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RES: [xmca] Vigotski text information
Thanks....
Joao
___________________________
João Batista Martins
Rua Pref. Hugo Cabral, 1062/142
Londrina - PR - Brasil
CEP: 86020-111
emaill: jbmartin@sercomtel.com.br
-----Mensagem original-----
De: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] Em nome de David Kellogg
Enviada em: quinta-feira, 25 de fevereiro de 2010 22:41
Para: Culture ActivityeXtended Mind
Assunto: Re: [xmca] Vigotski text information
Joao:
I don't know it. But it's listed on p. 287 of Volume 6 as:
Sovremennaja psikhologija i iskusstvo (Modern psychology and art), an article in Sovetskoe Iskusstvo (Soviet Art), 1927, 8: 5-8, and 1928, 1: 5-7.
David Kellogg
Seoul National University of Education
--- On Thu, 2/25/10, Joao Batista <jbmartin@sercomtel.com.br> wrote:
From: Joao Batista <jbmartin@sercomtel.com.br>
Subject: [xmca] Vigotski text information
To: "'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Date: Thursday, February 25, 2010, 5:29 PM
I located a Vigotski text in a paper of David West. Does anybody know that text?
The West's indications is:
"Although he would later meet and sometimes work with the leading cultural figures of his time (including Mandelstam and Eisenstein), and although he occasionally returned after 1924 to aesthetic questions in written form ('Modern Psychology and Art' (1928) and 'On the Problem of the Psychology of the Actor's Creativity' (published posthumously in 1936)), he devoted most of his considerable mental energies thereafter to building his science of humankind with the bricks of psychology.
The Vigotski's text is 'Modern Psychology and Art' (1928)
Thanks
Joao Martis
___________________________
João Batista Martins
Rua Pref. Hugo Cabral, 1062/142
Londrina - PR - Brasil
CEP: 86020-111
emaill: jbmartin@sercomtel.com.br
-----Mensagem original-----
De: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] Em nome de yuan lai
Enviada em: quarta-feira, 24 de fevereiro de 2010 02:02
Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Assunto: Re: [xmca] Gratuitous Difficulty and Guileless Deceit
David, the way I see it, the play discussion runs parallel to the play: the
main "argument" of Pearl as representative of her camp is that she did not
know what to make newly added characters say. She took a stance and had
difficulty coming up with what to say to support her stance, but she ended
up with the best line, with support from others, winning people over and
setting up for the finale. I see the preparation for and organization of the
play have the two elements you suggest: what to do with different people's
wanting different things, and resolving it within the confines the teacher
set out; when the children (those who spoke, those who nodded, those who
listened and agreed or disagreed privately) and the teacher participated in
taking different perspectives of the problem by articulating and trying to
comprehend what another was saying.
I love the video clips, young children articulating and trying to
articulate. They solved the difficult problem that their teacher declared
insolvable. The whole event is like a film that has a satisfying conclusion.
No wonder some children said afterwards, "I feel like I'm flying", in
different ways.
If I may borrow your terms, xmca can be thought of as a playworld of
Guileless Deceit and Gratuitous Difficulty, asking and answering big
questions, presenting different perspectives, taking of these perspectives?
Yuan
On Tue, Feb 23, 2010 at 1:15 PM, David Kellogg <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com>wrote:
> eric
>
> Oh, I think you hit the mark, or meet the need, and I notice that you take
> far fewer words than I do to hit it. But I think that MY need here (as I see
> it) is mostly to disentangle.
>
> Leif is right about xmca as a resource. But to me the most exciting thing
> is not the way it provides endless goodies at the click of a mouse or the
> most obscure and recondite historical information at the posting of a query.
> To me the most exciting thing is that threads that are apparently quite
> separate come together, meet, tangle, and transform each other.
>
> For example, the current thread on Teach for America seems very related (at
> least in my mind) to the problem of play and cursing, because the Korean
> equivalent, an internship programme which is being put forward by the Korean
> government to temporarily absorb job seekers until the crisis stricken
> economy improves, has filled our classroom with people who in many cases
> are at the bottom end of the children's next zone of development.
