Near the end of section six of Chapter Two (Piaget) in Thinking and
Speech, Vygotsky has two paragraphs where he is criticizing Piaget for
purging the child's imagination of all of the child's WANTS and NEEDS
(which Vygotsky defines as anything that is, in the child's view, a
motive for action).
He does this at the beginning of Chapter Seven in Mind in Society too,
where he talks about how "some theorists" deny that play fulfills a
need, and set up the child as a little philosopher whose cognitive level
changes with the solution of abstract logical problems. Some theorists
in Geneva who share the name of a well-known watchmaker, that is.
Vygotsky is defending play as a PRACTICAL activity. But the next move in
his Thinking and Speech argument seems strange, almost theological, to
us. He brings in the following extremely opaque quotation from the
recently published "Philosophical Notebooks" of Lenin.
*__*
"Primitive idealism: the universal (concept, idea) is a /particular
being/. This appears wild, monstrously (more accurately, childishly)
stupid. But is not modern idealism, Kant, Hegel, the idea of God, of the
same nature (/absolutely /of the same nature)?"
I have been reading this for years without any understanding of what
Vygotsky is doing here. He is not apple polishing ("See! I read Lenin!
Even when Lenin's unreadable!") or axe grinding ("Piaget contradicts
LENIN, so of course Piaget's wrong. Right?"). He really is putting his
finger on the soft, idealist underbelly of Piaget's notion which we may
sum up as, "I think, and therefore I speak!"
The idea that the concept is a BEING really is an anthropomorphism. The
child thinks of the sun, the moon and even the table and the chair as a
kind of Teletubby.
That's why Lenin calls it "childishly" and not just monstrously stupid,
and that is why he says that the idea of God is ABSOLUTELY of the same
nature. Lenin continues:
"Tables, chairs and the /ideas/ of table and chair; the world and the
idea of the world (God);
thing and “noumen,” the unknowable “Thing-in-itself”; the connection of
the earth and the sun, nature in general—and law, λόγος (Logos),^ God."
The reason I could read this for years (even before I read Vygotsky)
without a clue about what it meant is that I just wasn't paying
attention to the semi-colons. Lenin has FOUR examples of the great,
childish idea that a concept is a kind of being.
a) the (wooden) table (in my kitchen) and the (mental) idea of table (in
my mind). Eric and I have discussed this in the context of groceries on
the one hand and fiddles on the other. The former is a thing, and the
latter is an idea; the latter can very easily, to a suggestible mind
(and we are speaking of children) give rise to the God of Tables.
b) the world (nature) on the one hand and the idea of the world (God) on
the other. This is, I think, what Spinoza really means when he says
"Natura, sive Deus". I am much more sympathetic to this view than Andy
is, but of course he is right and Lenin is right when he says that it is
another instance of monstrous, childish anthropomorphizing.
c) the physical object on the one hand (in my hand), and the "thing in
itself" on the other. The baby's rattle in the baby's hand, and then
Kant's "noumon", an unknowable, mysterious God of (Baby) Things.
d) The actual relationship of the sun and the earth and the reified,
hypostatized "being" of "natural law" (once conceived of geocentrically,
now conceived of heliocentrically), "Logos", God.
Lenin continues:
"The doubling up of human knowledge and the /possibility/ of idealism (=
religion) are /given/ already in the first, elementary abstraction. (…)."
Why would any right-thinking child want to dabble in this mind-boggling
redundancy? Piaget cannot really tell us. But Lenin can. It's to do with
PLAY, and AFFECT, and the desire to ESCAPE:
"The approach of the (human) mind to a particular thing, the taking of a
copy (= a concept) of it /is not/ a simple, immediate act, a dead
mirroring, but one which is complex, split into two, zig-zag- like,
which /includes in it/ the possibility of the flight of fantasy from
life; more than that: the possibility of the /transformation/ (moreover,
an unnoticeable transformation, of which man is unaware) of the abstract
concept, idea, into a /fantasy /(in letzter Instanz = God)."
The child's creation of concepts is not a pure, truth seeking act at
all. The child IS a little scientist, but he's like a REAL scientist,
who does his best work while shaving or day-dreaming or fleeing from his
lecture notes and procrastinating the pile of homework he's supposed to
be correcting.
That's why Piaget (and Freud) are so very very wrong to write off the
"autistic" side of life as nondevelopmental and even antidevelopmental.
It's the playful side of life, the "life-fleeing" side, which creats our
abstractions, zigging and zagging between the exigencies of real life
and the desire to run away from it, if only for an instant.
God is a kind of game, a reified, hypostatized, anthropomorphized being
who presides over all life-fleeing play. That is why, perhaps, there are
no atheists on the tennis courts and shooting galleries, although there
may be quite a few in foxholes.
Lenin concludes with what we can only read as a rousing defense of the
child's day dream:
"For even in the simplest generalisation, in the most elementary general
idea (“table” in general), /there is/ a certain bit of fantasy."
We are never too young and never too old for this certain bit of
fantasy. Even Piaget's underlying idea of "I think, therefore I speak"
has this smattering of idealism in it.
Last week we had a rather extended discussion of a very much extended
article in the New York Times which, if I may gently paraphrase, said
that of course Whorf was totally wrong but maybe, you know, language
really does "shape" the way we think, so maybe Whorf was a little bit
totally right too.
I can't help wonder: what the devil is the alternative? We think, and
that shapes the way we speak? Yes, I can see the (very Piagetian) appeal
of this.
I suppose it's not a bad place to start with your average NYT reader,
who feels with his morning coffee, cognitive agency coursing through his
veins and transforming themselves into verbal thoughts and rousing
speeches, more or less in that order.
Out of the night that covers me
Black as the pit from pole to pole
I thank whatever gods may be
For my immortal soul
No matter then how strait the gate
How charged with punishments the scroll
I am the master of my fate
I am the captain of my soul!
(This was reportedly the last written message to the world of Timothy
McVeigh, the Oklahoma City bomber, before his execution. He not only did
not speak them, he didn't even think them: they are from a rather dreary
poem by William Ernest Henley)
But wait, thinks the very young child (who, as we know, already knows
how to think). How do I learn to speak?
Thinking is a PSYCHOLOGICAL process, and compared to thinking it is a
relatively closed system. Speaking is a SOCIAL process, and it is by its
very nature open. So it makes sense to say that we learn to think by
speaking and even that we learn to speak by speaking.
Of course, as an adult, I too feel that I think and then I speak. But
when I think about it developmentally, and certainly when I examine the
actual data (just where are these empirical studies which "disprove"
Whorf?), it seems that things are very much the other way around.
Children speak and then adolescents start to think.
David Kellogg
Seoul National University of Education
--- On *Thu, 9/2/10, Andy Blunden /<ablunden@mira.net>/* wrote:
From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
Subject: [xmca] The Absolute and all that
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Date: Thursday, September 2, 2010, 4:56 PM
was "Valsiner and pseudoconcepts"
Well, I wrote that advice about God many years ago, Eric, and I know
better now, but really it is about the nature of our times (cf 200
years ago) and upbringing (I was raised as an atheist). I have since
learnt much better to understand what Hegel is on about when he is
talking of God. It is still not part of my language, but still it is
easily misunderstood in the age of Christopher Hitchins and Richard
Dawkins and other narrowminded silliness.
For some people "Nature" is the absolute, but generally the
conception of Nature in modern society does not even rise to the
level of Pantheism, surviving more at the level of folk religion.
For many science people Experience is absolute, and its minor Gods
are repeatable Experiment and Double blind trials.
Every research methodology is an Absolute and has its God - that is
the simple sense in which Hegel talks about God. Of course, your
good, practical-minded natural scientist would deny it, but
exhortations that they only believe in Nature, or what can be
proved, or science or any such formulation, is usually nothing more
than their own ill-informed theology.
Does that make sense to you Eric? I am trying to get a one-day event
going in Melbourne around a critique of the New Atheism. I will have
something written in good time.
Andy
ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org>
wrote:
> Andy:
>
> I have finally found the time to get through a months worth of
XMCA postings and found this one could not pass without a brief
mention. In reading what you have written about Hegel I have great
respect for your work and find your insights on CHAT to be
wonderful. But I am struck with a circular argument about concepts
ala Hegel that on the one hand you embrace and on the other hand you
poo-poo. That being that a concept holds the absolute (or as
Ilyenkov calls it the ideal) and the absolute speaks of GOD but then
you yourself have written that when one comes across Hegel writing
of GOD to just skip over that part and not lay any credence to it.
Hegel was a philospher and not a practitioner, his ideas build upon
previous ideas. Marx the same. Now when you move to Vygotsky or
Valsiner they were practitioners of research methodologies and
philosphical constructs need to be deconstructed into measurable
units. If this is childish so be it but one cannot have a research
methodology that does not deconstruct. Holding an ideal for the
sake of holding the ideal never gets the horse out of the barn.
>
> eric
>
>
>
> From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=ablunden@mira.net>>
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
<xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>>
> Date: 08/11/2010 03:45 AM
> Subject: Re: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts
> Sent by: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
>
------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>
>
> Denise,
>
> I have at last found the time to look at Valsiner's article.
> I have only got 2 or 3 pages into the article but the
> problem is immediately obvious and I have better things to
> do than read the whole article.
>
> *From what I have read*, Valsiner is some kind of
> cognitivist and consequently his idea of what a concept is
> is simply quite different from the tradition of Goethe,
> Hegel and Marx which Vygotsky was continuing. He holds to
> the childish and shallow view that a concept is just a
> collection of "features" which are deemed to be necessary
> and sufficient for a thing to fall under the definition of a
> concept, as in Set Theory and Formal Logic. The same as for
> people like Rudolf Carnap and the Logical Positivists.
>
> Once you adopt what Hegel calls the "abstract general"
> conception of concepts, then what Vygotsky calls a
> pseduoconcept is the only genuine concept. Vygotsky's idea
> of "concept" will simply make no sense. Talking about
> concepts from a Vygotskyan point of view to someone that
> holds this view is just talking at cross purposes. Waste of
> time.
>
> Andy
>
> Denise Newnham wrote:
> > Dear Michael,
> >
> > >
> > I wrote to Jaan about your question as no where was it clearly
stipulated in
> > the earlier works and he has just replied so I forward his
words and text
> >
> > >
> > Denise
> >
> > Dear Denise,
> >
> > >
> > Good question! In 1998 I was somewhat naively optimistic about
Peirce cand
> > abduction (see Pizarroso & V 2009 on overcoming that optimism).
> >
> > But the 1998 quote from my book is indeed an embryonic form of
what later
> > (2001 in Potsdam, and more thoroughly in my 2007 book CULTURE
IN MINDS AND
> > SOCIETIES became clear-- words as POINT-LIKE CONCEPTS cannot
be the highest
> > level of semiotic mediation as they would close up further
creativity of
> > meaning-making. So Vygotsky was basically limited.
> >
> > Instead, the pseudo-concept translates in my terminology into
field-type
> > sign (Level 4 in my system of semiotic mediation)
> >
> > >
> > Jaan
> >
> > >
> > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
[mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>]
On
> > Behalf Of Michael Glassman
> > Sent: 05 August 2010 15:22
> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > Subject: RE: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts
> >
> > >
> > Hi Denise,
> >
> > >
> > I was wondering, does Valsiner have an argument as to how and why
> > pseudo-concepts actally aids in Peirces ilogic of abduction.
I am currently
> > under the impresson that abduction is primarily about
hypothesis generation
> > - the ability to develop new hypotheses in response to unique
problems. So
> > I'm wondering what role pseudo-concepts, if we are going by
Vygotsky's
> > definition, might play in all this.
> >
> > >
> > Michael
> >
> > >
> > _____ >
> > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
on behalf of Denise Newnham
> > Sent: Thu 8/5/2010 5:26 AM
> > To: ablunden@mira.net
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=ablunden@mira.net>;
'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'
> > Subject: RE: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts
> >
> > Hello Andy, the reference as you saw to pseudoconcepts is in
his book 'The
> > guided mind' 1998 and the other is : The development of the
concept of
> > development: Historical and epistemological perspectives. In
W. Damon, & R.
> > Lerner(Eds), Handbook of child psychology. 5th Ed. VOl.1.
Theoretical models
> > of human development (pp. 189-232). New York: Wiley.
> >
> > I quote (1998): 'Vygotsky and his colleagues (Luria would be
the closest
> > example) attributed and overly idealized role to the role of
concepts in
> > human reasoning. The role fitted with his emphasis on the
hierarchy of
> > mental functions (i.e. higher mental functions regulating
lower ones), yet
> > by this exaggerated emphasis the focus on the process of
semiogenesis is
> > actually diminished. In contrast, it could be claimed that
pseudo-concepts
> > (i.e. specific unified conglomerates of concept and complex
qualities) are
> > the core (and highest form) of human psychological
functioning. The claim
> > would fit with the unity of representational fields (of Karl
Buhler,
> > described and extended earlier) and with the central focus of
abduction
> > (rather than induction or deduction) in the process of making
sense (along
> > the lines of Pierce).
> >
> > I read you paper 'when is a concept really a concept' and
heard that there
> > was a debate on XMCA but as I was not connected at that time
have not heard
> > or read this debate.
> >
> > Denise
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
[mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>]
On
> > Behalf Of Andy Blunden
> > Sent: 05 August 2010 10:22
> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > Subject: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts
> >
> > Can you give us the full reference for "see Valsiner,
> > 1997d", Denise, and maybe even the context? I just find it
> > incredible that someone could know as much about Vygotsky as
> > Valsiner does and place pseduoconcepts at the top of the
> > development hierarchy.
> >
> > Andy
> >
> > Denise Newnham wrote:
> >> Dear Larry and others,
> >>
> >> I am new to this game so perhaps am doing something out of
turn so if so
> > let
> >> me know. Larry I read your reply and this extract below made
me think of
> >> Valsiner's work on semiotic mediators and concepts where he
states that
> >> pseudoconcepts (1998, p.278-279) should be placed at the top
to the
> >> developmental hierarchy as the hierarchy should be seen as
'open to
> > changes
> >> or formation of intrasensitive order- [see Valsiner, 1997d]'
(2001, p.
> >> 85).This brings ot my mind Markova's discussion on the
spontaneous of
> >> intuitive in knowledge formation (2003) and I think that
Cole's fifth
> >> dimension attests to this argument. There is an interesting
paper by
> >> Galligan (2008) "using Valsiner" on the web.
> >>
> >> Denise
> >>
> >> 'These reflections of linking up multiple perspectives lead
to the
> >> developmental question of how socially situated microgenetic
experiences
> >> get "generalized" into "higher" levels of organization that
organize
> >> experience across situations [and organize the relation of
the "lower" and
> >> "higher"
> >> functions]?'
> >>
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
[mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>]
On
> >> Behalf Of Larry Purss
> >> Sent: 04 August 2010 19:04
> >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >> Subject: Re: [xmca] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special
Issue on
> >> Mindreading, Review of Philosophy and Psychology
> >>
> >> Hi Leif and Katerina
> >>
> >> Leif,
> >> I have recently read Daniel Stern's latest book "The Present
Moment" and I
> >> agree that he has a fascinating perspective on the topic of
"engagement"
> >> that emphasizes a "non-mind reading interpretation" of
engaging with
> >> others. I will look up his earlier work discussing Vygotsky
and Glick.
> > It
> >> is also interesting that you mention Joseph Glick. Glick's
articles on
> >> Werner are also fascinating as they suggest that Werner was
also focused
> > on
> >> "microgenesis" as central to developmental accounts.
> >>
> >> Katerina,
> >> I'm not sure exactly what you mean by "accept metaphor" but
generally I
> >> accept metaphor as a central way of understanding "human
science" as
> >> interpretive and "perspectival". As I read Glick's
interpretation of
> >> Werner's microgenetic developmental theory, I was also
REFLECTING on Mike
> > &
> >> Natalia's focus on the microgenetic social situation of
development, and
> >> also my attempt to link these perspectives with neo-Meadian
notions of
> >> social ACTS [interchangeability of actual social positions].
These
> >> reflections of linking up multiple perspectives lead to the
developmental
> >> question of how socially situated microgenetic experiences get
> >> "generalized" into "higher" levels of organization that organize
> > experience
> >> across situations [and organize the relation of the "lower"
and "higher"
> >> functions]?
> >>
> >> Glick's article "Werner's Relevance for Contemporary
Developmental
> >> Psychology" points out that Werner thought developmental
processes got
> >> organized "at one of three different levels: the
sensorimotor, the
> >> perceptual, or the symbolic." (p.562) Metaphor organizes
experience at
> > the
> >> 3rd symbolic level and at this level we can have metaphoric
models of
> > "mind"
> >> [for example: conversation, text, computers, dance,
orchestra, etc.]
> >> However, this still leaves us with questioning the
RELATIONAL process of
> >> linking language and metaphor to the other levels of
organization at the
> >> sensorimotor and perceptual levels.
> >> Stern, Reddy, Werner, Glick, Gillespie & Martin, Mike and
Natalia, and
> >> others are exploring the possible dynamic fluidity of the
capacity for
> >> organizing and structuring the 3 levels of experience that
may be more
> >> reciprocal [and possibly simultaneous assemby] than a linear
teleological
> >> dynamic. The question becomes, how central are the
sensorimotor and
> >> perceptual ways of "constructing" or "forming" experience
once social
> >> situations of development are symbolic [and metaphorical]?
As Glick
> > points
> >> out, Werner believed these language and symbolic functions
"undergo a
> >> differentiation process from deeper sensorimotor roots."
(p.562) However
> >> these deeper roots are NOT TRANSCENDED but continue to organize
> > experience.
> >> The notion of "leading activity" implies an INVARIANT linear
process where
> > a
> >> specific leading activity DOMINATES each stage of
development. An
> >> alternative perspective emphasizes the fluidity of these "leading
> >> activities" as continuing to remain central for development. For
> >> example functions such as "affiliation" are not only dominant
in one
> >> specific stage of developmentand then recede into the
background, but
> >> ACTUALLY continue to ACTIVELY organize experience [depending
on the
> > societal
> >> microgenetic situation of development]. Whether the previous
"leading
> >> activity" recedes or remains active is dependent, not on the
stage of
> >> development [age determined] but rather on the particular
social situation
> >> of development. Mike's point that particular school contexts
correlate
> > with
> >> particular ages of students allows 2 alternative models of
development.
> >> Stage theory that is age "determined" or layered development
that is
> >> socially situated [schools CONSTRAIN affiliative activity
which recedes
> > into
> >> the background] If the 2nd alternative guided how we
structured schools
> > and
> >> affiliation and interchangeability of social positions was
VALUED,
> > identity
> >> and concept development would be altered.
> >> My personal fascination, working in schools, is the idea of the
> > possibility
> >> of creating institutional structures which promote the
"interchangeability
> >> of social positions in social acts" and how to facilitate
social spaces
> >> which nurture this interchangeability. An example of this is
the creation
> > of
> >> the 5th dimension METAPHORICAL SPACES where interchangeability of
> > positions
> >> is fluid and dynamic and leads to the development of "agentic
capacity"
> >> where ALL participants experience being recognized and
experiencing
> > OTHERS
> >> RESPONDING to their recognition. This affiliative activity
is formative
> > of
> >> particular "identity" characteristics [communal self] and
also "concept
> >> development" formed within microgenetic moments of
development. The reason
> > I
> >> appreciate neo-Meadian accounts of development are
> >> there privileging the centrality of ACTUAL INTERCHANGEABILITY
of social
> >> positions [which simultaneously organize and regulate
sensorimotor,
> >> perceptual, and symbolic experiences]. I also believe this
"ideal" of
> >> actual interchangeability is fundamentally affiliative and
dialogical as
> > the
> >> participants openly share perspectives. This also creates social
> >> spaces where cognitive development [and reflective capacity]
is nurtured
> > and
> >> "grown" [cultured]
> >>
> >> Larry
> >>
> >> On Wed, Aug 4, 2010 at 7:32 AM, Katerina Plakitsi
> > <kplakits@gmail.com
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=kplakits@gmail.com>>wrote:
> >>> Larry, with "trans situated" do you mean that you accept
"metaphor",
> > which
> >>> is been considered as a constructivist argument?
> >>> Katerina Plakitsi
> >>> Assistant Professor of Science Education
> >>> Department of Early Childhood Education
> >>> School of Education
> >>> University of Ioannina
> >>> 45110
> >>> Greece
> >>> tel.: +302651005771 office
> >>> fax: +302651005842
> >>> tel.: +6972898463 mobile
> >>> e-mail: kplakits@cc.uoi.gr
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=kplakits@cc.uoi.gr>
> >>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits
> >>> http://users.uoi.gr/5conns
> >>> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr <http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr/>
<http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr/> <http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr/>
> >>> http://www.edife.gr/school/5oschool.html
> >>>
> >>> --------------------------------------------------
> >>> From: "Larry Purss" <lpscholar2@gmail.com
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=lpscholar2@gmail.com>>
> >>> Sent: Tuesday, August 03, 2010 8:43 PM
> >>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>>
> >>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers:
Special Issue on
> >>>
> >>> Mindreading, Review of Philosophy and Psychology
> >>>
> >>> Hi Martin
> >>>> This topic of "mind-reading" vs "non-mind reading" models
of young
> >>>> infants
> >>>> CAPACITY for attending to and ENGAGING with other "minds"
[persons] is a
> >>>> fascinating topic which has been discussed previously in CHAT
> >>>> conversations
> >>>> on this listserve.
> >>>> I recently read V. Reddy's book which recommends a 2nd
person societal
> >>>> interactional microgenetic model of non-mind reading. I
have sympathy
> > for
> >>>> this particular perspective. However, I would like to read
more widely
> > on
> >>>> this particular topic.
> >>>>
> >>>> Do you or others on this listserve have any recommendations
for further
> >>>> articles which engage with the pros and cons of the
various models in a
> >>>> spirit similar to the proposed intent of the special issue
of the Review
> >>>> of
> >>>> Philosophy and Psychology?
> >>>>
> >>>> I'm curious about the various theories of young infants
capacity for
> >>>> engaging with others within sociogenesis, ontogenesis, and
microgenesis.
> >>>> However, I'm also interested in how the various models of
"infants
> >>>> engaging
> >>>> with others" become transformed in the transition to
> >>>> TRANS-situational understandings [the development of
"higher" mental
> >>>> functions.]
> >>>>
> >>>> Larry
> >>>>
> >>>> On Mon, Aug 2, 2010 at 12:57 PM, Martin Packer
<packer@duq.edu
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=packer@duq.edu>> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>> Begin forwarded message:
> >>>>>> From: Victoria Southgate <v.southgate@bbk.ac.uk
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=v.southgate@bbk.ac.uk>>
> >>>>>> Date: August 2, 2010 4:22:07 AM GMT-05:00
> >>>>>> To: cogdevsoc@virginia.edu
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=cogdevsoc@virginia.edu>
> >>>>>> Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special Issue on
Mindreading,
> >>>>> Review of Philosophy and Psychology
> >>>>>> Social Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Guest Editors:
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Daniel D Hutto, University of Hertfordshire
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Mitchell Herschbach, University of California, San Diego
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Victoria Southgate, University of London
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> CALL FOR PAPERS
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Deadline for submissions: 1 December 2010
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Human beings, even very young infants, exhibit remarkable
capacities
> >>>>>> for
> >>>>> attending to, and engaging with, other minds. A prevalent
account of
> >> such
> >>>>> abilities is that they involve "theory of mind" or
"mindreading": the
> >>>>> ability to represent mental states as mental states of
specific kinds
> >>>>> (i.e.,
> >>>>> to have concepts of "belief," "desire," etc.) and the
contents of such
> >>>>> mental states. A number of philosophers and psychologists
question the
> >>>>> standard mindreading and wider representationalist
framework for
> >>>>> characterizing and explaining our everyday modes and
methods of
> >>>>> understanding other people. One possibility is that
infants may be
> >>>>> exhibiting sophisticated yet non-conceptual, and possibly
> >>>>> non-representational, mind tracking abilities that do not
equate to any
> >>>>> sort
> >>>>> of mindreading.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Proponents on both sides of this debate must adequately
accommodate
> >>>>> recent work in developmental psychology. Experiments
involving a
> > variety
> >>>>> of
> >>>>> nonverbal tasks - e.g., the "violation of expectation"
paradigm and
> >>>>> anticipatory looking tasks, as well as nonverbal tasks
involving more
> >>>>> active
> >>>>> responses -suggest that young infants can understand
others' goals,
> >>>>> intentions, desires, knowledge/ignorance, and beliefs.
Perhaps most
> >>>>> prominent are studies suggesting infants as young as 13
months of age
> >> are
> >>>>> selectively responsive to the false beliefs of others,
well before they
> >>>>> are
> >>>>> able to reliably pass standard verbal false belief tasks
around 4 years
> >>>>> of
> >>>>> age.
> >>>>>> This special issue of the Review of Philosophy and
Psychology aims to
> >>>>> create a dialogue between the mindreading and non-mindreading
> > approaches
> >>>>> to
> >>>>> basic social cognition. Contributors are asked to clarify
their
> >>>>> theoretical
> >>>>> commitments; explain how their accounts compare with
rivals; and how
> >> they
> >>>>> propose to handle the emerging empirical data,
particularly that from
> >>>>> human
> >>>>> developmental psychology. Themes and questions to be
addressed include
> >>>>> but
> >>>>> are not limited to:
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> - Infants as young as 13 months old display a
systematic
> >>>>> sensitivity to the beliefs of others. Does it follow that
they must be
> >>>>> operating with a concept of belief, or indeed, any
concepts at all?
> >>>>>> - Normally developing children become able to
attribute false
> >>>>> beliefs to others between the ages of 3 and 5. Does it
follow that they
> >>>>> must
> >>>>> be operating with a "theory of mind" or the equivalent?
> >>>>>> - What does mental attribution minimally involve?
What exactly
> >>>>> distinguishes mindreading from non-mindreading approaches
to early
> >> social
> >>>>> cognition? Are there theoretical reasons to prefer one
over the other?
> >>>>>> - What exact roles are mental representations
thought to play in
> >>>>> mindreading approaches? What kind of mental
representations might be
> >>>>> involved? Can a principled dividing line be drawn between
> >>>>> representational
> >>>>> and non-representational approaches?
> >>>>>> - How precisely should we understand the
explicit/implicit
> >>>>> distinction as invoked by certain theorists?
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Invited contributors
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> - José Luis Bermúdez, Texas A&M University
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> - Pierre Jacob, Institut Jean Nicod
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> - Andrew Meltzoff, University of Washington
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Important dates
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> - Submission deadline: 1 December 2010
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> - Target publication date: July 2011
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> How to submit
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Prospective authors should register at:
> >>>>> https://www.editorialmanager.com/ropp to obtain a login
and select
> >>>>> "Social
> >>>>> Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives" as an article
type to submit a
> >>>>> manuscript. Manuscripts should be no longer than 8,000 words.
> >> Submissions
> >>>>> should follow the author guidelines available on the
journal's website:
> >>>>> http://www.springer.com/13164 Any questions? Please email
the guest
> >>>>> editors: d.d.hutto@herts.ac.uk
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=d.d.hutto@herts.ac.uk>,
mherschb@ucsd.edu
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=mherschb@ucsd.edu>,
> > v.southgate@bbk.ac.uk
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=v.southgate@bbk.ac.uk>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> About the journal
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> The Review of Philosophy and Psychology (ISSN: 1878-5158;
eISSN:
> >>>>> 1878-5166) is a peer-reviewed journal published quarterly
by Springer
> >> and
> >>>>> focusing on philosophical and foundational issues in
cognitive science.
> >>>>> The
> >>>>> aim of the journal is to provide a forum for discussion on
topics of
> >>>>> mutual
> >>>>> interest to philosophers and psychologists and to foster
> >>>>> interdisciplinary
> >>>>> research at the crossroads of philosophy and the sciences
of the mind,
> >>>>> including the neural, behavioural and social sciences.
> >>>>>> The journal publishes theoretical works grounded in
empirical
> >> research
> >>>>> as well as empirical articles on issues of philosophical
relevance. It
> >>>>> includes thematic issues featuring invited contributions
from leading
> >>>>> authors together with articles answering a call for paper.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Editorial board
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Editor-in-Chief: Dario Taraborelli, Surrey. Executive
Editors: Roberto
> >>>>> Casati, CNRS; Paul Egré, CNRS, Christophe Heintz, CEU.
> >>>>>> Scientific advisors: Clark Barrett, UCLA; Cristina
Bicchieri, Penn;
> >> Ned
> >>>>> Block, NYU; Paul Bloom, Yale; John Campbell, Berkeley;
Richard Breheny,
> >>>>> UCL;
> >>>>> Susan Carey, Harvard; David Chalmers, ANU; Martin Davies,
ANU; Vittorio
> >>>>> Girotto, IUAV; Alvin Goldman, Rutgers; Daniel Hutto,
Hertfordshire; Ray
> >>>>> Jackendoff, Tufts; Marc Jeannerod, CNRS; Alan Leslie,
Rutgers; Diego
> >>>>> Marconi, Turin; Kevin Mulligan, Geneva; Alva Noë,
Berkeley; Christopher
> >>>>> Peacocke, Columbia; John Perry, Stanford; Daniel Povinelli,
> >>>>> Louisiana-Lafayette; Jesse Prinz, CUNY; Zenon Pylyshyn,
Rutgers; Brian
> >>>>> Scholl, Yale; Natalie Sebanz, Nijmegen; Corrado
Sinigaglia, Milan;
> > Barry
> >>>>> C.
> >>>>> Smith, Birkbeck; Elizabeth Spelke, Harvard; Achille Varzi,
Columbia;
> >>>>> Timothy
> >>>>> Williamson, Oxford; Deirdre Wilson, UCL
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Dr. Victoria Southgate
> >>>>>> Wellcome Trust Research Career Development Fellow
> >>>>>> Centre for Brain and Cognitive Development
> >>>>>> Henry Wellcome Building
> >>>>>> Birkbeck, University of London
> >>>>>> Malet Street
> >>>>>> London, WC1E 7HX.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>>> xmca mailing list
> >>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>>>>
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> >>>>
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> >>>
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> >>
> >>
> >
> > --
> >
------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > *Andy Blunden*
> > Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
> > Videos: http://vimeo.com/user3478333/videos
> > Book: http://www.brill.nl/scss
> >
> >
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> --
------------------------------------------------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
> Videos: http://vimeo.com/user3478333/videos
> Book: http://www.brill.nl/scss
>
>
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------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Andy Blunden*
Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
Videos: http://vimeo.com/user3478333/videos
Book: http://www.brill.nl/scss
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