Re: [xmca] Vygotsky on Leading Activity

[Carol Macdonald <carolmacdon@gmail.com>]

Vico influenced von Glasersfeld, one of the modern exponents of
constructivism.
Carol

On 6 February 2011 14:54, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:

> Yes, someone (it may have been Mike C.) told me that Vico was playing in
> Italy a similar role at a similar time as Herder was playing in Germany. I
> MUST get around to reading Vico!! Thanks for the reminder Robert.
>
> Andy
>
>
> Robert Lake wrote:
>
>> Larry P.  Mike and Andy.
>> I so appreciate these  last postings. Here is a  paragraph from a piece I
>> wrote in 2006.
>> Robert Lake
>>
>>
>>  One man who is rarely mentioned, whose views are strikingly similar to
>> forward thinkers at the end of the Twentieth century, is Giambattista
>> Vico.
>> In fact, his work helped to spark the Romantic Movement by influencing the
>> poets and writers of the late Eighteenth century.  In his work called *New
>> Science* (1744), he states that “it is noteworthy that in all language,
>> the
>> greater part of the expressions relating to inanimate things is formed by
>> metaphors from the human body and its parts and from the human senses and
>> passions” (p. 405). In Vico’s view, this formation of the mind through
>> language began through metaphorical signs and gestures.  Metaphor became
>> the
>> primary way  Lof knowing and understanding experience in the world.
>>  Modell (2003) acknowledges the importance Vico placed on this view by
>> saying that “metaphor was understood not as a figure of speech, a trope,
>> but
>> as a vital means of understanding the world” (p. 15). Vico’s views sound
>> remarkably like Dewey (1934), Greene (1995), and others who welcome a
>> pluralistic epistemology through the portals of the body/mind.
>>
>> On Sun, Feb 6, 2011 at 3:29 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>> Hi Andy
>>> r
>>> You wrote,
>>>
>>>  "Which discipline should lead, unify, and elaborate the basic concepts,
>>> principles, and methods, verify and systematise the data of all other
>>> areas?    You see this question having a similar theme to David Ki's
>>> account of genres.
>>>
>>> In the spirit of this question I want to bring Lakoff & Johnson's
>>> perspective of 2nd generation cognitive science into the discussion.
>>>  This
>>> perspective is elaborated in their book "Philosophy in the Flesh"
>>>
>>> In a section of the book titled "Phenomenology, Functionalism, and
>>> Materialism: The Issue of Privileging the Metaphysics of Only One Level"
>>> they elaborate a perspective that suggests we can explain or understand
>>> reality at more than one level. They suggest there are three frameworks
>>> for
>>> understanding what is "real" 1 Direct  2 Representational 3 embodied.
>>>
>>> These alternative frameworks emerged historically.  The Greeks assumed a
>>> direct relation of the real. In the direct model there is no split
>>> between
>>> ontology [what there IS] and epistemology [what you could KNOW]
>>>
>>> With Descartes, a gap opened between mind and world. Ideas became
>>> internal
>>> representations OF external reality that CORRESPONDED to the external
>>> world
>>> and the mind becomes disembodied. In the most popular current version
>>> [1st
>>> generation cognitive science] representations have shrunk to symbolic
>>> representations or "symbol-system realism" (for example Foder)
>>> Symbol-system
>>> realism is a legacy of analytic philosophy.
>>>
>>> Lakoff and Johnson suggest with the 2nd generation of cognitive science
>>> there has been a shift to embodied realism (embodied reason) This
>>> perspective is an evolution based realism in which our bodies and brains
>>> accomodate and transform our surroundings.
>>>
>>> All three perspective are realist as they accept that the material world
>>> exists and we can give an account of how we function successfully in the
>>> world.  The direct and embodied perspective share an assumtion that there
>>> is
>>> no mind-body gap whereas the representational view accepts a gap.
>>>  However
>>> the embodied view rejects the premise that we can have absolutely correct
>>> objective knowledge of the world because our knowledge is constrained by
>>> the
>>> limitations of our physical bodies.  Embodied realism assumes a different
>>> epistemology and rejects the epistemology of direct absolute knowledge of
>>> the world-in-itself.  Knowledge is therefore relative, but not radically
>>> relative.  Knowledge is relative to the limited capacity of our bodies,
>>> brains, and embodied interactions in the world.
