[xmca] Re: reflections on discourse & activity

[Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>]

I have time to add a quote from Anna that may add to this post.  Anna is
contrasting the 3rd stage of concept formation [reification] with the first
stage [interiorization] and the second stage [condensation]  Anna states,

If the structural approach is more abstract than the operational [approach
to learning], if from the philosophical point of view numbers and functions
are bascically nothing but processes, if doing things, is the only way to
somehow "get in touch" with abstract constructs - if all this is true, then
to expect that a person would arrive at a structural conception [thought]
without previous operational understanding seems as unreasonable, as hoping
that he or she would comprehend the two-dimensional scheme of a cube without
being acquainted with its "real-life" three-dimensional model. ....

The condensation phase lasts as long as a new entity remains tightly
connected to a certain process. Only when a person becomes capable of
conceiving the notion as a fully-fledged object, we shall say that the
concept has been reified. REIFICATION, therefore, is defined as an
ontological shift, a sudden ability to see something familiar in a totally
new light [perspective]. Thus, whereas interiorization and condensation are
gradual, quantitative rather than qualitative changes, reification is an
instantaneous quantum leap; a process solidifies into object, into a static
structure.  Various representations OF the concept become semantically
unified by this abstract, PURELY IMAGINARY construct. The new entity is soon
detached from the process which produced it and begins to draw its meaning
from the fact of its being a member of  a certain category.  At some point
this category, rather than any kind of concrete construction becomes the
ultimate base for claims on the new object's existence [perceptually real]
{The bracketed comments I've added}

This quote from Anna, and the quote from John Shotter, are points of
reflection on seeing, showing, performing. knowing as EXPRESSIVE COGNITION
[communication] that is dialogical and intersubjective.

Larry
PS I can email Anna's article if requested



On Tue, Jul 5, 2011 at 7:44 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:

> Hi Andy, Anna, and others interested in talking and thinking
>
> The notion of "communication" as a central basic concept for the human
> sciences is a topic that seems endlessly fascinating.  I've recently been
> trying to understand Anna's 3 step process for concept formation. [1
> Interiorization, 2 Condensation and 3 Reification] which seems to go in the
> direction from analysis to synthesis.  I have also been exploring
> Merleau-Ponty's notions of going from the synaesthetic to the analytic.
> There seems to be a chiasmatic intertwining which is a term from
> Merleau-Ponty that is now being further elaborated by John Shotter.  I
> recently went to John's website and was fascinated to see the path of his
> concept development.  I was intrigued because he has written books about
> Vygotsky, Wittgenstein, Bahktin, and Merleau-Ponty.  I plan to spend more
> time "conversing" with John. Following is an example of the project John is
> developing.
>
> In an earlier article [Shotter, *New Ideas in Psychology*, *11*, 61–75
> (1993)], Vygotsky's account of internalization was reinterpreted from within
> both an ethical and a rhetorical perspective. It was argued that rather than
> having a mechanical and systematic character, our ‘inner lives’ function in
> essentially the same communicative terms as our ordinary, everyday
> transactions with other people out in the world. Here, this account is
> further extended. Making use of Bakhtin's writings, it is claimed that
> instead of functioning in terms of already well-formed mental
> representations at the centre of our being, awaiting codification in words,
> our mental activities are only ‘given form’ at the time of their expression,
> in a moment by moment process of ‘ethically sensitive negotiation’ at the
> boundaries of our being. This gives rise to a nonreferential, responsive
> view of speech, and suggests that what we speak of as our selves or as our
> ideas, rather than being real origins, or extralinguistic points of
> reference ‘outside’ of our discourses, are created as a part of them. In
> other words, presented here is a cognitive psychology without mental
> representations.
>
> This quote explores Anna's central notion of communication and cognition
> being two sides of the same coin. It also captures Merleau-Ponty's central
> notion of "expressive" cognition. These themes are exploring
> "intersubjectivity" as a dialogical process as the basic, fundamental,
> genesis of the human sciences.
>
>
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