Re: [xmca] Narration as BIG story in contrast to little story

[Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>]

Hi Gregory and David Ke

I am continuing to reflect on the meadian perspective.

 Gregory,  I have been following the elaboration of Alex Gillespie's and
Jack Martin's views on interpreting  Mead's understanding of position
"exchange" as a precursor to "taking" the perspectives of the "generalized"
other.  I recently discussed Bamberg's article in the journal "Theory &
Psychology" which was an elaboration on narrative practice.  David Ke's
comments were helpful  that "positioning" and "stance" as concepts in
positioning theory may not capture the centrality of action and acting which
are necessary to change circumstances.  That is an insight I appreciate and
will keep in mind when reading accounts written from the tradition of
narrative practice.

Another term which may be more useful than "positioning" is the term
"perspectives".  This is the term that Mead used and which Gillespie and
Martin are attempting to theorize.  I'm not sure David if you have a similar
reluctance to the usefulness of the term "perspectives" as  being similarly
ineffective in relation to the central construct of action"

Jack Martin, in 2006,  wrote an article in the journal "Human Development"
titled "Reinterpreting Internalization and Agency through G.H. Mead's
Perspectival Realism"  On page 67 of the article Martin interprets Mead's
notion of perspectives.    Martin points out that in his later years Mead
often used the phrase "being IN the perspective of the other" instead of
"taking the role of the other"  [today we might replace "role" with
"position"]    For Mead, taking perspectives was NOT primarily an
epistemological matter through which we come to "understand" our world  and
our selves.  Perspectives exist prior to the emergence of the self and exist
in the sociocultural world in which we are embedded from birth.  Thus a
perspective is an ORIENTATION to an environment that is associated with
acting in that environment.  Within this sociocultural world all
perspectives arise and are employed within interactivity [social acts]
These ontological perspectives may be elaborated IMAGINATIVELY and
REFLECTIVELY but they are seeded and maintained through interactions with
others.  Perspectivity of this kind is the ground that enables the
development and functioning of phenomena like mind and self.  When entered
into perspectives are BOTH perceptual and conceptual.  Though perspectives
arise within particular sequences of interactivity they are NOT fixed to the
present moment. Once they are experienced they can be used imaginatively.

This elaboration of Mead's perspectival realism [exists prior to the self]
is bracketing microgenetic social interactionalism as central to the
emergence of agency, mind, and self  and both Jack Martin and Alex Gillespie
in their positioning exchange theory are attempting to elaborate an
alternative account of internalization that is both determined and
determining.  Bamberg and Hutto in elaborating narrative practice, are
exploring the same interactional phenomena from a different perspective.
Narrative practice and positioning exchange theories both also elaborate on
mimesis as a pre-linguistic process [but that's for another post]

Larry

On Mon, Feb 21, 2011 at 9:55 PM, Gregory Allan Thompson <
gathomps@uchicago.edu> wrote:

> Larry,
> Just wanted to note that Gillespie's definition of agency as "being able to
> transcend immediacy" (my paraphrase) has a lot of affinities with Mike's
> recent thinking on "imagination" - which Mike and his colleague Etienne
> Pelaprat describe as "into image making" or "gap filling." If I've got it
> right, one element of this notion of imagination is that it involves
> transcending immediacy, or as described by one of his sources, a blind and
> deaf Russian man, "rising up" from the immediacy of the world.
> Thus, imagination is the key to agency.
> Very interesting.
> -greg
>
> P.S. Also of interest to this listserve, Gillespie's ideas seem to have
> some buried roots in Hegel's social ontology of the subject as mediated
> (Meadiated?) by GH Mead, and (arguably) Vygotsky. Given Gillespie's broad
> knowledge of social theory, it seems odd that there is no mention of Hegel.
> Nonetheless, a really fascinating piece.
>
>
> >
> >Message: 3
> >Date: Mon, 21 Feb 2011 11:35:07 -0800
> >From: Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> >Subject: Re: [xmca] Narration as BIG story in contrast to little story
> >To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >Message-ID:
> >       <AANLkTikSByn1AJVpDPWS6QJo_XtEe4Z-ve6p5dLVVrJe@mail.gmail.com>
> >Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
> >
> >Hi David
> >
> >That was a fascinating huffingtonpost article.  I want to reflect on the
> >statement you wrote,
> >
> >Here his idea is that the real key to reconciling all these contradictions
> >of identity is that we are all far, far more than we seem. But only the
> >actor, on the stage, can realize all of the potential identities that a
> >single self can contain. In practice, it is race, class, caste, and above
> >all the country in which the child finds himself or herself unwillingly
> born
> >that selects and realizes the potential that later becomes a cheap
> >substitute for his or her real identity. If the child wants anything more
> >than this cheap substitute, then we are simply going to have to do
> something
> >about race, class, caste, and above all national boundaries.
> >
> >
> >If we are all far far more than we seem [and our beliefs and fantasies
> keep
> >us imprisoned or contained or SUBJECTED] how do we go about freeing
> >ourselves from our illusions.  I have recently been reflecting on
> narrative
> >practices as "positioning" practices and how we are "given"position
> >[subjected] and the possibility that we can "take" positions
> >[subjectivity].  This narrative practice perspective is an aspect of the
> >discursive framework which is exploring positioning theory. [R. Harre]
>  The
> >neo-Meadian emphasis on position EXCHANGE theory is an extension of
> >positioning theory as a framework.  Position exchange theory uses a
> metaphor
> >of "weaving" the integration of multiple perspectives into a wider horizon
> >of understanding. This weaving activity as a concept has similarities to
> the
> >metaphor of  the world as a stage with interactants playing their parts.
> >Positioning exchange theory suggests that through taking multiple
> >perspectives [within actual social acts] intersubjectivity develops.  In
> >other words the development of the capacity to take many positions [as an
> >actor] requires developing an intersubjective  "imagination"  [that
> emerges
> >within particular  social acts.]  David, the notion of an "actor" playing
> >"roles" is a similar notion to interactants weaving together [integrating]
> >multiple perspectives.  Both metaphors imply or make reference to the
> notion
> >of agentic capacity as arising out of social interaction., but it does not
> >collapse the individual's agency into the social [as a reduction]. Alex
> >Gillespie writes,
> >
> >"although actors gain agency through social interaction, they subsequently
> >posses agency to the extent that they manage to extricate themselves from
> >those same interactions.  The mechanism for this liberation is
> >intersubjectivity and the basis of intersubjectivity, I have argued is
> >POSITION EXCHANGE. "   cited in "Gillespie, A., Position Exchange: The
> >Social Development of agency, New Ideas in Psychology, (2010),
> >doi:10.1016/j.newideapsych.2010.03.004"
> >
> >Michael Bamberg, who wrote the current article I referenced on narrative
> >practice as small stories has edited a book [with Anna Fina & Deborah
> >Schiffrin] titled "Discourse & Identity" (2006)  The book is a synthesis
> of
> >the multiple theories that go under the umbrella term "discourse theory"
> and
> >is an attempt to bridge two approaches at opposite extremes of discourse
> >theories.  The one approach is sustained within the frame of
> Conversational
> >Analysis and the other is sustained by scholars working in Critical
> >Discourse Analysis.  The book emphasizes that this division is not
> exclusive
> >to the study of identity.  Rather, it derives from different
> conceptions,of
> >the relationship between language and social life.  One approach brackets
> >and focuses on the emergence of identities in interaction in local
> contexts
> >to explain the emergence of subjectivity.  The other approach brackets and
> >focuses on the context in which identities are produced or imposed [given
> or
> >subjected] and frame the way identities are perceived.  David, the article
> >you posted is an excellent example of this approach.  In the book edited
> by
