[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

RE: [xmca] Six key points on sociocultural models of development



Thanks, Larry. This certainly helps clarify your sources and then some. All
very interesting.

-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
Behalf Of Larry Purss
Sent: Thursday, June 23, 2011 10:03 PM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Six key points on sociocultural models of development

Hi Monica

The specific reference to chiasm I did reference from Rupert Wegerif's
article which is titled

"Dialogical or dialectic? The Significance of Ontological Assumtions in
Research on Educational dialogue in the British Educational Research
Journal, 34, 3, p347-361.

 There is another article by Felder in the most recent copy of the journal
Theory & Psychology which also was very helpful

I also am reading a book by Lawrence Hass, titled "Merleau-Ponty's
Philosophy published in 2008 [on Kindle]

The general idea of  "recognizing difference" as the location of meaning is
a theme I've struggled to understand in Levina's work.

Lawrence Hass' book is trying to contrast Merleau-Ponty's notion of
"expressive cognition" [thinking, knowing, and language] as an alternative
to the perspective of cognition as "representation"  Merleau-Ponty is
attempting a re-conceptualization of our notions of cognition that is rooted
in nature and is essentially creative acts of expression.  Merleau-Ponty
does accept that thought and language do sometimes represent but this
representational process is based upon creative cognition.  Merleau-Ponty's
position assumes that the representational definition OF thought and
language mistakes a second order DERIVATIVE possibility for the PRIMARY
intersubjective process of expressive transformation.  Merleau-Ponty's
account of expressive cognition is an extension of his perceptual
figure/ground ontology.  Lawrence Hass believes that contemporary scholar's
attempts to elaborate on M-P's perceptual ontology has been elaborated at
the cost of overlooking his account of expressive cognition.  Hass' book is
an attempt to rectify the imbalance.

Monica, Hass also articulates that the assumption that "Phenomenology" is
introspective and subjective is a misunderstanding of the method of
phenominological "reason". Phenomenology is a way of arguing, reasoning, and
persuading, and reaching conclusions. However it functions differently than
deduction and induction. The method directs our attention to our worldly
experience, to SHOW us something, to help us notice and see something
specific through using evocative language that is descriptive and
metaphorical of our living experiences.  Hass uses the example of chess . We
can teach chess by defining propositions, or the teacher can pick up a rook
and SHOW how it moves relative to the board and the learner GETS it. He
passes from non-understanding to understanding. This is a passage from
non-seeing to seeing as a FORM OF INFERENCE, a way of REASONING.  Through
showing the premises we MOVE OTHERS toward a desired RECOGNITION [the
conclusion]  Words and language are gestures to evoke awareness of what we
want the other to understand.  As with any form of inference awareness is
NOT automatic and this type of showing can be flawed. There are better and
worse phenomenological showings determined by their success in having the
other grasp what is shown.  There can be errors in this method as there are
errors in inductive and deductive reasoning.  Phenomenology's showings can
be critiqued in the same way that inductive and deductive reasoning can be
critiqued but Hass suggests it must be criticized on ITS OWN TERMS. [as
should deduction and induction]  Phenomenology is a particular mode of
reasoning [inference]

Hass emphasizes as a method of reasoning, there is nothing essentially
subjectivistic in this method of inference. [This is in contrast to
Husserl's notion of phenomenology as a subjective ontology]  However it does
not follow from Husserl that the method is equivalent to subjectivism. Hass
cautions us not to slide from a method of reasoning to a particular
ontological outlook. [this is a category error]  For Merleau-Ponty being in
the world is being in history and culture as essentially intersubjective
recognition TOWARDS others.
Merleau-Ponty's perceptual ontology is called "perceptual realism" or
"experiential realism"

Monica, I hope this helps clarify some of my sources.

Larry



On Wed, Jun 22, 2011 at 1:51 PM, Monica Hansen <
monica.hansen@vandals.uidaho.edu> wrote:

> Hi, Larry and Andy.
>
> Sorry to just jump in so randomly, but this connection you talk about,
> Larry, has got me thinking. Merleau-Ponty's use of the term chiasm, you
> report as coming from the use of the term in grammar? Is this all in the
> Rupert Wegerif piece? Does Merleau-Ponty connect this at all, to the
> physiology of the perception? Can you point me in the direction of these
> references, if it's not a bother?
>
> Thanks,
> Monica
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
> Behalf Of Larry Purss
> Sent: Wednesday, June 22, 2011 6:26 AM
> To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: Re: [xmca] Six key points on sociocultural models of development
>
> Hi Andy
>
> Yes that helps, and recognition may have its roots in early Hegel.  You
> mention that MOST of the discussion of recognition is postmodern and
leaves
> out mediation.. You state
>
>
> More recent trends of recognition readings or Hegel - "intersubjectivity"
-
> just don't know or care about the notion of mediation. The self is not
> split
> as it is for Hegel and Mead, but body and soul are merged into one
> integrated subject. IMHO the whole process relies on some mysterious
> interpsychic process, and is simply reflective of the postmodern condition
> of individual powerlessness.
>
> Andy, I'm new to the ins and outs of the various ways scholars are
> constructing and deconstructing notions of mediation and dialogue.  But I
> do
> sense that these themes and how they intersect are central topics as we go
> forward.  Martin's article locating "desire FOR recognition" as one of the
> six themes as we articulate a sociocultural perspective is giving me the
> "permission" [I give myself in recognition that "recognition" is a viable
> topic on this forum] and how it intersects with mediation.
>
> I want to bring in an author, Rupert Wegerif" into the conversation.  I
met
> him on line [reading his articles] in a dialogical "space" as he engages
> with notions of recognition.  In the section to follow he is linking up
> Merleau-Ponty with Bahktin. [google scholar lists many of his articles]
>
> Merleau-Ponty has developed the notion of CHIASM.  The word chiasm is
> borrowed from grammar where it refers to the reversibility of the subject
> and the object in a sentence. This term is extended by Merleau-Ponty to
> refer to the mutual envelopment and reversibility BETWEEN two total
> perspectives on the world.  There is an UNBRIDGEABLE gap or "hinge" which
> is
> also an OPENING of meaning.
> This concept of chiasm is linked to Merleau-Ponty's visual [perceptual]
> account of the difference BETWEEN figure and ground, the idea that bounded
> things or objects stand out from and are DEFINED against an implicit
> background [fly-bottles, horizons,]  As a person stands forth in a
> landscape
> a horizon instantly forms around them but at the same time as the person's
> gaze precipitates THIS horizon they also experience themselves PLACED as
an
> object within their horizon AS IF the unsituated gaze of the horizon was
> looking at them and locating them within it..  Merleau-Ponty refers to
> these
> two sides, LOOKING in and LOOKING out as a "chiasm" in a figure/ground
> ontology.
>
> Rupert then links Merleau-Ponty's notion of chiasm to Bahktin, quoting
> Bahktin:
>
> "Thought ABOUT the world and thought IN the world. Thought striving to
> embrace the world and thought experiencing itself in the world AS PART OF
> IT. An EVENT in the world and participation in it.  The world as an event
> (and not as existence in ready-made form)" [Bahktin, 1986, p.162 my
> emphasis]
>
> Andy, Bahktin's notion of voice where my voice [perspective] is in the
> others voice and the others voice [perspective]  is in my voice AS
> DIFFERENCE that requires a "space" or "landscape" of BETWEENNESS that
> contains or holds the differences [and never finds identity [ A=A] linked
> with  Merleau-Ponty's figure/ground notion of chiasm is the theme of
> recognition I'm playing with.  I'm not sure if these notions are
> "postmodern" and reflect some mysterious "interpsychic" ideality but they
> are food for thought going forward.
>
> Larry
>
> On Wed, Jun 22, 2011 at 12:03 AM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>
> > Larry, as I see it, the idea of desire for recognition originated in the
> > Young Hegel's master-slave dialectic, but that was of course just the
> > beginning.
> >
> > Hegel's original version dealt with the confrontation between two
> subjects
> > for which there exists no mediation at all. This is a very strange
> > circumstance, but a scenario Hegel needed in order to expound his idea
of
> > modernity and the state. It could refer to two peoples coming into
> contact
> > for the first time, e.g. colonialism, or a brand new social movement
> > confronting the establishment. The two subjects manage to mediate their
> > interaction by each splitting in two, their needs and the means of their
> > satisfaction become differentiated, and mediation happens by the needs
> (or
> > labour) of one mediating between the needs and labour of the other. One
> or
> > another vesion, successively attenuated appears in every version of
> Hegel's
> > system.
> >
> > In a 1805 version of his system, he envisage the circulation of the
> > products of labour on the market as a form of recognition. But both the
> > fire-and-brimstone version in the Phenomenolohgy and the commodity
> version
> > are attenuated in later works. In the Philosophy of Right, recognition
> > happens via self-organised professional associations, the family, local
> > quasi-state organisations and so on - some kind of participatory
> democracy.
> > He explicitly warns against taking the master-servant relation as
> relevant
> > to life within a nation-state. But in his Subjective Spirit, he takes
the
> > relation of Recognition as the foundation of self-consciousness and the
> > emergence of intellect.
> >
> > GH Mead based his I/Me dialectic explicitly on Hegel's master-slave
> > relation, in as much as it relies on the self-sundering of the person
> into
> > subject and object, but without all the fire and brimstone.
> >
> > More recent trends of recognition readings or Hegel -
"intersubjectivity"
> -
> > just don't know or care about the notion of mediation. The self is not
> split
> > as it is for Hegel and Mead, but body and soul are merged into one
> > integrated subject. IMHO the whole process relies on some mysterious
> > interpsychic process, and is simply reflective of the postmodern
> condition
> > of individual powerlessness.
> >
> > Hope that helps Larry.
> >
> > Andy
> >
> >
> > Larry Purss wrote:
> >
> >> Gregory, thanks for this reference on the topic of desire for
> recognition.
> >>
> >> My question to Martin was my attempt to understand our fundamental need
> >> for
> >> recognition, [self/other], and how this fundamental need is transformed
> by
> >> cultural-historical institutional arrangements.  As I read Martin's
> >> article
> >> he located the need for recognition as one of the  6 foundational
> >> [ontological?] GROUNDS of the sociocultural perspective.
> >> If the desire for recognition is foundational , then the
> >> dialogical understanding of communication as the relation BETWEEN self
> and
> >> other is primary [not the dialectical resolution of tensions into a new
> >> cognitive synthesis which may be derivative from a more
> >> primary intersubjective relational foundation]  I'm wondering, reading
> >> scholars such as Merleau-Ponty, if mediation of dialogical relational
> >> intersubjectivity, is prior to mediation by material artifacts.
> >>
> >> This question is probably expressing my ignorance of the relation
> between
> >> the notions of tool use and intersubjectivity but how else to get
> clarity?
> >>
> >> In actual practice it may be impossible to separate these two
> mediational
> >> means BUT it seems that the dialogical perspective emphasizes the
> >> mediation
> >> of self/other intersubjective relational being/becoming while mediation
> >> via
> >> tool use emphasizes internalization and cognitive synthesis through
> >> cultural-historical object usage.
> >>
> >> The notion of biosocial niches can accomodate both mediation through
> other
> >> persons AND mediation through artifacts, so really it is not an
> either/or
> >> question but rather a matter of emphasis.  The practical question in
> >> school
> >> settings is how to be aware of the profound desire for recognition of
> all
> >> the persons [students and teachers] which teachers may loose sight of
in
> >> the
> >> focus on developing and internalizing scientific concepts. [which comes
> at
> >> a
> >> cost of transmuted desire for recognition]
> >>
> >> The focus on the intersubjective relational "betweenness" of the
> >> dialogical
> >> perspective seems to emphasize the "desre for recognition"  more than
> the
> >> language of mediated tool use.
> >>
> >> Hesitant to press "send" as I expose my ignorance
> >>
> >>
> >> Larry
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> On Tue, Jun 21, 2011 at 4:20 PM, Gregory Allan Thompson <
> >> gathomps@uchicago.edu> wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>> Larry,
> >>> Merleau-Ponty is certainly a good direction to go with desire and
> >>> recognition.
> >>> For writings on desire and recognition in the more sociological
> >>> tradition,
> >>> you might want to check out W.I. Thomas' The Unadjusted Girl. Section
4
> >>> of
> >>> Chapter 1 (p. 31). Check it out at:
> >>> http://www.brocku.ca/**MeadProject/Thomas/Thomas_**
> >>>
> 1923/Thomas_1923_1.html<
> http://www.brocku.ca/MeadProject/Thomas/Thomas_1923/
> Thomas_1923_1.html>
> >>>
> >>> Best,
> >>> -greg
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Message: 9
> >>> Date: Tue, 21 Jun 2011 07:30:16 -0700
> >>> From: Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> >>> Subject: [xmca] Six key points on sociocultural models of development
> >>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >>> Message-ID:
> <BANLkTimb+b7VV14eCr75T-eZj+**sOwhst-g@mail.gmail.com
> <BANLkTimb%2Bb7VV14eCr7
> 5T-eZj%2BsOwhst-g@mail.gmail.com>
>  >>> >
> >>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
> >>>
> >>> Hi Martin, Mike,
> >>>
> >>> Mike, thanks for the Sinha article on language as a biological niche
> and
> >>> social institution.  I'm working my way through the article.
> >>>
> >>> The concept of affordances within niches draws attention to species
> >>> specific
> >>> forms of meaning AS ......  Gibson on p. 8 of Sinha's article says
> >>> affordances are DIRECTLY PERCEIVED as it potentiates the activation of
> >>> perception-action circuits which form objects as directly perceived
> PARTS
> >>> of
> >>> gestalen [meaningful wholes] or niches.
> >>>
> >>> Martin, I now want to bring in one of the key themes of the six you
> >>> outline
> >>> in your article [I would recommend others read the article Martin
> posted
> >>> on
> >>> the ontology of the sociocultural turn]  This is the theme of "desire
&
> >>> recognition"  You suggest that the first 3 themes are familiar to
> >>> scholars
> >>> working within the sociocultural framework but the last 3 themes are
> more
> >>> outside their horizon of understanding.  Andy recently mentioned
> engaging
> >>> CHAT with Critical theory around the specific topic of recognition.
> >>>
> >>> I'm wondering how central you see the theme of "desire &recognition"
as
> >>> being to our fundamental human nature that must be theorized within
all
> >>> models of development.  Your article points to the COSTS of schooling
> as
> >>> "students" acquire the dispositions to slice the world into parts as
> >>> "analysis" comes to colonize how modernity incorporates lived direct
> >>> experience into cognitive formations that are DERIVATIVE.  You also
> >>> mention
> >>> that most of "us" on this listserve accept the costs as the price of
> >>> admission into our communities of practice.  We have developed skill
> and
> >>> facility with dicing and slicing and living within derivative
cognitive
> >>> spaces as "students", "professors", "therapists", and other successful
> >>> members of  educationally oriented institutions.
> >>>
> >>> I also wonder how Luria and Vygotsky viewed "desire & recognition" as
> >>> Luria
> >>> was interested in psychoanalysis.
> >>>
> >>> Martin, you mentioned six key themes grounding sociocultural models
and
> >>> this
> >>> framework seems to hold promise for teasing out the dialectic between
> the
> >>> first 3 themes [widely shared within sociocultural oriented
> communities]
> >>> and
> >>> the last 3 themes [recognition, being fundamentally split, & resulting
> >>> search for identity]
> >>>
> >>> Going back to my fist paragraph, how is "desire & recognition"
> >>> conceptualized as emerging and developing within biocultural niches
> >>> within
> >>> Vygotsky, Luria, and others??  With Andy, I sense this is a central
> topic
> >>> for helping us understand how we OUGHT to proceed.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Larry
> >>>
> >>> PS  Mike,  I believe Merleau-Ponty may have something to add on
"desire
> &
> >>> recognition" when we discuss his ideas on phenomenology as a form of
> >>> reflection that does not slice and dice in analysis. [analysis as one
> >>> powerful and legitimate FORM of consciousness BUT with costs]
> >>>
> >>> Can authors such as Merleau-Ponty help pay more attention to the
> >>> inevitable cost to become members of our communities of participation
> and
> >>> to
> >>> the cost of our institutional formations.  The Felder article in the
> >>> latest
> >>> issue of "Theory & Psychology" was well written as Felder attempts to
> >>> ground
> >>> the practice of psychotherapy  in Merleau-Ponty's theoretical
> >>> perspective.
> >>> ______________________________**____________
> >>> _____
> >>> xmca mailing list
> >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>>
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/list
> info/xmca>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >> ______________________________**____________
> >> _____
> >> xmca mailing list
> >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/list
> info/xmca>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >
> > --
> > ------------------------------**------------------------------**
> > ------------
> > *Andy Blunden*
> > Joint Editor MCA:
> http://www.informaworld.com/**smpp/title~db=all~content=
> >
> **g932564744<
> http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~db=all~content=g93256474
> 4>
> > Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
> > Book:
> http://www.brill.nl/default.**aspx?partid=227&pid=34857<
> http://www.brill.nl/
> default.aspx?partid=227&pid=34857>
> > MIA: http://www.marxists.org
> >
> >
> > ______________________________**____________
> > _____
> > xmca mailing list
> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/list
>  info/xmca>
> >
> __________________________________________
> _____
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
> __________________________________________
> _____
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
__________________________________________
_____
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca

__________________________________________
_____
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca