[xmca] Bateson's distinction between digital and analog

[Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>]

I want to reflect on the distinction that Bateson discusses in his
communication theory that seems to be pointing in the same direction as
phenomenology's central notion of "expression"
[Bateson's notions of proto, & deutero, as levels of knowing and how this
connects to David Kellogg's focus on "reversibility" as central to
"self-mastery" also are interesting departures. Also historically situating
the development of his ideas  was fascinating]

Back to the analog/digital distinction.  Bateson is attempting to move from
monads to dyads. This may be a limiting factor from a cultural-historical
perspective but in his exploration of dyadic communication he
proposes that  communicative action has both digital [language] and analog
[the non-verbal]  qualities. What is interesting is his premise that ALL
linguistic practices are always "composing" analog situations "within" [NOT
"in"] linguistic communication.  In other words, with every speech ACT
analogical "context" is re-composing or re-configuring.  The "analog
context" [within dyadic interactions] is always emerging as background FOR
the digital speech act as figure.  I read this distinction and wonder about
how this distinction reflects the phenomenological notion of "expression"
at multiple levels of "intentionality"  Is Bateson's notion of analog share
something in common with phenomenology's notion of "performative
intentionality" as the EXPRESSIVE GROUND [the WITHin of linguistic acts?]

To bring the "abstract" to the "concrete". In my personal relations, if I
"notice" or am "aware" that the analog context is EXPRESSED and FORMED
within each unique act of speaking I will be aware of "movement" as
ground.  From within this perspective the "analog context" is every bit as
dynamic and temporal as the linguistic digital speech act.  There is no
"in" or "container" in which to "put" the speech act.  There is only
gestalten as the "ground" [analog] is as dynamic as the
"figure".  Communicative action therefore is as fundamentally EXPRESSIVE as
it is PREDICATIVE.  The reasons and justifications of speech acts are
ALWAYS EXPRESSIONS forming contexts and all "epistemological knowing" is
intersubjective and relationally configuring both analog and digital
phenomena.

As a counsellor I can "bracket" [but never reduce] and attempt to make
"explicit" [to my awareness] the "expressive ground" of all speech acts.  I
can also RESPOND or ANSWER to the analog message rather than the digital
message.  This form of responding "brackets" the linguistic in order to be
more sensitive to the analog.  In this sense, shifting the figure and
ground of communicative action illuminates [visual metaphor or mind as
seeing] the EXPRESSIVE or ERFORMATIVE intentionality which is usually the
implicit analogical BACKground to our explicit linguistic utterances.

I'm not sure if I'm operating within my own "private" language" and
loosing  "common ground" but it is my attempt to express my sense that
EXPRESSIVE intersubjective dialogical movement is a fundamental aspect or
"part" of the cultural historical gestalten.  "Part" as metaphor for "cell"
that expresses the gestalten.

Larry
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