Re: [xmca] activity (was concepts)

[Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>]

On 20 April 2011 15:24, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:

> Anna Stetsenko wrote a paragraph on the fundamental ground of activity
> theory that used terms such as "regulatory mechanisms" & "part of dynamic
> systems"  Thought it may add to the conversation.
>
> "The activity theory perspective fully acknowledges the sociocultural
> origin
> and nature of human subjectivity (i.e. broadly conceived human
> psychological
> processes that include cognition, self-regulation, emotion, and self).
>  This
> perspective, however, does not begin with this assumption and cannot be
> reduced to it.  Instead, the grounding premises of activity theory are much
> broader.  At its most fundamental level, ... activity theory states that
> each living organism exists only AS PART OF a dynamic SYSTEM that connects
> it with the environment and with other organisms (note some similarity with
> the recently influential dynamic systems theory, e.g. Thelen & Smith,
> 1998).  It is the open-ended, ongoing exchange with the environment that
> constitutes the foundation of life for all living organisms, and it is also
> this ongoing process of exchange that gives rise to REGULATORY MECHANISMS
> that allow it to be carried out.  Much of activity theory is devoted to
> exploring how more and more REFINED MECHANISMS OF REGULATION, including
> increasingly complex psychological processes, have emerged in phylogeny as
> a
> result of an evolving complexity of EXCHANGES between organisms and their
> environments that, IN TURN, resulted from evolutionary pressures to adapt
> to
> the ever-growing demands of life"  [Theory & Psychology Journal,  Vol.
> 14(4): p 481-482]
>
>
Thank you Anna and Larry.  :)

Huw



> Larry
>
> On Wed, Apr 20, 2011 at 2:43 AM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > I appreciate all the thoughtful good will going into the attempts to find
> > common grounding and explore one's own thinking in this/these
> > thread/threads.
> >
> > I fear i violated Tony's reasonable 2 cents rule because I, too, have had
> > too little time to write and the intermixing of pieces of threads and
> thus
> > added to the difficulties.
> >
> > I believe that Andy identified one problem when he pointed out that Huw,
> > coming from a somewhat different (and relevant!) tradition(s) introduced
> > concepts such as activity as he understood them from, say, Maturana or
> > Bateson. So, for example, he pointed to Jim Wertsch's *Mind as Action* as
> a
> > source for explication of the concept of activity using the pole vaulting
> > example. But, Jim uses this example to talk about mediated action in
> > context, his preferred unit of analysis at the time (at the end of
> > *Vygotsky
> > and the Social Formation of mind-*- which you can find whole on the
> > internet
> > but not download- he DOES discuss notions of activity following LSV).
> >      For those of us who have been drawing upon this latter tradition,
> > Leontiev has been an important source. As in
> > ------------------
> >
> > *http://www.igs.net/~pballan/Leontiev%281979%29.htm*<http://www.igs.net/%7Epballan/Leontiev%281979%29.htm*>
> <http://www.igs.net/%7Epballan/Leontiev%281979%29.htm*>
> > * *
> >
> > * *
> > * *
> >
> > *Activity is the nonadditive, molar unit of life for the material,
> > corporeal
> > subject. In a narrower sense (i.e., on the psychological level) it is the
> > unit of life that is mediated by mental reflection. The real function of
> > this unit is to orient the subject in the world of objects. In other
> words,
> > activity is not a reaction or aggregate of reactions, but a system with
> its
> > own structure, its own internal transformations, and its own
> > development.<http://www.igs.net/%7Epballan/AT.htm>
> > *
> > * *
> >
> > *Introducing the category of activity changes the entire conceptual
> > framework of psychology. But in order to do this, we must accept this
> > category in its complete form, with all its implications with respect to
> > (1)
> > its structure, (2) its specific [p. 47] dynamics, and (3) its various
> > forms.
> > In other words, we are concerned with answering the question of precisely
> > what form the category of activity will take in psychology....*
> > * *
> >
> > *Human psychology is concerned with the activity of concrete individuals,
> > which takes place either in a collective - i.e., jointly with other
> people
> > -
> > or in a situation in which the subject deals directly with the
> surrounding
> > world of objects - e.g., at the potter's wheel or the writer's desk....*
> > * *
> >
> > *With all its varied forms, the human individual's activity is a system
> in
> > the system of social relations. It does not exist without these
> relations.
> > The specific form in which it exists is determined by the forms and means
> > of
> > material and mental social interaction (Verkehr) that are created by the
> > development of production and that can not be realized in any way other
> > than
> > in the activity of concrete people. It turns out that the activity of
> > separate individuals depends on their place in society, on the conditions
> > that fall to their lot, and on idiosyncratic, individual factors.*
> >
> > For a discussion of this tradition of the use of "activity" and its
> > relation
> > to Bateson and Pierce, see
> > lchc.ucsd.edu/mca/Paper/Engestrom/expanding/toc.htm
> >
> > Yrjo, too, has his critiques, but his Doktorat provides lots of good
> links
> > to other traditions and may serve as one useful starting point.
> >
> > Now I will gather up my .25$ and listen instead of prattling!
> > mike
> >
> > On Wed, Apr 20, 2011 at 1:13 AM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
> > >wrote:
> >
> > > On 20 April 2011 02:27, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> > >
> > > > Well, this convesation is really demonstrating something about
> concepts
> > > and
> > > > language, isn't it?
> > > >
> > > > When Huw joined the conversation, he silently changed the topic.
> > > Previously
> > > > we were talking about human beings and their life activity, using
> > > concepts
> > > > from Cultural Psychology and Activity Theory; Huw talked about
> > machines,
> > > > using cybernetics. But he used the same words, and did not signal
> thgat
> > > he
> > > > was using the words now in a different context and therefore
> indicating
> > > > different concepts.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > Possibly because I do not hold that dichotomy.
> > >
> > > Maturana, Autopoiesis and Cognition, p78:
> > >
> > > "Living Machines.
> > >
> > > That living systems are machines cannot be shown by pointing to their
> > > components.  Rather, one must show their organization in a manner such
> > that
> > > the way in which all their peculiar properties arise, becomes obvious.
> >  In
> > > order to do this, we shall first characterize the kind of machines that
> > > living systems are, and then show how the peculiar properties of living
> > > systems may arise as consequences of the organization of this kind of
> > > machines."
> > >
> > > Though I'd also add that any theoretical model presented is a machine
> > too.
> > >
> > > Many people think of machines that are closed, like the jacquard loom,
> > > rather than open to the environment like the watt governor.
> > >
> > > Huw
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > > No problem with using xmca to talk about machines, or
> > > > people-as-if-they-were-machines, but we need to be clear about it.
> > > >
> > >
> > > > Andy
> > > >
> > > >
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