Re: [xmca] LSV on the preschool stage

[mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>]

Ps- I liked the idea of *the notion of "complimentary" patterns [ie
dominant/submissive] from a Hegelian perspective and attempts to develop an
ideal model of the "inclusive self" that has parallels to Duveen's notion of
"explicit recognition".    *A-symmetries in social interaction and
developmental processes in general are, indeed, a fascinating topic.


On Sat, Oct 16, 2010 at 5:04 PM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:

> Sorry if I was off on the wrong dimension, Larry. The "piaget vs vygotsky"
> discussion, like horse race
> coverage in voting, seems to attract our attention too easily.
>
> I thought Martin was being his usual generous self in his comments on
> socio-cultural "vs" constructivism.
> My own guess is that this particular "vs" is promoted by the prevalence of
> the idea of "the context" as
> external to the organism (context as container) combined with a one-way
> "outside-in" ascription of causality to context so construed. A double
> mistake. Add the historical determinism of Stalin or the failure of people
> to distinguish operant and classical conditioning, and the deal is done.
>
> How else could a theoretical position that insists that "in the beginning
> was the deed" and the method of dual stimulation as a model of the ur
> structure of human behavior be said to assume a passive subject?
>
> mike
>
>
>
> On Sat, Oct 16, 2010 at 4:44 PM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Mike and Martin
>>
>> Thank you for your generous thoughts and responses to my questions and my
>> attempts to "see with new eyes". I will read the article you posted that is
>> a  response to the Psaltis et al article.
>>
>>  The more general question I was circling around by posting this
>> article was the question of symmetrical and asymmetrical patterns of
>> communicative interaction and the consequences of these various
>> communicative patterns for  various formations of identity and intergroup
>> positional frameworks.
>> An author who has explored the consequences of asymmetrical complimentary
>> patterns of communicative action is  Jessica Benjamin in a book called "Bond
>> of Love". In that book she explores the notion of "complimentary" patterns
>> [ie dominant/submissive] from a Hegelian perspective and attempts to develop
>> an ideal model of the "inclusive self" that has parallels to Duveen's notion
>> of "explicit recognition".
>> This general theme of various patterns of symmetrical/ asymmetrical
>> intergroup patterns of communication and the specific consequences of these
>> various relational patterns on cognitve development  is a topic that I'm
>> curious about.  Duveen's exploration of the consequences of asymmmetrical
>> complimentary intergroup relational patterns [constrained by particular
>> social representations] is asking similar questions to Jessica Benjamin. He
>> also is suggesting that the recognition of the other [Levinas] is central
>> for self development.
>>
>> This line of questioning may have some relevance for the topic of
>> bullying.  Are asymmetrical complimentary intergroup positions a
>> possible explanation for the prevalence of relational patterns of bullying?
>>
>> Larry
>> On Sat, Oct 16, 2010 at 2:05 PM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Attached is a commentary on the Psaltis et al article by members of XMCA.
>>> Note that Anne-Nelly is on the MCA editorial board. Perhaps these are
>>> issues
>>> that should be more extensively discussed in that forum?
>>> Whither...?
>>> mike
>>>
>>> On Wed, Oct 13, 2010 at 4:00 PM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> > Hi Martin
>>> >
>>> > The Journal HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 52:291-312 has an article titled "The
>>> Social
>>> > and the Psychological: Structure and Context in Intellectual
>>> Development".
>>> > The authors are Charis Psaltis, Gerard Duveen, and Anne-Nelly
>>> > Perret-Clermont.
>>> >
>>> > The ABSTACT begins,
>>> >
>>> > "This paper discusses the distinct meanings of 'internalization' and
>>> > 'interiorization' as ways of rendering intelligible the social
>>> constitution
>>> > of the psychological in a line of research that started with Piaget and
>>> > extended into a post-Piagetian reformulation of intelligence in
>>> successive
>>> > generations of studies of the relations between social interaction and
>>> > cognitive development."
>>> >
>>> > The article is an attempt to develop the idea of OPERATIVITY-IN-CONTEXT
>>> as
>>> > a
>>> > means of retaining the advantages of Piaget's structural analysis of
>>> > cognition whilst recognizing the situational and cultural constraints
>>> on
>>> > cognitive functioning.
>>> >
>>> > Not sure if this might be helpful to facilitate ongoing dialogue with
>>> the
>>> > students contrasting Piaget and Vygotsky, but seems relevant to other
>>> > threads on CHAT.
>>> >
>>> > Larry
>>> >
>>> > On Wed, Oct 13, 2010 at 2:34 PM, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> wrote:
>>> >
>>> > >
>>> > > Teaching is always such a humbling experience. One has to explain
>>> things
>>> > as
>>> > > clearly as possible, and in doing so it turns out that the subtle and
>>> > > sophisticated understanding one thought one had of the topic is riven
>>> by
>>> > > inconsistencies and filled with gaps (so to speak).
>>> > >
>>> > > This semester I am recasting my undergraduate course in developmental
>>> > > psychology to focus much more centrally on presenting a complete and
>>> > > coherent Vygotskian account of development. The topic this and last
>>> week
>>> > was
>>> > > the preschool stage (3 to 7 years). V wrote about this stage in at
>>> least
>>> > > five places: several times in T&L (on self-directed speech, and on
>>> the
>>> > > formation of complexes), the chapter on the crisis at age 3 in the
>>> > > unpublished manuscript on child development, in at least 2 chapters
>>> of
>>> > > HDHMF, and in the paper on play. These texts span only a few years,
>>> but
>>> > > coordinating them is not a straightforward task, for me at least,
>>> humbled
>>> > as
>>> > > I now am.
>>> > >
>>> > > And then trying to relate them to Piaget's work is complex. Piaget
>>> > himself
>>> > > had two distinct ways of describing the limitations in preschoolers'
>>> > > cognition (though he was consistent in emphasizing its limitations).
>>> One
>>> > was
>>> > > in terms of egocentrism, the second in terms of limitations in the
>>> > child's
>>> > > capacity to form mental representations at this stage (they are
>>> static,
>>> > > focused on a single dimension, etc.). LSV knew about the first of
>>> these,
>>> > but
>>> > > didn't live long enough to encounter the second. So we have to
>>> > extrapolate
>>> > > from his critique of Piaget's early work in order to infer what he
>>> might
>>> > > have said about conservation tasks, for example.
>>> > >
>>> > > First humbling experience: trying to reconcile the fact that
>>> preschoolers
>>> > > seem to be not only aware of the distinction between appearance and
>>> > reality
>>> > > but actively mastering it in their pretend play, while at the same
>>> time
>>> > they
>>> > > fail to distinguish between what a piece of playdoh really is and how
>>> it
>>> > > appears. Should we presume that the appearance/reality distinction
>>> slowly
>>> > > develops as consequence of playing (as Gaskins and Goncu once
>>> proposed)?
>>> > Or
>>> > > are these phenoman related in some other way? Does anyone know of
>>> studies
>>> > > that have explored the timing of acquisition of these two
>>> (conservation
>>> > and
>>> > > pretend play)? I h
>>> > >
>>> > > Second, my simple way of explaining LVS's view, and then contrasting
>>> it
>>> > > with Piaget's, has been to say that Piaget considered the
>>> preschooler's
>>> > > thought to be mental action on mental representations, and their
>>> speech
>>> > to
>>> > > be simply the expression of this thought, and consequently as
>>> manifesting
>>> > > the same egocentric characteristics. LSV, on the other hand, proposed
>>> > that
>>> > > preschoolers think, at least at first, only when they talk. Talk only
>>> > goes
>>> > > completely 'inner' at the end of this stage. (There is simplification
>>> > here,
>>> > > as I try to grapple with the fact that in some texts LSV wrote of
>>> > preverbal
>>> > > thinking occurring as early as infancy, with the first use of tools,
>>> > while
>>> > > in others he writes of thinking differentiating from perception and
>>> > action
>>> > > only in the preschool stage. I'm not suggesting those two claims are
>>> > > mutually exclusive, but it does take a bit of work to reconcile
>>> them.)
>>> > >
>>> > > This raises the question, how would children perform on the three
>>> > mountains
>>> > > task, for example, if they were allowed, or encouraged, to speak
>>> aloud in
>>> > > order to figure out the answer? ("The doll is over there, and so
>>> while
>>> > the
>>> > > green mountain is to my left, she must see it to her right...").
>>> Anyone
>>> > know
>>> > > of such a study? Anyone want to try such a study?The videos I have
>>> just
>>> > > shown in class don't offer much opportunity for this, but if LSV was
>>> > > correct, if the preschool child is not speaking, she is not thinking.
>>> > >
>>> > > Third, speech goes inner twice, in two different ways. First, social
>>> > speech
>>> > > becomes individual speech, as the preschooler talks to self aloud in
>>> > order
>>> > > to solve problems and to direct their own activity. Second, speech
>>> > becomes
>>> > > silent, 'in the mind' (and while this way of putting it is probably
>>> an
>>> > > unavoidable part of our folk psychology it surely shouldn't be
>>> considered
>>> > a
>>> > > satisfactory part of a scientific psychology, IMHO). This is the
>>> point, I
>>> > > told my students today, where the articulatory part of the brain has
>>> > formed
>>> > > an internal, direct neurological connection with the receptive part
>>> of
>>> > the
>>> > > brain. No longer does communication between these two require an
>>> > external,
>>> > > indirect route via mouth and ears. One of the braver students asked
>>> me,
>>> > is
>>> > > that just your idea or is it a fact? I seem to recall Luria writing
>>> along
>>> > > these very lines, but can anyone help me out here? Anyone know of
>>> either
>>> > > classic neuropsychological studies of 'inner' speech, or modern MRI
>>> > studies?
>>> > > What lights up when I talk to myself, either out loud or silently?
>>> > >
>>> > > Then, to go back to play. LSV describes pretend play as a
>>> differentiation
>>> > > between the field of the visible and the field of meaning. The child
>>> rips
>>> > > the word from one object, but only by applying it to another object,
>>> > which
>>> > > needn't resemble the first so much as be able to support a similar
>>> > activity
>>> > > on the part of the child. A stick doesn't resemble a horse, but it
>>> can be
>>> > > named 'horse' because it can be placed between the legs and ridden.
>>> This,
>>> > > LSV writes, is the key to symbolic activity at this stage (chap 7 of
>>> > HDHMF,
>>> > > as I recall). This is not yet an arbitrary relationship of
>>> > sign/signifier,
>>> > > but a motivated substitution within an imaginary field. I take this
>>> to
>>> > mean
>>> > > that the stick is not 'standing for' the horse; rather, the word
>>> 'horse'
>>> > is
>>> > > standing for, picking out, the stick. I am sorely tempted to say that
>>> > this
>>> > > means what we are dealing in prentend play with is not reality=stick,
>>> > > appearance=horse, an object that appears to be a horse within the
>>> play,
>>> > but
>>> > > is really a stick. We have an object that appears to be a stick, but
>>> > within
>>> > > the play is really a horse. I am further tempted to wish that Andy
>>> had
>>> > read
>>> > > Hegel's Phenomenology, because in that book one of the stages of
>>> > > consciousness that is described is one in which a distinction
>>> develops
>>> > > between appearance and reality. The distinction is soon overturned,
>>> > however,
>>> > > because it turns out to be unstable. Piaget stopped, but Hegel kept
>>> on
>>> > > trucking.
>>> > >
>>> > > In conclusion, any and all help and clarification of my jumbled
>>> thoughts
>>> > > would be greatly appreciated, not least by my students, who are
>>> dearly
>>> > > wishing that Prof. Packer could get stuff figured out before he tries
>>> to
>>> > > teach it. Sigh.
>>> > >
>>> > > Martin_______________________________________________
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>>> > >
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>>
>
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