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Re: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts



Mike, I downloaded it and secreted it at:
http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/imagination.pdf
but I confess I haven't got to reading it yet.
Will do so as soon as possible.

Andy

mike cole wrote:
Andy and Denise-
David K and Paula T have poured huge amount of energy into the pseudoconcept issue. I take it for granted that no one has THE ultimate truth, but where is the sheep in wolf's clothing discussion?
mike

On Wed, Aug 11, 2010 at 1:51 AM, Denise Newnham <dsnewnham@bluewin.ch <mailto:dsnewnham@bluewin.ch>> wrote:

    Dear Andy this is really interesting. I was ruminating over this
    exact same
    thought this morning (5am) before being really awake I sent an email
    before
    and would like you to comment please:)

    Denise

    -----Original Message-----
    From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
    <mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
    [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
    <mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>] On
    Behalf Of Andy Blunden
    Sent: 11 August 2010 10:45
    To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
    Subject: Re: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts

    Denise,

    I have at last found the time to look at Valsiner's article.
    I have only got 2 or 3 pages into the article but the
    problem is immediately obvious and I have better things to
    do than read the whole article.

    *From what I have read*, Valsiner is some kind of
    cognitivist and consequently his idea of what a concept is
    is simply quite different from the tradition of Goethe,
    Hegel and Marx which Vygotsky was continuing. He holds to
    the childish and shallow view that a concept is just a
    collection of "features" which are deemed to be necessary
    and sufficient for a thing to fall under the definition of a
    concept, as in Set Theory and Formal Logic. The same as for
    people like Rudolf Carnap and the Logical Positivists.

    Once you adopt what Hegel calls the "abstract general"
    conception of concepts, then what Vygotsky calls a
    pseduoconcept is the only genuine concept. Vygotsky's idea
    of "concept" will simply make no sense. Talking about
    concepts from a Vygotskyan point of view to someone that
    holds this view is just talking at cross purposes. Waste of
    time.

