Nice point, Denise. Funnily enough, as your message came through just
as I was reading a passage in Thomas Kuhn's "Scientific Revolutions" in
which he talked about "translating" from one system to the other, and I
was sitting here wondering what that would entail in this particular
dispute. So, your point is right on the spot for me.|
But I think the point is that this question of whether thought is an entity existing in the head, or an activity in which people engage, is just one of a million questions in which we can either take something as an entity and ask questions about where it is and what are its properties, its relations to other things, and so on, OR we can take it as an activity and a different set of questions flow. For example, we can divide the world into a subjective world and an objective world and still say all the same things we can say with a vocabulary of activities, but ... and this is the point ... history has proved (as I see it) that viewing the world as made up of entities, which are either objective or subjective, leads to problems, for example, how to correlate the things on one side of the subject-object divide with the things on the other. Are they the same? If so, in what way? Surely this is what Michael was referring to?
Now that view of the world, as subject-things and object-things, continues, and we still manage to live, communicate and do science together. But I am of a view that we could do all these things much more satisfactorily with a view of the world as formed by human activities which are subjective-objective. I accept that there are different views, and different legitimate readings of Vygotsky. At this point though I think we should at least aim for mutual understanding (if not conversion) rather than settling for dismissing the differences as "a nice story".
But at the moment I am being asked to prove that my reading of Vygotsky is legitimate.
Denise Newnham wrote:
I hope that you don't mind me butting in. I wanted to write several times but had some urgent work to attend to. I think that the main lines of this argument split hairs and Michael I tend to agree with you. Mike Cole mentioned awhile back that he thought that word meaning was a tool to form concepts (hope I remember correctly) Andy spoke of action and to be quite honest I defy someone to be able to show when these two notions can be empirically revealed. If they cannot then it is just a nice story. What do you think? Denise From: firstname.lastname@example.org [mailto:email@example.com] On Behalf Of Michael Glassman Sent: jeudi 16 juin 2011 12:31 To: firstname.lastname@example.org; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: RE: [xmca] Word Meaning and Action Hi Andy, This strikes me more an argument about epistemology than word meaning per se. Does knowledge or emerge from action (word meaning being part of our knowledge) or is it a property of the object. It reminds me very much of the debate between Dewey and Russell. But if you really don't have a defined epistemology and/or it just really isn't that important to your general scheme, you might tend to go back and forth between the two, without even realizing it (I know a lot of people do). My sense has always been that Vygotsky didn't have a dog in this fight, and the combination of different perspectives he seemed to embrace, including materialist, psychological, revolutionary, may have even made it more likely he goes back and forth. Michael _____ From: email@example.com on behalf of Andy Blunden Sent: Thu 6/16/2011 12:44 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [xmca] Word Meaning and Action Apologies! On further reflection, I can now see that what you want me to clarify, Martin, is the claim that by "word meaning," Vygotsky means an "artefact-mediated action," rather than a property (be it psychological or linguistic) of an artefact. I will get busy on that, Andy Andy Blunden wrote:Martin, before I devote another day to "cherry picking" for this one, can I try to clarify what I am gathering textual evidence for, please? You say "It is very clear to me that LSV viewed word-meaning as objective." This is of course true, but it is equally true that Vygotsky regarded word meaning as something subjective; word meaning develops, it has an inner and an outer aspect. So, am I right that I need to gather quotes which evidence that Vygotsky distinguished between what Tony called the "potentiality" of a word, and its inner, or pshycological form? Is that right? Andy Martin Packer wrote:Tony, I don't disagree with any of what you have proposed in this message or the preceding ones. I think it's a very plausible account of sign use. And I think it is very helpful to introduce such an account. But there seem to me to be two threads here that are mingling, and it would be helpful to keep them distinct. I have been trying to figure out what 'word meaning' meant to Vygotsky. It seems to me we have to understand what he wrote (that it, achieve a coherent and consistent interpretation of his texts) before we can critique it. You and others, on the other hand, are proposing an account of meaning that you find convincing. Both of these are valuable enterprises, for sure. The confusion comes when a Peircean account of meaning, for instance, is attributed to Vygotsky. It is very clear to me that LSV viewed word-meaning as objective. I could turn out to be mistaken, of course. But if anyone here wants to offer a different interpretation of LSV's notion of word meaning, it needs to be based on textual evidence, not on plausibility. I have never said that I find LSV's treatment of word meaning to be plausible, because I've not yet fully figured it out! Perhaps we will eventually decide that his account of words and concepts doesn't make sense. But we shouldn't turn this process around and try to decide first what is a plausible account of concepts and words, and then attribute this to Vygotsky. I'm not saying that this is what you are doing, Tony. But somewhere in the gaps between messages this seems to me to be what has been happening. Martin On Jun 15, 2011, at 10:52 AM, Tony Whitson wrote:Put most briefly, for anybody who is interested: Signs potentiate interpretation. That is what signs do. That's what semiosis (the activity of signs) is. This is the _semiosic_ activity of triadic sign relations. The meaning of a word consists of the interpretation that the word (qua sign) potentiates. Weights resist the muscular activity of lifting. This is dynamic physical action (not tradic semiosic activity). In this capacity, the weight is just a thing, and not a sign. Of course weights, beyond just in their dynamic resistance, can also participate in sign activity (as apparently they did in Congressman Weiner's weight-lifting in the Gongressional gym). On Wed, 15 Jun 2011, Huw Lloyd wrote:On 15 June 2011 14:53, Tony Whitson <firstname.lastname@example.org> wrote:The OED reflects the existing usage of words. Semiotics explores and attempts to account for the nature of signs and sign activity, including the nature of the meaning that signs do, and how signs do their meaning. Semiotics is not about deference to common usage, any more than is CHAT.Which is why distinct terms are used. If by "The meaning of a word is something the word does", you mean the active system of mental representations in which the word meaning (a set of relations) inheres and participates with other word meaning in particular contexts, then we need to dig into this system to identify which aspects relate to the defined word, and which relate to the system in which it participates. Care must be taken not to confuse the defined thing with the system it participates in. Words (like the weights of weight lifter) don't (on their own) do anything, the system they participate in does the doing. This is simply my opinion. It's fairly self-evident to me, and it's not something I'm deeply interested in pursing, relative to other interests. So, hopefully, I've answered the question put to me, and can let you get on with your ruminations. Huw __________________________________________ _____ xmca mailing list email@example.com http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmcaTony Whitson UD School of Education NEWARK DE 19716 firstname.lastname@example.org _______________________________ "those who fail to reread are obliged to read the same story everywhere" -- Roland Barthes, S/Z (1970) __________________________________________ _____ xmca mailing list email@example.com http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca__________________________________________ _____ xmca mailing list firstname.lastname@example.org http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* Joint Editor MCA: http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~db=all~content=g932564744 Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ Book: http://www.brill.nl/default.aspx?partid=227 <http://www.brill.nl/default.aspx?partid=227&pid=34857> &pid=34857 MIA: http://www.marxists.org <http://www.marxists.org/> __________________________________________ _____ xmca mailing list email@example.com http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
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