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Re: [xmca] Paradigms, Hyperdigms, Hypodigms



If I may just comment from the side, here:

David has been working on these ideas for almost a decade now. They have been getting sharper and clearer with each iteration.

On Tue, 18 Jan 2011, Andy Blunden wrote:

All absolutely fascinating, David HK!

I would like to read more of your project. *Have you written a book* covering all the material you have been talking about in this series of emails? Otherwise, I have a series of further questions I'd like to ask, but we may be stretching what is possible via email.

Your project is a little different from mine. I am not particularly oriented to teacher training, and I do aim to enlist people as partners in my own theoretical landscape, I guess. But I am very much interested in the interaction between theories of mind which inevitably happens because we inhabit the same real world, even if in academia we inhabit distinct theoretical landscapes. :)

andy

David H Kirshner wrote:
Sorry, Andy.

I guess I didn't get what your question was driving at. Yes, this started out as an exercise of examining the varying ways
learning is construed in the broad range of psychological schools. After
models involving 7, later 5 versions of learning, I ended up with a
simplified set of 3 learning metaphors that seemed to me to capture the
basic learning objectives of education: "habituation" of skills,
"construction" of concepts, and "enculturation" of dispositions.
Coincidently these corresponded well with the trio of learning
objectives promulgated by NCATE (an accrediting agency for colleges of
education). In my view, this is the universe of educational aspirations
for student learning. Part of what I struggled with in your previous clarification of the
framing question was your suggestion that once we "have a clear concept
of the class of problems" this is where "the messy competition between
currents of thinking could be presented [to teachers] in a way which was
productive." The genres approach, as I'm developing it, does not seek to
enlist teachers as colleagues in the sociology of science, rather to
marshal (selected) perspectives from within specific paradigms that make
coherent the prescribed methods of teaching for that genre. Perhaps
there is an analogy to physicists sparing engineers from controversies
in string theory. We in education have not previously had a way to
organize psychological knowledge in a way that constitutes a coherent
knowledge base for teachers. Our instinct is to make teachers partners
with us in making sense of the theoretical landscapes we inhabit.
Thoughts of prescriptive methods for teaching are uncomfortable. But, in
fact, that's how a professional knowledge base should work.

David


-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
Sent: Monday, January 17, 2011 6:34 PM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Paradigms, Hyperdigms, Hypodigms

David, I think (sic!) that what you are suggesting is consistent with what I was suggesting with my question about framing. You have analysed the existing range of genres by claiming that there are exactly 3 concepts of education, which are each legitimate objectives for a teacher. And you make an assessment (presumably) of a theory of psychology according to whether it satisfactorily responds to one of these frames. Is that right?

Andy

David H Kirshner wrote:

Robert, I'm not sure which David K you intended, but the "Jack of all
trades" issue is an important one to me. There is a way to respond to the multi-paradigmatic status of learning
theory that might be thought of as eclectic, perhaps also as
pluralistic. Educational Psychologists--those who teach Educational
Psychology courses, rather than psychologists whose work is applied to
education--often take a tool-box approach to applying psychology to
teaching: figure out what kind of problem you're facing, look around

in

your psychology tool box, and in the spirit of bricolage select some
appropriate theories you can figure out how to apply. Perhaps this is
the conception of a Jack of all trades that David Kellogg warned
against. The genres approach, as I am framing it, is not like that at all. A
genre of teaching is a sculpted teaching methodology, informed by
learning theory, and intended to support learning in one of 3 distinct
senses: habituation of skills; construction of concepts; or
enculturation of dispositions. The whole package of genres is proposed
as a professional knowledge base for teaching in relation to the
teacher's responsibility to support learning (there are other
responsibilities, requiring other resources). In this sense, the

teacher

is expected to understand and be competent in a variety of pedagogies,
but in quite well-defined and exact senses--I think this is not in the
spirit of the Jack of all trades.

David
-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
On Behalf Of Robert Lake
Sent: Monday, January 17, 2011 8:21 AM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Paradigms, Hyperdigms, Hypodigms

Happy MLK day to David K. and Everyone!

Does pluralism equate with a reduction to the lowest common

denominator

or
does it mean  an interdependent yet distinct set of approaches that
welcomes
difference without expecting each practitioner to be a "jack of all
trades"?

RL
On Sun, Jan 16, 2011 at 10:08 PM, David Kellogg
<vaughndogblack@yahoo.com>wrote:


I'm with him; with the other David K. The generic approach really

demands

too much Jack-of-all-tradesmanship of the teacher, and the Jack of

all

trades, while very useful in pioneer times, is ultimately a master of

none.

