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Re: [xmca] perception/conception etc
I will throw out an example that may work or may just need to be thrown
away. In the PBS show "the human spark" there were experiments conducted
comparing 3 year old humans to chimps. What they found was the 3 year
olds were invariably prone to provide assistance to those they perceive as
not knowing how to do a task. This was not the case in the chimpanzee who
were always inclined to be selfish, not share or not perceive that
assistance was needed. Now is it possible that this perception of helping
out is a percept?
Of course it could be stated that the culture the 3-year old as been
reared in provides the 'spark' for this helping out but it could just as
easily be theorized that helping out is an innate percept for which humans
are inclined to behave. Perhaps I could be so bold (i might as well at
this point for I started by saying this idea could just as easily be
discarded) that humans have it within their genetic code a 'helping out'
percept. Just as female cardinals (the bird) have a genetic code for
searching out red cardinals (like my keeping with your cardinal theme?)
humans have a genetic code for searching out ways to be helpful. Let's
call these genetic predispositions in humans: percepts. Who hasn't looked
in the sky to see silhouettes of faces or seen faces outlined in the sides
From: Martin Packer <firstname.lastname@example.org>
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <email@example.com>
Date: 07/12/2010 11:29 AM
Subject: Re: [xmca] perception/conception etc
Sent by: firstname.lastname@example.org
I think the difficulty that I am having with the proposals that people
have been making about percepts and concepts is that, if my understanding
is correct, these have been proposed as entities that belong (in some
sense) to an individual, and more than this that they are internal to the
individual - internal mental entities, distinct from the world in which
that individual lives.
I would say that we have learned from the work of Gibson and others that
perception is an active interaction with and in the world. If 'forms'
emerge in perception, these forms are not within the individual, they are
forms of active attunement in practical activity. I would propose that we
think of conception, too, as an active and interactive process.
And a social process too. We won't understand the ontogenesis of any of
this if we leave out the social moment. To return to pain, for example,
the first thing a toddler does when they fall over and skin their knees is
check to see how their parents are reacting. Only then will they cry, or
laugh, or jump up and keep playing. Whether it is a painful experience or
not is from the start a social matter.
On Jul 12, 2010, at 11:19 AM, ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org wrote:
> When thinking about the idea of a precept I do have a hard time just
> discarding it and stating that they are floating about in the ether
> we snatch one into our brain. There is a complexity to them but a
> complexity that falls short of a cultural artefact. I must say I
> currently have a banana inspired brain but I can't at the moment move
> passed the thought that percepts provide the jumping off point for the
> appropriation of cultural artifacts.
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