Re: [xmca] activity (was concepts)

[Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>]

Anna Stetsenko wrote a paragraph on the fundamental ground of activity
theory that used terms such as "regulatory mechanisms" & "part of dynamic
systems"  Thought it may add to the conversation.

"The activity theory perspective fully acknowledges the sociocultural origin
and nature of human subjectivity (i.e. broadly conceived human psychological
processes that include cognition, self-regulation, emotion, and self).  This
perspective, however, does not begin with this assumption and cannot be
reduced to it.  Instead, the grounding premises of activity theory are much
broader.  At its most fundamental level, ... activity theory states that
each living organism exists only AS PART OF a dynamic SYSTEM that connects
it with the environment and with other organisms (note some similarity with
the recently influential dynamic systems theory, e.g. Thelen & Smith,
1998).  It is the open-ended, ongoing exchange with the environment that
constitutes the foundation of life for all living organisms, and it is also
this ongoing process of exchange that gives rise to REGULATORY MECHANISMS
that allow it to be carried out.  Much of activity theory is devoted to
exploring how more and more REFINED MECHANISMS OF REGULATION, including
increasingly complex psychological processes, have emerged in phylogeny as a
result of an evolving complexity of EXCHANGES between organisms and their
environments that, IN TURN, resulted from evolutionary pressures to adapt to
the ever-growing demands of life"  [Theory & Psychology Journal,  Vol.
14(4): p 481-482]

Larry

On Wed, Apr 20, 2011 at 2:43 AM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:

> I appreciate all the thoughtful good will going into the attempts to find
> common grounding and explore one's own thinking in this/these
> thread/threads.
>
> I fear i violated Tony's reasonable 2 cents rule because I, too, have had
> too little time to write and the intermixing of pieces of threads and thus
> added to the difficulties.
>
> I believe that Andy identified one problem when he pointed out that Huw,
> coming from a somewhat different (and relevant!) tradition(s) introduced
> concepts such as activity as he understood them from, say, Maturana or
> Bateson. So, for example, he pointed to Jim Wertsch's *Mind as Action* as a
> source for explication of the concept of activity using the pole vaulting
> example. But, Jim uses this example to talk about mediated action in
> context, his preferred unit of analysis at the time (at the end of
> *Vygotsky
> and the Social Formation of mind-*- which you can find whole on the
> internet
> but not download- he DOES discuss notions of activity following LSV).
>      For those of us who have been drawing upon this latter tradition,
> Leontiev has been an important source. As in
> ------------------
>
> *http://www.igs.net/~pballan/Leontiev%281979%29.htm*<http://www.igs.net/%7Epballan/Leontiev%281979%29.htm*>
> * *
>
> * *
> * *
>
> *Activity is the nonadditive, molar unit of life for the material,
> corporeal
> subject. In a narrower sense (i.e., on the psychological level) it is the
> unit of life that is mediated by mental reflection. The real function of
> this unit is to orient the subject in the world of objects. In other words,
> activity is not a reaction or aggregate of reactions, but a system with its
> own structure, its own internal transformations, and its own
> development.<http://www.igs.net/%7Epballan/AT.htm>
> *
> * *
>
> *Introducing the category of activity changes the entire conceptual
> framework of psychology. But in order to do this, we must accept this
> category in its complete form, with all its implications with respect to
> (1)
> its structure, (2) its specific [p. 47] dynamics, and (3) its various
> forms.
> In other words, we are concerned with answering the question of precisely
> what form the category of activity will take in psychology....*
> * *
>
> *Human psychology is concerned with the activity of concrete individuals,
> which takes place either in a collective - i.e., jointly with other people
> -
> or in a situation in which the subject deals directly with the surrounding
> world of objects - e.g., at the potter's wheel or the writer's desk....*
> * *
>
> *With all its varied forms, the human individual's activity is a system in
> the system of social relations. It does not exist without these relations.
> The specific form in which it exists is determined by the forms and means
> of
> material and mental social interaction (Verkehr) that are created by the
> development of production and that can not be realized in any way other
> than
> in the activity of concrete people. It turns out that the activity of
> separate individuals depends on their place in society, on the conditions
> that fall to their lot, and on idiosyncratic, individual factors.*
>
> For a discussion of this tradition of the use of "activity" and its
> relation
> to Bateson and Pierce, see
> lchc.ucsd.edu/mca/Paper/Engestrom/expanding/toc.htm
>
> Yrjo, too, has his critiques, but his Doktorat provides lots of good links
> to other traditions and may serve as one useful starting point.
>
> Now I will gather up my .25$ and listen instead of prattling!
> mike
>
> On Wed, Apr 20, 2011 at 1:13 AM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
> >wrote:
>
> > On 20 April 2011 02:27, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> >
> > > Well, this convesation is really demonstrating something about concepts
> > and
> > > language, isn't it?
> > >
> > > When Huw joined the conversation, he silently changed the topic.
> > Previously
> > > we were talking about human beings and their life activity, using
> > concepts
> > > from Cultural Psychology and Activity Theory; Huw talked about
> machines,
> > > using cybernetics. But he used the same words, and did not signal thgat
> > he
> > > was using the words now in a different context and therefore indicating
> > > different concepts.
> > >
> > >
> > Possibly because I do not hold that dichotomy.
> >
> > Maturana, Autopoiesis and Cognition, p78:
> >
> > "Living Machines.
> >
> > That living systems are machines cannot be shown by pointing to their
> > components.  Rather, one must show their organization in a manner such
> that
> > the way in which all their peculiar properties arise, becomes obvious.
>  In
> > order to do this, we shall first characterize the kind of machines that
> > living systems are, and then show how the peculiar properties of living
> > systems may arise as consequences of the organization of this kind of
> > machines."
> >
> > Though I'd also add that any theoretical model presented is a machine
> too.
> >
> > Many people think of machines that are closed, like the jacquard loom,
> > rather than open to the environment like the watt governor.
> >
> > Huw
> >
> >
> >
> > > No problem with using xmca to talk about machines, or
> > > people-as-if-they-were-machines, but we need to be clear about it.
> > >
> >
> > > Andy
> > >
> > >
> > __________________________________________
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