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Re: [xmca] fetishism | word meaning



David's right, but I think he's explained the least difficult of difficulties in the position that "words are vocal sounds" (which I tried
                                     ~
to treat charitably with the "ainda nao" comment, conceding that vocal sounds "participate" in the meaning that words do).

What David described is just the difficulty of reducing the "acoustic image" (Sausurre) facet of words to "vocal sounds." Sausurre's students even recorded for us the sketches of sound-waves that Saussure used in his explanations of how phonemes are not just vocal sounds.

Way more difficult is reducing words to something less that signs -- signs in the full sense of Peirce's sign relations, not just Sausurre's structures.

On Tue, 7 Jun 2011, David Kellogg wrote:

Joseph:
 
Nobody is being difficult. The theory you are putting forward here is called "direct speech perception". The idea is that phonemes are themselves present in the sound waves, and do not have to be reconstructed by the receiving brain. It's a very radical, empiricist theory that has long been associated with behaviorism (Watson, for example, was a strong proponent of direct perception).
 
Imagine that you want to convey the letter "A" to me in South Korea. You could rig up a digital camera and send me an image. I would not need to "know" anything about language to get your message; what I see is what I get. That's direct perception.
 
But that isn't the way we did it. Instead, my computer has a software system that "knows" what an "A" is, and on a given signal will produce it for me. I in turn reconstruct what you mean from the "A" produced by my computer. That is mediated perception.
 
Vygotskyans,including myself, have always been suspicious of direct perception, and for good reason. As Vygotsky says, it doesn't appear to tell us what is specifically human about human speech (animals, for example, can convey emotion through vocal sounds, but they do not have human speech). This doesn't bother behaviorists; on the contrary, it's one of the strengths of the theory as far as they are concerned. I find it very...well, difficult. But I would say that the difficulty is not in me.
 
David Kellogg
Seoul National University of Education

--- On Tue, 6/7/11, Joseph Gilbert <joeg4us@roadrunner.com> wrote:


From: Joseph Gilbert <joeg4us@roadrunner.com>
Subject: Re: [xmca] fetishism | word meaning
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Date: Tuesday, June 7, 2011, 5:01 PM


Do you really need clarification or are you merely being difficult?

        J.G.

On Jun 7, 2011, at 2:11 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote:

On 7 June 2011 21:31, Joseph Gilbert <joeg4us@roadrunner.com> wrote:

Do you hold that vocal sounds affect us emotionally/feeling-wise?


Hi Jospeh,  I'm assuming this question is directed at me?

They are capable of emotional influence.  Though this a function of the
person, rather than the sound.  For example, deaf people aren't influenced
that much.

It's not clear to me how this relates to your usage of "are" in "words are
vocal sounds".

Will let you mull it over.

Huw



        Joseph Gilbert


On Jun 7, 2011, at 10:25 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote:

  On 7 June 2011 16:27, Joseph Gilbert <joeg4us@roadrunner.com> wrote:

  Words are vocal sounds. Vocal sounds are meaningful.


I think you have an elision here, Joseph.

If you take "are" as the plural of "is", you're effectively saying:

"A word is a sound, sound is meaningful."

Hence you appear to be conflating the relation of equivalence with
aggregation:

(Spoken) Words are (composed of) vocal sounds.

Just as you might say "Pyramids are (composed of) stone"  rather than
"Pyramids are buildings".

Huw





               Joseph Gilbert


On Jun 6, 2011, at 9:15 PM, Tony Whitson wrote:

  Peirce explicitly contended that the meaning of any sign (including
words,

thoughts, arguments, feelings, or whatever), _qua_ signs, lies in the
virtuality of potential future interpretations (just by virtue of the
fundamental nature of what it is to be a sign, i.e., in the activity of
sign-relations).

Also, notice that I'm using "meaning" as something that we -- and our
words, thoughts, etc. -- DO, not something they contain, convey, etc. I
recently noticed similar usage in the title of Jay's MCA review of
Sfard's
book, which speaks of "Meaning Mathematically," not "mathematical
meaning."
The latter locution could mean the same as Jay's, but it also would
allow
the more familiar reading of "meaning" as a noun. If we need to begin
meaning differently than how we might be heard to mean in positivist
discourse, I think we need to begin choosing speaking that resists
assimilation to that discourse.

On Mon, 6 Jun 2011, mike cole wrote:

  The poem is neat and your explication brings to mind a recurrent
thought

when I encounter the core idea of "the thought is completed in the
word."
I
(think I) know what LSV and Mandelshtam are saying, but I always have
this
thought that the thought is not yet completed, not in so far as it is
taken
up, perhaps transformed, and comes back again at a later time, in some
new,
albeit related, form, to begin that side of the cycle over again.
mike

On Sun, May 1, 2011 at 2:24 PM, Tony Whitson <twhitson@udel.edu>
wrote:

  I clipped the wrong line from Martin's post in that last message. I

meant
the Dickinson verse in reponse to the line that now appears below from
Martin.

In Dickinson's verse, what's not timeless is not merely the meaning
that
a
word does as a lexical unit in a language (i.e., in the philological
sense),
but even in a specific utterance the word spoken continues meaning, as
it
continues living, non-timelessly.


On Sun, 1 May 2011, Tony Whitson wrote:

  On Tue, 26 Apr 2011, Martin Packer wrote:



   For LSV word-meaning is not timeless. It changes over time; he
didn't


  study philology for nothing!



  A word is dead

    When it is said
  Some say.
I say it just
Begins to live
  That day.

    --Emily Dickinson

I find it helpful to think of meaning as something that words do --
not
something they contain, convey, etc.


  Tony Whitson

UD School of Education
NEWARK  DE  19716

twhitson@udel.edu
_______________________________

"those who fail to reread
  are obliged to read the same story everywhere"
                -- Roland Barthes, S/Z (1970)
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  Tony Whitson
UD School of Education
NEWARK  DE  19716

twhitson@udel.edu
_______________________________

"those who fail to reread
  are obliged to read the same story everywhere"
                 -- Roland Barthes, S/Z (1970)
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Tony Whitson
UD School of Education
NEWARK  DE  19716

twhitson@udel.edu
_______________________________

"those who fail to reread
 are obliged to read the same story everywhere"
                  -- Roland Barthes, S/Z (1970)
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