REVISITING A BOOK WRITTEN fifteen years ago about a rapidly changing field poses a dilemma. Do I rewrite it entirely—or do I let it stand and go ahead with other things? Finding neither alternative satisfactory, I have opted for a third solution, writing an extensive new Introduction. This revision permits me to correct, add to, subtract from, and elaborate on selected issues. It also permits me to step back and evaluate the book’s impact and to respond to some of the criticisms that have been directed at it. Finally, it allows me to trace where the book has led my own thinking.

Revisiting Selected Issues

This book has now been in print for fifteen years in ten languages. Four issues seem to have had the greatest impact.

THE LAYERED MODEL OF DEVELOPMENT

In contrast to the conventional stage model(s) whereby each successive phase of development not only replaces the preceding one but also essentially dismantles it, reorganizing the entire perspective, the layered model postulated here assumes a progressive ac-
cumulation of senses of the self, socioaffective competencies, and ways-of-being-with-others. No emerging domain disappears; each remains active and interacts dynamically with all the others. In fact, each domain facilitates the emergence of the ones that follow. In this way, all senses of the self, all socioaffective competencies, and all ways-of-being-with-others remain with us throughout the life span, whereas according to the stage model, earlier developmental organization can be accessed only by means of a process-like regression.

The shift to a layered model came about for two reasons. First, the classical Freudian model of psychosexual stages (replete with fixations) had not fulfilled its predictive promise for linkage with later psychopathology even after three-quarters of a century; it was not productive of new ideas and had become less persuasive and less interesting. And second, Piaget’s stage model, at the time still the dominant paradigm of development, accounted for the infant’s encounter with the inanimate physical world (with space, time, number, volume, weight, etc.), for which task it had been constructed—but it was inadequate to conceptualize the encounter with the richer and more complicated social-emotional human world composed of self and others, which is the world that interests me.

In this book’s original 1985 edition, I stated—but without the force of solid conviction (yet)—that the infant’s encounter with the human world was, if not primary, certainly not secondary, and that it had to be guided by psychological principles separate and different from those that directed his encounter with the inanimate, physical world. The two encounters proceed in parallel: That was the central point.

It had begun to occur to many working in the field that infants, and adults, had (indeed, had to have) two different, parallel systems of perception, cognition, affectivity, and memory, for encountering and making sense of the physical and human worlds. Of course, the two systems interact dynamically. This new view, a radical departure emphasizing the specificity of local knowledge in the broadest sense of those terms, has been gaining evidence and theoretical strength during the past fifteen years. (See, for example, Braten, 1998; Leslie, 1987; Rochat, 1999; Thelen and Smith,
1994.) Currently, it is proving to be extremely productive for both normal and pathological development (particularly concerning autism).

The layered model is not actually new. (The notion of parallel models is far newer.) It was greatly influenced by other nonsequential models such as the spirals of Werner and Kaplan (1963) and others. Some psychologists continue to criticize it for being essentially a model of growth, not development. There is some truth to this criticism, but a model must fit the data it proposes to embrace, and the layered model outlined here was more appropriate than the stage model to the infant’s meeting with the unique features of the human world. In any event, it seems to have helped many to push their thinking further than previous models did—at least when dealing with human interaction.

UNPACKING THE SELF
The book’s view that self/other differentiation begins at birth or before has been another source of much discussion, particularly in psychoanalytically influenced circles. If such differentiation is not the work of any special life phase, the “final” disentanglement of self from other cannot be dated in any meaningful sense. So instead of seeing the separation of self from other as a phase-limited developmental task, even the developmental task, this book maintains that self/other differentiation is in place and in process almost from the very beginning. Therefore, the infant’s major developmental task is the opposite one, the creation of ties with others—that is, increasing relatedness. It is important to note that the research cited above on parallel (perceptual, cognitive, and affective) systems operating essentially from birth supports the contention of differentiated beginnings for self and other.

This view places more emphasis on strategies and problems in attachment when viewing pathology, and it minimizes, even does away with, the need to conceptualize phases of “normal autism,” “primary narcissism,” and “symbiosis.” This is not to say that vaguelly similar phenomena do not exist as pathological entities later in life. They do, but they do not have their points of origin in the first two years; thus they cannot constitute specific sources of the pathogenic mechanism to which regression can occur.