1983), narratives provide the means to carry out the "configurational act" of "grasping together" sets of temporally distributed events, actors, and intentions into interpretable wholes. A crucial factor in this process is the "sense of an ending" (Kermode, 1968) around which a narrative is organized. As an illustration of this from the writing of history, consider an analysis by Cronon (1992) of two accounts of the Dust Bowl in the American Southwest. One takes the form of a "progressive" story of improvement and human victory over adversity, and the other takes a "tragic" form that reflects "romantic and antimodernist reactions against progress" (Cronon, p. 1352). In this instance, the resulting narratives are so different as to:

make us wonder how two competent authors looking at identical materials drawn from the same past can reach such divergent conclusions. But it is not merely their conclusions that differ. Although both narrate the same broad series of events with an essentially similar cast of characters, they tell two entirely different stories. In both texts, the story is inextricably bound to its conclusion, and the historical analysis
derives much of its force from the upward or downward sweep of the plot. (p. 1348)

The question of how narrative organization grasps things together and hence shapes representations of the past touches on what Mink (1978) termed "narrative truth." Mink proposed this notion in response to the claim that narratives can be treated as logical conjunctions of assertions. In his view, attempts to reduce the truth of a narrative to the truth of the conjunction of assertions reflect the misguided thinking of "philosophers intent on comparing the form of narrative with the form of theories, as if [narrative] were nothing but a logical conjunction of past-referring statements" (p. 144). Such approaches fail to take into account the unique properties of narrative associated with the configurational act that organizes information into a plot. Although discussions of the truth of logical conjunctions of statements may be appropriate for scientific theories and even for "chronicles" (Mink, p. 144) about the past, they are not adequate for dealing with narrative truth and hence narrative accounts of the past. Instead, narrative truth is concerned with a set of issues above and beyond this, having to do with the appropriate "emplotment" (Ricoeur, 1983) of a set of events.

Of course, Mink, Ricoeur, and other scholars of narrative history do not assume that emplotment is a matter to be determined independent of evidence. The emplotment of a set of events clearly depends on the content and truth of the statements about these events, and this, in turn, depends on evidence in the form of archival materials. For example, the official recognition of the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact made it much more difficult for Soviet authorities to insist on the veracity of previous narratives (according to which the 1940 incorporation of the Baltic states into the USSR was a response to demands by the masses of workers and peasants to join their socialist brothers) (Tulviste & Wertsch, 1994). However, in the view outlined here, archival and other evidence can only go so far in adjudicating between competing narrative truths.

Hence, when examining the production of new official history in post-Soviet Russia, I am particularly concerned with two major factors: (a) dialogic relations (especially in the form of hidden dialogicality) between old and new texts; and (b) the role of narratives in grasping together, or emplotting, various pieces of information in a configurational act. Of course, these factors do not mechanistically determine the production of new official histories. A host of political,
economic, and other sociocultural forces is involved as well, an issue to which I return subsequently. However, processes of narrative organization and dialogic engagement provide essential resources that mediate and constrain the production of new official histories, regardless of what sociocultural forces are involved. These resources are my primary concern in what follows.

SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET HISTORY TEXTBOOKS AND INSTRUCTION

Compared to what exists in Russia today, history instruction in the Soviet Union was both monolithic and monologic. Across all 11 time zones of that massive state, students in the same grade were literally on the same page of the same history textbook on any given day of the school year, and the official history taught allowed little room for competing voices. In the wake of the events in 1988, this changed dramatically. Many history teachers found themselves in the position of having to organize their instruction around whatever materials they could find. They used texts ranging from old Soviet textbooks to newspapers to family stories. The setting in which the changes I examine occurred, then, was one in which history instruction was moving from being part of a system of rigid, centralized control to being shaped by dispersed, local decision making.

To better understand the transformations at work in this context, consider the following facts about some high school history textbooks published in Russia in 1976, 1989, 1992, and 1995 (see Appendix A). These four textbooks were selected from a wider set of materials as a way of documenting some of the changes in historical representation that occurred before, during, and after perestroika. Each of the first three volumes was published as the single Soviet history textbook at a grade level (the 1976 text for 9th graders, the 1989 and 1992 texts for 10th graders), whereas the 1995 version was one of several competing textbooks for 11th graders.

As shown in Appendix A, there are major differences in the print runs for the Soviet and post-Soviet texts, something that reflects differences in how these texts were produced and used. In contrast to Soviet years when there was only one basic history textbook per grade level in the USSR, the Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation worked with several private publishing firms in the 1990s to produce multiple, competing accounts of history. Furthermore, some
teachers in Russian schools use none of these materials, either because of budget constraints or for other reasons.

As Mendeloff (1996) suggested, this diversity may be more apparent than real, and it is indeed likely that a great deal of uniformity in history instruction continues to exist. The new homogeneity derives at least in part from the fact that many schools and teachers use materials recommended by the Russian Ministry of Education. Although this ministry has encouraged the development of multiple textbooks for each grade level, it still serves as a sort of centralized endorsement agency. Specifically, it has produced a textbook list called the "Federal Set," and items on this list are much more likely to be used by teachers (especially in rural areas) than is the plethora of books and other materials produced by individual schools or other sources. Hence, although the rigidly enforced centralization of the Soviet years no longer exists, new sources of homogeneity have emerged.

Efforts to rewrite official history in Russia have experienced many of the political and cultural problems associated with such efforts in the United States and elsewhere (e.g., Nash, Crabtree, & Dunn, 1997). However, the Russian initiative was made even more difficult by the fact that it often involved the out-and-out rejection of previous accounts. Those involved in this effort often found themselves in the middle of a political maelstrom. They have been vilified in the press and on occasion have received threats from nationalist organizations such as Pamyat'. The result has been a complex, uneven, and as yet unfinished struggle to come up with a new picture of the past.

To examine some of the factors involved, I concentrate on two historical events covered in Soviet and post-Soviet history textbooks: the Russian Civil War of 1918-1920 and World War II. In the case of the Civil War, I argue that hidden dialogicality has yielded a quite new form of emplotment for grasping together the events and actors of that conflict. New textbook accounts of World War II provide a contrasting picture: In this instance, the emplotment remains largely unchanged, but hidden dialogicality has taken the form of other transformations, especially in the characters who occupy central roles.

**Soviet Narratives of the Civil War: Heroic Triumph Over Foreign and Domestic Enemies**

In Soviet-era textbooks, the Civil War was emplotted as beginning with foreign intervention, something that is clear from the titles of the sections and chapters. For example, the 50-page section in the text by
Berkhin and Fedosov (1976) for ninth grade is titled "The Soviet land during the period of intervention by imperialist governments and the Civil War (1918-1920)." The first chapter in this section is "The beginning of military intervention by the imperialists and the Civil War." The corresponding section and first chapter in the 1989 text by Korablëv, Fedosov, and Borisov have identical titles.

In Berkhin and Fedosov (1976), the chapter "The beginning of military intervention by the imperialists and the Civil War" begins as follows:

*Causes of the intervention and the Civil War.* A new period in the history of the young Soviet government began in the summer of 1918—a period of liberation and of class warfare of the workers and peasants of Russia against the combined forces of international imperialism and internal counter-revolution—a period of civil war. This period extended from May-June 1918 to November 1920.

This was thrust upon the Soviet people above all by international imperialism, which organized military intervention. Its goal was to destroy the world’s first socialist government of workers and peasants, "to extinguish the fire of socialist revolution begun by us," wrote Lenin, "and threatening to call out to the entire world." ... It strove to liquidate the center and foundation of the world-wide proletarian revolution. (p. 211)

Some change in this pattern of presenting the beginning of the Civil War appeared—at least in the chapter headings—in the 1992 text by Zharova and Mishina. Instead of setting the Civil War off in a separate section whose title clearly marked that it began with—and because of—foreign intervention, it is covered in a more inclusive chapter entitled "At the cliff of a historical turning point. The development of psychological confrontation in society into open civil war and the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia (July 1917-1920)." This new version comes closer to the treatment of the Russian Civil War found in contemporary Western historical scholarship (e.g., Figes, 1997), in that the Civil War is viewed as an extension of the October Revolution. From this perspective, the appropriate narrative is one that grasps together the October Revolution and the Civil War as part of extended civil strife, counterrevolution, and the emergence of a dictatorship.

Even with these new chapter and section titles in the 1992 text, the old Soviet narrative in which foreign intervention played a crucial role in initiating the Civil War continues to be in evidence. For example,
the authors introduce notions of imperialist intervention and describe it in the following terms:

The mind behind the idea for open foreign intervention in Russia was W. Churchill. He worked out the plan for reconstituting the German Army for the struggle with the Bolsheviks and then undertook the efforts to unite the counter-revolutionary forces with the goal of overthrowing the Soviet government and breaking up Russia into a multitude of weak political units. These plans were supported by the US State Department. The US delegation to the Paris peace conference brought with it a map of the “Proposed Borders of Russia.” On this map Karelia, and the Kola Peninsula, the Baltics, Ukraine, a significant part of Belorussia, Transcaucasia, Siberia, Central Asia, and other areas were outside the borders of Russia. . . . In the struggle against Soviet Russia Churchill even contemplated the use of chemical weapons. (Zharova & Mishina, 1992, pp. 213-214)

Hence, in all these Soviet-era history textbooks, foreign intervention was given a prominent role in the account of the Civil War, and, up to the very end of the Soviet era, it was viewed as marking the beginning of this conflict. This pattern is reflected clearly in the chapter titles of the 1976 and 1989 texts. The fact that it is more subtle in the 1992 text suggests that changes were under way during the transition from Soviet to post-Soviet Russia. In all these textbooks, however, the events of the Civil War systematically were emplotted so that foreign intervention was mentioned before the war, thus reflecting the assumption that the intervention caused the war. Furthermore, this emplotment of the Civil War served to separate the story of the Revolution neatly from the story of the Civil War. The former ended with a glorious victory for the Communist Party and the people, and the latter began with foreign intervention.

After the beginning of the Civil War, the subsequent emplotment follows a clear contour in the Soviet textbooks. It moves through the low points of defeats and setbacks for the Reds, and then turns to a glorious and final victory. The early defeats by external and internal enemies were so serious that the well-known term “Terrible 1918” is used as a chapter heading by Berkhin and Fedosov (1976). However, this section of the narrative is followed by one that focuses on the Reds’ decisive, heroic defeat (indeed, rout “razgrom”) of external and internal enemies. In this connection, for example, the 1976 text has chapters titled “The rout of the spring (1919) combined campaign of

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the Entente," "The decisive victory of the Red Army," and "The war with the Polish bourgeois-landowners. The rout of Wrangel's army."

In these narratives, such victories are presented as resulting from heroic efforts over seemingly impossible odds. As noted in the 1989 textbook by Korablev, Fedosov, and Borisov:

"A historical miracle." That is what V. I. Lenin called the victory over the White Guards and the international imperialists. It was a victory of our devastated country which was besieged from all sides in a duel with opponents who began with immeasurably greater strengths. The enemies had at their disposal a multitude of armies and a huge stock of arms, and they succeeded in surrounding the Soviet republic on all sides, cutting it off from regions that provided food and raw materials. But "we held our ground against everything" V. I. Lenin said with pride. (p. 238)

The end of the Civil War is presented in a much more muted fashion in the 1992 textbook. It involved a fairly simple, short account of how various White Guard generals left the country and various cities were liberated from the White Guards.

Hence, the sense of an ending that shapes the Soviet narratives about the Civil War (especially the 1976 and 1989 versions) is provided by decisive victory. After some initial low points, the rout of enemies produces the upward sweep of the employment, an upward sweep that is so powerful and unexpected that it is termed "a historical miracle."

I already have touched on one of the major actors in Soviet accounts of the Civil War: foreign imperialist interventionists. They and their counterrevolutionary allies, the White Guards, were pitted against the opposing forces composed of the Communist Party under the leadership of Lenin, the Red Army, and the masses of peasants and workers whom they led into battle. In a section on "Reasons for victory in the Civil War," Berkhin and Fedosov's 1976 textbook makes the following comments about these actors:

A decisive force which guaranteed victory in the Civil War was the working class. Tens and hundreds of thousands of workers went into the Red Army, cemented it together, and provided models of heroism and courage at the fronts. And the workers remaining in the rear carried out self-sacrificing labor provided weapons and ammunition. . . . The wise leadership of the Communist Party, under its great chief V. I.
Lenin made possible the victory over interventionists and White Guards. The Party supported the self-sacrificing struggle of millions of the masses of workers and laboring peasants. Any time when a critical situation arose at the fronts, the Party mobilized Communists who then went to the most dangerous areas. They rallied and inspired the Red Army, entered the battle in the first ranks, and sacrificed themselves in the name of saving the revolution. (pp. 252-253)

This triumphalist plot provides a framework for interpreting the motives and actions of Lenin and the Communist Party. They were the crucial actors who inspired the Red Army and the masses of peasants and workers to become actors in this grand narrative as well. The revolutionary zeal they exhibited not only makes sense but is heroic from the perspective of their struggle with foreign imperialist interventionists and counterrevolutionary internal enemies.

Post-Soviet Russian Narratives of the Civil War: A Counternarrative of Tragedy

Post-Soviet accounts of the Civil War found in Russian high school textbooks differ markedly from their earlier counterparts. Of particular importance for my purposes is the fact that they are emplotted in a fundamentally different way. Hidden dialogicality is clearly evident in that the Soviet narrative is “present invisibly” in the new text, and the new text “reacts with its every fiber to the invisible speaker, points to something outside itself” (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 197). Specifically, at many points, the new text seems to be more concerned with asserting that things did not happen the way they were presented in Soviet texts than with saying what did happen.

In this new account, the Civil War does not start with foreign intervention, its sense of an ending is not provided by glorious victory of the Reds, and its actors are not “collective individuals.” In all these respects, the post-Soviet text can be viewed as a counternarrative. My analysis of this post-Soviet employment focuses primarily on a 1995 high school textbook (Ostrovskii & Utkin, 1995), but similar patterns can be found in other recent textbooks, such as the one by Danilov et al. (1996) for college students.

The account of the Civil War in the 1995 post-Soviet Russian textbook is provided in a relatively short section (20 pages) entitled “Revolution in Russia. March 1917-March 1921.” This section treats
the Civil War as part of a larger set of events, including the October Revolution of 1917. Rather than assuming that the Revolution had a clear-cut beginning and end that neatly separates it from the Civil War, the authors specifically note that “Revolution in Russia was not a single, punctual event, but a process that extended over several years” (Ostrovskii & Utkin, 1995, p. 188). The authors further note that the protracted nature of events in Russia has strong parallels with many other revolutions. This, again, stands in marked contrast to accounts in earlier textbooks in which the Revolution is presented as a unique event in human history.

The treatment of the Civil War as a natural extension of the Revolution means that the narrative resources used to grasp together events are quite different from those used in Soviet textbooks. Specifically, the war is re-emplotted in such a way that it is viewed as growing out of internal disputes in the Soviet Union. Consistent with this is the fact that foreign intervention is given a minor role at best. In striking contrast to the emphasis given to foreign intervention as a cause marking the beginning of the Civil War in Soviet texts, there is virtually no mention of it in this post-Soviet volume. Intervention never appears in chapter or section titles, and “imperialism” is a term that never appears in this context. One of the few references to intervention is the dismissive comment that “the assistance of European countries to Poland [during the Soviet-Polish war of 1920-1921] was greater there than their help to the White movement in Russia” (Ostrovskii & Utkin, 1995, p. 162).

Indeed, the only extended comment about the role of Britain, the United States, and others asserts that their efforts did more to help the Reds than the Whites:

The White Army did not participate jointly in the military actions [of a landing by allied troops in the North, South, and Far East]. But the very fact of the landing was used by Bolshevik propaganda to stir up distrust in the White movement. Assistance by the allies in the form of finances, arms, and uniforms was of a limited character and could not exert an influence on the course of the White actions. (Ostrovskii & Utkin, 1995, p. 157)

As outlined previously, Soviet accounts of the Civil War emplotted its events as beginning with foreign intervention, which led to a dark and dangerous period, which was then followed by triumph over all
odds and the rout of external and internal enemies. In contrast to this “historical miracle,” which gives Soviet narratives their upward sweep, events are configured in a quite different way in the post-Soviet accounts. In the 1995 textbook by Ostrovskii and Utkin, the events are emplotted in terms of a downward sweep that eventually led to disaster for virtually everyone involved. Events leading up to the ending are presented as opportunities missed rather than steps toward an inevitable and glorious outcome. The tragic ending is presented as something that might have been avoided had various actors had the foresight, determination, and courage to avert it. The Whites are presented as clearly lacking in this regard:

Tragically for the White movement, a significant part of the country’s intelligentsia, being apathetic and nonbelievers, refused to support it. This break led to a situation in which the Whites did not succeed in creating a normal civil government for the country. They were forced to concern themselves with military matters because they did not have serious experience with such work and committed irreparable mistakes. Forced requisitions without financial guarantees alienated the peasants, who initially approved of the Whites, and the same pattern occurred with people banished by the Bolsheviks. (p. 157)

In striking contrast to the Whites, the Reds are portrayed by Ostrovskii and Utkin (1995) as being quick, decisive, and ruthless in their efforts to take power and organize their forces:

Communist power did not . . . vacillate. It was hard and cruel, executed with a certainty that the laws of history lay behind it. But its victory was not a matter of historical predestination. Instead, it is possible to identify two important conditions that underlay it. First, it was founded on organized violence never before seen in history. No one had ever recognized the possibilities of such violence before 1917. Second, the antibolshevik opposition in the armed forces and the antibolshevik opposition among the people were unable to unite into a unified whole. The reason for this was the long-standing rift between the people and the intelligentsia. (p. 189)

In sum, Ostrovskii and Utkin (1995) emplot the events of the Revolution and Civil War in such a way that the narrative clearly has a downward sweep. Like Figes (1997), they could have used “A People’s Tragedy” as a title. From this perspective, events leading up to
the ending come to be viewed as opportunities tragically missed rather than as causes leading inexorably toward a grand victory.

Further elements of the counternarrative presented in the 1995 textbook surface in the treatment of the actors. The first point to note in this regard is that the major actors are no longer the imperialist interventionists, White Guards, and others on one hand; nor are they the Reds led by the Communist Party with Lenin at its head on the other. Furthermore, instead of generally treating actors as collective individuals motivated by class interests and revolutionary or counterrevolutionary zeal, the post-Soviet textbook points to common—and often base—motives of unique individuals and groups concerned with local issues. This is reflected, for example, in the following passages:

The peasants from the central regions of Russia did not actively come out against the Bolsheviks, being engaged in the spontaneous demobilization and the return to farming. But in the spring of 1918 the peasants’ mood went through a turning point. More and more they expressed their discontent with the new power. The situation began to change, and not to the Soviets’ benefit. The main force operating in opposition to them became the so-called “democratic counterrevolution,” which united the former Socialist Revolutionaries and other moderate socialist parties and groups. They came out under the banner of restoring democracy in Russia and a return to the ideas of a constituent assembly. In the summer of 1918 these groups created their own regional governments: in Arkhangelsk, Samara, Ufa, Omsk, and also in other cities. . . . The suspicious and scornful approach that local soviet powers took toward [White elements such as] the Czechs led them to armed conflict. . . . At this time Trotsky, combining the most brutal measures for laying down discipline and for attracting the old officer corps into the Red Army, succeeded in creating a regular, battle-worthy army. The officers were recruited by force (officers’ family members were held as hostages), and some also volunteered. As a rule, the new army attracted those who thought that in the old army they had not realized their professional capacity. (Ostrovskii & Utkin, 1995, p. 146)

As presented in this narrative, then, the characters involved in the Civil War differ quite strikingly from those found in Soviet accounts. Instead of wishing to participate in the Revolution, peasants simply wanted to return to farming; rather than engaging in counterrevolution, the Czechs were simply responding to hostile treatment by local
soviet; and rather than joining the Red Army out of a new form of universal, class-based patriotism, men joined out of fear or for crude personal gain. All of these motives and actions gain their significance from the new, tragic emplotment that grasps them together.

The relation between the post-Soviet textbook account of the Civil War and its Soviet precursors can be understood in terms of the hidden dialogicality that has given rise to a counternarrative. This counternarrative is characterized by a different beginning; by a different sense of ending and associated narrative contour (falling, as opposed to rising sweep of the plot); and by the actors and motives that make sense within such a plot structure. The result is a 1995 text that grasps together events and actors into a new narrative truth: A tragedy that argues against an “invisible speaker” in the form of the previous Soviet narrative organized around a triumphalist sense of an ending.

World War II: One Plot With Different Characters

The process of revising the World War II narrative in post-Soviet textbooks follows a path quite different from that used in the case of the Civil War. Instead of a fundamental re-emplotment around a new sense of ending, post-Soviet emplotments of World War II look much the same as their Soviet precursors. There is little sense that they involve new ways of grasping the events together into an interpretable whole. This continuity with earlier accounts has been noted by Mendeloff (1997), who argued that the new narratives continue to be organized around well established themes of Russian exceptionalism, heroism, and victimization. Given the role of the World War II narrative as a continuing “dominant myth” (Weiner, 1996) in Russian life, this perhaps is to be expected.

My comparison of Soviet and post-Soviet accounts of World War II draws on a somewhat different set of textbooks than those used in the discussion of the Civil War. This is necessary because, in Soviet instruction, the year 1940 was the dividing point between what was covered at two grade levels. Hence, the Civil War was covered in one textbook and World War II in another. Thus, I examine Soviet textbooks published in 1964 and 1975, along with the same post-Soviet Russian textbook from 1995 that I used when examining the Civil War (see Appendix B).

Like recent Russian textbooks, Soviet accounts made a distinction between World War II, which began on September 1, 1939, and the Great Patriotic War, which began when the USSR was invaded on
June 22, 1941. In both cases, the entry of the Soviet Union into the war is presented as the event that transformed smaller-scale hostilities into the massive conflict whose major focus was the struggle between Germany and the USSR. Furthermore, Soviet and post-Soviet textbook accounts of World War II are emplotted in the same basic way. Both are about heavy initial losses followed by victory over great odds.

An additional similarity between Soviet and post-Soviet accounts can be found in the central role given to the USSR in the plot. From this perspective, the USSR was the central character in the war, and the motives and possibilities for others' actions were determined or made possible by what it did. For example, in Furaeva (1975), the author includes the following passage in a section titled “The Fundamental Turning Point in the Course of the Second World War: The International Significance of the Rout of German-Fascist Forces at Stalingrad”:

*The Battle of Stalingrad was the greatest military-political event of the Second World War. The victory at Stalingrad was the beginning of a fundamental turning point in the course of the Second World War in favor of the USSR and of the entire anti-fascist coalition. The Red Army began an offensive from the banks of the Volga which was completed in the unconditional capitulation of Hitlerite Germany. The defeat of the German Army, which was unprecedented in history, sobered the ruling circles of Japan and prevented it from entering into war with the USSR. It also brought to a halt the calculations by the leaders in Turkey, who formally were neutral, but in fact were helping Germany and were waiting for the fall of Stalingrad to declare an alliance with Germany. The rout of the Hitlerites who had thrown their most important forces into the Soviet-German front, created propitious conditions for an attack by Anglo-American forces in North Africa. (p. 27)*

As indicated by passages such as this, the main character in this narrative is the USSR, a point that is further elaborated by statements about the exceptionalism of the suffering and the heroism that characterized Soviet (as opposed to other countries') efforts.

In terms of the events in the plot structure, Soviet accounts of World War II point to the German attack on the USSR as the beginning of the major struggle known as the Great Patriotic War. The narratives then go on to identify several turning points that led to the defeat of Germany. The first of these is the successful defense of Moscow in the winter of 1941-1942. As noted in the textbook passage, the Battle of Stalingrad is then put forth as the major turning point of the entire narrative (of World War II and the Great Patriotic War). From
this perspective, Stalingrad is the high point of the German offensive and the beginning of the end for Germany. Indeed, all the events in the war from this point on are presented as part of a march to inevitable victory.

The similarities that I have noted between Soviet and post-Soviet accounts of World War II have to do with the events included in the narratives and how they are emplotted. Although these similarities are striking, their existence should not be taken to suggest that the two versions of World War II are identical. In fact, they are quite different, but the differences in this case concern the characters in the narrative rather than the plot structure.

The most important point to note in this respect is that Soviet-era textbooks consistently used a Marxist-Leninist theoretical framework to define the characters and interpret their motives. Various characters' actions invariably were formulated in terms of class struggle, imperialist designs on socialist states, and so forth. For example, the chapter on World War II in Krivoguz, Pritsker, and Stetskevich (1964) opens with the following words:

Like the First World War, the Second World War grew out of the contradictions of imperialism. The victorious powers of World War I—England, France, and US—divided the world into spheres of interest and tried not to give up or divide what they had seized. However, in accordance with a law of imperialism, the unequal economic and political development of countries led to a change in the interrelation of forces in the capitalist world. . . . Hence, the main cause of the Second World War was the aggravation of the contradictions of capitalism, which gave rise to attempts by both imperialist groups [England, France, the US and Germany, Japan, Italy] to rule the world. (p. 118)

In such passages, the actions of characters are viewed as the inevitable outcomes of forces such as "laws of imperialism." The major actors are classes and "collective individuals" (Ahonen, 1992) who operate in accordance with the dictates of class consciousness and other Marxist-Leninist categories. Furthermore, because the characters act on behalf of these categories, they occupy a superior moral position when compared to others. These points surface in passages such as the following from the 1964 textbook by Krivoguz et al.:

Throughout the entire war a struggle went on within the antifascist coalition between two lines: the line of the USSR, which persistently
strove to attain the fastest defeat of fascist powers and to create conditions for a just and lasting peace, and the line of the US and England, which tried to subordinate the conduct of the war to its own imperialistic interests. (p. 131)

In Soviet textbooks, the leading character in the entire narrative was the Communist Party. It was portrayed as the main force that led the efforts of the Red Army and the masses of workers and peasants in the USSR as well as worldwide, and it did all this in a selfless and heroic manner. For example, according to Krivoguz et al. (1964),

The Communist Party played a leading role in the struggle against Fascism during the war years. Not sparing themselves and their lives Communists everywhere were in the first ranks of the fighters for the freedom and independence of all peoples. Despite the fact that the Communist Party underwent terrible persecution, they were able to pursue and realize a program of struggle with the occupiers. Communist Parties in Germany, Italy, Japan, and other countries in the Hitlerite coalition carried forth the struggle under particularly onerous conditions, advancing the goal of defeating their governments.

The courage and deeply patriotic behavior of Communists during the hard years of the war evoked the admiration of the working classes. These facts provided clear and convincing evidence that only the Communists were capable of leading the people on a path toward freedom and delivering them from infamy. The authority and influence of the Communist Party quickly grew. (p. 135)

More picturesque and emotionally laden versions of these claims can be found in other Soviet-era history textbooks, especially those for younger readers. For example, some of the same points were made by Golubeva and Gellershtein in their 1984 textbook for fourth graders in a chapter about the Great Patriotic War in the Soviet Union. In a section titled “Everyone to the front! Everyone for victory!” they wrote

Following the appeal of the Communist Party, all the people rose up in the sacred struggle with the enemy. The Soviet people carried on the Patriotic War against the fascist murderers. The Central Committee of the Communist Party guided all the work of the defense of the country and the routing of the enemy. A Governmental Committee for Defense was formed with I. V. Stalin as its head.

Millions of Soviet citizens fought the fascists. More than half of all the members of the Communist Party and of the Komsomol went to the
front. The members of the Party and the Komsomol served as examples for the soldiers to see in the face of death. The best of the military joined the Party. "I ask to be considered a Communist" said soldiers going on the most dangerous military assignments.

During the war almost 12,000 people received the order Hero of the Soviet Union for their deeds. Of these about 9,000 were members of the Communist Party and the Komsomol. In museums one can see Party and Komsomol cards with bullet holes in them and covered with the blood of heroes who gave their life in battles for the motherland. (p. 178)

A central claim in the account of Soviet exceptionalism in World War II is that the Soviet Union stood largely alone in its struggle with Germany from June of 1941 until June of 1944, when the United States, Great Britain, Canada, and other allies landed in Normandy. This landing, which is usually called "D-Day" in the United States, Britain, and elsewhere in Western Europe, is discussed under the heading of "opening the second front" in Soviet textbooks. The first point made in these texts is that the USSR had to operate in a truly exceptional and heroic manner in the absence of others' help between 1941 and 1944. Krivoguz et al. (1964) noted the following:

This struggle [between sides within the antifascist coalition] appeared first of all in the question of a second front in Europe. The creation of a second front would have significantly sped up the defeat of Germany. It was not for nothing that Hitler’s forces sought with every effort to avoid a war on two fronts. Only the great certainty that the western powers did not intend offensive action made it possible for the fascists to throw 152 divisions into the Soviet-German front at one time. (p. 131)

As is the case for other events in this narrative, the treatment of the second front in Soviet textbooks is interpreted in terms of Marxist-Leninist theory in which individuals and groups act in accordance with their role in a worldwide class struggle over the direction of imperialism. Hence, Krivoguz et al. (1964) wrote,

Only upon becoming convinced that the Soviet Union, relying on its own strengths and without a second front, would complete victory over Germany, and fearing that the liberation of all Europe by Soviet forces would give peoples the possibility to establish a truly democratic order, the governments of the USA and England decided to open a second front. (p. 138)
Post-Soviet Russian Narratives of World War II

As previously stated, post-Soviet accounts in Russian history textbooks are organized around the same basic events and plot as are their Soviet precursors. The unprovoked attack by Germany in 1941; the battles of Moscow, Stalingrad, and Kursk as turning points; the belated opening of the second front; and the victorious march to Berlin are all still included. Furthermore, an upward, triumphal sweep still supplies the sense of an ending that grasps the narrative together. In contrast to their Soviet precursors, however, post-Soviet accounts of the war provide a quite different picture of the characters and motives involved.

The process of revision in this case follows a different path than what occurred in the case of the Civil War, because the switch in characters and motives is not tied to a fundamental switch in plot. Instead, it is a case of new characters appearing in an existing narrative framework. Specifically, the various peoples of the Soviet Union—especially Russians—are presented as being motivated by sentiments of national patriotism and as rallying around their culture and nation, making it possible to sustain the battle against the German invaders. Instead of the Communist Party, the Russian people, the Orthodox Church, and other traditional national and cultural forces are viewed as leading the effort.

Ostrovskii and Utkin (1995) set the stage for the heroic deeds of Russians, as well as other national groups, by outlining Hitler’s barbarous “Plan East”:

In May of 1940, before the attack on our country, the leadership of fascist Germany set about planning for the subjugation of the people of Eastern Europe. This plan was titled “East.” In accordance with this monstrous plan there was to be a liquidation of our country as a unified whole, a general annihilation or expulsion of a significant part of the population. There was a plan to Germanize the Estonians and Latvians, deprive them of their native language and culture. The Lithuanians were to share the fate of Slavic peoples. It was assumed that Germans would populate the liberated lands and after colonization these lands would be included in the great reich.

In occupied territories the goal was to exterminate 30 million Russians and 5 to 6 million Jews before the beginning of the expulsion. (p. 286)
As was the case in earlier accounts of the Great Patriotic War, the authors of this 1995 text emphasize the exceptionalism, heroism, and suffering of Soviet, especially Russian, people. For example, in describing the desperate struggle to move from early defeats to the strategic offensive, Ostrovskii and Utkin (1995) write,

The defeats were bitter, and our forces suffered large losses. But the resistance they showed forced the aggressors to recognize that the character of war on the territory of the USSR was different from what they had seen on the Western Front. A week after the beginning of military action the chief of the German general staff, F. Galder, wrote in his diary, "The unyielding resistance of the Russians has forced us to carry out combat using all the rules of our military regulations. In Poland and on the Western Front, we were able to allow ourselves some flexibility and to refrain from following strict military principles: this is no longer admissible." (p. 259)

In outlining these events, the authors of the 1995 textbook repeatedly emphasizes that the Red Army and the people were fighting for the motherland and not the Communist Party, something that consistently reflects the role of the "invisible speaker" of Soviet narratives in giving rise to the post-Soviet texts. In this context, Ostrovskii and Utkin (1995) go out of their way to note that Stalin himself was quite aware of where the people's loyalties lay:

Already at the beginning of the war there emerged a consolidation of society not on the foundation of Communist ideology but on the basis of traditional patriotic values. Having in mind the people and the Party, Stalin admitted to the US ambassador A. Harriman: "Do you think they carry on war for us? No, they carry on war for their mother—Russia." Out of this came a shift in political propaganda to appealing to traditional values. In addition to patriotic values, one would have to appeal to values of home and family and personal faith. There began, as it were, an external "humanization" of the regime that continued under the pressure of the people's elements. (p. 319)

This presentation of the actors' motives goes beyond simply saying that they fought the war out of loyalty to national rather than Communist ideology. Ostrovskii and Utkin (1995) argue that the actions of Stalin and the Communist Party had, in fact, been detrimental to the war effort and, as a result, the Soviet Union—especially the Russians—began its struggle from an unnecessarily enfeebled position:
The fact that an enemy reached the Volga (something that had never happened in Russian history) plus the fact that this enemy was stopped at the price of enormous sacrifice and losses point to the historical weaknesses and unsteadiness of the regime. It was only the colossal moral and intellectual potential of the Russian people, their long-suffering and self-sacrificing nature that made it possible to preserve governability. (p. 319)

Indeed, according to Ostrovskii and Utkin (1995), it was only because Stalin and the Communist Party were pushed aside and more stable and competent parties were allowed to take over that a successful war effort could be mounted:

While nominally remaining the infallible leader, Stalin in fact had to turn over almost all the real leadership for the war to military professionals. He also turned over leadership of the economy to professional organizers—economists. What occurred was a spontaneous "professionalization" of the regime. Purely ideological problems were pushed to the background. At the price of massive human and territorial losses the war succeeded in taking on a protracted character that doomed Germany to defeat. (p. 319)

An additional interesting point about the post-Soviet accounts of World War II is that they include several new events and characters that create challenges for writers wishing to use the same basic plot structure. These are events and characters that have been officially unearthed or recognized for the first time in the last decade. For example, in their 1995 textbook, Ostrovskii and Utkin (1995) mention the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the Soviet execution of Polish officers in the Katyn forest in 1940, and the massive network of Soviet prison camps (the gulag). Such events would seem to be difficult to incorporate into a narrative that essentially depicts Russians as victims of German aggression who become triumphalist heroes. These difficulties are handled in a variety of ways. In some cases, information about a newly documented event (e.g., the Katyn massacre and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact) simply is inserted into the text with little apparent relation to the overall narrative. In other cases, as in comments about the gulag, the information is used as part of the exceptionalism of Russian suffering and heroism.

In general, the inclusion of "new" information in post-Soviet textbooks has raised a set of challenges to employment that have not been resolved adequately. Specifically, it has raised problems for authors
who attempt to grasp events together through an older plot structure while including new events that have no obvious place in this plot structure. As a result, it sometimes seems that new information has been dropped into a narrative with little consideration given to how it does or does not fit into the overall text. All this suggests that one can expect to see a continuing struggle between the competing demands of including new information from archives and continuing to use a plot organized around Russian exceptionalism and heroism.

CONCLUSION

Over the past decade or so, Russia has provided a natural laboratory for studying the production of official history. The breakup of the Soviet Union created a context in which a new, radically different official history had to be produced in very short order. Many readers will be surprised, if not shocked, to see how fundamentally the new official history differs from the old. Anyone familiar with Soviet-era culture will understand that from that perspective the new accounts are not just different, but blasphemous.

When trying to account for this massive transformation, commentators often have focused on the role of newly available archival information. This is certainly part of the story, but I have argued that another factor has played a more fundamental role in the process of rewriting official Russian history. Specifically, I have argued that the latest versions of this history are shaped fundamentally by what Bakhtin (1984) termed “hidden dialogicality.” In post-Soviet texts, “Each present, uttered word responds and reacts with its every fiber to the invisible speaker, points to something outside itself, beyond its own limits, to the unspoken words of another person” (p. 197). The result of engaging in hidden dialogicality in this case is that the new official history takes the form of a counternarrative. The role of narrative is important because it provides the parameters within which the hidden dialogues have occurred. In the cases I examined, two basic elements of narrative—plot and character—provide these parameters.

In developing this line of reasoning, I have focused on two major episodes in 20th-century Russian history: the Civil War of 1918–1920 and World War II. In the case of the Civil War, a fundamental re-employment is involved in producing the new texts. The war now is
incorporated into a tragic narrative that starts with the October Revolution. This contrasts sharply with earlier accounts in which the Civil War was set off as a separate narrative that began with imperialist intervention and ended with Soviet triumph over internal and external foes. In the case of World War II, the same basic plot frames both Soviet and post-Soviet Russian official accounts, but one set of actors and motives is substituted for another. In this latter instance, there are also a few attempts to include new events such as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, but are not fully incorporated into the plot structure.

Having mapped out these two paths for producing new official history, we are left with the question of why the account of the Civil War was revised in one way and the history of World War II in another. To speculate on this matter involves going beyond the sorts of textual evidence I have supplied and into the realm of the cultural and institutional forces involved in the production of official history. Because I have not presented extensive evidence on these issues, my comments on them must be taken as speculative. It strikes me, however, that one interpretation immediately presents itself.

As Weiner (1996) noted, the heroic World War II narrative continues to serve as a positive "dominant myth" in many areas of the former Soviet Union. In this respect, it is an episode that stands in contrast to others from Soviet history, especially those having to do with events surrounding the Revolution. Part of this difference is simply a function of the fact that World War II is still part of the living memory of many people, whereas the Civil War is not. Perhaps more important, however, is the fact that in the new anti-Communist "official culture" (Bodnar, 1992), there is strong resistance, if not outright rejection, of heroic narratives about the origins of the Soviet state. Although a small segment of the Russian population still might embrace such narratives, this is a minority position, and certainly not that of the government. This is not to say that the tendency to transform earlier triumphalist narratives into tragic ones is driven solely by forces of politically expedient presentism. As suggested previously, new accounts also have the strength of having much more in common with accounts that have emerged in international scholarly research.

In contrast, World War II provides one of the few remaining positive historical narratives for contemporary Russians to employ when trying to make sense of their past and present. Indeed, its importance
in this capacity has probably grown over the past few years as narratives about other events such as the October Revolution and the Civil War have been rejected or rewritten as tragedies. The World War II narrative is about one of the defining events in 20th-century history, an event in which Russia and the Soviet Union clearly played a central, if not the central, role in stopping a brutal and dangerous enemy. It would be painful and difficult to give up such a narrative as a resource for constructing new national identities in Russia.

The kind of hidden dialogicality between narratives that I mapped out previously has now gone through one round. Although the textual transformations of the future may not be as radical as they have been in the past, they undoubtedly will continue along one line or another. Events occurring in Russia as this article is written provide a reminder of the difficulty in predicting who the players will be in shaping future accounts of the past, but it is reasonable to assume that the hidden dialogicality among narratives that has shaped the process up to now will continue to do so in the future.

APPENDIX A

Soviet and Post-Soviet Russian
Secondary School History Textbooks
Used in Analyses of the Russian Civil War


Edited by M. P. Kima, Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Approved by the Ministry of Education of the USSR. Press run: 3,900,000. Price: 41 k + 11 k for pictures.


Edited by Y. I. Korablëv. Approved by the State Committee of the USSR on People’s Education. Press run: 3,110,000. Price: 70 k.


APPENDIX B
Soviet and Post-Soviet Russian
Secondary School History Textbooks Used in Analyses of World War II


V. K. Furaeva. Pod redaktsiei Utverzhdeno Ministerstvom prosveshcheniya SSR. Izdanie shestoe, ispravlennoe i dopolnennoe. Print run: 1,400,000.


REFERENCES


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