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Re: [xmca] Culture & Rationality



Huw

I support to returning to Martin's thread but would appreciate a separate
thread which puts in play tthe various notions of rationality and reasoning
and types of logic USED by you, Andy, and Martin.
Not as assertions but as questions.
I may be lost in the *answers* [in over my head] but as I struggle to
understand each of your positions, it does open up this central question of
rationality and what it means.

The differences may be ambiguous with many mis-understandings but may lead
to further understanding through the misunderstandings
Larry

On Fri, Jun 29, 2012 at 7:26 AM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>wrote:

> On 29 June 2012 15:03, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>
> > I think we are at cross purposes here, Huw. Symbolic logic can only deal
> > with various kinds of propositional calculus, but always comes down to
> > "atoms" whose truth value is "outside the theory". I am not really
> > interested (these days) in formal languages. I am talking about real
> > languages.
> >
>
> Thank goodness!   I thought you were only interested in Andy language.
>
> That does beg the question why you're making assertions about formal logic
> though.
>
> But lets drop it and let Martin continue with the thread.
>
> Huw
>
>
> > Andy
> >
> > Huw Lloyd wrote:
> >
> >>
> >>
> >> On 29 June 2012 14:16, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:
> >> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
> >>
> >>    Huw, I think the scope for using formal logic is very limited in
> >>    the case of true concepts.
> >>
> >>    Basically, you are limited to chains of inferences from true
> >>    propositions.
> >>    But as I see it, pseudoconcepts, like the concepts of Set Theory,
> >>    are native to Formal Logic. The type of logic and the type of
> >>    concept are, as you point out, two different things, but I think
> >>    there is a definite and strong connection between defining a
> >>    concept as a set and the applicability of syllogistic logic.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> That connection is one of activity.  Discriminating on 'types' of logic
> >> by application is pseudoconceptual.  In fact if you look at the various
> >> kinds of logics, it becomes apparent that their key difference is in
> terms
> >> of application, each introduces a particular 'library' of notations
> >> particular to certain kinds of problems, yet these are actually built
> out
> >> simple logical operations.  One can describe one formal language in
> terms
> >> of another, which is what Godel did.
> >>
> >>
> >>    Andy
> >>
> >>    Huw Lloyd wrote:
> >>
> >>        On 29 June 2012 11:50, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
> >>        <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>            **
> >>
> >>            I wasn't talking about examples so much as archetypes of
> >>            "scientific
> >>            concepts", and for archetypes he uses exploitation, class
> >>            struggle,
> >>            exploitation, or the Paris Commune (T&S Ch 5 and 6).
> >>
> >>            The system of nature does of course provide ample material
> >>            for talking
> >>            about the difference between taxonomy and true concepts.
> >>            So for example:
> >>
> >>            "In its external characteristics, the pseudoconcept is as
> >>            similar to true
> >>            concept as the whale is to the fish. However, if we turn
> >>            to the 'origin of
> >>            the species' of intellectual and animate forms, it becomes
> >>            apparent that
> >>            the pseudoconcept is related to complexive thinking and
> >>            the whale to the
> >>            mammals [ie true concepts]." [T&S ch 5]
> >>
> >>            which allows LSV to show how sorting by contingent
> >>            attributes (rather than
> >>            according to essential relations within a system)
> >>            corresponds to
> >>            pseudoconcepts and formal logic.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>        I think you'll find its the types used that are
> >>        pseudoconceptual, rather
> >>        than the logic.
> >>
> >>        Huw
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>            True, he does not confine himself to the concepts of
> >>            Marxist social
> >>            science. He uses different sets of concepts for different
> >>            purposes. The
> >>            reasons for falling off your bicycle (somethign within a
> >>            child's
> >>            experience) at one point; kulaks from prerevolutionary
> >>            days at another
> >>            point (outside a child's experience), at another. I was
> >>            just saying that he
> >>            takes scientific conepts as the purest form of true
> >>            concept and the
> >>            concepts of marxist social science as the purest type of
> >>            scientific concept.