> >Bamberg et al  the various authors explore aspects of positioning [not
> >position exchange] theory to bridge the tension between conversational and
> >critical discourse traditions.  In the introduction on page 7 the authors
> >write
> >
> >"On the one hand, historical, sociocultural forces in the form of dominant
> >discourses or master narratives" [big stories] "position speakers in their
> >situated practices and construct who they are without their agentive
> >involvment.  On the other hand, speakers position themselves as
> constructive
> >and interactive agents and choose the MEANS by which they construct their
> >identities vis-a-vis others as well as vis-a-vis dominant discourses and
> >master narratives".
> >
> >David, I'm curious about the concept of positions "given" [subjected],
> >positions "taken", [subjectivity] and positions "exchanged"
> >[intersubjectivity] as ways we construct, imagine, and fantasize possible
> >worlds and how we are situated within them.
> >
> >The other basic primary metaphor that weaves through my speculations on
> this
> >topic is the metaphor of "container" and containment.  The tension of
> being
> >contained [as subjected AND subjectivity AND intersubjectivity].  What are
> >the "right" relationships for "containing" development [identity &
> security
> >needs] and also developing the capacity to agentively "take" positions
> >beyond security needs.  In other words, to develop the capacity to imagine
> >and act to create possible new worlds of containment beyond the "given"
> >
> >Larry
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >On Wed, Feb 16, 2011 at 7:13 PM, David Kellogg <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com
> >wrote:
> >
> >> Thanks, Larry. Somewhere in the headwaters of the current thread on
> >> Vygotsky's claims, Andy says that Vygotsky's purposes in psychological
> >> inquiry are better set out in "The Socialist Alternation of Man", and
> Mike
> >> counters that his goal in "Thinking and Speech", anyway, is the more
> modest
> >> one of merely accounting for the whole of human consciousness. Well, I
> want
> >> to argue, sort of on the basis of what you've sent and also on the basis
> of
> >> something I have been reading, that these two purposes have more in
> common
> >> than you might think.
> >>
> >> I don't have the article at hand. But you quote Bamberg to the effect
> that
> >> any "claim" of identy actually involves:
> >>
> >> 1) sameness of a sense of self across time in the face of constant
> change;
> >> 2) uniqueness of the person vis-a-vis others in the face of being the
> same
> >> as everybody else; and
> >> 3) the construction of agency as constituted by self
> >> (with a self-to-world direction of fit) and world (with a world -to-
> self
> >> direction of fit).
> >>
> >> You can see why "identity" is a very tenuous claim. You would have to be
> a
> >> very eccentric person, one of Dickens' grotesques, to have the same
> sense of
> >> self accross time in the face of constant change (think of Micawber and
> his
> >> wife, "I have never abandoned Mr. Micawber and I shall never abandon Mr.
> >> Micawber!").
> >>
> >> Even if you could somehow manage the trick, it would rather tend to
> >> emphasize the things that make you the same as everybody else (we might
> call
> >> this your "embodiments" as opposed to your potentials). Most of all, the
> >> idea that the self is somehow a source of agency, a tragic or comic
> hero, a
> >> central figure in the face of all the vicissitudes of the social world
> in
> >> which it discovers itself, with all the trappings of class and race and
> so
> >> on, is somewhat laughable and pathetic; if all the world is a stage,
> then
> >> all the men and women upon it are not actors but only extras.
> >>
> >> But take a look at this.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> http://www.huffingtonpost.com/wallace-shawn/why-i-call-myself-a-socia_b_818061.html
> >>
> >> It's only an article in the Huffington Post (which, as we all know, does
> >> not actually pay for what it prints, and therefore gets scoffed at by
> "real"
> >> writers, but we academics, who are NEVER paid for what we publish are
> >> therefore not real writers either, may take it as seriously as I think
> it is
> >> meant). The author is mostly a voice actor, who you may have seen as a
> goofy
> >> high school teacher in "Clueless"; he was also one of the leading
> sources of
> >> ideas for a "poor theatre" that we see in Louis Malle' s great movie "My
> >> Dinner With Andre".
> >>
> >> Here his idea is that the real key to reconciling all these
> contradictions
> >> of identity is that we are all far, far more than we seem. But only the
> >> actor, on the stage, can realize all of the potential identities that a
> >> single self can contain. In practice, it is race, class, caste, and
> above
> >> all the country in which the child finds himself or herself unwillingly
> born
> >> that selects and realizes the potential that later becomes a cheap
> >> substitute for his or her real identity. If the child wants anything
> more
> >> than this cheap substitute, then we are simply going to have to do
> something
> >> about race, class, caste, and above all national boundaries.
> >>
> >> In Volume Five of the Collected Works, Vygosky is writing (at
> considerable
> >> length) about how we might test the James-Lange theory of emotion (that
> is,
> >> the idea that physiological changes in the viscera or the vasomotor
> system
> >> somehow occur as an unmediated response to perceptions and emotion is
> merely
> >> the conscious mind that notices these).
> >>
> >> He discusses a "direct theorem" and also a "reciprocal one". The direct
> one
> >> is the surgical realization of James' "gedankenexperiment": through
> >> vivisection we prevent all changes in the viscera, the vasomotor system,
> and
> >> even the sympathetic nervous system, and we discover that animals still
> have
> >> emotional responses. The "reciprocal one", though, is the opposite: we
> >> produce, through drugs, pathology, or Stanislavskian "method" acting,
> the
> >> changes in the viscera, vasomotor system, and sympathetic nervous
> system,
> >> and we see if there is an emotional response.
> >>
> >> Now the problem is that these two theorems contradict each other. The
> >> direct theorem suggests that physiological changes and emotional
> experiences
> >> really CAN be decoupled. But the Stanslavskian method really indicates
> the
> >> OPPOSITE--we find that when we produce the physiological changes through
> >> method acting, we really DO get an emotional response with it.
> >>
> >> But the contradiction is really only apparent. First of all, the
> emotional
> >> responses that we get from dogs who have had their vagus nerve cut or
> their
> >> spinal cord severed are really very different from emotional response in
> the
> >> wild. They are not adaptive, they are altered by being decoupled from
> >> practical activity. For example, if you poke a paralyzed dog with a
> stick
> >> through the bars of a cage, it will get angry, but there is no
> possiblity of
> >> either fight or flight, so the anger is, as Vygotsky says, "anger
> without
> >> the sting".
> >>
> >> Secondly, the emotional responses we get from actors who have taken on
> >> another role are not so much responses to physiological changes as
> responses
> >> to ideas. And these ideas are not just any ideas. They are ideas that
> must
> >> in some way represent POTENTIAL SELVES to the actor. They are a kind of
> >> living realization of a potential emotional response rather than a real
> one.
> >>
> >> I guess I think that narration is always a little story; it's always a
> >> potential and not a real emotional response. That is why the
> Stanislavskyan
> >> technique seems a technique for testing the James-Lange hypothesis
> rather
> >> than a realistic method for the exploration of real, and not simply
> >> potential, human feeling.
> >>
> >> David Kellogg
> >> Seoul National University of Educaiton
> >>
> >>
> >> --- On Wed, 2/16/11, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >> From: Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> >> Subject: [xmca] Narration as BIG story in contrast to little story
> >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >> Date: Wednesday, February 16, 2011, 7:12 AM
> >>
> >>
> >> David Ke
> >>
> >> I thought I would bring to your attention an article in the current
> journal
> >> of Theory & Psychology by Michael Bamberg titled "Who am I? Narration
> and
> >> its Contributions to Self and Identity".  He is contrasting the
> >> biographical
> >> approach [lives as texts] as a metaphor of BIG stories with the
> Narrative
> >> Practice approach as a metaphor of small stories.
> >>
> >> To prime the upcoming discussion on identity formation that this months
> >> article will explore I want to bring Bamberg's perspective on
> >> distinguishing
> >> self from identity. On page 6 of the article he writes,
> >>
> >> "in broad strokes, identity is a label attributed to the attempt to
> >> differentiate and integrate a sense of self along different social and
> >> personal dimensions" [which the article explains not not distinct or
> >> separate dimensions] "Consequently, identities can be differentiated and
> >> claimed according to varying socio-cultural categories e.g., gender,
> age,
> >> race, occupation, gangs, socio-economic status, ethnicity, class, nation
> >> states, or regional territory. Any claim of identity faces three
> dilemmas:
> >> 1) sameness of a sense of self across time in the face of constant
> change;
> >> 2) uniqueness of the person vis-a-vis others in the face of being the
> same
> >> as everybody else; and 3) the construction of agency as constituted by
> self
> >> (with a self-to-world direction of fit) and world (with a world -to-
> self
> >> direction of fit). It is argued that IDENTITY takes off from the
> >> continuity/change dilemma, and from here ventures into issues of
> uniqueness
> >> (self-other differentiation) and agency.  In contrast, notions of SELF
> and
> >> SENSE OF SELF start from the self/other and agency differentiation and
> from
> >> here can filter into the diachronicity of continuity and change".
> >>
> >> David,  Bamberg is elaborating a notion of a small story approach which
> is
> >> in the discourse tradition of the Narrative Practice framework. {Hutto
> is
> >> also working in this realm}  Not sure how these ideas will possibly link
> up
> >> with notions of identity in the coming article to be posted but I
> >> appreciated how Bamberg opens his article with 3 dilemmas to be answered
> by
> >> concepts of identity and a sense of self.
> >>
> >> Larry
> >> __________________________________________
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