A still more individual kind of particularity is exhibited by the so-called idiosyncrasies which occur both in the physical nature and in the mentality of man. Some people, for example, can scent the presence of cats near them. Others are quite peculiarly affected by certain diseases. King James I of England fainted if he saw a dagger. Mental idiosyncrasies are displayed especially in youth, e.g. in the incredible rapidity of mental arithmetic in particular children. In addition, it is not merely individuals who are distinguished from one another by the forms of mind or spirit in its natural modes discussed above, but families, too, more or less, especially when they have intermarried among themselves and not with outsiders, as has been the case, for example, in Berne and in some German cities.

Now that we have depicted the three forms of the qualitative natural mode of the individual soul—natural disposition, temperament, and character—we have still to indicate the rational necessity why this natural mode has just these three forms and no others, and why these forms have to be considered in the order we have followed. We began with natural disposition, more specifically with talent and genius, because in natural disposition the qualitative natural mode of the individual soul has predominantly the form of something that merely is, something immediately fixed and of such a nature that its inner differentiation is related to a difference existing outside of it. In temperament, on the other hand, this natural mode loses such a fixed shape; for whereas either one talent prevails exclusively in the individual, or several exist alongside one another in him quiescently and without passing into one another, each form of temperament can pass into the opposite in one and the same individual, so that no temperament has a fixed being in him. At the same time, the difference of the natural mode in question is reflected into the interior of the individual soul out of the reference to something existing outside of it. But in character, we see the fixity of the natural disposition united with the changefulness of the various temperaments, the predominant reference outwards in the former, united with the reflectedness-into-self of the soul prevailing in the different temperaments. The fixity of character is not so immediate, is not so innate, as the fixity of natural disposition, but has to be developed by the will. Character consists in something more than an even blending of the various temperaments. All the same, it cannot be denied that it has a natural foundation, that some people are more naturally disposed to possess a strong character than others. For this reason, we were right in speaking of character here in Anthropology, although it is only in the sphere of free mind or spirit that it is fully unfolded.

Taking the soul as an individual, we find its diversities, as alterations in it, the one permanent subject, and as stages in its development. As they are at once physical and mental diversities, a more concrete definition or description of them would require us to anticipate an acquaintance with the formed and matured mind.

(1) The first of these is the natural lapse of the ages in man's life. He begins with Childhood—mind wrapped up in itself. His next step is the fully developed antithesis, the strain and struggle of a universality which is still subjective (as seen in ideals, fancies, hopes, ambitions) against his immediate individuality. And that individuality marks both the world which, as it exists, fails to meet his ideal requirements, and the position of the individual himself, who is still short of independence and not fully equipped for the part he has to play (Youth). Thirdly, we see man in his true relation to his environment, recognizing the subjective necessity and reasonableness of the world as he finds it—a world no longer incomplete, but able in the work which it collectively achieves to afford the individual a place and a security for his performance. By his share in this collective work he first is really somebody, gaining an effective existence and an objective value (Manhood). Last of all comes the finishing touch to this unity with objectivity: a unity which, while on its realist side it passes into the inertia of deadening habit, on its idealist side gains freedom from the limited interests and entanglements of the outward present (Old Age).

Zusatz. The soul, which at first is completely universal, having in the way we have indicated particularized itself and finally determined itself to the stage of individuality, now enters into opposition to its inner universality, to its substance. This contradiction of the immediate individuality and the substantial universality implicitly present in it, establishes the life-process of the individual soul, a process by which the immediate individuality of the soul is made conformable to the universal, actualizing the latter in the former and thus raising the initial, simple unity of the soul with itself to a unity mediated by the opposition, developing the initially abstract universality of the soul to concrete universality. This process of development is education. Even merely animal life in its own way exhibits
MIND SUBJECTIVE

this process in principle. But, as we have already seen, it does not have the power to actualize within itself the genus in its true form; its immediate, merely affirmative, abstract individuality remains permanently in contradiction with its genus, excludes it no less than includes it. By this incapacity of merely animal life to represent perfectly the genus, it perishes. In the animal, the genus proves itself to be the power in face of which the former must perish. Therefore, in the death of the individual, the genus attains a realization which is no less abstract than the individuality of merely animal life; it just as much excludes that individuality as it remains excluded by it. The genus is truly realized, on the other hand, in mind, in Thought, in this element which is homogeneous with the genus. But in the anthropological sphere this actualization, since it takes place in the natural individual mind, is still present in a natural mode. Consequently it falls into time. Thus arises a series of distinct stages through which the individual as such passes, a sequence of differences which no longer possess the fixity of the immediate differences of universal mind in its natural mode which prevail in the various races of mankind and in the rational minds, but manifest in one and the same individual as transient forms which pass into one another.