>
> Alas, this is particularly true of the "conversation specialists" we are
> getting for English instruction, some of whom are refugees from the crisis
> stricken economies in the USA and Canada. These teachers-for-awhile tend to
> emphasize mindless activities (or rather passivities) rather than thinking,
> the transactional functions of English information at the expense of the
> reflective, metalinguistic ones, and play rather than school work. And yes,
> they curse, and some are delighted when they discover that the kids
> "understand" them, or at least understand that they are cursing.
>
> That's the exciting part; when threads meet. But the problem (for me) is
> that the very excitement of threads meeting sometimes muddles up the real
> and important disagreements that we have on this list; there is a rush to
> mutual recognition and to premature agreement with others, at least in my
> mind, and I tend to overlook my own point of view in the hurry to acquire
> the topic, and the view of the topic of others.
>
> For example, I was so anxious to pick up the element of cursing you
> suggested in your post, I overlooked two rather important things:
>
> a) The whole point of the James McCawley paper that I was citing (why we
> say "abso-blooming-lutely" and "fan-fucking-tastic" is STRESS. The curse
> word (clearly "bloody" in the case of Eliza, which is another good example
> of semantic vacuity) serves to stress the following syllable, and that is
> abso-blooming-lutely all that it does.
>
> b) The whole point of stressing things in this way is indicativity,
> and emotional release. But it seems to me that the real point of
> disagreement which is emerging here (between you and me, and also, I think,
> between Rod and Larry) is that indicativity and emotional release is not
> necessarily on the developmental agenda; in many ways what is required of
> school children is the very opposite: signification, and shared emotion,
> which in many cases requires emotional restraint and adopting the point of
> view of the other while necessarily losing some of the emotional
> involvement.
>
> I feel that as a developmental fossil, cursing cannot play a role in the
> next zone of development. In fact, I think that only certain forms of play
> can: only those that are conceptually based, which depend on rules and
> abstract principles, and which result in the exercise of higher
> psychological functions such as fairness, justice, and critical thinking. Of
> course, cursing can be part of this development ("Curse you, Red Baron!" as
> a form of critical thinking?) but its functions will always be summative
> rather than formative, retroleptic rather than proleptic. It will not play a
> developmental role.
>
> Gunilla Lindqvist has really hit the mark and met the needs of the next
> zone of development--for preschoolers, where the cutting edge of the next
> zone really is the development of imaginative play by allowing the various
> threads of thinking and speech to tangle and cross fertilize. I think,
> actually, that the Socratic Dialogue in our paper may miss the mark
> precisely because it is not concerned with play, but only with the
> organization of play. That is why the discussion keeps falling,
> retroleptically, into non-generalizeable emotion 'We are all Pearl's best
> friends", as Yongho points out, is a logical contradiction, precisely
> because, like cursing, it puts a generalizeable sentiment in a retroleptic,
> nongeneralizeable form.
>
> David Kellogg
> Seoul National University of Education
>
> --- On Tue, 2/23/10, ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org <ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org> wrote:
>
>
> From: ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org <ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org>
> Subject: RE: [xmca] Gratuitous Difficulty and Guileless Deceit
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> Date: Tuesday, February 23, 2010, 11:01 AM
>
>
> David:
>
> Nice post, regardless of the curse words. My example was not intended to
> provide distaste but was the first example that came to mind where a child
> speaks a word they have obviously heard but are unfamiliar with its usage
> (except for perhaps hearing it as an exclamation of excitement).
> Linguistic chops aside I believe that the child using the profanity is an
> expansion of their developmental level.
>
> Pertaining to Vygotsky I believe that the ZPD is a growth of his view that
> the child begins by imitating and that the growth occurs as that imitation
> is expanded (ala engstrom) into ever exceeding levels of conceptual
> understanding. George Carlin did not curse in his comedy acts because of
> a lack of esteem but rather as an ever expanding conceptual understanding
> of both language and the human condition.
>
> eric
>
> p.s. I see persistant cursing in the adolescent as a lack of vocabulary
> rather than esteem
>
> p.p.s sometimes two cents gets u nuthin and somtimes it meets the need,
> don't know which one this post is though
>
>
>
>
>
>
> David Kellogg <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com>
> Sent by: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
> 02/22/2010 08:01 PM
> Please respond to "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
>
>
> To: Culture ActivityeXtended Mind <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> cc:
> Subject: RE: [xmca] Gratuitous Difficulty and Guileless
> Deceit
>
>
> Warning: this posting contains some foul language, which is semantically
> meaningless and syntactically vacuous, but obeys very interesting
> phonological regularities, and for, I think, a very good reason.
>
> eric
>
> When I say "fuck you" (which I only do in linguistic circles, for reasons
> that will soon be apparent), I do not actually have any sexual act in mind
> at all, and the semantic meaning cannot actually be performed as the
> imperative that it syntactically appears to be (you cannot actually fuck
> yourself, even if you are linguist; it takes two, figuratively, to tango).
>
>
> However, foul language DOES have phonological rules. One of the earliest
> linguistics papers I read as an undergraduate at the University of Chicago
> was called about why you can say "fan-fucking-tastic" but you cannot say
> "fantast-fucking-tic". Or, to give it a transparent Bowdlerization,
> why Eliza Doolittle, in "My Fair Lady" sings:
>
> Oh, so, loverly sittin' abso-bloomin'-lootely still
> I would never budge till spring, crept, over me window-sill!
> Someone's 'ead restin' on my knee...warm an' tender as 'e could be
> Oo tykes good care of me, Oww--wouldn't it be loverly?
>
> Why "Abso-blooming-lutely still" and not "Ab-blooming-solutely still" or
> "Absolute-blooming-ly still"?
>
> You know Wittgenstein spends a big part of "Philosophical Investigations"
> trying to debunk the Vygoskyan model of the concept, and the example he
> hits upon is that of "games". Games, according to Wittgenstein, have no
> single trait in common, either internal or external, and are best thought
> of as a family where everybody resembles each other to some extent or
> another but there is no underlying common essence.
>
> I think Vygotsky would be perfectly happy to say that games and play in
> general are preconceptual, a potential concept rather than an actual one,
> and the idea of "family resemblances" is exactly what Vygotsky uses to
> describe complexes (in Chapter Five of Thinking and Speech). But play IS a
> potential concept, that is, a concept for others (scientists and
> thinkers) and potentially one for myself (children and other players).
>
> Vygotsky points out that all forms of play have not one but TWO things in
> common: the imaginary situation, and the abstract rule. It's just that at
> the beginning of development one is explicit and the other is implicit,
> and by the end of development the roles are reversed.
>
> We can call these ROLE play and RULE play ("guileless deceit" and
> "gratuitous difficulty" were really just my attempts to describe how they
> might feel from the user's point of view.) But let me add one MORE
> element. At the very beginning of development, the period that Vygotsky
> calls "pseudo-play"--there is a form of play that is really just ROTE
> repetition.
>
> So foul language does not have any "role play", that is, no role to play
> in communication or reflection, and it doesn't have any "rule play", that
> is, no rules at the semantic or syntactic level. Yet it clearly is
> intimately linked to our emotional life, and it obeys phonological rules.
> Why is this?
>
> It seems to me that foul language is a linguistic fossil of ROTE play,
> of the period Vygotsky calls "pseudoplay", that is, play for others but
> not for myself. Vygotsky notes that most of this is repetitious activity
> of a sensorimotor sort (the sort of nose-scratching and ear-pulling and
> hair-twisting that my undergrads do when I rabbit on for too long). Foul
> language seems very similar to me, and I think it's no accident that
> mindless foul language is often a symptom of Asperger's.