> >>
> >>            Andy
> >>
> >>            Peter Smagorinsky wrote:
> >>
> >>            And yet, most of LSV's own examples are biological, no?
> >>
> >>            -----Original Message-----
> >>            From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>            <mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.**ucsd.edu<
> xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >> >
> >>            [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.**ucsd.edu<
> xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >>            <mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.**ucsd.edu<
> xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >> >
> >>            <xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>            <mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.**ucsd.edu<
> xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>>>]
>  >> On Behalf Of Andy
> >>            Blunden
> >>            Sent: Thursday, June 28, 2012 10:54 PM
> >>            To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >>            Subject: Re: [xmca] Culture & Rationality
> >>
> >>            Oh, and also, when Vygotsky uses "scientific concepts" as
> >>            the archetype for a true concept, remember that he *does
> >>            not* use the concepts of
> >>            *natural* science, as Piaget did, but the concepts of
> >>            Marxist social theory. So, when we are considering
> >>            Vygotsky's ideas about "scientific concepts" it is
> >>            probably useful to *not* have in mind concepts like those
> >>            of physics which Piaget, not Vygotsky, took as ideal types.
> >>
> >>            Andy
> >>
> >>            Andy Blunden wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>             Stephen Toulmin, in "The Philosophy of Science. An
> >>            Introduction"
> >>            (1953) I thought definitively proved that the method of
> >>            reasoning of
> >>            science is not formal logic, or what Toulmin called
> >>            "syllogistic"
> >>            inference. For example, on p.33: "Certainly none of the
> >>            substantial
> >>            inferences that one comes across in the phsyical sciences
> >>            is of a
> >>            syllogistic type. This is because, in the physical
> >>            sciences, we are
> >>            not seriously interested in enumerating the common
> >>            properties of sets
> >>            of objects." In other words, the concepts of the physical
> >>            sciences are
> >>            not pseudoconcepts, therefore we can't use formal logic to
> >>            makes
> >>            inferences about them. Brandom uses the idea of "formal" and
> >>            "material" inference to make the distinction.
> >>
> >>            So scientific, and in fact all true, concepts imply going
> >>            past formal
> >>            logic, which only works with pseudoconcepts.
> >>
> >>            Andy
> >>
> >>            Jennifer Vadeboncoeur wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>             Yes, exactly Martin, this work is consistent. I do think
> >>            Vygotsky
> >>            privileges dialectical logic over formal logic; by
> >>            definition, it
> >>            subsumes formal logic and moves beyond it. From my
> >>            cultural position,
> >>            growing up comfortably with formal logic and having to
> >>            practice
> >>            thinking dialectically, the above statement doesn't bother
> >>            me. But I
> >>            would take a different position relative to an Indigenous
> >>            perspective, and be much more circumspect about saying that
> >>            dialectical logic can or should be privileged there. The
> >>            difference
> >>            in the two positions is one of power. In the first, it
> >>            seems that a
> >>            marginalized position (Marx's in North America) works to
> >>            challenge a
> >>            privileged position (formal logic in North America). In
> >>            the second,
> >>            privileging a dialectical perspective seems like another
> >>            act of
> >>            colonization.
> >>
> >>            If we look equally across these three positions, which is
> >>            problematic
> >>            because the is no single homogenous Indigenous
> >>            perspective, but let's
> >>            say for this one exercise, then it seems like we are
> >>            comparing three
> >>            different cultural, historical perspectives on reasoning,
> >>            right and
> >>            logical, or rational,behavior.
> >>
> >>            The question remains to the effects of these different ways
> of
> >>            thinking, but for the people thinking within these
> >>            systems, what is
> >>            the evidence to show that they cannot think at the adult
> >>            level of
> >>            their cultural form of rationality? Yikes, now that I've
> >>            written
> >>            this, I'm not even sure it's the question. Is the issue
> >>            when we try
> >>            to compare the standards of one cultural group to another?
> >>
> >>            I'll jump to Peter's post, because I totally appreciate
> >>            what he has
> >>            written there as well. I appreciate the idea of separating
> >>            dialogical
> >>            thinking from scientific ... but I also think of Vera
> >>            John-Steiner's
> >>            cognitive pluralism, and want to reaffirm all the other
> >>            ways of
> >>            thinking and experiencing the world through image, sound,
> >>            diagram.
> >>            These are sometimes more obvious to draw on in some
> Indigenous
> >>            cultures, but the move also shifts the discussion from
> >>            speech to
> >>            writing, whether we are writing lines, or diagrams, or words.
> >>
> >>            I was looking back over my sad copy of Luria & Vygotsky
> >>            (1992), the
> >>            bottom of page 41 through pages 61 are interesting to this
> >>            topic
> >>            because they show how much Vygotsky struggled with the
> >>            necessity of
> >>            using the work of others and at the same time trying not
> >>            to be bound
> >>            by it. He relies on the work of Levy-Bruhl and takes up
> >>            his language
> >>            "so-called 'primitive peoples'" and then tries to
> >>            problematize this a
> >>            bit. "Primitive man, in the true sense of the term, does
> >>            not exist
> >>            anywhere at the present time," but then of course he
> >>            continues to use
> >>            this language. He argues against any biological type,
> >>            discusses
> >>            "objectively logical thinking" in relation to nature, and
> >>            goes on to
> >>            say .... hm, hm, okay, page 59, the focus is on the
> >>            development of
> >>            writing, and the transition from natural to cultural
> >>            memory, and
> >>            later the historical development of human memory. The
> >>            ability of sign
> >>            systems to enable an external form of memory, an external
> >>            storage of
> >>            memory.
> >>
> >>            What is different about people with access to the
> >>            accumulation of
> >>            cultural knowledge of any particular culture and people of
> >>            that same
> >>            culture who do not have access to this accumulated
> >>            knowledge? In some
> >>            cultures this may be scientific concepts, as defined by
> >>            Vygotsky, in
> >>            other cultures it may be ....?
> >>
> >>            But I keep returning to my post a bit ago, the quote there
> >>            makes it
> >>            clear that Vygotsky realizes that even after formal
> >>            schooling, many
> >>            people do not think with scientific concepts, and adults
> >>            do not think
> >>            with scientific concepts across all domains ... this has been
> >>            supported by contemporary work, from Panofsky, John-Steiner,
> &
> >>            Blackwell (1990) to Howard Gardner's work with Project Zero.
> >>
> >>            Vygotsky's goal of thinking in scientific concepts is
> >>            actually not
> >>            accessible to many people within our own cultures ....
> >>
> >>            Okay, have I completely gone overboard? :)
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>             Hi Jennifer,
> >>
> >>            Yes, there has been interesting work recently proposing that
> >>            indigenous cultures are using a distinct kind of
> >>            reasoning. These guys:
> >>
> >>            Berkes, F., & Berkes, M. K. (2009). Ecological complexity,
> >>            fuzzy
> >>            logic, and holism in indigenous knowledge. Futures, 41(1),
> >>            6-12.
> >>            doi:10.1016/j.futures.2008.07.**003
>  >>
> >>            ...suggest that indigenous peoples have learned to deal with
> >>            complexity, and to manage natural environments rather than
> >>            master
> >>            them; that what has been dismissed as animism is actually a
> >>            sophisticated non-dualistic ontology; and that a holistic
> >>            systems
> >>            thinking is being used. I like several aspects of their
> >>            analysis,
> >>            not least that it explains the "simple number system" -
> >>            one, two,
> >>            many - that has been found in many indigenous cultures, as
> >>            due to an
> >>            approach in which people read and interpret signals from the
> >>            environment rather than counting and measuring it.
> >>
> >>            And I agree with you that judgments of rationality are
> >>            often violent
> >>            impositions; all the judgments of people as 'primitive' are
> >>            presumably of this kind. Presumably what we need are
> >>            non-violent
> >>            ways to look at difference.
> >>
> >>            As for dialectical logic, it take it that LSV believed
> >>            that this was
> >>            the form of rationality he was employing, and the
> >>            ontogenesis of
> >>            which he was describing. And that he considered it superior
> to
> >>            formal logic, not an alternative.
> >>
> >>            Martin
> >>
> >>            On Jun 27, 2012, at 2:04 PM, Jennifer Vadeboncoeur wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>             Hi Martin,
> >>
> >>             I am thinking about what you wrote,
> >>
> >>             "On the contrary, it seems to me that much of LSV's
> >>            writing can be
> >>            read as pointing to the conclusion that *standards* of
> >>            rationality
> >>            will vary from one culture another. But I don't think he
> >>            followed
> >>            his own pointers, and, as I've said above, it is a pretty
> >>            radical
> >>            conclusion to come to."
> >>
> >>             I was first thinking about different standards of
> >>            rationality as
> >>            noted in the quote below, between formal and dialectical
> >>            logic.
> >>            Both are tied to "Western" countries, through dialectical
> >>            thinking
> >>            can also be tied to "Eastern" countries, so maybe the
> >>            issue is one
> >>            of "industrialized" countries?
> >>
> >>             "A child who has mastered the higher forms of thinking, a
> >>            child
> >>            who has mastered concepts, does not part with the more
> >>            elementary
> >>            forms of thinking. In quantitative terms, these more
> >>            elementary
> >>            forms continue to predominate in many domains of
> >>            experience for a
> >>            long time. As we noted earlier, even adults often fail to
> >>            think in
> >>            concepts. S When applied to the domain of life experience,
> >>            even the
> >>            concepts of the adult and adolescent frequently fail to
> >>            rise higher
> >>            than the level of the pseudoconcept. They may possess all the
> >>            features of the concepts from the perspective of formal
> >>            logic, but
> >>            from the perspective of dialectical logic they are nothing
> >>            more
> >>            than general representations, nothing more than complexes."
> >>            (emphasis added, Vygotsky, 1987, p. 160)
> >>
> >>
> >>             >
> >>
> >>
> >>             But the issue in your quote has surfaced several times as
> >>            well in
> >>            my work with Indigenous students and scholars, and we have
> >>            ended in
> >>            the place noted in your quote above. Particular examples
> >>            include
> >>            the complexity and unity of some Indigenous cosmological
> >>            systems,
> >>            their symbolic representation through the medicine wheel, for
> >>            example, and the narratives, signs, gestures, practices,
> >>            writings
> >>            that accompany these cosmological systems.
> >>
> >>             Can this be considered another cultural form of
> >>            rationality (seems
> >>            dialectical in a sense as well ...)?
> >>
> >>             I know this is different from the question you posed in
> >>            the follow
> >>            up email, but isn't "demonstrably weaker" a matter of
> >>            cultural,
> >>            historical, political, economic positioning ... assessed by a
> >>            particular dominant group at a particular time on the basis
> of
> >>            their own potentially culturally irrelevant assessments?
> >>
> >>             Is part of your question also asking for a standard that
> >>            exists
> >>            outside of culture?
> >>
> >>             Just thoughts here ... jen
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>             Hi Peter,
> >>
> >>             I am glad to see you join in the discussion, since I know
> >>            you've
> >>            done interesting research on inner speech.
> >>
> >>             I am certainly willing to grant that patterns of social
> >>            interaction will become patterns of self-regulation and
> >>            thereby
> >>            parts of patterns of individual thinking. It also makes
> >>            sense to
> >>            me, and in my opinion LSV clearly states the view, that
> >>            the higher
> >>            psychological processes are cultural processes. I think he
> >>            goes so
> >>            far as to say that reasoning is cultural.
> >>
> >>
> >>             >>
> >>
> >>
> >>             But, importantly, that is not the same as saying that
> >>            reasoning
> >>            *varies* across cultures. We *all* live in culture, and
> >>            one can
> >>            say that reasoning is cultural and still maintain that
> >>            reasoning
> >>            is universal. Are we willing to take another step, and
> suggest
> >>            that in specific cultures the ways that people reason will be
> >>            different, because the specific conventions of each
> >>            culture are
> >>            involved? That is a big step to take, because the rules of
> >>            logic,
> >>            to pick what is usually taken to be one component of
> >>            reasoning,
> >>            are usually considered to hold regardless of local
> >>            conventions.
> >>
> >>             One way to take this step, of course, is to say that
> >>            people in
> >>            cultures reason in different ways but then to add an
> >>            evaluative
> >>            dimension. Those people in that culture reason differently
> >>            from
> >>            the way we do, but that is because their reasoning is less
> >>            adequate than ours. They are more childlike, more primitive.
> >>            *This* move has often been made, and I can find many
> >>            passages in
> >>            LSV's texts where he seems to be saying basically this.
> >>            That's not
> >>            a move I find interesting or appealing, and it's not what I
> am
> >>            proposing.
> >>
> >>             On the contrary, it seems to me that much of LSV's
> >>            writing can be
> >>            read as pointing to the conclusion that *standards* of
> >>            rationality
> >>            will vary from one culture another. But I don't think he
> >>            followed
> >>            his own pointers, and, as I've said above, it is a pretty
> >>            radical
> >>            conclusion to come to.
> >>
> >>             Martin
> >>
> >>             On Jun 27, 2012, at 9:33 AM, Peter Feigenbaum wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>             Martin--
> >>
> >>             If you grant that interpersonal speech communication is
> >>            essentially a cultural invention, and that private and inner
> >>            speech--as derivatives of interpersonal speech
> >>            communication--are
> >>            also cultural inventions, then Vygotsky's assertions about
> >>            inner
> >>            speech as a tool that adults use voluntarily to conduct and
> >>            direct such crucial psychological activities as analyzing,
> >>            reflecting, conceptualizing, regulating, monitoring,
> >>            simulating,
> >>            rehearsing (actually, some of these activities were not
> >>            specifically asserted by Vygotsky, but instead have been
> >>            discovered in experiments with private speech) would imply
> >>            that
> >>            these "higher mental processes" are themselves cultural
> >>            products.
> >>            Even if the *contents* of inner speech thinking happen to
> >>            bear no
> >>            discernible cultural imprint, the process of production
> >>            nonetheless does.
> >>
> >>             Of course, you may not agree that interpersonal speech
> >>            communication is a cultural invention. But if you do go along
> >>            with the idea that every speech community follows (albeit
> >>            implicitly) their own particular conventions or customs for:
> >>            assigning specific speech sounds to specific meanings (i.e.,
> >>            inventing words); organizing words into sequences (i.e.,
> >>            inventing grammar--Chomsky's claims not withstanding); and
> >>            sequencing utterances in conversation according to rules of
> >>            appropriateness (i.e., inventing rules that regulate "what
> >>            kinds
> >>            of things to say, in what message forms, to what kinds of
> >>            people,
> >>            in what kinds of situations", according to the cross-cultural
> >>            work of E. O. Frake), then reasoning based on the use of
> >>            speech
> >>            must be cultural as well.
> >>
> >>
> >>              >>>
> >>
> >>
> >>              My guess is that you are looking for evidence that cultures
> >>            reason differently. While there may be evidence for such a
> >>            claim,
> >>            I only want to point out that the tools for reasoning are
> >>            themselves manufactured by human culture.
> >>
> >>             Peter
> >>
> >>             Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D.
> >>             Associate Director of Institutional Research
> >>             Fordham University
> >>             Thebaud Hall-202
> >>             Bronx, NY 10458
> >>
> >>             Phone: (718) 817-2243 <tel:%28718%29%20817-2243>
> >>             Fax: (718) 817-3203 <tel:%28718%29%20817-3203>
> >>             e-mail: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu
> >>            <mailto:pfeigenbaum@fordham.**edu <pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu>>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>             From:        Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu
> >>            <mailto:packer@duq.edu>> <packer@duq.edu
> >>            <mailto:packer@duq.edu>>
> >>
> >>             To:        "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
> >>            <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>>
> >>            <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>>
> >>
> >>
> >>             Date:        06/26/2012 05:06 PM
> >>             Subject:        [xmca] Culture & Rationality
> >>             Sent by:        xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>            <mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.**ucsd.edu<
> xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
>  >> >
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>             Thank you for the suggestions that people have made about
> >>            evidence that supports the claim that culture is
> >>            constitutive of
> >>            psychological functions. Keep sending them in, please! Now
> >>            I want
> >>            to introduce a new, but related, thread. A few days ago I
> gave
> >>            Peter a hard time because he wrote that "higher mental
> >>            processes
> >>            are those specific to a culture, and thus those that embody
> >>            cultural concepts so that they guide activity."
> >>
> >>
> >>              >>>
> >>
> >>
> >>              I responded that I don't think that LSV ever wrote this
> >>            - his
> >>            view seems to me to have been that it is scientific
> >>            concepts that
> >>            make possible the higher psychological functions (through
> >>            at time
> >>            he seems to suggest the opposite).
> >>
> >>             My questions now are these:
> >>
> >>             1. Am I wrong? Did LSV suggest that higher mental
> >>            processes are
> >>            specific to a culture and based on cultural concepts?
> >>
> >>             2. If LSV didn't suggest this, who has? Not counting
> >>            Peter!  :)
> >>
> >>             3. Do we have empirical evidence to support such a
> >>            suggestion?
> >>            It seems to me to boil down, or add up, to the claim that
> >>            human
> >>            rationality, human reasoning, varies culturally. (Except who
> >>            knows what rationality is? - it turns out that the Stanford
> >>            Encyclopedia of Philosophy does not have an entry for
> >>            Rationality; apparently they are still making up their
> minds.)
> >>
> >>             that's all, folks
> >>
> >>             Martin
> >>
> >>             ______________________________**____________
> >>             _____
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> >>
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> >>
> >>             ______________________________**____________
> >>
> >>
> >>             > _____
> >>
> >>
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> >>             ______________________________**____________
> >>             _____
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> >>
> >>             --
> >>             ______________________________
> >>
> >>             Jennifer A. Vadeboncoeur, Ph.D.
> >>             Associate Professor
> >>             The University of British Columbia
> >>             Faculty of Education
> >>             2125 Main Mall
> >>             Library Block 272B
> >>             Vancouver BC V6T-1Z4
> >>             http://leap-educ.sites.olt.**ubc.ca/<
> http://leap-educ.sites.olt.ubc.ca/>
> >>
> >>             phone: 1.604.822.9099 <tel:1.604.822.9099>
> >>             fax: 1.604.822.3302 <tel:1.604.822.3302>
> >>
> >>             ______________________________**____________
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> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
> >>
> >>             ______________________________**____________
> >>            _____
> >>            xmca mailing
> >>            listxmca@weber.ucsd.eduhttp://**
> dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/
> >> **xmca <http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
> >>            <http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
> >> >
> >>
> >>
> >>            --
> >>            ------------------------------
> >>
> >>            *Andy Blunden*
> >>            Joint Editor MCA:
> http://www.tandfonline.com/**toc/hmca20/18/1<
> http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/18/1>
> >>            Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
> >>            <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/**<http://home.mira.net/~andy/**>
> >
> >>
> >>            Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts
> >>
> >>            ______________________________**____________
> >>            _____
> >>            xmca mailing list
> >>            xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >>
> >>            http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>        ______________________________**____________
> >>
> >>        _____
> >>        xmca mailing list
> >>        xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >>
> >>        http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>    --
> ------------------------------**------------------------------*
> >> *------------
> >>
> >>
> >>    *Andy Blunden*
> >>    Joint Editor MCA: http://www.tandfonline.com/**toc/hmca20/18/1<
> http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/18/1>
> >>    Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ <
> http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/* <http://home.mira.net/~andy/*>
> >> *>
> >>
> >>    Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts
> >>
> >>    ______________________________**____________
> >>    _____
> >>    xmca mailing list
> >>    xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >>    http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> > --
> > ------------------------------**------------------------------**
> > ------------
> > *Andy Blunden*
> > Joint Editor MCA: http://www.tandfonline.com/**toc/hmca20/18/1<
> http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/18/1>
> > Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
> > Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts
> >
> > ______________________________**____________
> > _____
> > xmca mailing list
> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
> >
> __________________________________________
> _____
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
__________________________________________
_____
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca