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Re: [xmca] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special Issue on Mindreading, Review of Philosophy and Psychology

Hi Larry

What about

Daniel N Stern
The interpersonal world of the infant.
A view from psychoanalysis and developmental psychology.

He refers both to Vygotsky and Joe Glick

3 aug 2010 kl. 19.43 skrev Larry Purss:

Hi Martin

This topic of "mind-reading" vs "non-mind reading" models of young infants CAPACITY for attending to and ENGAGING with other "minds" [persons] is a fascinating topic which has been discussed previously in CHAT conversations
on this listserve.
I recently read V. Reddy's book which recommends a 2nd person societal interactional microgenetic model of non-mind reading. I have sympathy for this particular perspective. However, I would like to read more widely on
this particular topic.

Do you or others on this listserve have any recommendations for further articles which engage with the pros and cons of the various models in a spirit similar to the proposed intent of the special issue of the Review of
Philosophy and Psychology?

I'm curious about the various theories of young infants capacity for
engaging with others within sociogenesis, ontogenesis, and microgenesis. However, I'm also interested in how the various models of "infants engaging
with others" become transformed in the transition to
TRANS-situational understandings  [the development of "higher" mental


On Mon, Aug 2, 2010 at 12:57 PM, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> wrote:

Begin forwarded message:

From: Victoria Southgate <v.southgate@bbk.ac.uk>
Date: August 2, 2010 4:22:07 AM GMT-05:00
To: cogdevsoc@virginia.edu
Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special Issue on Mindreading,
Review of Philosophy and Psychology

Social Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives

Special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology

Guest Editors:

Daniel D Hutto, University of Hertfordshire

Mitchell Herschbach, University of California, San Diego

Victoria Southgate, University of London


          Deadline for submissions: 1 December 2010

Human beings, even very young infants, exhibit remarkable capacities for
attending to, and engaging with, other minds. A prevalent account of such
abilities is that they involve “theory of mind” or “mindreading”: the
ability to represent mental states as mental states of specific kinds (i.e., to have concepts of “belief,” “desire,” etc.) and the contents of such mental states. A number of philosophers and psychologists question the
standard mindreading and wider representationalist framework for
characterizing and explaining our everyday modes and methods of
understanding other people. One possibility is that infants may be
exhibiting sophisticated yet non-conceptual, and possibly
non-representational, mind tracking abilities that do not equate to any sort
of mindreading.

Proponents on both sides of this debate must adequately accommodate
recent work in developmental psychology. Experiments involving a variety of
nonverbal tasks — e.g., the “violation of expectation” paradigm and
anticipatory looking tasks, as well as nonverbal tasks involving more active
responses —suggest that young infants can understand others’ goals,
intentions, desires, knowledge/ignorance, and beliefs. Perhaps most
prominent are studies suggesting infants as young as 13 months of age are selectively responsive to the false beliefs of others, well before they are able to reliably pass standard verbal false belief tasks around 4 years of

This special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology aims to
create a dialogue between the mindreading and non-mindreading approaches to basic social cognition. Contributors are asked to clarify their theoretical commitments; explain how their accounts compare with rivals; and how they propose to handle the emerging empirical data, particularly that from human developmental psychology. Themes and questions to be addressed include but
are not limited to:

-       Infants as young as 13 months old display a systematic
sensitivity to the beliefs of others. Does it follow that they must be
operating with a concept of belief, or indeed, any concepts at all?

-       Normally developing children become able to attribute false
beliefs to others between the ages of 3 and 5. Does it follow that they must
be operating with a “theory of mind” or the equivalent?

-       What does mental attribution minimally involve? What exactly
distinguishes mindreading from non-mindreading approaches to early social cognition? Are there theoretical reasons to prefer one over the other?

- What exact roles are mental representations thought to play in
mindreading approaches? What kind of mental representations might be
involved? Can a principled dividing line be drawn between representational
and non-representational approaches?

-       How precisely should we understand the explicit/implicit
distinction as invoked by certain theorists?

Invited contributors

-       José Luis Bermúdez, Texas A&M University

-       Pierre Jacob, Institut Jean Nicod

-       Andrew Meltzoff, University of Washington

Important dates

-       Submission deadline: 1 December 2010

-       Target publication date: July 2011

How to submit

Prospective authors should register at:
https://www.editorialmanager.com/ropp to obtain a login and select “Social Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives” as an article type to submit a manuscript. Manuscripts should be no longer than 8,000 words. Submissions should follow the author guidelines available on the journal's website:
http://www.springer.com/13164  Any questions? Please email the guest
editors: d.d.hutto@herts.ac.uk, mherschb@ucsd.edu, v.southgate@bbk.ac.uk

About the journal

The Review of Philosophy and Psychology (ISSN: 1878-5158; eISSN:
1878-5166) is a peer-reviewed journal published quarterly by Springer and focusing on philosophical and foundational issues in cognitive science. The aim of the journal is to provide a forum for discussion on topics of mutual interest to philosophers and psychologists and to foster interdisciplinary research at the crossroads of philosophy and the sciences of the mind,
including the neural, behavioural and social sciences.

The journal publishes theoretical works grounded in empirical research
as well as empirical articles on issues of philosophical relevance. It
includes thematic issues featuring invited contributions from leading
authors together with articles answering a call for paper.

Editorial board

Editor-in-Chief: Dario Taraborelli, Surrey. Executive Editors: Roberto
Casati, CNRS; Paul Egré, CNRS, Christophe Heintz, CEU.
Scientific advisors: Clark Barrett, UCLA; Cristina Bicchieri, Penn; Ned
Block, NYU; Paul Bloom, Yale; John Campbell, Berkeley; Richard Breheny, UCL; Susan Carey, Harvard; David Chalmers, ANU; Martin Davies, ANU; Vittorio Girotto, IUAV; Alvin Goldman, Rutgers; Daniel Hutto, Hertfordshire; Ray
Jackendoff, Tufts; Marc Jeannerod, CNRS; Alan Leslie, Rutgers; Diego
Marconi, Turin; Kevin Mulligan, Geneva; Alva Noë, Berkeley; Christopher
Peacocke, Columbia; John Perry, Stanford; Daniel Povinelli,
Louisiana-Lafayette; Jesse Prinz, CUNY; Zenon Pylyshyn, Rutgers; Brian Scholl, Yale; Natalie Sebanz, Nijmegen; Corrado Sinigaglia, Milan; Barry C. Smith, Birkbeck; Elizabeth Spelke, Harvard; Achille Varzi, Columbia; Timothy
Williamson, Oxford; Deirdre Wilson, UCL

Dr. Victoria Southgate
Wellcome Trust Research Career Development Fellow
Centre for Brain and Cognitive Development
Henry Wellcome Building
Birkbeck, University of London
Malet Street
London, WC1E 7HX.

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