>
> Why should we call it play at all? Well, of course, Vygotsky doesn't. But
> it seems to me that there are two ways in which it is LINKED to
> play. First of all, mindless repetition DOES lead to the creation of a
> kind of ideal, potential, model of an action; when children color for
> example, they do so by repeating and ordering the kinds of motions they
> use for scribbling. Secondly, there is a sense in which role play involves
> repeating the SPEAKER but varying the SPEECH in much the same way that
> rote play involved repeating the SPEECH.
>
> I think this is why Vygotsky and Voloshinov were both so struck by
> the variation-and-repetition of foul language in Dostoevsky's diary. There
> is some debate about whether Vygotsky got the example (which is quoted
> almost exactly) from Voloshinov, or whether they both took it from an
> article on "dialogic speech" by Jakubinsky. It seems to me that
> since Voloshinov and Vygotsky were BOTH working at the Herzen Pedagogic
> Academy in Leningrad at exactly the same time (1933-1934), the former
> seems very likely.
>
> David Kellogg
> Seoul National University of Education
>
> PS: I had a grad student, an EXTREMELY conscientious teacher and mother
> who had a tendency to want to study anything that cropped up in class. She
> discovered, through a foreign co-teacher, that some of the kids had
> learned a variety of swear words (from movies) and were using them, and
> she determined to make this her thesis topic.
>
> Her initial thesis was that kids swear because they "lack self-esteem".
> Like many working hunches, this turned out to be very well founded,
> although couched in a language I would call a little too hardworking and
> not quite hunchy enough (viz, if we help the kids feel better about
> themselves they will stop swearing).
>
> When I started looking at examples, I noticed that the kids tend to swear
> in situations where they can't really follow or understand, and swearing
> was a kind of emphatic, parodic, almost satirical expression of the
> MEANINGLESSNESS, that is, the rote quality, of English in class.
>
> Unfortunately, my grad found it almost impossible to discuss the actual
> examples she gathered, so we had to broaden the topic to include
> dispreferred and negative language quite generally. But I still get quite
> a thrill from looking at the data that has absolutely nothing to do with
> its (nonexistent) semantic or syntactic properties.
>
> dk
>
> --- On Mon, 2/22/10, ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org <ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org> wrote:
>
>
> From: ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org <ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org>
> Subject: RE: [xmca] Gratuitous Difficulty and Guileless Deceit
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> Date: Monday, February 22, 2010, 8:02 AM
>
>
> Such a wonderful discussion occuring pertaining to development and the
> consequent study!
>
> The stretching of an experience by play does appear to touch on how
> emotions pertain to development. I just consider the different
> experiences i had as a child and have observed as both teacher and parent
> and know that without emotions then an experience is devoid of meaning.
> Associating "more" with food makes perfect sense when attached to emotion
> and so the context and the societal sense of a situation feed people's
> responses to the play world and these responses are satiated in emotion.
> New words are tried out more freely in the play world and the 8 year-old
> learns that f*** shouldn't be stated with such clarity, at least in some
> company. Would the forbidden utterance be an example of your Guiless
> Deceit David?
>
> eric
>
>
>
>
> Rod Parker-Rees <R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk>
> Sent by: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
> 02/22/2010 04:27 AM
> Please respond to "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
>
>
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>,
> "lchcmike@gmail.com" <lchcmike@gmail.com>
> cc:
> Subject: RE: [xmca] Gratuitous Difficulty and Guileless
> Deceit
>
>
> I wish I could remember where I read about a study which illustrated the
> cultural construction of 'meaning' through an account of children's use of
>
> the word 'more'. Researchers were rather puzzled by the fact that young
> children often pointed to a smaller quantity of objects when asked to
> point to the one which was 'more' - after a while they realised that for
> these children 'more' was particularly associated with mealtimes (can I
> have some more?) and in this context 'more' was usually less (second
> portions being smaller than first portions). I think this shows how
> concepts are inextricably bound up in the language practices of speakers
> so that the distinction between children 'knowing' about conservation of
> volume and knowing how to use the word 'more' is delightfully complicated.
>
> Some people are willing to argue about whether a tomato is a fruit or a
> vegetable as if there is an objective truth out there which could rule on
> the matter.
>
> The question about frustration v. humiliation reminds me of an interesting
>
> paper from 'Early Years' (Licht, Simoni and Perrig-Chiello 2008 - 28,3
> 235-49) entitled 'Conflict between peers in infancy and toddler age: what
> do they fight about' in which the authors argue that many conflicts
> between under 2 year olds which have traditionally been understood as
> conflicts about ownership can better be understood in terms of frustration
>
> at interruption of an activity (e.g. when one child takes away something
> another child was examining or playing with). Vasu Reddy has also argued
> (with Colwyn Trevarthen) that very young infants display forms of 'pride'
> and 'shame' in their social interactions and perhaps these emotions can be
>
> understood in terms of satisfaction when experiences correspond with
> mental models, theories or plans and frustration when they don't - though
> these 'personal' responses will also be shaped by cultural patterns of
> behaviour which children will experience both directly, in responses to
> their actions, and indirectly, observing other people's reactions to other
>
> people's actions.
>
> I too am a bit ambivalent about the playworlds approach - at first it felt
>
> to me like an intrusion into a space which children should be allowed to
> own but I can see how it could serve as a form of boundary space between
> this more (but not entirely) child-owned space and the more public space
> of social interactions with unfamiliar others. There seems to be a form of
>
> trajectory by which children 'develop' from a foetus which can only
> function with the support of a womb to infants who can only function with
> the support of familiar others, to children who can only function in a
> supportive, familiar community (a village), to adults who can function in
> progressively wider, more public communities, dealing with people with
> whom they have progressively less shared history. The 'higher' levels of
> development may not be accessible to all (not all adults feel comfortable
> giving a presentation to a room full of strangers) but the 'lower' levels
> remain highly important!
>
> Also, it may be no bad thing to give young children clear signals about
> the 'oddness' of the cultural context of being at school - always a
> playworld but not always acknowledged as such!
>
> All the best,
>
> Rod
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
> Behalf Of David Kellogg
> Sent: 22 February 2010 00:52
> To: lchcmike@gmail.com; Culture ActivityeXtended Mind
> Subject: Re: [xmca] Gratuitous Difficulty and Guileless Deceit
>
> First of all, I have a rather stupid question. In the "conservation"
> studies that Piaget does, when we ask children whether there is more
> liquid in the taller glass or the shorter glass, how do we know what the
> question actually means to the children?
>
> Isn't it possible that it might mean "the level is higher"? When I myself
> check the the mark on the side of a well I usually just think the level is
>
> higher. If you asked me in an unguarded moment, I might say, lazily, that
> somehow there is more or less water in the well (rather than talk about
> the water table).
>
> I might think that a higher tide mark means that somehow there is "more
> tide", and if my wife checks the oil or the transmission fluid in the car
> using a dipstick, I doubt if she considers whether the transmission fluid
> is conserved (perhaps it is hiding somewhere in the engine)?
>
> So I often wonder, when we think about issues of face, and menace, and
> even risk, whether these concepts really mean what we mean when we use
> them. When children worry about "losing face", isn't it the FRUSTRATION
> component which is dominant and the HUMILIATION component that is
> secondary? When they consider "risk", is it the consequences of failure
> that primarily weigh upon them (as they do with us) or is it instead other
>
> the initial outlay of bother and effort that is their prime concern?
>
> Of course, at the adult end of development, kids are like us. One of us,
> Kim Yongho, created some "avatars" out of children's photographs, and
> found that the third and fourth graders were very happy to have these used
>
> in class, but fifth and sixth graders really hated it. Their humiliation
> is like our humiliation and the consequences of ridicule fall heavily on
> their consciousnesses. But that's not what we've got in this article; far
> from it.
>
> In some ways, Gunilla Lindqvist's whole concept of "playworlds" is the
> very opposite of what we see in the data. Instead of having a tightly
> circumscribed activity, with a clear beginning and end, in which the
> principles of an imaginary situation (guileless, shared deceit) and of
> abstract rules (gratuitious difficulty) hold sway, a kind of carefully
> bounded "carnival" space where things are turned upside down without in
> any way impinging on normal relations, Lindqvist actually takes the kids
> out of doors and has stuff hidden for them to find, and even members of
> staff dressed as characters hiding in the woods.
>
> When I first read this, I was pretty shocked, because it seemed to me that
>
> it's precisely the DELINEATION of gratuitous difficulty from the normal
> everyday sort that makes it play, and the DIFFERENTIATION of guileless
> deceit from the manipulative sort that makes it a fictioin as opposed to a
>
> lie. It seemed to me that the whole idea of "playworlds" erases this
> boundary.
>
> Now I am not so sure. It seems to me that in Vygotsky a "social situation"
>
> (whether it's the "social situation of development" or the "environment"
> [среды]) is really a RELATION rather than a physical environment of some
> kind. After all, children don't seem to link play acting to any particuar
> physical site; it's a way of being rather than a place to be.
>
> Or rather it's a bunch of different ways of being. Gratuitous difficulty
> has to reconstruct guileless deceit before it can fully supplant and take
> over its functions, including its developmental functions.
>
> So school-age children who, in their guileless deceit, successfully play
> cops and robbers or cowboys and indians or (as my wife did as a girl,
> Americans vs. communists), are more developed than preschoolers who stick
> to "socialist realism" ("house", "school", "hospital", or, as one of my
> students who grew up over a butcher shop used to, "meat market" games).
> Requiring toys and props and friends to do this represents a lower
> developmental moment than being able to do it with nothing but a piece of
>
> paper and a pencil.
>
> But in the same way, gratuitous difficulty represents a higher
> developmental moment than guileless deceit, and soccer, which requires
> physical mediation, represents a lower developmental moment than chess
> (which can actually, at a very high level, be played with nothing but a
> piece of paper).
>
> Not better. But in a developmental sense higher, in the sense that the
> child who can do the higher can do the lower with great ease, but the
> child who can do the lower may not be able to do the higher at all.
>
> And also in the sense that if I really think about the well and the tide
> and the dipstick in the transmission fluid I can see conservation at work,
>
> but it would take billions of physically mediated measurements to prove it
>
> (and any mismeasurement, at least according to Karl Popper, would force me
>
> to start again from zero!)
>
> David Kellogg
> Seoul National University of Education
>
> --- On Sun, 2/21/10, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
> From: mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
> Subject: Re: [xmca] Gratuitous Difficulty and Guileless Deceit
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> Date: Sunday, February 21, 2010, 10:40 AM
>
>
> I would add, Rod, in this case, part of what is unusual owing to the
> nature
> of the play world this scene is linked to is that the teacher is also a
> risk
> taking co-player, in this sense/con-text a peer in the "safe space" of the
> play where he takes risks that at times made the researcher's practically
> drop their teeth!! All very difficult to get into a single article.
> mike
>
> On Sun, Feb 21, 2010 at 3:52 AM, Rod Parker-Rees <
> R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote:
>
> > I wonder how gratuitous the gratuitous difficulties introduced in play
> > really are - if we see play as being (among other things) a way of
> > organising, calibrating and revising our 'mental models' or theories
> about
> > how the world works, these added difficulties can be seen as a strategy
> for
> > testing the range of applicability of the model or of monitoring how it
> > works in new situations. Bruner wrote about how adults 'up the ante' in
> > their interactions with developing children, adjusting their level of
> > support as children are able to take over more of a shared task and this
> > aspect of play may be a way by which children can up their own ante. It
> is
> > now easier to recognise that the relationship between child and adult is
>
> not
> > 'one-way' - that even babies play a part in educating their parents,
> > training them to develop mutually acceptable ways of interacting and one
>
> of
> > the advantages of introducing 'guileless deceit' into play is that it
> > affords opportunities for 'dressing up' in social practices associated
> with
> > negotiation of interests. If maternal love serves to modify aspects of
> > mothers' social monitoring (the 'love is blind' argument made by Fonagy,
> > Gergely and Target on p. 298 of their article 'The parent-infant dyad
> and
> > the construction of the subjective self') this may provide a 'safe
> space' in
> > which infants can play their way into social processes and indeed babies
>
> do
> > appear to take on much more active, co-creating roles when playing with
> more
> > familiar partners. Even playing at deceit may be considerably more risky
> > when one's partner is less well known - familiarity provides a degree of
> > security which allows social risk taking to be thrilling rather than
> > frightening.
> >
> > In the context of the playworlds paper, these children (and their
> teacher)
> > are having to work out a space between friendship and the more formal,
> > managed relationships between children and teacher to identify how much
> > scope there really is for children to shape the future course of their
> > activity. The question for me is how children can be helped to make the
> step
> > from negotiation of play planning among peers to this more sophisticated
>
> way
> > of 'playing the game', which involves awareness of the teacher's
> interests
> > and constraints so that these can be negotiated. It seems to me that a
> > factor which would support this transition would be the degree to which
> the
> > children know the teacher, not only as a teacher (role-holder) but also
> as a
> > person - what he likes and dislikes, how he reacts to teasing and
> > challenging, how willing he is to respond to children's suggestions etc.
> > Playing social games is supported by familiar 'more competent others'
> and
> > develops skills which allow us to engage in interactions with less
> familiar,
> > less congenial 'adversaries'.
> >
> > All the best,
> >
> > Rod
> >
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> On
> > Behalf Of David Kellogg
> > Sent: 20 February 2010 21:55
> > To: xmca
> > Subject: [xmca] Gratuitous Difficulty and Guileless Deceit
> >
> > Very well, let me try to take the play discussion in a rather new
> > direction. So far we've mostly discussed how play manages to highlight
> the
> > different e-motions of very young children and mostly speculated about
> how
> > this might be developmental.
> >
> > In some ways it seems to me that the article is rather poorly suited to
> > this view. First of all, the actual data is not play per se but only
> > preparation for play. One can easily imagine this play taking place
> without
> > this preparation and therefore it doesn't seem a necessary component.
> >
> > Secondly, even if we accept the preplay discussion as a necessary stage
> of
> > this form of play, it's not clear to me how e-motion is a necessary part
>
> of
> > the resolution of the discussion. One can easily imagine the discussion
> > being resolved without reference to friendship or best friends, etc.
> >
> > But take the following dialogue, from our third grade textbook:
> >
> > Minsu: I like apples.
> > Julie: I don't like apples.
> > (Minsu's mother turns the plate so Julie can see some fresh Keobong
> grapes)
> > Julie: Grapes! I like grapes.
> > Minsu: I don't like ...
> >
> > When we ask the kids to continue the dialogue (either as "volleyball" or
> > "pingpong" they will go like this for hours. They will not stick to the
> > concept of 'fruit' either (we don't teach the word fruit, because it
> > presents a very difficult plural in English). They will extend the use
> of
> > the verb to virtually any field of experience, at hand or not.
> >
> > In fact, the verb "like" turns out to be BY FAR the preferred verb in
> third
> > grade; the verb which is most likely to be used when we put the kids in
> > teams or groups and ask them to improvise on ANY dialogue. This is
> strange,
> > because it's not at all frequent in the material we teach.
> >
> > So I want to suggest two ways in which play per se requires emotion and
> in
> > particular requires not only emotion but the mastery of emotion. The
> first
> > we can call the principle of Gratuitious Difficulty, that is, the
> > introduction of extraneous problems and unnecessary rules whose only
> > apparent purpose is to complicate the game, rather like the introduction
>
> of
> > obstacles between the hero and the goal in a story.
> >
> > The second we can call the principle of Guileless or Guiltless Deceit,
> > that is, the introduction of a conceit, or an imaginary situation which
> is
> > shared but also contested in some way. I want to suggest that these two
> > principles are common to all forms of play, but not the preplay activity
> > which the article is concerned with.
> >
> > David Kellogg
> > Seoul National University of Education
> >
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
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