>>>
>>> Lakoff and Johnson suggest there are DIRECTLY embodied concepts [primary
>>> basic level concepts, spatial-relations concepts, and event-structure
>>> concepts] which form the basis of "stable" knowledge.  They also
>>> postulate
>>> the existence of PRIMARY METAPHORS which are the origin and make possible
>>> the extension of the direct basic level concepts INTO abstract domains.
>>> The PRIMARY metaphors are highly constrained both by the nature of our
>>> bodies and brains AND by the interactions in the world.
>>>
>>> Embodied realism  recognizes that concepts do change over time, vary
>>> across
>>> cultures, and have multiple structures which reflect social interactions
>>> and
>>> social constructions.
>>>
>>> Lakoff and Johnson recognize John Dewey and Maurice Merleau-Ponty as
>>> anticipating the emergence of embodied realism. Both recognized when we
>>> use
>>> the words "mind" and "body" we are imposing bounded conceptual structures
>>> artificially on a horizon of fluid processes that constitute our
>>> experience.  The concepts "subjective" and "objective" are imposed on
>>> this
>>> fluid process.  More recently Varela, Thompson, and Rosch have extended
>>> understanding of embodied realism with their ENACTIVE notion of
>>> experience
>>> which depend on sensorimotor capacities embedded within biological,
>>> psychological, and cultural contexts.
>>>
>>> Lakoff and Johnson's embodied realism framework is distinguished from
>>> these
>>> other  perspectives in their reliance on empirical neuroscience in their
>>> understanding of the structuring of experience.
>>>
>>>  Lakoff and Johnson suggest there are at least three LEVELS to
>>> understanding
>>> the embodiment of concepts. [neural level, phenomenological conscious
>>> level,
>>> and a 3rd level they label the cognitive unconscious] The neural level is
>>> explored through the metaphor of neural structure in electronic,
>>> circuitry
>>> concepts. "Truth" at the neural level shares this common metaphor of
>>> electronic terms.  Lakoff and Johnson point out that many neural
>>> scientists
>>> make the mistake of assuming they are exploring a "physical" level but
>>> loose
>>> sight that they are explaining this physical level in metaphorical terms
>>> of
>>> neural circuitry.
>>>
>>> The 2nd phenomenological level is the level at which we speak of the
>>> "feel"
>>> of experience as conscious, and the way things appear to us.
>>>
>>> Lakoff and Johnson hypothesize a 3rd level of nonconscious structure
>>> [phenomenology also posits this level] which makes possible the structure
>>> of
>>> consciousness.  This nonconscious level is highly structured but
>>> inaccessible to conscious awareness.  Lakoff and Johnson suggest that to
>>> say
>>> the cognitive unconscious is real is much like saying neural circuitry is
>>> real.
>>>
>>> The 3 levels ARE RELATED.  We would not have spatial-relation concepts
>>> without orientation-sensitive nerve cells.  We would not have the color
>>> concepts we have without specific neural circuitry that creates the color
>>> categories.  The neural level AND experience of the external world
>>> together
>>> significantly determine what concepts develop.
>>>
>>> Full understanding from Lakoff and Johnson's perspective requires
>>> explanations at ALL 3 LEVELS.  No one level is sufficient to explain the
>>> mind. Many aspects of mind are about the "feel" of experience
>>> [phenomenological level]  Other aspects of mind can only be explained as
>>> higher-level patterns which constitute the cognitive unconscious.  All 3
>>> levels are present. Explanations at all 3 levels are necessary [though
>>> not
>>> sufficient] for adequate accounts of the mind.
>>>
>>> Color is an example of levels of explanation.  At the phenomenological
>>> level
>>> we perceice colors as being "in" the objects that "are" colored. Grass IS
>>> green.  This is a phenomenology-first account of truth which privileges
>>> that
>>> level over scientific neural circuity truth claims.  The word "green"
>>> reflects our conscious phenomenological experience of colors inhering in
>>> objects themselves.  If grass is green then there is greeness in the
>>> grass.
>>>
>>> However from the neural circuitry level of truth colors do not inhere in
>>> the
>>> objects themselves. They are created by our color cones and neural
>>> circuitry
>>> together with the wavelength reflectances of objects and local light
>>> conditions.  "At the neural level, green is a multiplace interactional
>>> property"  This truth claim contradicts the truth claim at the
>>> phenomenological level.  These are "distinct" truths at different levels.
>>> To state both the phenomenological and neural truths requires looking at
>>> both levels at once. There is NO independent neutral truth beyond
>>> perspectives.  Each level provides different modes of understanding.
>>>
>>> Embodied truth is not subjective truth. Lakoff and Johnson hypothesize we
>>> all have similar embodied BASIC level and spatial-relation abilities to
>>> perceive and manipulate [sensori-motor] which explains the structure of
>>> primary metaphors.  Lakoff and Johnson are advocating a metaphysical
>>> pluralism of explanations.  They suggest functionalists priviledge the
>>> level
>>> of the cognitive unconscious, whereas Husserl privileges the
>>> phenomenological.  Eliminative materialists such as Churchland privilege
>>> the
>>> neural level for all aspects of cognition.  Functioalist developmental
>>> scholars who study the acquistion of language privilege both the
>>> phenomenological and cognitive unconscious levels but are silent on the
>>> neural level.  Lakoff and Johnson recognize the validity of all 3 levels
>>> as
>>> distinct levels of understanding within their version of 2nd generation
>>> cognitive science.  Although there is NOT ONE correct description there
>>> can
>>> still be MANY CORRECT descriptions, depending on embodied understandings
>>> at
>>> different levels or different perspectives.   Each distinct perspective
>>> provides a distinct commitment to what is real about that situation. Each
>>> is
>>> a version of a commitment to truth.
>>>
>>> Lakoff and Johnson take a position that they are PHYSICALISTS in that
>>> they
>>> believe there is an ultimate material basis for what is real.  But they
>>> are
>>> not "eliminativists" who posit that only physically existing "entities"
>>> are
>>> real.  For Lakoff and Johnson entities such as "basic primary metaphors"
>>> [embodied metaphors] are real.
>>>
>>> Andy, I'm not sure where notions of "embodied" realism, mind, and
>>> cognition
>>> fit in your question of "leading" frameworks, but it is one more example
>>> of
>>> the possible usefullness of plural explanations of experience.
>>>
>>> Larry
>>>
>>> On Fri, Feb 4, 2011 at 7:33 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> I have just started re-reading Vygotsky's "Historical Crisis" from the
>>>> beginning, for the first time for many years (I have looked a cetain
>>>>
>>>>
>>> "hot"
>>>
>>>
>>>> topics, but not read it from the beginning for years). There is a pair
>>>> of
>>>> insights which he offers which I'd like to remind people of.
>>>>
>>>> (1) He says that at different stages in the history of psychology, one
>>>> or
>>>> another branch of psychology plays the "leading role." First the
>>>>
>>>>
>>> psychology
>>>
>>>
>>>> of the normal adult person, then pathology and then the psychology of
>>>> the
>>>> unconscious. He asks: "Which discipline should lead, unify, and
>>>> elaborate
>>>> the basic concepts, principles, and methods, verify and systematise the
>>>>
>>>>
>>> data
>>>
>>>
>>>> of all other areas?
>>>>
>>>> He then goes on to consider the same problem in a slightly different
>>>> way:
>>>> "What makes the most diverse phenomena into psychological facts - from
>>>>
>>>>
>>> the
>>>
>>>
>>>> salivation in a dog to the enjoyment of a tragedy, what do the ravings
>>>> of
>>>>
>>>>
>>> a
>>>
>>>
>>>> madman and the rigorous computations of the mathematician share?" In
>>>>
>>>>
>>> other
>>>
>>>
>>>> words, what is the concept of psychology and its subject matter? He then
>>>> goes on to look at three competing answers, based on reflections of the
>>>> proposed leading roles to be given to subjective psychology, animal
>>>> psychology or psychoanalysis: "For general psychology the three answers
>>>> mean, respectively that it is a science of (1) the mental and its
>>>> properties, or (2) behaviour; or (3) the unconscious." This leads very
>>>> directly to a consideration of the concept of psychology in terms of a
>>>>
>>>>
>>> unit
>>>
>>>
>>>> of analysis.
>>>>
>>>> Could we give an answer to the question as to which branch of general
>>>> psychology plays the "leading role" today, in these very
>>>> historical/objective terms?
>>>>
>>>> Andy
>>>> --
>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>> Hegel Summer School: The New Atheism: Just Another Dogma? <
>>>> http://ethicalpolitics.org/seminars/hss2011.htm>
>>>>
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>>>>
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>>
>>
>>
>>
>
> --
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Hegel Summer School: The New Atheism: Just Another Dogma? <
> http://ethicalpolitics.org/seminars/hss2011.htm>
>
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