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Re: Re: [xmca] Re: microgenesis?

Lots of important stuff in your messages, thanks David.

I think where we are passing each other and discoordinating is that I am
talking about the process of learning to read and alphabetic script, as a
microgenetic process, or as a development occuring under particular
cultural constraints.

So I am seeing the same solution to thinking about the
ontogeny/microgenesis relationships by analogy with the
phylogeny/cultural-history relation (your sociogenesis).

Another way of getting toward the same goal is to ask, are processes
occurring in a zone of proximal development, whatever that is, an
ontogenetic or a microgenetic time scale? Of course the former is a moment
in the latter, but to me the answer is yes. If the answer is yes,
how do we think about obuchenie and development at that time scale

If we can get into the same temporal space, perhaps we can continue to
narrow down the differences to the point where we could declare agreement
and then move on to seeing if we can increase the area covered by the light
that we have concentrated on that problem.

On Wed, Oct 3, 2012 at 4:38 PM, kellogg <kellogg59@hanmail.net> wrote:

>   I guess I see "microgenesis" as a special case of genesis generally.
> But maybe all cases of genesis are special.
> I used to think of the relationship between microgenesis and ontogenesis
> by analogy with the link between phylogenesis and sociogenesis. Ironically,
> it was really MIKE who taught me to see the link between phylogenesis and
> sociogenesis as a problem and not just a postulate, as a moment when
> phylogenesis provides the environment for sociogenesis but sociogenesis in
> return provides the very content for the next (relatively short) phase of
> phylogenesis.
> Mike argued that for hundreds of thousands of years, the rudiments of
> society and the vestiges of biological evolution must have co-existed (see
> "the co-evolution of mind and brain"). Of course, in the long run, we have
> to say that sociogenesis really did turn phylogenesis on its head--that we
> can, at least in logical terms, treat the product of phylogenesis, that is,
> the biological type of man, as stable and unchanging and attribute the
> variations we see around us to sociogenesis alone. Indeed, we must, if we
> are not to fall into the very worst and most unscientific fallacies of
> nineteenth century ethnography.
> But they didn't know about all that back then, poor schleps. What they
> knew about were some circumstances where certain socially derived
> advantages, e.g. collective production, fire, cooperation, appeared to
> derive advantages that were not obtainable from individual advantages, and
> other situations where the reverse appeared to obtain. In a footnote to
> Scribner's article "Vygotsky's uses of history", Scribner notes that
> Vygotsky sometimes uses the word "phylogenesis" to refer to both
> prehistoric evolution and historical change in the human species (e.g.
> epigenetic changes such as the fact that we are growing taller, the Flynn
> effect, etc.
> Vygotsky was certainly aware of (and actually refers to) the kinds of
> phenomena that Baldwin was studying--the circumstance where, for example,
> although the incest taboo appears to be biological and is almost certainly
> selected for genetically, it can be and is overcome, so that for example in
> almost every society the ruling classes perpetuate family fortunes largely
> by overcoming the innate humane distaste for semi-incestuous marriages to
> one degree or another. See, for example, the perverse marriage practices of
> ancient Egyptian royalty, and also the prevalence of diseases like
> porphyria and hemophilia in European royal families, and of course the
> American horror of miscegenation, which, viewed dispassionately, can only
> be seen as a good thing (and can be even better when considered
> passionately).
> It seems logical (though not exactly historical) to say that phylogenesis
> provides the basis for sociogenesis, and sociogenesis then, in return,
> creates the next stage of phylogenesis, almost as a byproduct of a new and
> more important form of progress (by providing a better diet which allows us
> to grow taller, and by mass literacy, and of course by the Baldwin effect).
> Viewed from phylogenesis, sociogenesis is a kind of microgenesis, just as
> viewed from sociogenesis, phylogenesis appears to be no genesis at all.
> Now, I am not a naturally dialectical thinker. So my first impulse when
> confronted with the link between sociogenesis and ontogenesis (e.g. the
> child learning to read) is to treat it exactly the same way. The society
> that children are born into seems unchanging and homogenous when we
> consider the diachronic variations observable in child behavior as the
> child grows older. But in the long run, we have to say that ontogenesis
> really turns sociogenesis upside-down; kids do not grow up to be their
> parents; they grow up to be themselves.
> You can see this in the forms of literacy that children are developing in
> South Korea today, many of which are quite incomprehensible to me for
> reasons that have nothing to do with my grasp of Korean. Children do grow
> up and make transformations in society, and some of these transformations
> are contemporaneouos with the child's adolescence and young adulthood.
> Vygotsky himself, who seems so extraordinary to us but in many ways was
> quite typical of his generation, is a very good example of how ontogenesis
> can provide the next moment of sociogenesis. The relationship is not
> symmetrical--this is why i really loathe the thoughtless formula
> "constructs and is constructed by"--but an unsymmetrical relationship is
> still a relationship, else we could not say "physical chemistry" or
> "molecular biology".
> But of course my analogy is losing its grip on reality. The Russian
> revolution conceived as a moment when the ontogenesis of Lenin provided the
> next zone of development for a whole society is the Russian revolution
> misconceived. And while I do think that microgenesis provides the next zone
> of development for ontogenesis (and that is why we must distinguish between
> developmentally inert forms of teaching-and-learning and those which are
> rich in potential for ontogenesis), I also think that there is an important
> sense in which microgenesis is sui generis. But that's probably true
> of sociogenesis and phylogenesis too!
> David Kellogg
> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> --------- 원본 메일 ---------
> *보낸사람*: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
> *받는사람* : lchcmike@gmail.com
> *참조* : "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> *날짜*: 2012년 10월 04일 목요일, 00시 59분 15초 +0900
> *제목*: Re: [xmca] Re: microgenesis?
> **  Does Vygotsky ever *mention *"microgenesis" or whatever the Russian
> translation of the word is?
> Andy
> mike cole wrote:
> Hi Andy-- Maybe I am off on a totally mistaken path here. It would not be
> the first time. But in raising the examples I have, I have been seeking to
> clarify a question, i think initiated by greg about microgenesis.
>  Here is the question I have been trying to get clear about.
>  Is there such a process, in a Vygotskian framework, as micro-genesis
> that involves development? Or is all microgenetic change "learning." (As in
> the learning/development distinction).
>  So each time an answer comes back that moves the genetic domain from
> microgenesis to ontogenesis from *my* perspective, its a change of topic,
> not an answer.
>  David pointed us to Vygotsky/Koffka on maturation (development?
> ravitie?) and learning (obuchenie), which introduces its own ambiguities?
>  I want to print out the materials that David posted to read more
> carefully and am hoping we can either dismiss my question as a
> misunderstanding of what the conversation was about or hone in enough on
> the topic so that we all feel like we are talking about the same thing.
> Right now I am pretty sure we are not.
>  mike
> On Wed, Oct 3, 2012 at 6:25 AM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>> No, I don't believe Vygotsky is speaking of microgenesis, Mike.
>> My PS was responding to David saying:
>>    "It’s that moment when learning-and-teaching leads development, or
>>    opens the next stage of development (as Koffka says, a pfennigsworth
>>    of learning and teaching yields a mark of development) that I always
>>    thought was called microgenesis."
>> Andy
>> Mike Cole wrote:
>>> Is he speaking of micro genesis, Andy?
>>> Mike
>>> On Oct 3, 2012, at 5:59 AM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>>>> Mike, reading Chapter 6 of "Thinking and Speech" about written speech,
>>>> it seems to me that Vygotsky takes the development of written speech as
>>>> archetypical and a pre-requiresite for the development of true concepts
>>>> in modern society. He actually says that in taking up instruction in
>>>> grammar (which is always associated with the learning of written speech)
>>>> he is deferring the formation of scientific concepts to "susbsequent
>>>> sections"!!
>>>> As is well-known, he points to at least three characteristics of written
>>>> speech which are significant: that it requires conscious awareness of
>>>> the semantic, syntactic and phonetic properties of both inner and oral
>>>> speech; it requires an abstraction from the speech-situation and in
>>>> particular the interlocutor; finally, it requires a motivation which is
>>>> entirely absent for the child when they begin to learn written speech.
>>>> Each qualitative leap, each /development/ in the psychological growth of
>>>> a child is marked by a crisis and sharp change in the will, the
>>>> development of new motivations and therewith new relationships, new
>>>> "situations". The motivation is no longer provided by the situation, an
>>>> answer is required when there is no question. Thus the achievement of
>>>> written speech requires conscious control of the will in abstraction
>>>> from the situation, and reflecting upon and controlling inner speech.
>>>> The formulation of actions, thinking, in the absence of the actual,
>>>> sensuous presence of the stimulus, is one of the most central
>>>> characteristic of conceptual thought. This is a development that is
>>>> required even in non-literate communities. But in modern societies, the
>>>> psychic functions required for conceptual, i.e., culturally inherited
>>>> means of action, are acquired through formal schooling and as I see it
>>>> the means of doing so is the mastery of written speech.
>>>> Back on the 29 September, you asked:
>>>>    "Since qualitative change in the organization of sensory-motor
>>>>    behavior appear off the table when discussing HIGHER psych
>>>>    functions, might you turn your scalpels to the acquisition of the
>>>>    ability to read a phonetic alphabet fluently? How am I going wrong
>>>>    in believing that acquisition of reading is a developmental process
>>>>    in which learning also plays an essential role that shifts in the
>>>>    course off acquisition?"
>>>> It is really nothing to with sensory-motor behavior, even though
>>>> sensory-motor behavior is the only means by which written speech can be
>>>> manifested. But if a child has normal vision and normal control of their
>>>> hands, and these functions are sufficiently developed to recognise the
>>>> letters of the alphabet, then teaching the child to read and write them
>>>> is a good move. But it is not development itself. What is development is
>>>> acquisition of those functions Vygotsky talks about: abstraction from
>>>> the semantic, syntactic and phonetic properties of oral speech;
>>>> abstraction from interlocutor and the speech situation; and the
>>>> development of motivations to write. None of the actions implied in this
>>>> psychological development are possible unless the child has /some/ means
>>>> of written speech. Learning the ABCs simply creates the possibility for
>>>> the leap of mastering one's own thinking by the culturally-specific
>>>> means of written speech with a phonetic alphabet.
>>>> That's how I read it.
>>>> Andy
>>>> PS. David. "Microgenesis" is not really part of my vocabulary, but I
>>>> think it is not warranted to apply the term to the critical phases of
>>>> ontogenesis. These are after all ontogenesis. I have always taken
>>>> "microgenesis" to refer to the processes whereby a given psychological
>>>> condition, or process, or action, is manifested out of its conditions,
>>>> ie., something which happens every second. E.g. if I have a problem and
>>>> then I hit on the solution; or if I meet someone, and in a second or two
>>>> recognize them and adopt an orientation to them; or I want to speak in a
>>>> meeting, stand up and then speak. That is the context in which I say
>>>> concepts /are/ themselves processes of development (and not just the
>>>> product of development).
>>>> mike cole wrote:
>>>>> Thanks David.
>>>>> So there is microgenetic DEVELOPMENT of reading, or is LSV talking
>>>>> about
>>>>> the ontogenetic change that comes from mediation of activity through
>>>>> literacy?
>>>>> mike
>>>>> On Tue, Oct 2, 2012 at 7:56 PM, kellogg <kellogg59@hanmail.net> wrote:
>>>>>>   First of all, here's Vygotsky attacking Meumann and Piaget for the
>>>>>> view that learning to read and write is really just learning, and not
>>>>>> a
>>>>>> fundamental restructuring of the child's understanding. It's from
>>>>>> Thinking
>>>>>> and Speech, Chapter Six, Part Three. But unfortunately neither English
>>>>>> translation is really adequate. So here is the Russian:
>>>>>> Обучение как бы пожинает плоды детского созревания, но само по себе
>>>>>> обучение остается безразличным для развития. У ребенка память,
>>>>>> внимание и
>>>>>> мышление развились до такого уровня, что он может обучаться грамоте и
>>>>>> арифметике; но если мы его обучим грамоте и арифметике, то его память,
>>>>>> внимание и мышление изменятся или нет? Старая психология отвечала на
>>>>>> этот
>>>>>> вопрос так: изменятся в той мере, в какой мы будем их упражнять, т.е.
>>>>>> они
>>>>>> изменятся в результате упражнения, но ничего не изменится в ходе их
>>>>>> развития. Ничего нового не возникнет в умственном развитии ребенка от
>>>>>> того,
>>>>>> что мы его обучим грамоте. Это будет тот же самый ребенок, но
>>>>>> грамотный.