This sequence of distinct stages is the series of ages in man's life.

It begins with the immediate, still undifferentiated unity of the genus and the individuality, with the abstract origin of the immediate individuality, the birth of the individual, and closes with the in-forming of the genus within the individuality, or of the latter within the former, that is, with the triumph of the genus over the individuality, with the absolute destruction of the latter, with death.

What in animal life as such is genus, is in the sphere of mind rationality; for the genus already possesses the character of inner universality which belongs to the rational being. In this unity of the genus and the rational being lies the reason why the mental phenomena appearing in the passage of the ages of man correspond to the physical alterations of the individual developed in that process. The correspondence of the mental and the physical is here more definite than in racial diversities where we have to do only with the universal fixed differences of mind in Nature and with the equally fixed differences of men, whereas here the specific alterations to be considered are those of the individual soul and its corporeity. But, on the other hand, we must not go the length of seeking in the physiological development of the individual the clearly outlined counterpart of his mental or spiritual unfolding; for in the latter, the opposition prominent in it and the unity which is to issue from that opposition, have a much higher significance than in the physiological sphere. Mind here reveals its independence of its corporeity in the fact that it can develop itself earlier than this. Children have often a mental development far in advance of their years. This has mainly occurred with outstanding artistic talents, especially with musical geniuses. Such precocity is not infrequently shown too in connection with an easy assimilation of various kinds of information, especially in the mathematical field, and also in connection with a capacity for formal reasoning even on ethical and religious topics. In general, however, it must be admitted that intellect does not come before its time. It is almost solely in the case of artistic talents that their premature appearance is an indication of excellence. On the other hand, the premature development of intelligence generally which has been observed in some children has not, as a rule, been followed by great intellectual distinction in manhood.

Now the process of development of the natural human individual splits up into a series of processes whose difference rests on the different relationship of the individual to the genus and establishes the difference between the child, the adult, and the old. These differences represent the differences of the Notion. Childhood is, therefore, the time of natural harmony, of the peace of the individual with himself and with the world; the beginning which contains no opposition, just as old age is the end which is free from it. The oppositions which may occur in childhood remain devoid of any serious interest. The child lives in innocence, without any lasting pain, in the love it has for its parents and in the feeling of being loved by them. This immediate and therefore non-spiritual, purely natural unity of the individual with its genus and with the world generally, must be superseded; the individual must go forward to the stage where he opposes himself to the universal as that which exists in and for itself, already finished and complete, must go on to apprehend himself in his self-dependence. But this self-dependence, this opposition, at first appears in just as one-sided a shape as does the unity of subjectivity and objectivity in the child. The youth analyses the Idea which is actualized in the world, in the following manner: if he attributes the character of the substantial, of the true and the good, which appertain to the nature of the Idea; but the world, on the other hand, he regards as something contingent, accidental. This untruth opposition must not be a stopping-place; instead the youth must rise above it and learn to see that, on the contrary, the world is the substantial element and the individual merely an accident, and that therefore a man can find his essential occupation and satisfaction only in the world which pursues its own course independently in face of him, and that for this reason he must procure for himself the skill necessary to accomplish his work. Reaching this standpoint, the youth has become a man. The mature man also considers the ethical world-order as something which in its essential nature is already in existence, which has not waited for him to bring it into being. Thus he is for, not against, the existing order of things, is interested in promoting, not opposing it; he has thus risen above the one-sided subjectivity of youth to the standpoint to an objective intelligence. Old age, on the other hand, is the return to an absence of interest in the world around; the old man has lived himself into his world and just because of this unity with the world in which the opposition has vanished, gives up his active interest in the world.


This general indication of the differences of the different ages of man's life we now propose to characterize in more detail.

Childhood we can differentiate again into three, or if we wish to include in our treatment the unborn child which is identical with its mother, into four stages.

The unborn child has not as yet a proper individuality, not an individuality which could enter into relation with particular objects in a particular manner or could take in an external object at a specific point of its organism. The life of the unborn child resembles that of the plant. Just as the latter does not possess an interrupted intussusception but feeds itself by a continuous flow of nutriment, so, too, does the babe feed itself at first by a continual sucking and does not as yet possess a rhythmic respiration.

When the babe is brought into the world out of this vegetative state in which it exists in the womb, it passes into the animal mode of life. Birth is, therefore, a tremendous leap. By it the child emerges from the state of a life completely devoid of opposition into the state of a separate existence, into the relationship to light and air and into a perpetually unfolding relationship to an individualized objectivity and especially to individualized nourishment. The first way in which the child constitutes itself a self-dependent organism is by respiration, the inhalation and exhalation of air at a single point of its body, a process which interrupts the flow of that element. Immediately after the birth of the child, its body already reveals itself as almost fully organized; only single details alter in it. Thus, for example, the so-called foramen ovale does not close up until later. The main alteration in the child’s body consists of growth. In connection with this event, it is hardly necessary to recall that in animal life generally, in contrast to plant life, growth is not a coming-out-of-self, not a process of being drawn out of and beyond self, not a production of new shapes, but is only a development of the organism producing merely quantitative, formal difference, namely, that of the degree of strength and of dimensions. Just as little do we need here to do what has already been done in the appropriate place in the Philosophy of Nature, namely, to explain at length that the completeness of the bodily structure which is lacking in the plant and is first accomplished in the animal organism, this leading back of all the members to the negative, simple unity of life, is the ground of the origin of self-feeling in the animal, and therefore also in the child.

But, on the other hand, we must emphasize here that in man the animal organism reaches its most perfect form. Even the highest animal is unable to exhibit this delicately organized, infinitely plastic body which we already perceive in the newly born child. At first, however, the child is much more dependent and in much more need than the animal. Yet in this, too, the child already manifests its higher nature. It at once makes known its wants in unruly, stormy, and peremptory fashion. Whereas the animal is silent or expresses its pain only by groaning, the child makes known its wants by screaming. By this ideal activity, the child shows that it is straightway imbued with the certainty that it has a right to demand from the outer world the satisfaction of its needs, that the independence of the outer world is non-existent where man is concerned.

Now as regards the mental development of the child in this first stage of its life, it can be said that man never learns more than in this period. Here the child makes itself gradually familiar with all the specifications of the world of the senses. The outer world now becomes something actual for it. It progresses from sensation to perception. To begin with, the child has only a sensation of light by which things are manifest to it. This mere sensation misleads the child into reaching out for something distant as if it were near. But through the sense of touch the child orients itself in regard to distances. In this way it succeeds in measuring with its eyes and simply projects from itself the outer world. In this period, too, the child learns that external things offer resistance.

The transition from childhood to boyhood is marked by the development of the child’s behaviour to the outer world; the child, in reaching a feeling of the actuality of the outer world, begins to become an actual human being himself and to feel himself as such; but in doing so he passes on to the practical inclination to test himself in this actual world. The child is enabled to make this practical approach to the world by growing teeth, by learning to stand, to walk, and to talk. The first thing to be learnt at this stage is to stand upright. This is peculiar to man and can only be effected by his will; a man stands only so long as he wills to stand. When we no longer will to stand, we collapse. Standing is, therefore, the habit of willing to stand. Man acquires a yet freer relation to the outer world by walking, by this he overcomes the awkwardness of space and gains himself his own place. But speech, which enables man to apprehend things as universal, to attain to the consciousness of his own universality, to express himself as ‘I’. This laying hold of his ego-hood is an extremely important point in the mental development of the child; at this point it begins to reflect itself into itself out of its immersion in the outer world. To begin with, this incipient self-dependence expresses itself in the child’s learning to play with tangible things. But the most rational thing that children can do with their toys is to break them.

In passing from play to the seriousness of learning, the child becomes a boy. At this stage children begin to be curious, especially for stories; what interests them in these is ideas which do not come to them in an immediate manner. But here the main thing is the awakening feeling in them that as yet they are not what they ought to be, and the active desire to become like the adults in whose surroundings they are living. It is this desire which gives rise to the imitiveness of children. Whereas the feeling of immediate unity with the parents is the spiritual mother’s milk on which children thrive, it is the children’s own need to grow up which acts as the stimulus to that growth. This striving after education on the part of children themselves is the immanent factor in all education. But since the boy is still at the stage of immediacy, the higher to which he is
to raise himself appears to him, not in the form of universality or of the matter in hand, but in the shape of something given, of an individual, an authority. It is this or that man who forms the ideal which the boy strives to know and to imitate; only in this concrete manner does the child at this stage perceive his own essential nature. What the child is to learn must therefore be given to him on and with authority; he has the feeling that what is thus given to him is superior to him. This feeling must be carefully fostered in education. For this reason we must describe as completely preposterous the pedagogy which bases itself on play, which proposes that children should be made acquainted with serious things in the form of play and demands that the educator should lower himself to the childish level of intelligence of the pupils instead of lifting them up to an appreciation of the seriousness of the matter in hand. This education by playing at lessons can result in the boy throughout his whole life treating everything disdainfully. Such a regrettable result can also be produced by perpetually stimulating children to indulge in argument and disputation, a method recommended by unintelligent pedagogues; this can easily make children impertinent. Children must, of course, be roused to think for themselves; but the worth of the matter in hand should not be put at the mercy of their immaturity, vain understanding.

With regard to one side of education, namely, discipline, the boy should not be allowed to follow his own inclination; he must obey in order that he may learn to command. Obedience is the beginning of all wisdom; for the will which as yet does not know what is true and objective, does not make its own goal and therefore far from being truly self-dependent and free is still immature; such a will is enabled through obedience inwardly to accept the authority of the rational will coming to it externally and gradually to make it its own. On the other hand, to allow children to do as they please, to be so foolish as to provide them into the bargain with reasons for their whims, is to fall into the worst of all educational practices; such children develop the deplorable habit of fixing their attention on their own inclinations, their own peculiar cleverness, their own selfish interests, and this is the root of all evil. By nature, the child is neither bad nor good, since it starts without any knowledge either of good or of evil. To deem this unknowing innocence an ideal and to yearn to return to it would be silly; it has no value and is short-lived. Self-will and evil soon make their appearance in the child. This self-will, this germ of evil, must be broken and destroyed by discipline.

With regard to the other side of education, namely, instruction, it is to be observed that this rationally begins with the most abstract thing that the child can grasp; and that is the alphabet. This presupposes a power of abstraction to which entire races, for example, even the Chinese, have not attained. Language as such is this airy element, at once sensuous and nonsensuous, and it is by the child’s increasing command of language that its intelligence rises more and more above the sensuous, from the individual to the universal, to thought. This growing ability to think is the most useful part of primary education. But the child only gets as far as picture-thinking; the world is only for his representational thinking. He learns the qualities of things, becomes acquainted with the facts of the worlds of Nature and mind, develops an interest in things but does not as yet cognize the world in its inner connectedness. This knowledge comes only with manhood, though even in boyhood there is an imperfect understanding of the worlds of Nature and mind. It is, therefore, a mistake to assert that a boy understands as yet nothing whatever of religion and right, that therefore he must not be bothered with these matters, that on no account, must ideas be forced on him but, on the contrary, he must be provided with experiences of his own and one must be content to let him be stimulated by what is sensuously present to him. Even the ancients did not allow children to dwell for any length of time on objects of sense. The modern spirit, however, involves a wholly different exaltation above the world of the senses, a much deeper absorption in its own inwardness, than is characteristic of the antique spirit. Therefore, in the present-day world, a boy should be made acquainted with the idea of the supersensuous world at an early age. This is done in a much higher degree in the school than in the family. In the latter, the child is accepted in its immediate individuality, is loved whether its behaviour is good or bad. In school, on the other hand, the immediacy of the child no longer counts; here it is esteemed only according to its worth, according to its achievements, is not merely loved but criticized and guided in accordance with universal principles, motivated by instruction according to fixed rules, in general, subjected to a universal order which forbids many things innocent in themselves because everyone cannot be permitted to do them. The school thus forms the transition from the family into civil society. But to the latter the boy has at first only an undefined relationship; his interest is still divided between learning and playing.

With the onset of puberty the boy becomes a youth, when the life of the sense begins to stir in him and to seek satisfaction. The youth turns, in general, to the substantial universal; his ideal no longer appears to him, as it does to the boy, in the person of a man, but is conceived by him as a universal, independent of such individuality. But in the youth this ideal still has a more or less subjective shape, whether it lives in him as an ideal of love and friendship or as an ideal of a universal state of the world. In this subjectivity of the substantial content of such an ideal there is involved its opposition to the existing world, but also the urge to remove this opposition by realizing the ideal. The content of the ideal imubes the youth with the feeling of power to act; he therefore fancies himself called and qualified to transform the world, or at least to put the world back on the right path from which, so it seems to him, it has strayed. The fact that the substantial universal contained in his ideal, in keeping with its essential nature, has already succeeded in explicating and actualizing itself, this is not perceived by the enthusiastic spirit of the youth. To him the actualization of that universal seems a lapse from it. For this
MIND SUBJECTIVE

reason he feels that both his ideal and his own personality are not rec
recognized by the world, and thus the youth, unlike the child, is no longer at
peace with the world. Because of this turning to the ideal, youth
seems to possess a nobler sense and greater altruism than is displayed
by the man who attends to his particular, temporal interests. As against
this, it must be pointed out that the man is no longer wrapped up in his
particular impulses and subjective views and occupied only with his
personal development; on the contrary, he has plunged into the Reason
of the actual world and shown himself to be active on its behalf. The youth
necessarily arrives at this goal; but his immediate aim is to train and
discipline himself so that he will be able to realize his ideals. In the attempt
to make these actual he becomes a man.

At first, the transition from his ideal life into civil society can appear to
the youth as a painful transition into the life of the Philistine. The youth,
who hitherto has been occupied only with general objects and has worked
only for himself, now that he is growing into manhood and entering into
practical life, must be active for others and concern himself with details.
Now, much as this belongs to the nature of things, since if something is
to be done it is with details that one must deal, the occupation with
details can at first be very distressing to the man, and the impossibility
of an immediate realization of his ideals can turn him into a hypocho
ndriac. This hypochondria, however difficult it may be to discern it in
many cases, is not easily escaped by anyone. The later the age at which it
attacks a man, the more serious are its symptoms. In weak natures it can
persist throughout the entire lifetime. In this diseased frame of mind
the man will not give up his subjectivity, is unable to overcome his repug
nance to the actual world, and by this very fact finds himself in a state of
relative incapacity which easily becomes an actual incapacity. If, there
fore, the man does not want to perish, he must recognize the world as a
self-dependent world which in its essential nature is already complete,
must accept the conditions set for him by the world and wrest from it what
he wants for himself. As a rule, the man believes that this submission is
only forced on him by necessity. But, in truth, this unity with the world
must be recognized, not as a relation imposed by necessity, but as the
rational. The rational, the divine, possesses the absolute power to actualize
itself and has, right from the beginning, fulfilled itself; it is not so im
potent that it would have to wait for the beginning of its actualization.
The world is this actualization of divine Reason; it is only on its surface
that the play of contingency prevails. It can claim, therefore, with at least
as much right, indeed with even greater right, than the adolescent to be
esteemed as complete and self-dependent; and therefore the man behaves
quite rationally in abandoning his plan for completely transforming the
world and in striving to realize his personal aims, passions, and interests
only within the framework of the world of which he is a part. Even
so, this leaves him scope for an honourable, far-reaching and creative
activity. For although the world must be recognized as already complete

ANTHROPOLOGY

in its essential nature, yet it is not a dead, absolutely inert world but,
like the life-process, a world which perpetually creates itself anew, which
while merely preserving itself, at the same time progresses. It is in this
conservation and advancement of the world that the man's work consists.
Therefore, on the one hand we can say that the man only creates what is
already there; yet on the other hand, his activity must also bring about an
advance. But the world's progress occurs only on the large scale and only
comes to view in a large aggregate of what has been produced. If the
man after a labour of fifty years looks back on his past, he will readily
recognize the progress made. This knowledge, as also the insight into the
rationality of the world, liberates him from mourning over the destruction
of his ideals. What is true in these ideals is preserved in the practical
activity; what the man must purge himself of is only what is untrue, the
empty abstractions. The scope and nature of his activity can vary con
siderably; but the substantial element in all human activities is the same,
namely, the interests of right, ethics, and religion. Therefore, men can
find satisfaction and honour in all spheres of their practical activity if
they accomplish throughout what is rightly required of them in the
particular sphere to which they belong either by chance, outer necessity,
or free choice. But to this end it is above all else necessary that the
education of the adolescent be completed, that he has finished his studies,
and secondly, that he resolve to earn his subsistence himself, that he
to begin to be active on behalf of others. Education alone is not enough
to make him a complete, mature man; he becomes such only through his
own intelligent concern for his temporal interests; just as nations only
attain their majority when they have reached the stage where they are not
excluded by a so-called paternal government from attending to their
material and spiritual interests.

With his entry now into practical life, the man may well be vexed
and morose about the state of the world and lose hope of any improve
ment in it; but in spite of this he finds his place in the world of objective
relationships and becomes habituated to it and to his work. The objects
with which he has to concern himself are, it is true, particular and mut
able, and in their peculiarity are more or less new. But at the same time,
these particulars contain a universal, a rule, something conformable to
law; and the longer the man is active in his work, the more does this
universal rise into prominence out of the welter of particulars. In this
way he gets to be completely at home in his profession and grows thor
oughly accustomed to his lot. The substantial element in all those things
with which he deals is then quite familiar to him and only the particular,
unessential can occasionally present him with something new. The very
fact, however, that his activity has become so conformed to his work, that
his activity no longer meets with any resistance from its objects, this
complete facility of execution, brings in its train the extinction of its
vitality; for with the disappearance of the opposition between subject and
object there also disappears the interest of the former in the latter. Thus
the habit of mental life, equally with the dulling of the functions of his physical organism, changes the man into an old man.

The old man lives without any definite interest, for he has abandoned the hope of realizing the ideals which he cherished when he was young and the future seems to hold no promise of anything new at all; on the contrary, he believes that he already knows what is universal and substantial in anything he may yet encounter. The mind of the old man is thus turned only towards this universal and to the past to which he owes the knowledge of this universal. But in thus dwelling in the memory of the past and of the substantial element, he loses his memory for details of the present and for arbitrary things, names, for example, in the same measure that, conversely, he firmly retains in his mind the maxims of experience and feels obliged to preach to those younger than himself. But this wisdom, this lifeless, complete coincidence of the subject’s activity with its world, leads back to the childhood in which there is no opposition, in the same way that the reduction of his physical functions to a process-less habit leads on to the abstract negation of the living individuality, to death.

The sequence of ages in man’s life is thus rounded into a notionally determined totality of alterations which are produced by the process of the genus with the individual.

When describing the racial differences of mankind and the characteristics of the national minds, we had to anticipate a knowledge of concrete mind, for this does not come within the scope of Anthropology: similarly, since concrete mind enters into the above-mentioned process, we must anticipate a knowledge of it in order that we may speak categorically about the sequence of the ages of man and must make use of this knowledge for distinguishing the different stages of that process.

§ 397

(2) Next we find the individual subject to a real antithesis, leading it to seek and find itself in another individual. This—the sexual relation—on a physical basis, shows, on its one side, subjectivity remaining in an instinctive and emotional harmony of moral life and love, and not pushing these tendencies to an extreme universal phase, in purposes political, scientific, or artistic; and on the other, shows an active half, where the individual is the vehicle of a struggle of universal and objective interests with the given conditions (both of his own existence and of that of the external world), carrying out these universal principles into a unity with the world which is his own work. The sexual tie acquires its moral and spiritual significance and function in the family.

§ 398

(3) When the individuality, or self-centralized being, distinguishes itself from its mere being, this immediate judgement is the taking of the soul, which confronts its self-absorbed natural life, in the first instance, as one natural quality and state confronts another state, viz. sleep.—The waking is not merely for the observer, or externally distinct from the sleep: it is itself the judgement (primary partition) of the individual soul—which is self-existing only as it relates its self-existence to its mere existence, distinguishing itself from its still undifferentiated universality. The waking state includes generally all self-conscious and rational activity in which the mind realizes its own distinct self.—Sleep is an invigoration of this activity—not as a merely negative rest from it, but as a return back from the world of specialization, from dispersion into phases where it has grown hard and stiff—a return into the general nature of subjectivity, which is the substance of those specialized energies and their absolute master.

The distinction between sleep and waking is one of those postes, as they may be called, which are often addressed to philosophy:—Napoleon, for example, on a visit to the University of Pavia, put this question to the class of ideology. The characterization given in the section is abstract; it primarily treats waking merely as a natural fact, containing the mental element implicite but not yet as invested with a special being of its own. If we are to speak more concretely of this distinction (in fundamentals it remains the same), we must take the self-existence of the individual soul in its higher aspects as the Ego of consciousness and as intelligent mind. The difficulty raised anent the distinction of the two states properly arises, only when we also take into account the dreams in sleep and describe these dreams, as well as the mental representations in the sober waking consciousness under one and the same title of mental representations. Thus superficially classified as states of mental representation the two coincide, because we have lost sight of the difference; and in the case of any assignable distinction of waking consciousness, we can always remember the trivial remark that all this is nothing more than mental idea. But the concrete theory of the waking soul in its