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Re: [xmca] Culture & Rationality



On 29 June 2012 16:03, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:

> Huw
>
> I support to returning to Martin's thread but would appreciate a separate
> thread which puts in play tthe various notions of rationality and reasoning
> and types of logic USED by you, Andy, and Martin.
> Not as assertions but as questions.
> I may be lost in the *answers* [in over my head] but as I struggle to
> understand each of your positions, it does open up this central question of
> rationality and what it means.
>
> The differences may be ambiguous with many mis-understandings but may lead
> to further understanding through the misunderstandings
> Larry
>
>
Hi Larry,

The basic point is about digitality.  All of the recent threads on
rationality, creativity etc are implicated.

I'm not sure a mail server is the best forum, but if you post questions
I'll read them and perhaps venture to give my opinion.

Huw

On Fri, Jun 29, 2012 at 7:26 AM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>wrote:
>
> > On 29 June 2012 15:03, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> >
> > > I think we are at cross purposes here, Huw. Symbolic logic can only
> deal
> > > with various kinds of propositional calculus, but always comes down to
> > > "atoms" whose truth value is "outside the theory". I am not really
> > > interested (these days) in formal languages. I am talking about real
> > > languages.
> > >
> >
> > Thank goodness!   I thought you were only interested in Andy language.
> >
> > That does beg the question why you're making assertions about formal
> logic
> > though.
> >
> > But lets drop it and let Martin continue with the thread.
> >
> > Huw
> >
> >
> > > Andy
> > >
> > > Huw Lloyd wrote:
> > >
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> On 29 June 2012 14:16, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:
> > >> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
> > >>
> > >>    Huw, I think the scope for using formal logic is very limited in
> > >>    the case of true concepts.
> > >>
> > >>    Basically, you are limited to chains of inferences from true
> > >>    propositions.
> > >>    But as I see it, pseudoconcepts, like the concepts of Set Theory,
> > >>    are native to Formal Logic. The type of logic and the type of
> > >>    concept are, as you point out, two different things, but I think
> > >>    there is a definite and strong connection between defining a
> > >>    concept as a set and the applicability of syllogistic logic.
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> That connection is one of activity.  Discriminating on 'types' of
> logic
> > >> by application is pseudoconceptual.  In fact if you look at the
> various
> > >> kinds of logics, it becomes apparent that their key difference is in
> > terms
> > >> of application, each introduces a particular 'library' of notations
> > >> particular to certain kinds of problems, yet these are actually built
> > out
> > >> simple logical operations.  One can describe one formal language in
> > terms
> > >> of another, which is what Godel did.
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>    Andy
> > >>
> > >>    Huw Lloyd wrote:
> > >>
> > >>        On 29 June 2012 11:50, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
> > >>        <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>            **
> > >>
> > >>            I wasn't talking about examples so much as archetypes of
> > >>            "scientific
> > >>            concepts", and for archetypes he uses exploitation, class
> > >>            struggle,
> > >>            exploitation, or the Paris Commune (T&S Ch 5 and 6).
> > >>
> > >>            The system of nature does of course provide ample material
> > >>            for talking
> > >>            about the difference between taxonomy and true concepts.
> > >>            So for example:
> > >>
> > >>            "In its external characteristics, the pseudoconcept is as
> > >>            similar to true
> > >>            concept as the whale is to the fish. However, if we turn
> > >>            to the 'origin of
> > >>            the species' of intellectual and animate forms, it becomes
> > >>            apparent that
> > >>            the pseudoconcept is related to complexive thinking and
> > >>            the whale to the
> > >>            mammals [ie true concepts]." [T&S ch 5]
> > >>
> > >>            which allows LSV to show how sorting by contingent
> > >>            attributes (rather than
> > >>            according to essential relations within a system)
> > >>            corresponds to
> > >>            pseudoconcepts and formal logic.
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>        I think you'll find its the types used that are
> > >>        pseudoconceptual, rather
> > >>        than the logic.
> > >>
> > >>        Huw
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>            True, he does not confine himself to the concepts of
> > >>            Marxist social
> > >>            science. He uses different sets of concepts for different
> > >>            purposes. The
> > >>            reasons for falling off your bicycle (somethign within a
> > >>            child's
> > >>            experience) at one point; kulaks from prerevolutionary
> > >>            days at another
> > >>            point (outside a child's experience), at another. I was
> > >>            just saying that he
> > >>            takes scientific conepts as the purest form of true
> > >>            concept and the
> > >>            concepts of marxist social science as the purest type of
> > >>            scientific concept.
> > >>
> > >>            Andy
> > >>
> > >>            Peter Smagorinsky wrote:
> > >>
> > >>            And yet, most of LSV's own examples are biological, no?
> > >>
> > >>            -----Original Message-----
> > >>            From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
> > >>            <mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.**ucsd.edu<
> > xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > >> >
> > >>            [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.**ucsd.edu<
> > xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > >>            <mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.**ucsd.edu<
> > xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > >> >
> > >>            <xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
> > >>            <mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.**ucsd.edu<
> > xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>>>]
> >  >> On Behalf Of Andy
> > >>            Blunden
> > >>            Sent: Thursday, June 28, 2012 10:54 PM
> > >>            To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > >>            Subject: Re: [xmca] Culture & Rationality
> > >>
> > >>            Oh, and also, when Vygotsky uses "scientific concepts" as
> > >>            the archetype for a true concept, remember that he *does
> > >>            not* use the concepts of
> > >>            *natural* science, as Piaget did, but the concepts of
> > >>            Marxist social theory. So, when we are considering
> > >>            Vygotsky's ideas about "scientific concepts" it is
> > >>            probably useful to *not* have in mind concepts like those
> > >>            of physics which Piaget, not Vygotsky, took as ideal types.
> > >>
> > >>            Andy
> > >>
> > >>            Andy Blunden wrote:
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>             Stephen Toulmin, in "The Philosophy of Science. An
> > >>            Introduction"
> > >>            (1953) I thought definitively proved that the method of
> > >>            reasoning of
> > >>            science is not formal logic, or what Toulmin called
> > >>            "syllogistic"
> > >>            inference. For example, on p.33: "Certainly none of the
> > >>            substantial
> > >>            inferences that one comes across in the phsyical sciences
> > >>            is of a
> > >>            syllogistic type. This is because, in the physical
> > >>            sciences, we are
> > >>            not seriously interested in enumerating the common
> > >>            properties of sets
> > >>            of objects." In other words, the concepts of the physical
> > >>            sciences are
> > >>            not pseudoconcepts, therefore we can't use formal logic to
> > >>            makes
> > >>            inferences about them. Brandom uses the idea of "formal"
> and
> > >>            "material" inference to make the distinction.
> > >>
> > >>            So scientific, and in fact all true, concepts imply going
> > >>            past formal
> > >>            logic, which only works with pseudoconcepts.
> > >>
> > >>            Andy
> > >>
> > >>            Jennifer Vadeboncoeur wrote:
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>             Yes, exactly Martin, this work is consistent. I do think
> > >>            Vygotsky
> > >>            privileges dialectical logic over formal logic; by
> > >>            definition, it
> > >>            subsumes formal logic and moves beyond it. From my
> > >>            cultural position,
> > >>            growing up comfortably with formal logic and having to
> > >>            practice
> > >>            thinking dialectically, the above statement doesn't bother
> > >>            me. But I
> > >>            would take a different position relative to an Indigenous
> > >>            perspective, and be much more circumspect about saying that
> > >>            dialectical logic can or should be privileged there. The
> > >>            difference
> > >>            in the two positions is one of power. In the first, it
> > >>            seems that a
> > >>            marginalized position (Marx's in North America) works to
> > >>            challenge a
> > >>            privileged position (formal logic in North America). In
> > >>            the second,
> > >>            privileging a dialectical perspective seems like another
> > >>            act of
> > >>            colonization.
> > >>
> > >>            If we look equally across these three positions, which is
> > >>            problematic
> > >>            because the is no single homogenous Indigenous
> > >>            perspective, but let's
> > >>            say for this one exercise, then it seems like we are
> > >>            comparing three
> > >>            different cultural, historical perspectives on reasoning,
> > >>            right and
> > >>            logical, or rational,behavior.
> > >>
> > >>            The question remains to the effects of these different ways
> > of
> > >>            thinking, but for the people thinking within these
> > >>            systems, what is
> > >>            the evidence to show that they cannot think at the adult
> > >>            level of
> > >>            their cultural form of rationality? Yikes, now that I've
> > >>            written
> > >>            this, I'm not even sure it's the question. Is the issue
> > >>            when we try
> > >>            to compare the standards of one cultural group to another?
> > >>
> > >>            I'll jump to Peter's post, because I totally appreciate
> > >>            what he has
> > >>            written there as well. I appreciate the idea of separating
> > >>            dialogical
> > >>            thinking from scientific ... but I also think of Vera
> > >>            John-Steiner's
> > >>            cognitive pluralism, and want to reaffirm all the other
> > >>            ways of
> > >>            thinking and experiencing the world through image, sound,
> > >>            diagram.
> > >>            These are sometimes more obvious to draw on in some
> > Indigenous
> > >>            cultures, but the move also shifts the discussion from
> > >>            speech to
> > >>            writing, whether we are writing lines, or diagrams, or
> words.
> > >>
> > >>            I was looking back over my sad copy of Luria & Vygotsky
> > >>            (1992), the
> > >>            bottom of page 41 through pages 61 are interesting to this
> > >>            topic
> > >>            because they show how much Vygotsky struggled with the
> > >>            necessity of
> > >>            using the work of others and at the same time trying not
> > >>            to be bound
> > >>            by it. He relies on the work of Levy-Bruhl and takes up
> > >>            his language
> > >>            "so-called 'primitive peoples'" and then tries to
> > >>            problematize this a
> > >>            bit. "Primitive man, in the true sense of the term, does
> > >>            not exist
> > >>            anywhere at the present time," but then of course he
> > >>            continues to use
> > >>            this language. He argues against any biological type,
> > >>            discusses
> > >>            "objectively logical thinking" in relation to nature, and
> > >>            goes on to
> > >>            say .... hm, hm, okay, page 59, the focus is on the
> > >>            development of
> > >>            writing, and the transition from natural to cultural
> > >>            memory, and
> > >>            later the historical development of human memory. The
> > >>            ability of sign
> > >>            systems to enable an external form of memory, an external
> > >>            storage of
> > >>            memory.
> > >>
> > >>            What is different about people with access to the
> > >>            accumulation of
> > >>            cultural knowledge of any particular culture and people of
> > >>            that same
> > >>            culture who do not have access to this accumulated
> > >>            knowledge? In some
> > >>            cultures this may be scientific concepts, as defined by
> > >>            Vygotsky, in
> > >>            other cultures it may be ....?
> > >>
> > >>            But I keep returning to my post a bit ago, the quote there
> > >>            makes it
> > >>            clear that Vygotsky realizes that even after formal
> > >>            schooling, many
> > >>            people do not think with scientific concepts, and adults
> > >>            do not think
> > >>            with scientific concepts across all domains ... this has
> been
> > >>            supported by contemporary work, from Panofsky,
> John-Steiner,
> > &
> > >>            Blackwell (1990) to Howard Gardner's work with Project
> Zero.
> > >>
> > >>            Vygotsky's goal of thinking in scientific concepts is
> > >>            actually not
> > >>            accessible to many people within our own cultures ....
> > >>
> > >>            Okay, have I completely gone overboard? :)
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>             Hi Jennifer,
> > >>
> > >>            Yes, there has been interesting work recently proposing
> that
> > >>            indigenous cultures are using a distinct kind of
> > >>            reasoning. These guys:
> > >>
> > >>            Berkes, F., & Berkes, M. K. (2009). Ecological complexity,
> > >>            fuzzy
> > >>            logic, and holism in indigenous knowledge. Futures, 41(1),
> > >>            6-12.
> > >>            doi:10.1016/j.futures.2008.07.**003
> >  >>
> > >>            ...suggest that indigenous peoples have learned to deal
> with
> > >>            complexity, and to manage natural environments rather than
> > >>            master
> > >>            them; that what has been dismissed as animism is actually a
> > >>            sophisticated non-dualistic ontology; and that a holistic
> > >>            systems
> > >>            thinking is being used. I like several aspects of their
> > >>            analysis,
> > >>            not least that it explains the "simple number system" -
> > >>            one, two,
> > >>            many - that has been found in many indigenous cultures, as
> > >>            due to an
> > >>            approach in which people read and interpret signals from
> the
> > >>            environment rather than counting and measuring it.
> > >>
> > >>            And I agree with you that judgments of rationality are
> > >>            often violent
> > >>            impositions; all the judgments of people as 'primitive' are
> > >>            presumably of this kind. Presumably what we need are
> > >>            non-violent
> > >>            ways to look at difference.
> > >>
> > >>            As for dialectical logic, it take it that LSV believed
> > >>            that this was
> > >>            the form of rationality he was employing, and the
> > >>            ontogenesis of
> > >>            which he was describing. And that he considered it superior
> > to
> > >>            formal logic, not an alternative.
> > >>
> > >>            Martin
> > >>
> > >>            On Jun 27, 2012, at 2:04 PM, Jennifer Vadeboncoeur wrote:
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>             Hi Martin,
> > >>
> > >>             I am thinking about what you wrote,
> > >>
> > >>             "On the contrary, it seems to me that much of LSV's
> > >>            writing can be
> > >>            read as pointing to the conclusion that *standards* of
> > >>            rationality
> > >>            will vary from one culture another. But I don't think he
> > >>            followed
> > >>            his own pointers, and, as I've said above, it is a pretty
> > >>            radical
> > >>            conclusion to come to."
> > >>
> > >>             I was first thinking about different standards of
> > >>            rationality as
> > >>            noted in the quote below, between formal and dialectical
> > >>            logic.
> > >>            Both are tied to "Western" countries, through dialectical
> > >>            thinking
> > >>            can also be tied to "Eastern" countries, so maybe the
> > >>            issue is one
> > >>            of "industrialized" countries?
> > >>
> > >>             "A child who has mastered the higher forms of thinking, a
> > >>            child
> > >>            who has mastered concepts, does not part with the more
> > >>            elementary
> > >>            forms of thinking. In quantitative terms, these more
> > >>            elementary
> > >>            forms continue to predominate in many domains of
> > >>            experience for a
> > >>            long time. As we noted earlier, even adults often fail to
> > >>            think in
> > >>            concepts. S When applied to the domain of life experience,
> > >>            even the
> > >>            concepts of the adult and adolescent frequently fail to
> > >>            rise higher
> > >>            than the level of the pseudoconcept. They may possess all
> the
> > >>            features of the concepts from the perspective of formal
> > >>            logic, but
> > >>            from the perspective of dialectical logic they are nothing
> > >>            more
> > >>            than general representations, nothing more than complexes."
> > >>            (emphasis added, Vygotsky, 1987, p. 160)
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>             >
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>             But the issue in your quote has surfaced several times as
> > >>            well in
> > >>            my work with Indigenous students and scholars, and we have
> > >>            ended in
> > >>            the place noted in your quote above. Particular examples
> > >>            include
> > >>            the complexity and unity of some Indigenous cosmological
> > >>            systems,
> > >>            their symbolic representation through the medicine wheel,
> for
> > >>            example, and the narratives, signs, gestures, practices,
> > >>            writings
> > >>            that accompany these cosmological systems.
> > >>
> > >>             Can this be considered another cultural form of
> > >>            rationality (seems
> > >>            dialectical in a sense as well ...)?
> > >>
> > >>             I know this is different from the question you posed in
> > >>            the follow
> > >>            up email, but isn't "demonstrably weaker" a matter of
> > >>            cultural,
> > >>            historical, political, economic positioning ... assessed
> by a
> > >>            particular dominant group at a particular time on the basis
> > of
> > >>            their own potentially culturally irrelevant assessments?
> > >>
> > >>             Is part of your question also asking for a standard that
> > >>            exists
> > >>            outside of culture?
> > >>
> > >>             Just thoughts here ... jen
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>             Hi Peter,
> > >>
> > >>             I am glad to see you join in the discussion, since I know
> > >>            you've
> > >>            done interesting research on inner speech.
> > >>
> > >>             I am certainly willing to grant that patterns of social
> > >>            interaction will become patterns of self-regulation and
> > >>            thereby
> > >>            parts of patterns of individual thinking. It also makes
> > >>            sense to
> > >>            me, and in my opinion LSV clearly states the view, that
> > >>            the higher
> > >>            psychological processes are cultural processes. I think he
> > >>            goes so
> > >>            far as to say that reasoning is cultural.
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>             >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>             But, importantly, that is not the same as saying that
> > >>            reasoning
> > >>            *varies* across cultures. We *all* live in culture, and
> > >>            one can
> > >>            say that reasoning is cultural and still maintain that
> > >>            reasoning
> > >>            is universal. Are we willing to take another step, and
> > suggest
> > >>            that in specific cultures the ways that people reason will
> be
> > >>            different, because the specific conventions of each
> > >>            culture are
> > >>            involved? That is a big step to take, because the rules of
> > >>            logic,
> > >>            to pick what is usually taken to be one component of
> > >>            reasoning,
> > >>            are usually considered to hold regardless of local
> > >>            conventions.
> > >>
> > >>             One way to take this step, of course, is to say that
> > >>            people in
> > >>            cultures reason in different ways but then to add an
> > >>            evaluative
> > >>            dimension. Those people in that culture reason differently
> > >>            from
> > >>            the way we do, but that is because their reasoning is less
> > >>            adequate than ours. They are more childlike, more
> primitive.
> > >>            *This* move has often been made, and I can find many
> > >>            passages in
> > >>            LSV's texts where he seems to be saying basically this.
> > >>            That's not
> > >>            a move I find interesting or appealing, and it's not what I
> > am
> > >>            proposing.
> > >>
> > >>             On the contrary, it seems to me that much of LSV's
> > >>            writing can be
> > >>            read as pointing to the conclusion that *standards* of
> > >>            rationality
> > >>            will vary from one culture another. But I don't think he
> > >>            followed
> > >>            his own pointers, and, as I've said above, it is a pretty
> > >>            radical
> > >>            conclusion to come to.
> > >>
> > >>             Martin
> > >>
> > >>             On Jun 27, 2012, at 9:33 AM, Peter Feigenbaum wrote:
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>             Martin--
> > >>
> > >>             If you grant that interpersonal speech communication is
> > >>            essentially a cultural invention, and that private and
> inner
> > >>            speech--as derivatives of interpersonal speech
> > >>            communication--are
> > >>            also cultural inventions, then Vygotsky's assertions about
> > >>            inner
> > >>            speech as a tool that adults use voluntarily to conduct and
> > >>            direct such crucial psychological activities as analyzing,
> > >>            reflecting, conceptualizing, regulating, monitoring,
> > >>            simulating,
> > >>            rehearsing (actually, some of these activities were not
> > >>            specifically asserted by Vygotsky, but instead have been
> > >>            discovered in experiments with private speech) would imply
> > >>            that
> > >>            these "higher mental processes" are themselves cultural
> > >>            products.
> > >>            Even if the *contents* of inner speech thinking happen to
> > >>            bear no
> > >>            discernible cultural imprint, the process of production
> > >>            nonetheless does.
> > >>
> > >>             Of course, you may not agree that interpersonal speech
> > >>            communication is a cultural invention. But if you do go
> along
> > >>            with the idea that every speech community follows (albeit
> > >>            implicitly) their own particular conventions or customs
> for:
> > >>            assigning specific speech sounds to specific meanings
> (i.e.,
> > >>            inventing words); organizing words into sequences (i.e.,
> > >>            inventing grammar--Chomsky's claims not withstanding); and
> > >>            sequencing utterances in conversation according to rules of
> > >>            appropriateness (i.e., inventing rules that regulate "what
> > >>            kinds
> > >>            of things to say, in what message forms, to what kinds of
> > >>            people,
> > >>            in what kinds of situations", according to the
> cross-cultural
> > >>            work of E. O. Frake), then reasoning based on the use of
> > >>            speech
> > >>            must be cultural as well.
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>              >>>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>              My guess is that you are looking for evidence that
> cultures
> > >>            reason differently. While there may be evidence for such a
> > >>            claim,
> > >>            I only want to point out that the tools for reasoning are
> > >>            themselves manufactured by human culture.
> > >>
> > >>             Peter
> > >>
> > >>             Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D.
> > >>             Associate Director of Institutional Research
> > >>             Fordham University
> > >>             Thebaud Hall-202
> > >>             Bronx, NY 10458
> > >>
> > >>             Phone: (718) 817-2243 <tel:%28718%29%20817-2243>
> > >>             Fax: (718) 817-3203 <tel:%28718%29%20817-3203>
> > >>             e-mail: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu
> > >>            <mailto:pfeigenbaum@fordham.**edu <pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu
> >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>             From:        Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu
> > >>            <mailto:packer@duq.edu>> <packer@duq.edu
> > >>            <mailto:packer@duq.edu>>
> > >>
> > >>             To:        "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
> > >>            <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>>
> > >>            <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>             Date:        06/26/2012 05:06 PM
> > >>             Subject:        [xmca] Culture & Rationality
> > >>             Sent by:        xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
> > >>            <mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.**ucsd.edu<
> > xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >  >> >
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>             Thank you for the suggestions that people have made about
> > >>            evidence that supports the claim that culture is
> > >>            constitutive of
> > >>            psychological functions. Keep sending them in, please! Now
> > >>            I want
> > >>            to introduce a new, but related, thread. A few days ago I
> > gave
> > >>            Peter a hard time because he wrote that "higher mental
> > >>            processes
> > >>            are those specific to a culture, and thus those that embody
> > >>            cultural concepts so that they guide activity."
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>              >>>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>              I responded that I don't think that LSV ever wrote this
> > >>            - his
> > >>            view seems to me to have been that it is scientific
> > >>            concepts that
> > >>            make possible the higher psychological functions (through
> > >>            at time
> > >>            he seems to suggest the opposite).
> > >>
> > >>             My questions now are these:
> > >>
> > >>             1. Am I wrong? Did LSV suggest that higher mental
> > >>            processes are
> > >>            specific to a culture and based on cultural concepts?
> > >>
> > >>             2. If LSV didn't suggest this, who has? Not counting
> > >>            Peter!  :)
> > >>
> > >>             3. Do we have empirical evidence to support such a
> > >>            suggestion?
> > >>            It seems to me to boil down, or add up, to the claim that
> > >>            human
> > >>            rationality, human reasoning, varies culturally. (Except
> who
> > >>            knows what rationality is? - it turns out that the Stanford
> > >>            Encyclopedia of Philosophy does not have an entry for
> > >>            Rationality; apparently they are still making up their
> > minds.)
> > >>
> > >>             that's all, folks
> > >>
> > >>             Martin
> > >>
> > >>             ______________________________**____________
> > >>             _____
> > >>             xmca mailing list
> > >>             xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > >>
> > >>             http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
> > >>
> > >>             ______________________________**____________
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>             > _____
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>             xmca mailing list
> > >>             xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > >>
> > >>             http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
> > >>
> > >>             ______________________________**____________
> > >>             _____
> > >>             xmca mailing list
> > >>             xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > >>
> > >>             http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
> > >>
> > >>             --
> > >>             ______________________________
> > >>
> > >>             Jennifer A. Vadeboncoeur, Ph.D.
> > >>             Associate Professor
> > >>             The University of British Columbia
> > >>             Faculty of Education
> > >>             2125 Main Mall
> > >>             Library Block 272B
> > >>             Vancouver BC V6T-1Z4
> > >>             http://leap-educ.sites.olt.**ubc.ca/<
> > http://leap-educ.sites.olt.ubc.ca/>
> > >>
> > >>             phone: 1.604.822.9099 <tel:1.604.822.9099>
> > >>             fax: 1.604.822.3302 <tel:1.604.822.3302>
> > >>
> > >>             ______________________________**____________
> > >>             _____
> > >>             xmca mailing list
> > >>             xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > >>
> > >>             http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
> > >>
> > >>             ______________________________**____________
> > >>            _____
> > >>            xmca mailing
> > >>            listxmca@weber.ucsd.eduhttp://**
> > dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/
> > >> **xmca <http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
> > >>            <http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
> > >> >
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>            --
> > >>            ------------------------------
> > >>
> > >>            *Andy Blunden*
> > >>            Joint Editor MCA:
> > http://www.tandfonline.com/**toc/hmca20/18/1<
> > http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/18/1>
> > >>            Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
> > >>            <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/**<
> http://home.mira.net/~andy/**>
> > >
> > >>
> > >>            Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts
> > >>
> > >>            ______________________________**____________
> > >>            _____
> > >>            xmca mailing list
> > >>            xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > >>
> > >>            http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>        ______________________________**____________
> > >>
> > >>        _____
> > >>        xmca mailing list
> > >>        xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > >>
> > >>        http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>    --
> > ------------------------------**------------------------------*
> > >> *------------
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>    *Andy Blunden*
> > >>    Joint Editor MCA: http://www.tandfonline.com/**toc/hmca20/18/1<
> > http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/18/1>
> > >>    Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ <
> > http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/* <http://home.mira.net/~andy/*>
> > >> *>
> > >>
> > >>    Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts
> > >>
> > >>    ______________________________**____________
> > >>    _____
> > >>    xmca mailing list
> > >>    xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > >>    http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > > --
> > > ------------------------------**------------------------------**
> > > ------------
> > > *Andy Blunden*
> > > Joint Editor MCA: http://www.tandfonline.com/**toc/hmca20/18/1<
> > http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/18/1>
> > > Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
> > > Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts
> > >
> > > ______________________________**____________
> > > _____
> > > xmca mailing list
> > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
> > >
> > __________________________________________
> > _____
> > xmca mailing list
> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
> __________________________________________
> _____
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
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