Yes, in Chapter ONE of T&S Vygotsky is defining the problem and the
approach. But even there he doesn't exactly want to let a hundred

flowers

blossom and a hundred schools of thought content. The problem he

addresses

is quite specific, and within this problem there is really only

legitimate

method, and it's not the tried and true method of analysis into

elements

that forms the basis of the extant genre.

In Chapter TWO Vygotsky is even less eclectic, if possible. He BEGINS

by

saying that Piaget (actually Claparede) associates himself with

Freud,

Blondel, and Levy-Bruhl as a great pioneer of an entirely new field.

But

then he says that this is not at all an enviable position: Freud,

Blondel,

and Levy-Bruhl created their psychologies from problem to paradigm,

and this

is exactly what is wrong with them, and why their psychologies

inevitably

end up with that peculiarly metaphysical smell imparted by an

overambitious

bottom-upmanship. (It's a familiar problem for painters: when you

frame the

painting according to the subject you end up making your picture too

small,

but when you want to include enough background to make sense of it,

you

always end up making your picture too big.)

When LSV talks about "general" psychology and the necessity to

"unify"

psychology, he's not just making the point that individual psychology

has to

be seen, contra Wundt, as an instantiation of social psychology. He's

also

calling for what in applied linguistics has come to be called "theory
culling", the falsification and the destruction of some entirely

wrong

paradigms (e.g. Bergson, elan vital, Mach, Freud, Levy-Bruhl,

Blondel,


and

Piaget too.).

I think he would say that "general psychology", in which he would

include

sociology (see Chapter Four) and semiology, must become the

hyperdigm.


What

we now call psychology is really what he calls "individual

psychology", and

that is the paradigm. Education would be a hypodigm of psychology

dealing

with teaching/learning and microgenetic change.

One way to look at this is to think of the subordination of paradigms

to

hyperdigms and their superordination to hypodigms in terms of the

TIME

variable. Social psychology, the hyperdigm, is really the study of
sociogenesis, the functional differentiation of societies and their
resultant structure, just as biology is the study of biogenesis, the
evolutionary differentiation of species, and the resulting

structures.

Individual psychology, for Vygotsky, is the study of ontogenesis,
functional differentiation between and within individuals, and the
psychological structures that come out of this, and of course the
hypodigm, education, is the study of microgenesis. That's OUR cue;
it's where we (teachers) come in!

David Kellogg
Seoul National University of Education

--- On Sun, 1/16/11, David H Kirshner <dkirsh@lsu.edu> wrote:


From: David H Kirshner <dkirsh@lsu.edu>
Subject: RE: [xmca] Brains, Computer, and the Future of Education
To: ablunden@mira.net, "eXtended Mind, Culture,Activity" <
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Date: Sunday, January 16, 2011, 10:43 AM


Andy,

The question of whether you, Vygotsky, I, or anyone else thinks

multiple

paradigms are a good idea needs to be separated from the question of
whether psychology is preparadigmatic in the sense of questing toward
paradigmatic consensus. Kuhn's sociology of science analysis does not
imply that every, or indeed any, particular scientist interprets

their

work in terms of this sociological imperative. But in the case of
psychology, we can see certain historical processes that are not easy

to

account for otherwise. I'm thinking, particularly, of the dynamic of
paradigmatic ambitions presented as solid (or immanent)

accomplishments,

only to be beaten back by proponents of other schools. Think for
Skinner's (1958) attempt to extend behavioral psychology from

unmediated

response conditioning to verbal behavior beaten back by Chomsky's

(1959)

famous book review, or the counterattack of Anderson, Reder, and

Simon

(1996) in the face of defections by notable cognitivists like Brown,
Collins, and Duguid (1989), Greeno (1993), Hirst and Manier (1995)
dissatisfied with cognitivist attempts to account for the problem of
"context." I argue this kind of discourse is not characteristic of
paradigmatic science, but instead supports the thesis that psychology

is

preparadigmatic.

If, as you suggest, multiple paradigms--not competing, but

co-existing

peacefully--is a happy steady-state for psychology, then we'd expect

a

genres approach for education to have arisen long ago as an

alternative

to saddling educational practitioners with the need to grapple with
dialectical syntheses across paradigms. On the other hand, if
preparadigmatic psychology is ever questing toward paradigmatic
consensus, then expect psychologists to resist a genres approach

through

many different sorts of explanations, including, possibly, denying

the

preparadigmatic status of their science.

David



-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu

[mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]

On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
Sent: Sunday, January 16, 2011 7:12 AM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture,Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Brains, Computer, and the Future of Education

I certainly don't see the problematic you pose, David, as indicating

a

need for us to "grow up" and actually I find "genre" as you present

it,

a very fruitful way of characterising the problem. Shortly before

your

earlier message arrived I had been reading LSV's "Thinking and

Speech,"

Chapter 1. I can't for the life of me find a suitable succinct quote,
but as I recall it, he was saying that Psychology was, as you say,

not

yet able to form a unified theory, and that (something like) every

new

observation or problem launched a new theory. Now, I don't read

Vygotsky

as attempting to create a master theory. On the contrary he argues
against this, as I see it. His piece about the "unit" in that chapter
says that we have to form a concept of the class of phenomena or
*problem* that we want to solve and unfold a theory from there, as
opposed to subordinating that definite class of problem to a more
general one which lacks the special characteristics of the special
probem we want to solve.Confusion has arisen I think from trying to

read

LSV's theory of the relation of thinking and speaking as a grand

theory

of consciousness.

So it seems to me that in any very general field of phenomena

multiple

genre are quite OK, fruitful and just as useful as they are in

everyday

life. (Imagine trying to get by in everyday life with one genre!)

Only

each "genre" needs to have a clear concept of the class of problems

that

it covers. That's why I raise the question of stepping back one step
from a genre and ask: how does this genre frame the phenomena, as a
problem, as a unit or concept of its subject matter.

I think if we do that the messy competition between currents of

thinking

could be presented in a way which was productive.

What do you think?
Andy

David H Kirshner wrote:

Larry and Andy,

Thanks for kind words.

Andy, I don't have the philosophical background to be able to

address

your question as formulated. But I read the intent of the question

as

probing the utility of the paradigm construct, and hence the genres
solution: If all differences of opinion are ultimately paradigm
differences, then shouldn't we just grow up, accept differences in
framing as inevitable, and get on with debating issues and acting on

the

basis of our best judgment following from the debate? Why should we
regard differences of opinion that emerge in psychological framings

of

learning as different from other disagreements, and requiring its

own

new kind of solution, namely a "genres" solution?

Let me address that concern directly. Take as a major instance the
difference between sociogenetic and ontogenetic (i.e.,

individualist)

approaches to learning. These approaches construe the world of

learning

in very different terms, each highlighting certain questions as

crucial,

while other questions are incidental. Not coincidently, each can

answer

certain questions, to wit the ones it considers important, much more
effectively than the other questions.

We have the following usual choices: Adopt one perspective based on

the

promise that it (eventually) will be able to answer the full set of
questions adequately; or construct a new theory as a dialectical
synthesis of the original two. (I think socioculturalists straddle

the

two choices by sometimes claiming they are sociogenetic and other

times

that they are inherently dialectic.)

In the behaviorist era and subsequently the cognitive area, the

first

choice was more appealing. The desire to be "scientific" (i.e.,
uni-paradigmatic), in conjunction with shameless hawking by

proponents,

gave those approaches some time to adequately address the concerns

of

the other school. As neither succeeded in unifying the field, in

this

post-cognitive era, we opt more for dialectical approaches.

The problem is that these dialectical alternatives, rather like the
particle/wave dialectic of quantum physics, don't really help us

make

sense of the world in a way that is actionable. Our intuitions about
learning are not able to encompass both sides of the dialectic in

such

a

way as to constitute a synthesis. As a result, a dialectic approach

puts

on the table the diverse and discordant pieces that somehow have to

be

coordinated. Paul Cobb (1994) addressed this problem of

constructivist

and sociocultural approaches in a widely read ER piece recommending
precisely that: a coordination of perspectives.

Well, obviously a coordination of perspectives is exactly what is
needed. The issue at hand is who does the coordinating? In Cobb's
approach--as in all other academic approaches that have been

offered--it

is the researcher's challenge to figure out the coordination. In

this

way, the work of coordination can take place in the academy in

concert

with efforts to forge a dialectical synthesis that eventually could
serve to unify the science of learning under a single theorization.

This

is why a genres approach is so disruptive. A genres approach says,
instead, let's focus within each paradigm on figuring out what that
framing has to offer teaching. Then leave it to teachers, to the

world

of professional practice, to figure out how (or if) to coordinate.

For the researcher, this genres approach is a disaster. It

constructs

what is most important for researchers--an eventual dialectical
synthesis that unites the field--as irrelevant to the world of

practice.

Our theoretical musing no longer are projected into the world of
educational practice as relevant, they become just our private

concern,

with possible long-term payoff for the world, but no immediate
relevance. For teachers, the genres approach finally provides for
emancipation from the intellectual tyranny of theory. Because the
individual paradigms are grounded in accessible metaphors for

learning,

it becomes possible to articulate pedagogical principles in ways

that

are coherently available to teachers. And then it becomes the

purview

of

professional practice to determine how best to coordinate the genres

of

teaching.

This is truly a moral dilemma for researchers.

David


-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu

[mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]

On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
Sent: Saturday, January 15, 2011 6:51 PM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Brains, Computer, and the Future of Education

Thank you David for your truly enlightening post.

Can I ask this question: when two subjects are engaged in a dialogue
over some issue, and are positing the issue in two different genres,

is

it true to say that they are explicitly or implicitly asserting
different frames. For example, if two parties are arguing over

whether

to increase unemployment benefit, they may disagree over the frame

being

lazy people ripping off the community or disadvantaged people who
deserve the support of the community. So isn't there always a frame
around a genre where rational contest is possible? Every specialism
exists within a lingua franca of shared concepts, doesn't it?

Andy

David H Kirshner wrote:


Larry, Andy, Michael, and Monica.

Sorry for the delay in responding. Let me first address the

technology

tie-in, and then turn to the pedagogical question about how to deal


with


the multi-paradigmatic theorization of learning.

I'm sympathetic to the perspective that it is "the current


technologies


being used and developed which transforms our guiding metaphors

[for

learning] and not the internal debates among scholars." If we look

at

the whole ball of wax, psychology certainly does seem a chaotic

tangle

that may well be led by technological happenstance rather than by
intellectual coherence. But the proliferation of new schools and

new

approaches based on technological developments should not obscure

the

kinds of processes of development that go within each paradigmatic
school. Certainly, paradigmatic differences are not settled by

debate.

As Kuhn pointed out, the competitive process is inescapably


sociological


rather than purely intellectual. What about within a paradigm? As
sociohistorical institutions schools of research persist over time
because of mutually shared projects that often are experienced as
intellectually coherent. Certainly technological developments can
influence the basic understandings pursued within a school. For
instance, psychologists moved on from the telephone switchboard


metaphor


of cognitive processing to the serial digital computer metaphor

which

afforded much more dynamic possibilities for theorization, but with


much


basic conceptual continuity. I don't think it's "wrong" to regard


intra


paradigmatic development as led by technological developments.


However,


I imagine most of the time, for example in thinking about our own
progress as sociocultural or CHAT researchers, we find it useful to


view


progress in terms of intellectual coherence. In any case, in my

work

in


harvesting insights from the diverse branches of psychology for the
purpose of framing a multi-paradigmatic pedagogy, I find it useful

to

regard the work within paradigms as progressing through rational


debate


(or at least attempting to).

A Multi-paradigmatic Pedagogical Framework:

How do we advance pedagogical theory taking seriously the
multi-paradigmatic status of learning theory?

Let me warn that this is a theme I've pursued before on xmca

without

much uptake--I think for very good reasons. The path leads to
delegitimization of education as a co-participant with psychology

in

the


scientific enterprise. Alternatively, it leads to the repudiation

by

education of psychology's scientific pretensions. Given how deeply
enmeshed educational and psychological communities are with one


another


(e.g., xmca) this is not an easy or appealing path for either

party.

The first step on this path is the hardest to take, though it is


simple


to articulate. If we accept that learning is diversely conceived


across


varied paradigms, and we also regard the purpose of teaching as
promoting learning, then there is only one sensible path to take if


one


desires pedagogical theory to be grounded in learning theory: A

genres

approach to pedagogical theorizing, with each genre of teaching
addressing learning in a particular paradigmatic sense. To date, a
genres approach has not been advanced. However, there are two
alternative approaches that have been attempted, in each case with
disastrous consequences. One method is to focus on a single

paradigm

and


deny the legitimacy of any others (e.g., the behaviorist era in
education). The other is to fashion a holistic vision of "good


teaching"


that somehow is to address learning in its various interpretations.


This


is the current Zeitgeist in educational theorizing, and I'll devote

a

couple of paragraphs, below, to explaining its multifaceted ill


effects


on education, the most immediate and debilitating of which is

systemic

de-intellectualization of pedagogy. For if teaching practice is to

be

understood in terms of learning theory, it can only be in terms of

a

single theory at a time, given the multi-paradigmatic character of


this


branch of knowledge.

I have been teaching an Education doctoral course on the genres


approach


for about 15 years, and I've ALMOST NEVER succeeded in making this


first


step comprehensible. So entrenched in our discourse are the ideas

of

holistic pedagogy--"good teaching" as a set of practices that


addresses


learning conceived as a complex and multifaceted whole--that the
language of genres just doesn't register for my students.

Typically,

when I present a framework for teaching for Skills, Concepts, and
Dispositions as distinct genres of teaching, this gets assimilated


into


a "learning styles" frame in which the different pedagogical


approaches


provide different routes to learning conceived as a complex and
multi-faceted whole. Indeed, our discourse typically intermixes

these

learning goals as we talk of "understanding the skill," "practicing


the


concept," or "inculcating thinking skills." Students almost never

come

to grasp the motive of differentiating, rather than integrating,

these

notions of learning as a comprehensible agenda.

The cost we pay for maintaining an integrative or holistic

discourse

about "good teaching" in education is staggeringly high. First, is

the

impossibility of articulating pedagogical principles, which, as
discussed above would require that learning be conceived locally,
relative to the independently conceived notions of learning.

Because

in


the standard discourse "good teaching" is somehow simultaneously to address learning in its many various senses, we end up instead with
generalities and platitudes, with intractably dense dialectical


analyses


attempting to span disparate local theories, and with vignettes

that

are


meant to illustrate good teaching, but that don't articulate its
principles. In short, we provide almost no usable intellectual


resources


that can serve to guide development of teaching practice.

Second is the politicized character of our pedagogical discourse
stemming from the interpenetration of values issues with issues of
efficacy. Given the varied notions of learning that motivate


educators,


it is to be expected that values issues will arise as to which

sort(s)

of learning ought to be pursued with students. But since our

discourse

constructs good teaching as a holistic set of practices, there's no
discursive space for this variation. One's opponent's construction

of

good teaching is not just wrong on values, but also misguided about


what


is effective practice (e.g., the Reading Wars and the Math Wars). A
discourse framed in genres of teaching would enable values issues

to

be


separated from issues of efficacy, thereby protecting the

professional

integrity of the field of teaching practice.

Finally, with so little to offer professional teaching practice,
learning theory is easily subject to being dismissed as irrelevant.

If

Teaching is defined in terms of promoting Learning, then learning


theory


ought to be THE theoretical discourse through which teaching

practice

is


articulated. We see our growing irrelevance in the current

prominence

of


"brain" perspectives on teaching--which is what started this


thread--but


also in other cognitive mechanisms approaches like "learning

styles"

research, as well as in pedagogical framings based on critical

theory,

values theory, philosophical commitments, or metaphysical or

spiritual

bases. In the end what we have is an open-ended pedagogical

discourse

in


which each new proposal for "good teaching" can create its own


universe


of discourse within which it is to be analyzed and evaluated. The
marketplace of pedagogical ideas resembles much more a bazaar than

a

professional knowledge base. A genres approach, while featuring a
theoretically heterogeneous set of framings for learning,

nonetheless

would enable us to capture the essential interests that motivate

the

pedagogical enterprise within a finite and determinate set of
theoretical approaches.

Genres: Why Not?

One excellent reason to dismiss the genres approach is because it

is

so


obvious. After all, it is immediately apparent that learning is
diversely conceived in varied psychological paradigms. So


theorizations


of good teaching that really come to grips with learning theory

would

need to be constructed locally, relative to a specific notion of
learning. Surely, if a genres approach had any merit it would have


been


adopted, or at least explored, a long time ago.

The alternative is that there are powerful interests arrayed

against

recognizing and dealing with the preparadigmatic status of

psychology.

I


propose that the genres approach has not previously been advanced
because it is in psychologists' self interest that it not be.

To understand these interests, we need to delve a bit into how
preparadigmatic science functions. Preparadigmatic science consists

of

multiple schools each in competition with the others to the unify

the

field under its own banner. However, paradigmatic differences are


never


settled by debate. As Kuhn pointed out, the competitive process is
inescapably sociological rather than purely intellectual. Viewed


through


divergent paradigmatic lenses, different aspects of observed

phenomena

become highlighted as problematic. So one paradigm cannot

invalidate

the


perspectives of another. Instead, a paradigm succeeds against

others

by


addressing the concerns of the other paradigms in ways that are
sufficiently appealing and powerful as to attract established
researchers from other schools, and especially new researchers just
entering the field. Like old soldiers, old paradigms never die,

they

just fade away.

Viewed in this way, we see that psychologists must lead double

lives.

Within their paradigm, the psychologist's life is similar to that

of

most other scientists. They are involved in deliberate and careful
elaboration and extension of the basic perspectives that initiated

the

school. However, externally, they are hucksters extraordinaire.

Claims

are exaggerated. Hoped for/planned developments are presented as

faits

accomplis. After all, one wins in the broader game by attracting
researchers, especially neophyte researchers, to your school.

One could castigate psychologists for being duplicitous or

dishonest,

but I think this freights individual psychology too heavily. What

we

have is best viewed not as individual misrepresentation, but a
discursive form reflecting the sociological imperative of
preparadigmatic science to achieve paradigmatic consensus. The

ironic

result is that across the broad diversity of psychology, there is

only

one tenet espoused by learning theorists of every persuasion: a

single

perspective (eventually) encompasses all of the relevant phenomena

of

learning. Thus a genres approach to pedagogy, building on discrete
accomplishments across paradigmatic divisions, would subvert
psychologists' active self-interest in promoting the problem of
paradigmatic division as (imminently) solved.

But what about educators? If psychologists prefer to deny the
preparadigmatic status of their field, why is it that educators


haven't


pressed on with a genres approach on their own? Again, a

sociological

perspective can help, this time explaining the client status of
Education with respect to Psychology. One of the first

preoccupations

of


Psychology, dating back to its emergence as a scientific

enterprise,

was


investigation of the transfer of training assumptions of faculty
psychology (e.g., Thorndike & Woodworth, 1901). These early studies
found the prevailing belief in broad transfer of learning to be
unwarranted. Through preceding centuries, the classical

(Aristotelian)

theory of faculty psychology, and its associated theory of
mental-disciplines, had served as the basis for pedagogical

thought.

So,


psychology's attack upon transfer of training effectively dislodged


the


existing foundations for educational practice. As a result,

education

attached itself to the new science, not as a separate and

independent

field of inquiry, but as a client discipline, dependent upon


psychology


for our legitimacy and intellectual authority. In that role, we

have

tended to see the world as the psychologists do. We have not

construed

psychology independently, as we would need to do to adopt a genres
approach.

Marshalling Preparadigmatic Psychology for Educational Purposes:

I'm going to conclude this post with a description of how


psychological


theory gets appropriated and reworked in genres scholarship. (This
really is where the psychologists get mad.) I mentioned, above,

that

"Within their paradigm, the psychologist's life is similar to that

of

most other scientists." Similar, but not identical. I want to argue


that


paradigmatic science develops more organically based on insights

that

bubble up from within the paradigm, in comparison with

preparadigmatic

science that is more teleologically driven by a felt need to

address

concerns that have emerged in other schools. For instance,


cognitivists


exploring the computational metaphor might eventually have decided,

on

their own, to extend from decontextualized problem solving to


encompass


social and cultural context. But the need to be positioned as
competitive with sociogenetic approaches like sociocultural

psychology

forced this development earlier. In this respect, we can see a
trajectory of preparadigmatic science that is not quite parallel

with

paradigmatic science. Preparadigmatic schools tends to evolve from
simple and powerful, but local, initial insights toward complex and opaque interpretations intended to bridge disparate intuitions. And


then


again, some preparadigmatic schools--e.g., social constructivism

and

perhaps situated cognition theory, in psychology--initially are

formed

as a synthesis of diverse perspectives precisely in order to be
competitive players in the preparadigmatic game, but without a

clear

and


simple local insight. The result is that use of psychology to

inform

a

genres approach must be highly selective, calling only on those


theories


that most effectively highlight a single metaphorical notion of
learning, often relying on earlier, more narrow, versions of the


theory


over contemporary forms.

In my own "crossdisciplinary"* effort to found a genres approach

for

education that builds on insights from diverse psychological

schools,

I've found it convenient to identify the metaphors for learning

that

I

see as framing education's diverse interests, and then to hunt

around

for psychological approaches that help to fill out that

metaphorical

interpretation. In this approach, I am guided by the perspective

that

psychology often draws from our culturally shared metaphors for its
basic images and intuitions (Fletcher, 1995; Leary, 1994; Olson &
Bruner, 1996; Sternberg, 1997). For instance, my "habituation"


metaphor


for learning-as-skill-attainment draws somewhat on behaviorist
psychology, but also on a branch of cognitive theory known as


"implicit


learning theory." My "construction" metaphor for
learning-as-concept-attainment draws somewhat on the Piagetian

based

radical constructivist, but also on the conceptual change

literature.

My


"enculturation" metaphor for learning-as-disposition-attainment

draws

partly on sociocultural theory, but also on social psychology. For
although sociocultural theory is predominantly sociogenetic

Vygotsky,

along with those who have undertaken to extend his legacy, resisted


the


complete social determinism that I see as needed to articulate a
coherent "enculturation pedagogy." As Penuel and Wertsch (1995) put


it:


"Sociocultural processes on the one hand and individual functioning

on

the other [exist] in a dynamic, irreducible tension rather than a


static


notion of social determination. A sociocultural approach ...

considers

these poles of sociocultural processes and individual functioning

as

interacting moments in human action, rather than as static

processes

that exist in isolation from one another" (p. 84). (Emphasizing

social

determinism, my prototypical exemplar of enculturational learning

is

"proxemics" drawn from social psychology, the study of how

individual

comes to embody the "personal body space" conventions of their


national


culture.)

I think this serves to establish how psychological science is


marshaled


within a genres agenda. Resisting what is everywhere present in
psychology--the attempt to develop a comprehensive account of

learning

that suffices for all purposes--the genres approach seeks after


partial


accounts that correspond with what I see as coherently forming the
discrete interest of educators in teaching skills, concepts, and
dispositions. It's not "wrong" for socioculturalists to agree, as

did

Larry a couple of posts ago, "that we must account for processes at


the


neurological level from a CHAT perspective." Indeed, such

initiatives

are vital to enable CHAT/sociocultural psychology to remain viable,


and


perhaps eventually prevail, within the competitive game of
preparadigmatic psychology. But the broader designs of the various
schools will not help us, today, to support educational practice.

The

psychology of TODAY is a preparadigmatic psychology, and that

reality

must be embraced in order to discern and support the discrete

agendas

for learning that motivate education.

*I use the term crossdisciplinary in contrast with

interdisciplinary

to


signal the coordination, rather than integration, of existing
theoretical frameworks.

David


-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu

[mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]

On Behalf Of Larry Purss
Sent: Wednesday, January 12, 2011 7:35 AM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Brains, Computer, and the Future of Education

David
Another quick thought on the competing models of learning and how


these


models become common sense or taken for granted folk psychological


ways


of
orienting to the world. The  power of metaphors to conventionalize

a

cultural imaginary seems to be  central to this transformative

process

that
develops various cognitive models at the implicit or tacit level.


Andy


points to the historical processes that lead to a particular

metaphor

structuring our cognition [the zeitgeist]. As I read his comments
he suggests it is the current technologies being used and developed
which
transforms our guiding metaphors and not the internal debates among
scholars.  If technological transformation  "constitutes"


metaphorical


transformation [stronger term than influences] then how do we
consciously
engage with these transformative technological processes to

influence

the
zeitgeist [as a dialogue among models] ? At the level of common

sense

folk
psychological metaphors of learning are university debates leading

the

way
or charting where the technology has taken us?
The underlying question is, How do we get teachers to incorporate
alternative models of learning and cognition which run counter to


common


sense

Larry


On Wed, Jan 12, 2011 at 4:37 AM, Michael Glassman
<MGlassman@ehe.osu.edu>wrote:




Hi David,

I sort of feel like the human relationship with information has



changed in



very fundemental ways over the last ten years. Phenomena like the



Web,



Google, FaceBook, the Open Source movement have moved incredibly



quickly.



Some academic urban legends are rising up, such as the idea that

the

computer in some way changes the structure of wiring of the brain
(absolutely no evidence, or even proto-evidence for this I can.)

But


I



think it is a combination of fear and confusion.  You have first



amendment



lawyers like Floyd Abrams arguing against free speech on the


Internet.



You



have brutal authoritarians like Putin signing executive orders

making

Russian government completely Open Source by 2015 (my guess is he

has


no



idea what Open Source actually is).  The whole thing is mind


boggling.


I think of cognitivist, behaviorists socio cultural theorists,

etc,


etc.



arguing over who bats next, not realizing that the rules of the

game


are



completely changing.  Changing in ways we don't even have a


vocabulary



to



talk about yet.

Michael

________________________________

From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu on behalf of David H Kirshner
Sent: Tue 1/11/2011 10:45 PM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: RE: [xmca] Brains, Computer, and the Future of Education



Larry,

Here's my sociology of science account of the rise of brain

studies

as



a



substitute for learning theory.

1. In Kuhnian terms, psychology is a preparadigmatic science. For instance, learning is variously studied in behavioral, cognitive, developmental, and sociocultural schools that conceive of learning

in

fundamentally distinct ways.

2. The grand motive of preparadigmatic science is establishment of
paradigmatic consensus. Each school is in competition with the

others


to



unify the field under its umbrella by coming to accommodate the
interests of the other schools while still preserving the essence

of


its



own unique perspective. Most often this competition is implicit,

but

periodically it leads to open conflict as in Chomsky's repudiation

of

Skinner's effort to account for "Verbal Behavior," or in the flare

up


in



the late '90s between James Greeno and John Anderson and company

over

cognitivist efforts to account for the situated character of


learning.


3. The dominant paradigm in any period always is the one to most
strenuously pursue hegemonic designs on the field. The

cognitivists'

embracing of the rhetoric of situativity has cost them dearly:

they

no


longer can forefront the technical machinery of information


processing


theory and artificial intelligence computer simulation as their



central



technical method and theoretical thrust. This is really a crisis


point


for cognitivists. They gained prominence through the Information
Processing approach, and are coasting along on their reputation.
Embracing brain science enables them to maintain the surface

features


of



dynamic "science," while providing a convenient disguise for the

fact

that there's no longer a central metaphor for learning that is

being

elaborated and developed by that community.

4. Projecting this forward a decade or so, we have the likelihood

of

diminishment of the importance of the cognitivist umbrella, and



renewed



opportunity for the other schools to push toward the front of the



pack.



...should be lots of fun.

David



-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu


[mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]


On Behalf Of Larry Purss
Sent: Tuesday, January 11, 2011 7:37 AM
To: lchcmike@gmail.com; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Brains, Computer, and the Future of Education

Mike,

The band wagon may not be a strong enough metaphor. The image of

a

steam
roller seems more accurate. I mentioned earlier that the term ZPD

is

now a
recognized term in many school settings [as scaffolding]. However



this



alternative metaphor of mind as computer or mind  as brain is a

far


more



powerful metaphor in schools. Often school staffs are fascinated

with

these
explanations and believe that neuroscience is finally getting to

the

"heart"
of the matter [couldn't resist the contradictary metaphor]. Brain
science as
an explanation of learning is becoming the dominant narrative in
many school debates.  I was wondering if there are any

"simplified'

articles
for a general audience that engage with these neuro/brain

metaphors


that



would lead to school staffs possibly having a dialogue [by


introducing


dought]  I have shared a few articles with interested staff who

love

ideas
but they were too "theoretical" for a staff discussion.

With this steam roller comes the call for justifying your practice

in

schools by using "best practices" which are "evidence based".

This

evidence often is dominated by evidence from neuroscience

I have attempted to introduce sociocultural perspectives into the
debate in
 response to the neuro/brain social representations of learning

but

I

would
appreciate an  article for a general audience that I could hand

out

to


start
a dialogue among school staffs.

Mike, I believe this frame of reference is not a "fad" or a "band



wagon"



but is developing into a "conventionalized" metaphor which most
educators
may use to explain "learning" in  schools.  Fad indicates a


transitory


phenomena and neuroscience seems a longer lasting  phenomena.

I am looking for an article that does not refute or contradict the
neuroscience explanations but rather LINKS the  ideas to


sociocultural


concepts.

One of the principals in a school I work in is attending this
conference,
and principals do have influence in school cultures.  I hope to
influence
her.

Larry

On Mon, Jan 10, 2011 at 8:07 PM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>


wrote:



The bandwagon is visible coming over the horizon!
Check it out at http://www.learningandthebrain.com/brain28.html.
Join for just the price of a click and a clack.
mike
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--


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Hegel Summer School: The New Atheism: Just Another Dogma?
<http://ethicalpolitics.org/seminars/hss2011.htm>

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Tony Whitson
UD School of Education
NEWARK  DE  19716

twhitson@udel.edu
_______________________________

"those who fail to reread
 are obliged to read the same story everywhere"
                  -- Roland Barthes, S/Z (1970)
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