    Andy

    Denise Newnham wrote:
     > Dear Michael,
     >
     >
     >
     > I wrote to Jaan about your question as no where was it clearly
    stipulated
    in
     > the earlier works and he has just replied so I forward his words
    and text
     >
     >
     >
     > Denise
     >
     > Dear Denise,
     >
     >
     >
     > Good question! In 1998 I was somewhat naively optimistic about
    Peirce cand
     > abduction (see Pizarroso & V 2009 on overcoming that optimism).
     >
     > But the 1998 quote from my book is indeed an embryonic form of
    what later
     > (2001 in Potsdam, and more thoroughly in my 2007 book CULTURE IN
    MINDS AND
     > SOCIETIES became clear-- words as POINT-LIKE CONCEPTS cannot be the
    highest
     > level of semiotic mediation as they would close up further
    creativity of
     > meaning-making. So Vygotsky was basically limited.
     >
     > Instead, the pseudo-concept translates in my terminology into
    field-type
     > sign (Level 4 in my system of semiotic mediation)
     >
     >
     >
     > Jaan
     >
     >
     >
     > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
    <mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
    [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
    <mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>] On
     > Behalf Of Michael Glassman
     > Sent: 05 August 2010 15:22
     > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
     > Subject: RE: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts
     >
     >
     >
     > Hi Denise,
     >
     >
     >
     > I was wondering, does Valsiner have an argument as to how and why
     > pseudo-concepts actally aids in Peirces ilogic of abduction.  I am
    currently
     > under the impresson that abduction is primarily about hypothesis
    generation
     > - the ability to develop new hypotheses in response to unique
    problems.
    So
     > I'm wondering what role pseudo-concepts, if we are going by
    Vygotsky's
     > definition, might play in all this.
     >
     >
     >
     > Michael
     >
     >
     >
     >   _____
     >
     >  From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
    <mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu> on behalf of Denise Newnham
     > Sent: Thu 8/5/2010 5:26 AM
     > To: ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>; 'eXtended Mind,
    Culture, Activity'
     > Subject: RE: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts
     >
     > Hello Andy, the reference as you saw to pseudoconcepts is in his
    book 'The
     > guided mind' 1998 and the other is : The development of the
    concept of
     > development: Historical and epistemological perspectives. In W.
    Damon, &
    R.
     > Lerner(Eds), Handbook of child psychology. 5th Ed. VOl.1. Theoretical
    models
     > of human development (pp. 189-232). New York: Wiley.
     >
     > I quote (1998): 'Vygotsky and his colleagues (Luria would be the
    closest
     > example) attributed and overly idealized role to the role of
    concepts in
     > human reasoning. The role fitted with his emphasis on the
    hierarchy of
     > mental functions (i.e. higher mental functions regulating lower
    ones), yet
     > by this exaggerated emphasis the focus on the process of
    semiogenesis is
     > actually diminished. In contrast, it could be claimed that
    pseudo-concepts
     > (i.e. specific unified conglomerates of concept and complex
    qualities) are
     > the core (and highest form) of human psychological functioning.
    The claim
     > would fit with the unity of representational fields (of Karl Buhler,
     > described and extended earlier) and with the central focus of
    abduction
     > (rather than induction or deduction) in the process of making
    sense (along
     > the lines of Pierce).
     >
     > I read you paper 'when is a concept really a concept' and heard
    that there
     > was a debate on XMCA but as I was not connected at that time have not
    heard
     > or read this debate.
     >
     > Denise
     >
     > -----Original Message-----
     > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
    <mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
    [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
    <mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>] On
     > Behalf Of Andy Blunden
     > Sent: 05 August 2010 10:22
     > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
     > Subject: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts
     >
     > Can you give us the full reference for "see Valsiner,
     > 1997d", Denise, and maybe even the context? I just find it
     > incredible that someone could know as much about Vygotsky as
     > Valsiner does and place pseduoconcepts at the top of the
     > development hierarchy.
     >
     > Andy
     >
     > Denise Newnham wrote:
     >> Dear Larry and others,
     >>
     >> I am new to this game so perhaps am doing something out of turn
    so if so
     > let
     >> me know. Larry I read your reply and this extract below made me
    think of
     >> Valsiner's work on semiotic mediators and concepts where he
    states that
     >> pseudoconcepts (1998, p.278-279) should be placed at the top to the
     >> developmental hierarchy as the hierarchy should be seen as 'open to
     > changes
     >> or formation of intrasensitive order- [see Valsiner, 1997d]'
    (2001, p.
     >> 85).This brings ot my mind Markova's discussion on the
    spontaneous of
     >> intuitive in knowledge formation (2003) and I think that Cole's
    fifth
     >> dimension attests to this argument. There is an interesting paper by
     >> Galligan (2008) "using Valsiner" on the web.
     >>
     >> Denise
     >>
     >> 'These reflections of linking up multiple perspectives lead to the
     >> developmental question of how  socially situated microgenetic
    experiences
     >> get "generalized" into "higher" levels of organization that organize
     >> experience across situations [and organize the relation of the
    "lower"
    and
     >> "higher"
     >> functions]?'
     >>
     >> -----Original Message-----
     >> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
    <mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
    [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
    <mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>] On
     >> Behalf Of Larry Purss
     >> Sent: 04 August 2010 19:04
     >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
     >> Subject: Re: [xmca] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special
    Issue on
     >> Mindreading, Review of Philosophy and Psychology
     >>
     >> Hi Leif and Katerina
     >>
     >> Leif,
     >> I have recently read Daniel Stern's latest book "The Present
    Moment" and
    I
     >> agree that he has a fascinating perspective on the topic of
    "engagement"
     >> that emphasizes a "non-mind reading interpretation" of engaging with
     >> others.  I will look up his earlier work discussing Vygotsky and
    Glick.
     > It
     >> is also interesting that you mention Joseph Glick. Glick's
    articles on
     >> Werner are also fascinating as they suggest that Werner was also
    focused
     > on
     >> "microgenesis" as central to developmental accounts.
     >>
     >> Katerina,
     >> I'm not sure exactly what you mean by "accept metaphor" but
    generally I
     >> accept metaphor as a central way of understanding "human science" as
     >> interpretive and "perspectival".  As I read  Glick's
    interpretation of
     >> Werner's microgenetic developmental theory, I was also
    REFLECTING on Mike
     > &
     >> Natalia's focus on the microgenetic social situation of
    development, and
     >> also my attempt to link these perspectives with neo-Meadian
    notions of
     >> social ACTS [interchangeability of actual social positions].  These
     >> reflections of linking up multiple perspectives lead to the
    developmental
     >> question of how  socially situated microgenetic experiences get
     >> "generalized" into "higher" levels of organization that organize
     > experience
     >> across situations [and organize the relation of the "lower" and
    "higher"
     >> functions]?
     >>
     >> Glick's article "Werner's Relevance for Contemporary Developmental
     >> Psychology"  points out that Werner thought developmental
    processes got
     >> organized "at one of  three different levels: the sensorimotor, the
     >> perceptual, or the symbolic." (p.562)  Metaphor organizes
    experience at
     > the
     >> 3rd symbolic level and at this level we can have metaphoric
    models of
     > "mind"
     >> [for example: conversation, text, computers, dance, orchestra, etc.]
     >> However, this still leaves us with questioning  the RELATIONAL
    process of
     >> linking language and metaphor to the other levels of
    organization at the
     >> sensorimotor and perceptual levels.
     >> Stern, Reddy, Werner, Glick, Gillespie & Martin, Mike and
    Natalia, and
     >> others are exploring the possible dynamic fluidity of the
    capacity for
     >> organizing and structuring the 3 levels of experience that may
    be more
     >> reciprocal [and possibly simultaneous assemby] than a linear
    teleological
     >> dynamic.  The question becomes, how central are the sensorimotor and
     >> perceptual ways of "constructing" or "forming" experience once
    social
     >> situations of development are  symbolic [and metaphorical]?  As
    Glick
     > points
     >> out, Werner believed these language and symbolic functions
    "undergo a
     >> differentiation process from deeper sensorimotor roots." (p.562)
    However
     >> these deeper roots are NOT TRANSCENDED but continue to organize
     > experience.
     >> The notion of "leading activity" implies an INVARIANT linear process
    where
     > a
     >> specific leading activity DOMINATES each stage of development.  An
     >> alternative perspective emphasizes the fluidity of these "leading
     >> activities" as continuing to remain central for development. For
     >> example functions such as "affiliation" are not only dominant in one
     >> specific stage of developmentand then recede into the
    background, but
     >> ACTUALLY continue to ACTIVELY organize experience [depending on the
     > societal
     >> microgenetic situation of development].  Whether the previous
    "leading
     >> activity" recedes or remains active is dependent, not on the
    stage of
     >> development [age determined] but rather on the particular social
    situation
     >> of development. Mike's point that particular school contexts
    correlate
     > with
     >> particular ages of students allows 2 alternative models of
    development.
     >> Stage theory that is age "determined" or layered development that is
     >> socially situated [schools CONSTRAIN affiliative activity which
    recedes
     > into
     >> the background]  If the 2nd alternative guided how we structured
    schools
     > and
     >> affiliation and interchangeability of social positions was VALUED,
     > identity
     >> and concept development would be altered.
     >> My personal fascination, working in schools, is the idea of the
     > possibility
     >> of creating institutional structures which promote the
    "interchangeability
     >> of social positions in social acts" and how to facilitate social
    spaces
     >> which nurture this interchangeability. An example of this is the
    creation
     > of
     >> the 5th dimension METAPHORICAL SPACES where interchangeability of
     > positions
     >> is fluid and dynamic and leads to the development of "agentic
    capacity"
     >> where ALL participants experience being recognized and experiencing
     > OTHERS
     >> RESPONDING to their recognition.  This affiliative activity is
    formative
     > of
     >> particular "identity" characteristics [communal self] and also
    "concept
     >> development" formed within microgenetic moments of development. The
    reason
     > I
     >> appreciate  neo-Meadian accounts of development are
     >> there privileging the centrality of ACTUAL INTERCHANGEABILITY of
    social
     >> positions [which simultaneously organize and regulate sensorimotor,
     >> perceptual, and symbolic experiences].  I also believe this
    "ideal" of
     >> actual interchangeability is fundamentally affiliative and
    dialogical as
     > the
     >> participants openly share perspectives.  This also creates social
     >> spaces where cognitive development [and reflective capacity] is
    nurtured
     > and
     >> "grown" [cultured]
     >>
     >> Larry
     >>
     >> On Wed, Aug 4, 2010 at 7:32 AM, Katerina Plakitsi
     > <kplakits@gmail.com <mailto:kplakits@gmail.com>>wrote:
     >>> Larry, with "trans situated" do you mean that you accept
    "metaphor",
     > which
     >>> is been considered as a constructivist argument?
     >>> Katerina Plakitsi
     >>> Assistant Professor of Science Education
     >>> Department of Early Childhood Education
     >>> School of Education
     >>> University of Ioannina
     >>> 45110
     >>> Greece
     >>> tel.: +302651005771 office
     >>> fax: +302651005842
     >>> tel.: +6972898463 mobile
     >>> e-mail: kplakits@cc.uoi.gr <mailto:kplakits@cc.uoi.gr>
     >>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits
     >>> http://users.uoi.gr/5conns
     >>> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr <http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr/>
    <http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr/>
     >>> http://www.edife.gr/school/5oschool.html
     >>>
     >>> --------------------------------------------------
     >>> From: "Larry Purss" <lpscholar2@gmail.com
    <mailto:lpscholar2@gmail.com>>
     >>> Sent: Tuesday, August 03, 2010 8:43 PM
     >>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
    <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>>
     >>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special
    Issue on
     >>>
     >>> Mindreading, Review of Philosophy and Psychology
     >>>
     >>> Hi Martin
     >>>> This topic of "mind-reading" vs  "non-mind reading" models of
    young
     >>>> infants
     >>>> CAPACITY for attending to and ENGAGING with other "minds"
    [persons] is
    a
     >>>> fascinating topic which has been discussed previously in CHAT
     >>>> conversations
     >>>> on this listserve.
     >>>> I recently read V. Reddy's book which recommends a 2nd person
    societal
     >>>> interactional microgenetic model of non-mind reading. I have
    sympathy
     > for
     >>>> this particular perspective. However, I would like to read
    more widely
     > on
     >>>> this particular topic.
     >>>>
     >>>> Do you or others on this listserve have any recommendations
    for further
     >>>> articles which  engage with the pros and cons of the various
    models in
    a
     >>>> spirit similar to the proposed intent of the special issue of the
    Review
     >>>> of
     >>>> Philosophy and Psychology?
     >>>>
     >>>> I'm curious about the various theories of young infants
    capacity for
     >>>> engaging with others within sociogenesis, ontogenesis, and
    microgenesis.
     >>>> However, I'm also interested in how the various  models of
    "infants
     >>>> engaging
     >>>> with others" become transformed in the transition to
     >>>> TRANS-situational understandings  [the development of "higher"
    mental
     >>>> functions.]
     >>>>
     >>>> Larry
     >>>>
     >>>> On Mon, Aug 2, 2010 at 12:57 PM, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu
    <mailto:packer@duq.edu>> wrote:
     >>>>
     >>>> Begin forwarded message:
     >>>>>> From: Victoria Southgate <v.southgate@bbk.ac.uk
    <mailto:v.southgate@bbk.ac.uk>>
     >>>>>> Date: August 2, 2010 4:22:07 AM GMT-05:00
     >>>>>> To: cogdevsoc@virginia.edu <mailto:cogdevsoc@virginia.edu>
     >>>>>> Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special Issue on
    Mindreading,
     >>>>> Review of Philosophy and Psychology
     >>>>>> Social Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives
     >>>>>>
     >>>>>>
     >>>>>>
     >>>>>> Special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology
     >>>>>>
     >>>>>>
     >>>>>>
     >>>>>> Guest Editors:
     >>>>>>
     >>>>>> Daniel D Hutto, University of Hertfordshire
     >>>>>>
     >>>>>> Mitchell Herschbach, University of California, San Diego
     >>>>>>
     >>>>>> Victoria Southgate, University of London
     >>>>>>
     >>>>>>
     >>>>>>
     >>>>>>
     >>>>>>
     >>>>>>           CALL FOR PAPERS
     >>>>>>
     >>>>>>           Deadline for submissions: 1 December 2010
     >>>>>>
     >>>>>>
     >>>>>>
     >>>>>>
     >>>>>>
     >>>>>> Human beings, even very young infants, exhibit remarkable
    capacities
     >>>>>> for
     >>>>> attending to, and engaging with, other minds. A prevalent
    account of
     >> such
     >>>>> abilities is that they involve "theory of mind" or
    "mindreading": the
     >>>>> ability to represent mental states as mental states of
    specific kinds
     >>>>> (i.e.,
     >>>>> to have concepts of "belief," "desire," etc.) and the
    contents of such
     >>>>> mental states. A number of philosophers and psychologists
    question the
     >>>>> standard mindreading and wider representationalist framework for
     >>>>> characterizing and explaining our everyday modes and methods of
     >>>>> understanding other people. One possibility is that infants
    may be
     >>>>> exhibiting sophisticated yet non-conceptual, and possibly
     >>>>> non-representational, mind tracking abilities that do not
    equate to
    any
     >>>>> sort
     >>>>> of mindreading.
     >>>>>>
     >>>>>> Proponents on both sides of this debate must adequately
    accommodate
     >>>>> recent work in developmental psychology. Experiments involving a
     > variety
     >>>>> of
     >>>>> nonverbal tasks - e.g., the "violation of expectation"
    paradigm and
     >>>>> anticipatory looking tasks, as well as nonverbal tasks
    involving more
     >>>>> active
     >>>>> responses -suggest that young infants can understand others'
    goals,
     >>>>> intentions, desires, knowledge/ignorance, and beliefs.
    Perhaps most
     >>>>> prominent are studies suggesting infants as young as 13
    months of age
     >> are
     >>>>> selectively responsive to the false beliefs of others, well
    before
    they
     >>>>> are
     >>>>> able to reliably pass standard verbal false belief tasks around 4
    years
     >>>>> of
     >>>>> age.
     >>>>>> This special issue of the Review of Philosophy and
    Psychology aims to
     >>>>> create a dialogue between the mindreading and non-mindreading
     > approaches
     >>>>> to
     >>>>> basic social cognition. Contributors are asked to clarify their
     >>>>> theoretical
     >>>>> commitments; explain how their accounts compare with rivals;
    and how
     >> they
     >>>>> propose to handle the emerging empirical data, particularly
    that from
     >>>>> human
     >>>>> developmental psychology. Themes and questions to be
    addressed include
     >>>>> but
     >>>>> are not limited to:
     >>>>>>
     >>>>>> -       Infants as young as 13 months old display a systematic
     >>>>> sensitivity to the beliefs of others. Does it follow that
    they must be
     >>>>> operating with a concept of belief, or indeed, any concepts
    at all?
     >>>>>> -       Normally developing children become able to
    attribute false
     >>>>> beliefs to others between the ages of 3 and 5. Does it follow
    that
    they
     >>>>> must
     >>>>> be operating with a "theory of mind" or the equivalent?
     >>>>>> -       What does mental attribution minimally involve? What
    exactly
     >>>>> distinguishes mindreading from non-mindreading approaches to
    early
     >> social
     >>>>> cognition? Are there theoretical reasons to prefer one over
    the other?
     >>>>>> -       What exact roles are mental representations thought
    to play
    in
     >>>>> mindreading approaches? What kind of mental representations
    might be
     >>>>> involved? Can a principled dividing line be drawn between
     >>>>> representational
     >>>>> and non-representational approaches?
     >>>>>> -       How precisely should we understand the explicit/implicit
     >>>>> distinction as invoked by certain theorists?
     >>>>>>
     >>>>>> Invited contributors
     >>>>>>
     >>>>>> -       José Luis Bermúdez, Texas A&M University
     >>>>>>
     >>>>>> -       Pierre Jacob, Institut Jean Nicod
     >>>>>>
     >>>>>> -       Andrew Meltzoff, University of Washington
     >>>>>>
     >>>>>>
     >>>>>>
     >>>>>> Important dates
     >>>>>>
     >>>>>> -       Submission deadline: 1 December 2010
     >>>>>>
     >>>>>> -       Target publication date: July 2011
     >>>>>>
     >>>>>>
     >>>>>>
     >>>>>>
     >>>>>>
     >>>>>> How to submit
     >>>>>>
     >>>>>> Prospective authors should register at:
     >>>>> https://www.editorialmanager.com/ropp to obtain a login and
    select
     >>>>> "Social
     >>>>> Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives" as an article type
    to submit
    a
     >>>>> manuscript. Manuscripts should be no longer than 8,000 words.
     >> Submissions
     >>>>> should follow the author guidelines available on the journal's
    website:
     >>>>> http://www.springer.com/13164  Any questions? Please email
    the guest
     >>>>> editors: d.d.hutto@herts.ac.uk
    <mailto:d.d.hutto@herts.ac.uk>, mherschb@ucsd.edu
    <mailto:mherschb@ucsd.edu>,
     > v.southgate@bbk.ac.uk <mailto:v.southgate@bbk.ac.uk>
     >>>>>>
     >>>>>> About the journal
     >>>>>>
     >>>>>> The Review of Philosophy and Psychology (ISSN: 1878-5158; eISSN:
     >>>>> 1878-5166) is a peer-reviewed journal published quarterly by
    Springer
     >> and
     >>>>> focusing on philosophical and foundational issues in cognitive
    science.
     >>>>> The
     >>>>> aim of the journal is to provide a forum for discussion on
    topics of
     >>>>> mutual
     >>>>> interest to philosophers and psychologists and to foster
     >>>>> interdisciplinary
     >>>>> research at the crossroads of philosophy and the sciences of
    the mind,
     >>>>> including the neural, behavioural and social sciences.
     >>>>>>  The journal publishes theoretical works grounded in empirical
     >> research
     >>>>> as well as empirical articles on issues of philosophical
    relevance. It
     >>>>> includes thematic issues featuring invited contributions from
    leading
     >>>>> authors together with articles answering a call for paper.
     >>>>>>
     >>>>>> Editorial board
     >>>>>>
     >>>>>> Editor-in-Chief: Dario Taraborelli, Surrey. Executive Editors:
    Roberto
     >>>>> Casati, CNRS; Paul Egré, CNRS, Christophe Heintz, CEU.
     >>>>>> Scientific advisors: Clark Barrett, UCLA; Cristina
    Bicchieri, Penn;
     >> Ned
     >>>>> Block, NYU; Paul Bloom, Yale; John Campbell, Berkeley; Richard
    Breheny,
     >>>>> UCL;
     >>>>> Susan Carey, Harvard; David Chalmers, ANU; Martin Davies, ANU;
    Vittorio
     >>>>> Girotto, IUAV; Alvin Goldman, Rutgers; Daniel Hutto,
    Hertfordshire;
    Ray
     >>>>> Jackendoff, Tufts; Marc Jeannerod, CNRS; Alan Leslie,
    Rutgers; Diego
     >>>>> Marconi, Turin; Kevin Mulligan, Geneva; Alva Noë, Berkeley;
    Christopher
     >>>>> Peacocke, Columbia; John Perry, Stanford; Daniel Povinelli,
     >>>>> Louisiana-Lafayette; Jesse Prinz, CUNY; Zenon Pylyshyn,
    Rutgers; Brian
     >>>>> Scholl, Yale; Natalie Sebanz, Nijmegen; Corrado Sinigaglia,
    Milan;
     > Barry
     >>>>> C.
     >>>>> Smith, Birkbeck; Elizabeth Spelke, Harvard; Achille Varzi,
    Columbia;
     >>>>> Timothy
     >>>>> Williamson, Oxford; Deirdre Wilson, UCL
     >>>>>>
     >>>>>> Dr. Victoria Southgate
     >>>>>> Wellcome Trust Research Career Development Fellow
     >>>>>> Centre for Brain and Cognitive Development
     >>>>>> Henry Wellcome Building
     >>>>>> Birkbeck, University of London
     >>>>>> Malet Street
     >>>>>> London, WC1E 7HX.
     >>>>>>
     >>>>>>
     >>>>>>
     >>>>>>
     >>>>>>
     >>>>>>
     >>>>>>
     >>>>> _______________________________________________
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     >>
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     >
     > --
     >
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
     > *Andy Blunden*
     > Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
     > Videos: http://vimeo.com/user3478333/videos
     > Book: http://www.brill.nl/scss
     >
     >
     > _______________________________________________
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     > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
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     >
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     > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
     >
     >
     >
     >
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
     >
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     > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
     > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca

    --
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    *Andy Blunden*
    Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
    Videos: http://vimeo.com/user3478333/videos
    Book: http://www.brill.nl/scss


    _______________________________________________
    xmca mailing list
    xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
    http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca

    _______________________________________________
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    xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
    http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca



--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Andy Blunden*
Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
Videos: http://vimeo.com/user3478333/videos
Book: http://www.brill.nl/scss


_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca