Chapter II
Typological Analysis of Regularities in Experiencing

1. CONSTRUCTION OF A TYPOLOGY OF "LIVED WORLDS"

The general aim of this work is to elaborate theoretical concepts of experiencing. In relation to this aim, the point of the preceding chapter was to prepare the ground: we have introduced the concept of experiencing into the range of categories operative within the psychological theory of activity; we have demarcated the area of psychological reality appropriate to that concept, and we have shown how this reality is reflected in already existing conceptions. Thus we now have, on the one hand, an exceedingly abstract idea of experiencing in terms of activity theory, and on the other, some notion of corresponding empirical field, in the form of an array of facts, generalisations, distinctions, classifications and suppositions concerning the regularities of experiencing processes. The task now is to try and bring the basic abstractions of activity theory to bear upon this empirical scene, i.e., to carry a systematic "ascent" from the abstract to the concrete.

* * *

Experiencing, taken in the most abstract sense, is a struggle against the impossibility of living, in a certain sense it is a struggle against death in life. Naturally not everything in life that dies, or is threatened, requires experiencing — only that which is essential, significant, a matter of principle for the given form of life, that which forms its internal necessities. If one could isolate and describe particular forms of life and establish their immanent laws or "principles", then clearly those laws would essentially determine not only the "normal" life processes, but also the life processes taking place in extremity, that is, the processes of experiencing. In other words, for each form of life
there is a corresponding type of experiencing, and once this is so, in order to elucidate the fundamental regularities of experiencing processes we must first establish the fundamental psychological regularities of life and typologise the “forms of life”. The construction of such a general typology is the immediate task of this first section of our present chapter.

The Concept of Life and Activity
Within A.N. Leontiev’s Theory

If we are to perform our task, we must first analyse the category of life itself, as it appears to the psychologist. Within the terms of reference of the activity theory, analysis of this, the ultimate, category for the psychologist has to be made in close connection with the theory's own central category—activity (and indeed this has already to some extent been done by A.N. Leontiev [156]).

In Leontiev’s work, the concept of activity first appears (as regards logical construction, that is, not first chronologically) in the context of a discussion of the concept of life in its most general biological meaning, “in its universal form” [ibid., p. 37], where life is defined as “a specific interaction of bodies organised in a specific way” [ibid., p. 27]. The specificity of this interaction, as distinct from interactions within inanimate nature, is that it represents an essential condition of existence for one of the bodies interacting (the living body), and further that it is of an active and object-oriented nature. The specific processes which make up this side of the interaction are the processes of activity [ibid., p. 39]. “Activity is a unit of the substance of life, not of something added to it...” [152, p. 81]. This definition of Leontiev's is valid for prepsychological life, and for life mediated by psychological reflection, and for human life mediated by consciousness. But in this last case “life” may be understood in two ways, and there are, correspondingly, two concepts of activity. When life is viewed in a non-individualised manner, as an abstract “human life in general”, activity is seen as the essence of that life and as the material from which individual existence is made up. When the life under consideration is a concrete, individualised, finite life-span (e.g., as presented in a biography), as “a totality, or better a system, of activities following in succession one upon another” [ibid.], then the word “unit”, applied to activity in the original definition of life, has to be understood as “a part”: a life as a whole consists of parts which are activities. We are no longer speaking of activity in “the general, collective meaning of the concept” [ibid., p. 102], but of particular or separate activities, each of which “corresponds to a particular need, dies away when that need is satisfied, and is reproduced anew...” [ibid.].

The central, key point for the concept of the separate activity is the question of motive. This, which may at first sight seem a subsidiary matter, in fact proves to be of decisive importance for the activity theory, the central nerve, as it were, crystallising the main ontological and methodological concepts of the theory. The idea of motive which Leontiev introduced—“understanding motive to be the object (material or ideal) which stimulates activity, directing the latter upon itself”—is, as he noted himself, “different from that generally accepted” [ibid.]. It evoked a flood of critical comment, some of it suggesting slight corrections and some rejecting the idea outright [9; 45; 277 et al.]. The most direct cause of this lack of acceptance was that commentators saw the thesis not as a meaningful abstraction but as a generalisation from empirically observed facts on stimulation of activity, to be verified by direct reference to those facts. If in the process of such reference even one fact appeared which did not fit in with the idea of activity being stimulated by an object corresponding to a need, then the idea could be discarded as not in accord with the facts, or at the most not fully satisfactory.

And there are plenty of such facts. Really, run the protests addressed to Leontiev, how can an external object (object in the sense of something external, present and apparent to the subject, not necessarily a material object) in itself suffice to stimulate the individual to activity? Does not the individual first have to perceive the object, before it (and “it” by that time is no longer the object itself, but its mental image) can have a motivating effect upon him? And even the mental image of the object is far from enough to produce activity on the part of the individual. For that to happen, one must actually have the need to which the object corresponds, otherwise living beings would immediately, upon meeting with an object of need, set about satisfying the need, whether or not this was called for at the given moment—and this contradicts the facts of what actually happens [277]. Furthermore, an objective accentuation of a need must somehow be reflected in the mind, otherwise a person would be unable to give preference to any one of all the
activities possible [44; 277]. And lastly, the final event in this series of reflections must be the making of a connection between two mental images — the image of the need and the image of the corresponding object. Only when all this has been accomplished will stimulation take place, and the stimulating agent therefore is not the object itself but its significance for the subject. Thus runs the argument advanced against Leontiev.

One can sum up the general conclusion of these objections in the following counter-thesis: an object of need is not in itself capable of stimulating and directing activity on the part of a person, i.e., is not the motive of activity [9]. Although it is possible to advance a counter-argument against the counter-thesis by pointing to the facts of what is known as "field behaviour", where things themselves apparently cause a person to act, this counter-argument is not decisive. In the first place, on purely logical grounds: Leontiev's formula is after all laying claim to be generally valid, whereas "field behaviour" is just one class of processes in activity. Secondly, because "field behaviour" itself can be variously interpreted, and one of the possible interpretations is that it comes into operation not through the action exerted by an object itself but as a result of the subject's perception of it (and how could it be otherwise?) — the perception presumably stimulating the corresponding need, which in its turn is expressed in the mind as, say, an immediate desire to possess the object perceived. The illusion that the object itself is a sufficient initiating agent is produced because its significance is concealed [108].

And if stimulation even in the case of "field behaviour", which might seem to be the case most amenable to explanation by Leontiev's formula, is seen on closer inspection to be mediated by various reflections of object and of need, what then are we to say of behaviour stemming from voluntary decision or conscious calculation, where absence of direct stimulation by an object is obvious?

If, then, we consider the formula that the motive of activity is an object which corresponds to a need of the individual as an attempt to generalise from the entire fund of empirical observations on stimulation of activity — then it would appear that the formula will not stand up to criticism.

But the whole point is that this formula is of quite another order. Its claims are quite different, its status in logic is quite different, from those tacitly attributed to it by criticisms of the sort just described. That is to say: it does not claim to take in the full variety of possible facts pertaining to stimulation of individual activity; its logical nature is that of an abstraction, and an abstraction of a fairly high order at that, i.e., a statement from which a long road of theoretical "ascent" must be travelled to bring us to concrete cases. That is not to say that the statement itself, before any "ascent" is made, does not contain some concrete truth; the formula under discussion, like any abstract law, does coincide with the actual or concrete state of affairs, but only when certain conditions are fulfilled [cf. 165].

If we are to establish what these conditions are, we must describe the ontology which provides the basis for Leontiev's theory of activity and his conception of motivation — an ontology which is the exact opposite of that attributed to his conception by his critics for in its context his understanding would indeed be inadequate. These two ontologies may be provisionally called: "the ontology of the lived world", and "the ontology of the isolated individual".

For the latter, the situation taken as primary for subsequent theoretical development is one where you have, on the one hand, a separate being isolated from the world, and, on the other hand, objects, or more precisely things, existing "in themselves". The space between them, empty and contentless, only keeps them apart from one another. Subject and object are both thought of as existing from the beginning and as intrinsically definite, prior to and independently of any practical connection between them; they are independent natural entities. Activity, which brings about a practical connection between subject and object, is still in the future; in order to commence, it must be sanctioned while the primary situation of separation between subject and object still prevails.

The cognitive image provides the basis for all classical psychology and is the source of its fundamental ontological postulates ("immediacy" [270], "conformity" [202; 204], identity of consciousness and mind, self-identity of the individual) and of its methodological principles.

The way in which activity is understood, within the "isolated individual" ontology, is directly defined by the "postulate of conformity" [202; 204], according to which any activity of the subject is of an individual-adaptive nature. If subject and object (or, strictly speaking, individual and thing) are laid down in the primary ontological figuration as separate and independent one of another, then the "conformity" of activity — introduced
at the next stage — can be seen as based on either one of two quite opposite mechanisms.

The first possibility, followed up in conceptions with a cognitive orientation, can in its most extreme and highly rationalised form be reduced to a view that activity is based on calculation. Even the emotion-based variant of this idea (the basis of action is feeling) still retains the main cognitivist thesis: activity is sanctioned by mental reflection (rational or emotional). The reflection precedes the activity; subject and object are first linked by exploratory procedures within the subject’s mind, aimed at discovering the significance of the object, and only thereafter does the activity take place which links them in practice. The model followed in description of each and every behavioural process is here, whether intentionally or not, the goal-directed, voluntary, conscious activity of a human adult.

The second possibility, characteristic for reflexology and behaviourism, is given its most clear-cut expression in B.F. Skinner’s radical behaviourism. The “conformity” of behaviour is here explained as follows: it is supposed that the subject is endowed, in advance of individual experience, with ways of reacting which were fully pre-formed prior to any active contact with the environment and independently of it, which are not altered in their ontogenesis, and which are “put out”, ready-made, into the environment by the organism. The “conformity” of behaviour composed of such motor “outputs” is not explained by the individual having once achieved success in such-and-such a situation by such-and-such a reaction and then operating in the same way in a similar situation, anticipating the same result. A reaction always remains a blind, random trial, there are no grounds for ascribing to it any inner direction towards a goal, or any mediation by mental reflection of the objective connections of the situation. The mechanism of individual adaptation is thus conceived of as analogous to adaptation of species [245]. Reactions, like mutations, happen randomly to prove useful or harmful to the organism; by virtue of this the probability of their repetition is altered, and behaviour acquires an apparently intentional direction, but in fact continues to be an assortment of blind trials “un-elucidated” by any mental reflection. Here any and every subject is thought of on the model of an animal, and an animal at a pretty low evolutionary level at that.\

Which of these ontologies, then, is to be counterposed to the “subject-object” epistemological schema found in classical psychology? The ontology of “the lived world”.*  

Only within the framework of this ontology can A.N. Leontiev’s idea of motivation, outlined above, be properly appreciated and given its rightful place within the activity theory of psychology.

As activity itself is a unit of life, so its main constituent cause — the object of activity — is a unit of the world.

Here we must stress, most insistently, how important it is to make a fundamental distinction, as Leontiev does, between “object” and “thing”. “We must delimit the concept of ‘object,’” he writes. “Usually this concept is employed with a dual meaning — as meaning a thing standing in some relation to other things... and in a narrower meaning, as something standing opposed (Gegenstand in German), something resistant (objektum in Latin), something upon which action is directed (predmet in Russian), i.e., as something which is, in relationship to a living being, that upon which activity is directed (as an ‘object of consumption’, ... ‘object of thought’ and so on)” [156, p. 39]. An object is thus not simply a thing lying outside the life-circuit of the subject, but a thing already absorbed into the subject’s being, which has become an essential feature of that being, has been subjectivised by life process even before any special ideal appropriation (cognitive, exploratory, informational, etc.) takes place.

If we are to get clear the true theoretical meaning of the proposition that the object is the true motive of activity, we must understand that the everyday “obvious fact” of a living creature existing separately from the world cannot serve as an ontological base-point, because nowhere do we find a living creature before and outside of its interconnections with the world. It is from the first “implanted into” the world, linked with it by the material navel-cord of its own life. This world, while still an objective, material entity, is not “the physical world” in the sense which that carries for the science of physics, which studies the interactions of things: this is the lived world. It is the lived world, in fact, which is the sole stimulator and source of content for the creature living in it. That is our primary

* There is a whole string of synonyms for this: “vital ontology”, “ontology of human existence” [223, 225], “life-space”, “psychological space” [130], etc.
ontological picture. When we start from that and begin to construct a psychological theory, and pick out (abstract) a particular activity as the “unit of life” for the subject, then the object of that activity appears, in this abstracted form, not in its own self-sufficiency and self-identity, not as a thing representing itself, but as a “unit” representing the lived world, and it is by virtue of this representative character that the object acquires the status of a motive. To base a psychological theory on the statement that the object is the motive of activity is to start from the conviction that life is ultimately determined by the world. At this initial stage of theoretical construction there is no differentiation of actual functions performed by the motive (stimulation of activity, direction of activity, formation of meaning), we are not yet speaking of the various forms of ideational mediations involved in the initiation and regulation of concrete activity on the part of an actual, concrete person— that will all transpire later, that is not what we start from but what we will come to, “ascending” from the abstract to the concrete.

The proposition about motive which we have been discussing is in methodological status an abstraction from which this “ascent” is to be made.

We have already shown how activity is deduced from an “isolated individual” ontology, one where subject and object are disunited. We now have the essential basis for establishing the conditions whereby the concept of activity can be deduced from a “vital” ontology. Bearing in mind what has been said above, the task can be formulated as follows: what must the conditions and characteristics of a lived world be, if the abstract idea of activity as a process stimulated by the object of need — that object in itself — is to be realisable, i.e., is to coincide with a concrete activity.

CONSTRUCTION OF A TYPOLOGY OF “LIVED WORLDS”

The first and basic of such conditions is simplicity of the lived world. Life can in principle consist of many interlinked activities. But it is also quite possible to conceive of a creature having only one single need, one single relation to the world. The internal world of such a creature will be simple, the whole of its life will consist of one activity.

For such a creature no knowledge of the dynamics of its own need is necessary. For the need, being the one and only need, will in principle be insatiable [cf. 70] and therefore always operative: for such a creature the process of need satisfaction is the same thing as living, so that psychologically it cannot be completed (though it may of course come to an end; but its ending would be equivalent to death).

If we further assume the external world of our hypothetical creature to be easy, i.e., consisting of one single object (or more precisely, one object quality), which forms a kind of “nourishing broth” that corresponds exactly to the need of the creature and is in continuous, direct contact with it, enfolding it — then no ideational reflection of it in the mind is needed before that object can stimulate and direct the activity of the individual.

A simple internal world and an easy external world constitute the conditions or characteristics we were seeking, given which the formula of activity being stimulated directly by the object of need is fulfilled to the letter.

If we complement these characteristics of the lived world—simplicity and ease — by their opposites, complexity and difficulty, we then have two pairs of opposed categories, one of which

* To make this clearer: if we were speaking of, say, the law governing free fall of (solid) bodies, we would have to discover the physical conditions under which this law precisely describes what happens in empirical cases of bodies falling [cf. 165].
(simple — complex) refers to the internal world, and the other
(easy — difficult) to the external. These categories, counterposed,
give us a typology of lived worlds or forms of life—the conclusion
which our argument was intended to arrive at.

This typology is structured as follows: the object of analysis is
the “lived world”. This has external and internal aspects, denoted
in the figure as “external world” and “internal world”. The exter-
nal world can be either easy or difficult. The internal world can
be either simple or complex. The intersections of these categories
give us four possible states, or types of lived world.

Before proceeding to a step-by-step interpretation of the
typology thus obtained, we should discuss in more detail the
categories determining it.

The concept of the “lived world” has probably had more
attention devoted to it by Kurt Lewin than by any other
psychologist. Since Lewin was so deeply concerned with the
problem of transforming psychology into an exact science
based on principles of reasoning “like Galileo’s” [165], it is no
surprise to find that the most important thing for him, in matters of
the psychological world, was the question of whether or not it
is an enclosed world, i.e., is it possible to use the laws prevail-
ing within it to explain any situation S₁ from the preceding situ-
ation S₀ (or conversely, to predict from any S₀ the subsequent
S₁). Lewin held that the psychological world, unlike the physi-
cal, does not meet this requirement, and is in consequence an
open world. In other words, the physical world has nothing
outside of itself: knowing in totality the situation in the physical
world and all the laws of physics governing it, it would be pos-
sible (so Lewin considers) to predict all the changes due to
happen in it, for nothing from outside can interfere with the
course of the physical processes determined once and for all
by the laws of physics. But beyond the bounds of a given
psychological world there is an external, transgressed reality
which acts upon it, interfering in the course of psychological
processes, and it is therefore impossible either fully to explain
or to predict events in the psychological world by means of
psychological laws alone. An example given by Lewin [166]: if
someone is writing a letter to a friend, and suddenly the door
opens and the friend himself appears, these two psychological
situations, while following one upon the other, are so related

that it is impossible either to predict or to explain the second
in terms of the first.

But does not this openness of the psychological world make
it impossible to see it as “a world” at all?—how can you have
an independent world, if events within it are influenced by
processes that do not obey the laws governing it? The concept
can only be saved if one can envisage a world which dynamically
is not enclosed, but within which a strict determinism obtains
nonetheless [166]. To solve this problem Lewin puts forward
mathematical arguments to demonstrate the possibility of closed
fields which stilt, like open fields, are in contact at all
points, central as well as peripheral, with external space: for
instance, a plane placed in three-dimensional space, or more
generally, n-dimensional space placed in (n + 1)-dimensional
space [ibid.].

One may feel that formalism of that kind does not really
solve the problem Lewin has set himself, of demonstrating the
possibility of strict determinism within a dynamically un-
enclosed psychological world. Discussion of the content of the
matter is much more important. It should be mentioned that
in Lewin’s reasoning on the physical world there is a vital in-
accuracy (in spite of the fact that he himself saw the danger of
it)—that of implicitly identifying the physical world and nature
as a whole, the universe. The presence of such things as build-
ings and biocenoses, which undoubtedly have physical exist-
ence, can be described in terms of the physical processes that
put them there, but cannot be either explained or predicted as
inevitable by even the absolute knowledge of all physical laws,
in spite of the fact that these laws were in no way infringed
when these things came into existence. So according to Lewin’s
own yardstick of “predictability” the physical world, like the
psychological, is open, i.e., it can be acted upon by influences
from non-physical realms whose regularities cannot be grasped
by the physical view of reality. But such influence operates in
entirely physical ways, in accord with physical laws, by physical
means only, and in this regard—in view of the absence from
the physical world of events and phenomena alien to it—it is
closed, without anything external, since any process of another
order, having no physical embodiment, leaves no trace upon
the physical world, does not affect it.

In just the same way the lived world, or psychological world,
of a given being is simultaneously both open and closed. The
psychological world knows nothing non-psychological; nothing

* For Lewin the concepts “psychological world”, “life-space” and “lived
world” are synonymous.
alien to it or of another order can appear within it. But in the psychological world there appear from time to time special phenomena (difficulty and pain, in particular) which though entirely psychological and appertaining strictly to the reality of life do, as it were, give a nod in the direction of something non-psychological, something to which the given lived world could not itself give rise. Through these phenomena something looks in upon the psychological world which transcends that world, something "from the other side", but it does so having already donned the mask of a psychological fact, having adopted psychological citizenship as it were, and thus having achieved the status of a fact of life. Only the obverse side of these phenomena gives pressing hints of some independently existing, alien order which does not obey the laws of the given lived world.

Phenomena of this kind may be provisionally referred to as "border-line" factors, they constitute the external aspect of the lived world, they as it were lay the basis from which springs realistic perception of external reality.

In other words, the phenomena of difficulty and pain bring into the originally homogeneous psychological world a differentiation between what is internal and what is external, or to be more exact, the external appears within the psychological world in the phenomena of difficulty and pain.

Here it should be especially noted that in speaking of the difficulty of external world we shall be referring not only to the experience* caused by it, but to difficulty as an actual characteristic of the world; not of the world "in itself" of course, not of the world before and apart from the individual's existence, but of the world as "a fraction where the divisor is the subject", the world seen through the prism of the individual's life and activity, for difficulty can be discovered in the world only through activity, there is no other way.

Up to now we have been viewing matters phenomenologically, as if standing inside life and seeing the world from there, with its eyes. Seen from the outside, "easiness" in the external aspect of a lived world appears as full provision (to the creature concerned) for all life processes, direct availability of all objects of need, while "difficulty" is seen as the presence of obstacles to the attainment of objects of need.

The internal aspect of the psychological world (or the internal world) means the internal structure of life, the organisation, conjunction and mutual interconnection of the separate units of life. (Here we are departing from organic, natural, purely biological connections between needs.) For the sake of convenience, simplicity of the internal world was brought into the argument — and will in the main continue to figure there — as meaning its uniformity; but in fact this kind of lived world, which has one "unit" only, is just one variant of the world which is, internally, simple. Strictly speaking, simplicity should be understood as meaning absence of supra-organic structuring and conjunction of separate life instances. Even when a person has many relationships with the world, his internal world may remain simple, if for him those relationships run together into a subjectively undifferentiated, single whole, or if the relationships are totally disconnected, each one being actualised by the individual as if it were the only one. In the first case, the psychological world is a whole without parts, in the second it consists of parts without a whole.

We have now been through the categories employed to give us our types of lived world. We should now pause to consider one point concerning the way in which these types are described. Each lived world will be classified primarily in terms of its space-time organisation. And since we are distinguishing between the internal and the external aspects of the lived world, we shall accordingly be separately describing external and internal time-space (or the external and internal aspects of the lived world's integral time-space).

We must here introduce some conventional expressions used in the description of time-space. So far as its external aspect is concerned, the main characteristic noted will be presence or absence of "extension", here used to denote spatial distance (of objects of need) and duration of time required to cover that distance. "Extension", clearly, is a transference to the time-space dimension of the "difficulty" concept, or the expression of that concept in time-space categories: for whatever the actual difficulties in life may be — whether goods are out of reach spatially, or concealed, or blocked off by obstacles — they all come to the same thing in that they mean the individual's needs cannot be directly satisfied, they require the individual to make efforts to overcome them; thus they can all be reduced to one conventional scale of measurement — "extension".

The internal aspect of time-space refers to the degree of structure found in the internal world, i.e., presence or absence of "conjunction", by which we mean subjective integration of different units of life. "Conjunction" is expressed in the inter-
connection of different life relations within internal space. In respect of time, “conjunction” means subjective links of conseq-ecution between actualisations of various relationships. Extension, distance, duration, conjunction, connection, consecution—these are all terms we shall be using to describe the time and space of the lived world.

And to conclude with, one last preliminary consideration. We are to view each of the types in the typology suggested above both as a representation of a particular section of psychological reality, and at the same time as a pattern to assist understanding. These patterns are strictly defined, formally speaking, by the categories determining them, but can at the same time be filled with living phenomenological content. These two aspects taken together make our types into uniquely useful instruments in psychological thinking. Types are something like living models which, while clearly endowed with psychological reality, can be effectively used for cognitive purposes thanks to the definiteness from the categorical point of view.

2. Type 1. THE INTERNALLY SIMPLE AND EXTERNALLY EASY LIVED WORLD

Description of the Lived World

The world that is internally simple and externally easy can be visualised if we imagine a creature having one single need, and living under conditions which make object of that need directly available. If we suppose the single need to be for nourishment, then absolute “ease” of the external world would be assured if fully prepared nourishing substances were conveyed directly from it into the creature’s organism. There is in this case no distance, no activity, separating need and object, the two are in direct contact.

The external world is tailor-made to fit the life of our creature, having neither too much nor too little of anything needed for its life; it can be “divided” by that life without remainder. The external world is in its nature one with the lived world, consequently in this psychological world there are none of the special phenomena which would announce, within the psychological world, the existence of an external world, and so would serve as a kind of frontier between them. The lived world and the external world are fused together, so that an observer from the subject’s view-point would not see the world and would consider the creature itself substantive, i.e., a being not requiring another being for its existence [253], while an observer from the standpoint of the world would not single out any creature from it and would see what V.I. Vernadsky [274] calls “living substance”.

The life of the subject in such a world is naked being, being completely open to the world. Strictly speaking one cannot call such a creature a subject, for it exercises no activity and therefore does not distinguish itself from its object. Its existence is a pure culture of life-activity wrapped in endless bliss, primary living or vitality.

Let us now describe the space and time of this lived world. “Ease” in respect of space-time has to be seen as absence of any “extension” in the world’s external aspect, i.e., there is no distance in space and no duration of time. The first of these conditions can be expressed phenomenologically by saying that for the creature living in this world there is no “there”, all external space is reduced to one point, “here on the spot”; while the second condition reduces all external time to “now, at once”. So the phenomenological structure appropriate to the external aspect of the creature described can be indicated by the expression “on the spot-and-at once”.3

The simplicity of the internal world, or absence of any “conjunction” between separate points of internal space-time, i.e., between actualisation of separate relations by the individual, makes these relations into absolutely separate entities, completely particularised and utterly blind to one another. In other words simplicity (and even more so uniformity, one of its variants) of the internal world means total absorption in the life relation being realised, total attachment to the given point in space and time. Furthermore, there is in internal space no subjective connection between its different areas, which phenomenologically is expressed in the abolition (or non-existence) of any “that” and “other than”, there being only an all-sufficient “this” (or “one”). So far as internal time is concerned, it is without any sequential connections, i.e., any relation of “now” to “later” as regards its separate points. The present point or moment, outside any idea of “before” and “after”, i.e., devoid of future and of past, has no knowledge of its own end, its own boundary in time, and is therefore apprehended from within, phenomenologically as “always” (or