Yrjo, Larry, Christine, everybody, Primarily I know Whytte, and owe what I think about the evolution of AR in the US from this issue of American Behavior Scientist, 32, (1989). http://journals.ohiolink.edu.proxy.lib.ohio-state.edu/ejc/pdf.cgi/Whyte_William_Foote.pdf?issn=00027642&issue=v32i0005&article=502_i (The link it through my library, so unless you have access to a university system it might be hard to find) Whytte takes the beginnings of AR back to Einar Thorsrud (who was actually Norwegian and did his original research with Norwegian shipyards) and Elton Mayo who did his original research with General Western Electric. (Before I had read this I had no idea the Hawthorne effect came from AR). Whyte makes the argument though in this article that in AR it is best for those leading the research are separate from the organizational structure (which I guess Thorsrud and Mayo were not careful about), and act as outside consultants (I don't think I agree with this), which is why I think of US AR as being based in business consultancy. Every article in the journal issue seemed to follow this model. I think probably I am taking a wide view of business consultancy (or perhaps these days we tend to take too narrow a view of business consultancy). But it does seem for Whyte the word emphasized is consultancy and not business. Michael ________________________________ From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu on behalf of Yrjö Engeström Sent: Sun 5/15/2011 8:21 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: Re: [xmca] Dialectical Inquiry as the method/methodology of CHAT Dear Michael and others, it seems odd that you do not mention the Participatory Action Research (PAR) approach founded by the sociologist William Foote Whyte (1914-2000). The term Participatory Action Research is usually connected to his work and legacy, and it is quite different from the Action Science of the psychologically trained Chris Argyris. Whyte's work in Mondragon and in many other industrial and community contexts is not easily categorized as mere business consultancy. Regards, Yrjö Engeström Michael Glassman kirjoitti 15.5.2011 kello 14.17: > Hi Larry and Christine and others, > > Larry what you write about Anna Stetsenko's approach is particularly > interesting to me right now. The other day I was talking with a > student who wanted to use Participatory Action Research in her > dissertation. We talked a bit about Lewin and Argylis but she > argued she wanted to use Friere's PAR. She claimed that while the > two types of AR wind up with a number of similarities (the biggest > difference being US AR wants to change organizaitons through > relationships, while South American AR of whom Friere was an > important founding voice, wants to empower individuals by allowing > them to recognize the effects of corrupt relationships through > knowlege/information) they both came from two very different > origins. It is true I think that you can't really find any deposit > of Lewin in Friere's writing. The student made the argument that > Friere's PAR comes almost completely from his use of Marx. It is > ironic because the PAR in the United States was developed primarily > by business consultants who would probably become upset at the > mention of Marx. Having two groups doing almost the same thing, > with exactly the same name, but a few very, very critical difference > certainly makes things confusing. > > But reading what you say about Anna Stetsenko is gave me greater > insight into what this student was trying to say. There does seem > to be a strong Marxist aspect to what Friere was trying to say (or > in the case of Friere is is more what he was trying to do). It > seems like Friere's PAR (and Martin I think already made this point) > might be much closer to Vygotsky in origins and spirit than the AR > and Action Science that emerged out of Lewin's work and the whole > business consultation movement. Were there any Friere based > articles in the special issue discussing AR and Vygotsky. > > But as far as general laws, I don't think Lewin was speaking > paradigmatically, at least as Kuhn describes it. He was I think > instead talking about habits systems develop that become part of > cultural intelligence without the participants even realizing it. > It is the underlying systems relationships that would lead to real > change (and I would suppose one of the impetuses behind Argylis' > double loop learning). > > I'm thinking about Christine's question about environmental > education. The melt down at Fukushia Dai-ichi is an extraordinary > ecological disaster. I read where a Japanese woman wrote to a > friend and asked, "After what happened to us how can you in the U.S. > not be having a very serious conversation about nuclear power in > your country." - the U.S. I am sure some people on this list live > near a nuclear power plant, some near a fault. And yet after a > short burst of enery all conversation about nuclear power has pretty > much been blacked out. Just as conversation of global warming has > become blacked out after a short conversation related to Al Gore's > work. Why can't we talk about these things, what are the > relationships that make it unallowable and for even people in danger > to acquiesce to the silence? This I think is what PAR gets to. > > Michael > > ________________________________ > > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu on behalf of Larry Purss > Sent: Sun 5/15/2011 1:13 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [xmca] Dialectical Inquiry as the method/methodology of CHAT > > > > This months discussion is about method/methodology as contrasted in > Action > Research and CHAT. I may be wandering off topic but this topic has > left me > perplexed about the larger context of this question > > I have re-read a chapter "Standing on the Shoulders of Giants A > Balancing > Act of Dialectically Theorizing Conceptual Understanding on the > Grounds of > Vygotsky's Project" by Anna Stetsenko . The chapter is in the book > "Re/Structuring Science Education: Reuniting Sociological and > Psychological > Perspectives" edited by W.M.Roth. Anna is offering her > interpretation of the > dialectical *method* and outlook on reality. > > To put her reflections in context I want to bring in Jay's thoughts on > paradigm assumtions and *general laws* He wrote, > > But I am rather conflicted about some of the paradigm assumptions. I > don't > happen to believe that there are useful general laws about social > systems. > They are not the kind of objects of study about which such laws are > possible, primarily because what usually turns out to matter about > them are > more their differences rather than their similarities (as opposed to > the > ways in which natural science's objects are defined, so that > similarities > matter more than differences). Social systems are in this sense a > bit more > like literary texts. So there are ways of not having to start from > scratch > in understanding a new one, but not ways that rely on general laws > of their > behavior. More like check lists of things to pay attention to, and of > possible or frequent kinds of connections seen before. Weak > similarities, > embedded in strong differences (the uniqueness, individuality, and > unpredictability of real complex systems). > > The methods of controlled research depend on predictability, and on > the > dominance of similarity over difference. They have their uses in > social > science and psychology, but they don't get one very far, and in > particular > they don't enable social engineering. Which may be a good thing! As > someone > like Latour might note, academic disciplines, and indeed all > organized, > historically long-lived institutionalized activity systems work at > making > things seem and sometimes even be more predictable and regular than > they > would be "in the wild". But when their norms are violated, when > objects of > study are defined in new ways, when systems under study combine > things that > do not normally combine, or combine them in new ways (e.g. combining > researcher culture and practitioner culture), the predictability and > the > illusion of control and regularity quickly evaporates. > > The pursuit of general laws is not a good route to the practical > knowledge > and wisdom needed to make our way toward a better society. We cannot > afford > to be misled by superficial generalizations when we are dealing with > real, > particular comm and their problems. We need particularist research > that adds > to our capacity to help out in the next particular case. > > END OF QUOTE > > Jay is questioning the value of pursuing *general laws" in our > search and > encourages inquiry into practical knowledge and wisdom [phronesis] > as we > pursue the value of developing a *better* society. This perspective > values > the practical as a *higher* good than searching for general laws. > > I now want to contrast this standpoint with Anna Stetsenko's > perspective > towards dialectical methodology. She states, > > "Within Marxism, there has been a considerable debate as to WHAT > KIND of an > approach the dialectical method represents and whether the term > dialectics > refers to the core outlook on REALITY and its phenomena and > processes or, > alternatively, ONLY to the ANALYTICAL METHOD itself.? Anna points > out that > neither Marx or Vygotsky's positions are clear on this question. (p. > 70) > > Anna suggests that > > "the true hallmark and condition sin qua non for the dialectical > method is > the notion that *practice* serves as the ultimate ground for > advancing the > verifying theories as well as for providing warrants for knowledge > claims. > Unlike the skepticism of social constructionism and other postmodern > approaches that acknowledge no grounds for falsifying theories or > adjudicating among various theoretical standpoints and claims, the > Marxist > method provides warrants for such adjudication. These warrants have > to do > not with applying some abstract, fixed principles that lie outside > knowledge > claims but instead, are derived by discerning the (often implicit > but always > ineluctably present) ideological and ETHICAL underpinnings and > potentialities of a given theory as a form of practice." > > I introduced Anna's quote as it seems to parallel both Aristole's > notion of > phronesis and also Gadamer's notion of philosophical hermeneutics > [as well > as Jay Lemke's position as I understand it] > > Episteme as a particular *theoretical* form of practice, and also > techne as > a particular *productive* form of practice, are legitimate ways to > engage > with the world IF they are INFORMED, not by general laws or > *systems* of > scientific prediction, but rather by re-cognizing *practical wisdom* > [value-knowledge] which serves as the ULTIMATE ground for warranting > knowledge claims. > > The relations between episteme, techne, and phronesis, as various > FORMS of > knowledge as expressed within the methods of dialectical materialism, > philosophical hermeneutics, or Aristotle's knowledge framework may > bias > episteme, techne, or practical wisdom [value-knowledge] as more or > less > central and the other forms as more or less peripheral, [different > hierarchical perspectives] but all 3 perspectives emphasize that we > must > reclaim a central role for practical ethical wisdom in our knowledge > frameworks. > > Larry > __________________________________________ > _____ > xmca mailing list > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > > <winmail.dat>__________________________________________ > _____ > xmca mailing list > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca __________________________________________ _____ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
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