>>>>>> Эта точка зрения, целиком определяющая всю старую педагогическую
>>>>>> психологию, в том числе и известную работу Меймана, доведена до
>>>>>> логического
>>>>>> предела в теории Пиаже. Его точка зрения такова, что мышление ребенка
>>>>>> с
>>>>>> необходимостью проходит через известные фазы и стадии, независимо от
>>>>>> того,
>>>>>> обучается этот ребенок или нет. Если он обучается, то это есть чисто
>>>>>> внешний факт, который еще не находится в единстве с его собственными
>>>>>> процессами мышления. Поэтому педагогика должна считаться с этими
>>>>>> автономными особенностями детского мышления как с низшим порогом,
>>>>>> определяющим возможности обучения. Когда же у ребенка разовьются
>>>>>> другие
>>>>>> возможности мышления, тогда станет возможным и другое обучение. Для
>>>>>> Пиаже
>>>>>> показателем уровня детского мышления является не то, что ребенок
>>>>>> знает, не
>>>>>> то, что он способен усвоить, а то, как он мыслит в той области, где он
>>>>>> никакого знания не имеет. Здесь самым резким образом
>>>>>> противопоставляются
>>>>>> обучение и развитие, знание и мышление. Исходя из этог Пиаже задает
>>>>>> ребенку
>>>>>> такие вопросы, в отношении которых он застрахован от того, о,что
>>>>>> ребенок
>>>>>> может иметь какие-нибудь знания о спрашиваемом предмете. А если мы
>>>>>> спрашиваем ребенка о таких вещах, о которых у него могут быть знания,
>>>>>> то
>>>>>> здесь мы получаем не результаты мышления, а результаты знания. Поэтому
>>>>>> спонтанные понятия, возникающие в процессе развития ребенка,
>>>>>> рассматриваются как показательные для его мышления, а научные понятия,
>>>>>> возникающие из обучения, не обладают этой показательностью. Поэтому
>>>>>> же, раз
>>>>>> обучение и развитие резко противопоставляются друг другу, мы приходим
>>>>>> с
>>>>>> необходимостью к основному положению Пиаже, согласно которому научные
>>>>>> понятия скорее вытесняют спонтанные и занимают их место, чем
>>>>>> возникают из
>>>>>> них, преобразуя их.
>>>>>> "Teaching-and-learning reaps the benefits of the children's
>>>>>> maturation,
>>>>>> but is in itself of no interest to development. If we teach literacy
>>>>>> and
>>>>>> numeracy when the child's memory, attention and thinking have evolved
>>>>>> to
>>>>>> such a level that it can be taught, will his memory, attention and
>>>>>> thinking
>>>>>> change or no? The old psychology responded to this question thus: it
>>>>>> will
>>>>>> change to the extent that we exercise them, i.e. it will change as a
>>>>>> result
>>>>>> of exercise, but nothing will change in the course of their
>>>>>> development.
>>>>>> There is nothing new here in the mental development of the child from
>>>>>> what
>>>>>> we taught him to read. It will be the same child, but competent. This
>>>>>> view is entirely fixed by the whole of the old educational psychology,
>>>>>> including the well-known work of Meumann, and brought to its logical
>>>>>> limit
>>>>>> in Piaget's theory. His point of view is that the child's thinking
>>>>>> must
>>>>>> needs to pass through certain phases and stages, regardless of
>>>>>> whether the
>>>>>> child undergoes teaching-and-learning or not. If he undergoes it,
>>>>>> this is
>>>>>> a purely external fact, which is not yet in any communion with his own
>>>>>> thinking processes. Pedagogy should therefore be considered alongside
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> autonomous features of children's thinking, as a lower threshold
>>>>>> determining teaching-and-learning. When a child develops, other ways
>>>>>> of
>>>>>> thinking and other forms of teaching-and-learning will then be
>>>>>> possible. For
>>>>>> Piaget, the indicator of the child's thinking is not what the child
>>>>>> knows,
>>>>>> not what he is able to learn, but the way he thinks in an area where
>>>>>> he has
>>>>>> no knowledge. Here lies the very sharpest contrast between
>>>>>> teaching-and-learning and development, between knowledge and
>>>>>> thinking. It
>>>>>> is on this basis that Piaget sets the child questions with respect to
>>>>>> which
>>>>>> he may be assured that the child can have no knowledge whatever. For
>>>>>> if
>>>>>> we ask the child about things about which he may have knowledge, here
>>>>>> we do
>>>>>> not get the results of thinking, but the results of knowledge.
>>>>>> Therefore,
>>>>>> spontaneous notions arising in the development of the child shall be
>>>>>> considered as indicative of his thinking, and scientific concepts that
>>>>>> arise from learning-and-teaching, do not have this potential. For the
>>>>>> same reason, once learning-and-teaching and development are sharply
>>>>>> counterposed to each other, we necessarily arrive at the main point of
>>>>>> Piaget, according to which scientific concepts rather displace
>>>>>> spontaneous
>>>>>> and take their place rather than derive from them, transforming them."
>>>>>> Later on, Vygotsky dwells at some length on his disagreements with
>>>>>> Koffka.
>>>>>> It will be seen that the passage which Vygotsky is lingering over is
>>>>>> precisely the one that Mike sent around:
>>>>>> Есть, наконец, третья группа теорий, которая особенно влиятельна в
>>>>>> европейской детской психологии. Эти теории пытаются подняться над
>>>>>> крайностями обеих точек зрения, которые изложены выше. Они пытаются
>>>>>> проплыть между Сциллой и Харибдой. При этом случается то, что обычно
>>>>>> происходит с теориями, занимающими среднее место между двумя крайними
>>>>>> точками зрения. Они становятся не над обеими теориями, а между ними,
>>>>>> преодолевая одну крайность ровно в такой мере, в какой они попадают в
>>>>>> другую. Одну неправильную теорию они преодолевают, частично уступая
>>>>>> другой,
>>>>>> а другую . уступками первой. В сущности говоря, это . двойственные
>>>>>> теории:
>>>>>> занимая позицию между двумя противоположными точками зрения, они на
>>>>>> самом
>>>>>> деле приводят к некоторому объединению этих точек зрения.
>>>>>> Такова точка зрения Коффки, который заявляет с самого начала, что
>>>>>> развитие
>>>>>> всегда имеет двойственный характер: во-первых, надо различать
>>>>>> развитие как
>>>>>> созревание и, во-вторых, надо различать развитие как обучение. Но это
>>>>>> и
>>>>>> значит признать в сущности две прежние крайние точки зрения, одну
>>>>>> вслед за
>>>>>> другой, или объединить их. Первая точка зрения говорит, что процессы
>>>>>> развития и обучения независимы друг от друга. Ее Коффка повторяет,
>>>>>> утверждая, что развитие и есть созревание, не зависящее в своих
>>>>>> внутренних
>>>>>> законах от обучения. Вторая точка зрения говорит, что обучение есть
>>>>>> развитие. Эту точку зрения Коффка повторяет буквально.
>>>>>> "There is, finally, a third group of theories, which is particularly
>>>>>> influential in European child psychology. These theories attempt to
>>>>>> rise
>>>>>> above the extremes of both points of view, as set out above. They are
>>>>>> trying to sail between Scylla and Charybdis. In this case, what
>>>>>> happens is
>>>>>> the usual case with theories that occupy the middle ground between two
>>>>>> extremes. They do not stand above the two theories but between them
>>>>>> overcoming one extreme exactly to the extent to which they veer
>>>>>> towards the
>>>>>> other. They overcome one wrong theory by partially surrendering to
>>>>>> another.
>>>>>> Generally speaking, it is a dualistic theory: occupying a position
>>>>>> between
>>>>>> two opposing points of view, they actually result from some
>>>>>> combination of
>>>>>> the two points of view."
>>>>>> "This is the view Koffka, who states at the outset that the
>>>>>> development is
>>>>>> always dualistic: First, we must distinguish development as
>>>>>> maturation and
>>>>>> second we must distinguish development as learning-and-teaching. But
>>>>>> this
>>>>>> means to recognize in essence the two previous extreme positions one
>>>>>> after
>>>>>> the other, or combine them. The first point of view is that the
>>>>>> processes
>>>>>> of development and learning-and-teaching are independent of each
>>>>>> other.
>>>>>> Here Koffka repeats the argument that development and maturation are
>>>>>> not
>>>>>> dependent in their internal laws upon learning-and-teaching. The
>>>>>> second
>>>>>> point of view is that learning is development. This view too Koffka
>>>>>> repeats
>>>>>> word for word."
>>>>>> Vygotsky goes on to discuss three positive elements in Koffka's work:
>>>>>> First, Koffka recognizes that there are two different things and they
>>>>>> exist
>>>>>> in a state of mutual dependence. Second, Koffka must introduce a new
>>>>>> conception of learning-and-teaching, namely the appearance of new
>>>>>> structures and the completion of old ones. Thirdly, Koffka raises,
>>>>>> although
>>>>>> he cannot solve, the whole question of whether learning-and-teaching
>>>>>> leads
>>>>>> development or the other way around. It's that moment when
>>>>>> learning-and-teaching leads development, or opens the next stage of
>>>>>> development (as Koffka says, a pfennigsworth of learning and teaching
>>>>>> yields a mark of development) that I always thought was called
>>>>>> microgenesis.
>>>>>> In developing that second point, on the new STRUCTURAL conception of
>>>>>> learning-and-teaching that Vygotsky distinguishes between
>>>>>> learning-and-teaching that offers only the skill that it offers and a
>>>>>> transformative skill--and the example he gives of the former is
>>>>>> learning to
>>>>>> type. What about the latter, though? It seems to me he has already
>>>>>> given us
>>>>>> an example of the latter at the very outset of this discussion when
>>>>>> he was
>>>>>> raking Meumann and Piaget over the coals. It is when a child learns
>>>>>> that he
>>>>>> or she can draw speech.
>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>>>>>> --------- 원본 메일 ---------
>>>>>> *보낸사람*: mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
>>>>>> *받는사람* : "eXtended Mind, Culture,Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>,
>>>>>> kellogg
>>>>>> <kellogg59@hanmail.net>
>>>>>> *날짜*: 2012년 10월 03일 수요일, 08시 43분 37초 +0900
>>>>>> *제목*: microgenesis?
>>>>>> Hi David- This message was begun several days ago but got hung up in
>>>>>> my
>>>>>> messy schedule and a delay while I got to Koffka.
>>>>>> I would like very much to continue the microgeneis discussion started
>>>>>> by
>>>>>> Greg (or was it you?) because it seems to me to get us to the heart
>>>>>> of the
>>>>>> learning/development issue. We made a lot of progress a few years ago
>>>>>> when
>>>>>> you and Andy and I tried to write down "our" theory of development,
>>>>>> with
>>>>>> LSV as the paternal text.
>>>>>> While I have been off doing my form of inquiry, you have been doing
>>>>>> yours  including all of the intense work on Tool and Znak, and
>>>>>> immersing
>>>>>> yourself in the texts.
>>>>>> I have  have a copy of Koffka at home, so I read a bunch of places
>>>>>> where
>>>>>> the learning/development issue is brought up.
>>>>>> Rather than jump straight into conversation, I would like to provide
>>>>>> other xmca'ites as wish, to read the texts being discussed.
>>>>>> To that end, I have attached a few pages from Koffka that seem
>>>>>> particularly to the point. As I understand it, this approach, which
>>>>>> attributes cultural influences on development only for forms of
>>>>>> action that
>>>>>> are species typical/universal and closely related to (acquiring a
>>>>>> first
>>>>>> language, acquiring the ability to walk and run and jump and duck,
>>>>>> and so
>>>>>> on).
>>>>>> So the answer to questions about development being involved in
>>>>>> learning
>>>>>> to ride a bike or acquing the ability to read a phonetic alphabet. The
>>>>>> matter is forclosed. Reading is a process of learning, ipso facto,
>>>>>> end of
>>>>>> discussion.
>>>>>> You indicate in your note that LSV also had some disagreements with
>>>>>> Koffka, but I was not clear on what they were. If you could elaborate
>>>>>> in
>>>>>> context I would find it helpful.
>>>>>> So, moving slowly, and doggedly sticking to the topic of microgenesis
>>>>>> of
>>>>>> functions including acquiring the ability to walk, to ride a bike,
>>>>>> and to
>>>>>> learn to read, and lets include acquire a language, since that is
>>>>>> clearly a
>>>>>> central topic, I attach the relevant pages from Koffka so others can
>>>>>> see
>>>>>> what we are nattering on about, and at least figure out what is at
>>>>>> stake.
>>>>>> If you would indicate other parts of Koffka to read, David, if you
>>>>>> think
>>>>>> them relevant, I can make the pdf and distribute.
>>>>>> more to come.
>>>>>> mike
>>>>>> PS-- ALL-- Note David's new email. I am probably not the only one who
>>>>>> missed the transition to it.
>>>>>> <kellogg59@hanmail.net>
>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>> __________________________________________
>>>>>> _____
>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>> --
>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>> *Andy Blunden*
>>>> Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
>>>> Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts
>>>> __________________________________________
>>>> _____
>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>> --
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> *Andy Blunden*
>> Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
>> Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts
>> __________________________________________
>> _____
>> xmca mailing list
>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> --
> ------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
> Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts
>  __________________________________________
> _____
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu<http://mail2.daum.net/hanmail/mail/MailComposeFrame.daum?TO=xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> <kellogg59@hanmail.net>
> __________________________________________
> _____
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
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