Hi XMCA,
How are you? I wish fine.
I was studding the Vygotsky's "Teaching about emotions" and at the chapter 18 (see atached) I find very interesting mentions to Chabrier - (I guess Joseph François Chabrier that wrote "Les émotions et les états organiques" in 1911). The contributions from Chabrier are linked with Vygotsky's concerns for criticize dualistic views about emotions, and to understand actual relations between emotions and
- consciousness
- culture
- ideology (world view)
- history
- and personality
I search a lot for Chabrier, but there was practically nothing. Nothing in Amazon, nothing in Google books. And French Libraries don't send to Brazil. Somebody have any suggestion, please? Any useful kind of service to legally obtain the book? Some kind of "East View" to French resources?

Thank you very much.
Achilles
from Brazil.

I cannot find a thing, Achilles.
Let's see if we can elicit some help.

Rene-- Do you know of this work? Is it of enduring signicance?
mike
Achilles!!

Voila!! The book is in library at UC Berkeley. I have ordered it. Lets see how thick it is.

:-)

mike

Oh, incredible! Thank you very much. You are a "power plant", always working.

Oh, "thick" have many meanings, I see. But, if it is about number of pages, there are 157 pages.... according my Google sources...

Then you see, please, what must I do to pay the order.

Muito obrigado.

Achilles.

Some quotes, from Vygotsky

“Little attention has been given to this aspect of the problem because the problem of man did not at all arise before contemporary psychology. But from the very beginning, even the authors of the theory and their critics understood that in the visceral hypothesis, they were speaking in essence of the animal nature of human emotions. We will cite Chabrier, who advanced this idea in the most complete form. Chabrier says that with this problem, we penetrate into the heart of the problem and touch on the major objection that rises against the peripheral theory. When we are speaking about instincts, we have before us an absolutely and invariably established mechanism, which is activated automatically as soon as an appropriate stimulation appears. It is possible that this is true also with respect to the primitive emotions of the child, but it cannot be the same with respect to the usual emotions of adults.” (Vygotsky, 1999, p. 206)

“Chabrier completely justifiably refers to the fact that a feeling of hunger, usually considered in
the group of lower bodily feelings in civilized man, is already a fine feeling from the point of view of the nomenclature of James, that the simple need of food can acquire a religious sense when it leads to the appearance of a symbolic rite of mystical communication between man and God. And conversely, a religious feeling, usually considered as a purely spiritual emotion, in pious cannibals bringing human sacrifices to the gods, can scarcely he referred to the group of higher emotions. Consequently, there is no emotion that by nature would be independent of the body and not connected with it. James' book, The Varieties of Religious Experience, shows incontrovertibly the extent to which higher feelings are closely connected with all the fibers of our body.” (Vygotsky, 1999, p. 207)

“Separating emotions from the development of a system of ideas and establishing their dependence exclusively on organic structures, James inevitably comes to the fatalistic conception of emotions which encompasses animals and man equally. The serious differences that human emotions display depending on the era, the degree of civilization, the difference between mystical adoration of a knight for his lady and the noble gallantry of the seventeenth century, remain unexplained from the point of view of this theory. Chabrier says, if we imagine the infinitely rich nature of the poorest emotion, if we pay less attention to the imaginary psychology of single-celled organisms than to the remarkable analysis of novelists and writers, if we simply make use of valuable data supplied by observations of people around us, we cannot but admit the complete failure of the peripheral theory. Actually, it is impossible to admit that simple perception of a female silhouette automatically evoked an endless series of organic reactions of which could be born love such as the love of Dante for Beatrice if we do not previously assume the whole ensemble of theological, political, esthetic, and scientific ideas that comprised the consciousness of the genius, Alighieri.” (Vygosky, 1999, p. 207)


I have attached before, to you see something, but perhaps with these direct quotes you can tell me more about... Mainly the question about historical, cultural ideological constitution of human emotions... If the development of this could not be looking for in Past, any suggestions about clues in present and future are very welcome too.

Thank you very much.
Achilles

006 - Re: [xmca] Vygotsky and J. F. Chabrier - about emotions
De: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu em nome de Andy Blunden (ablunden@mira.net)
Enviada: quarta-feira, 25 de novembro de 2009 6:09:19
Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity (xmca@weber.ucsd.edu)

Achilles, this is a fascinating problem, isn't it? It's kind away out of my area, but can I just offer a couple of innane observations from my own remote point of view?

1. We should think of the body as an artifact which as such plays the same mediating role in consciousness as do other artifacts. We have a thought, our stomach tenses up, we feel that tension in the stomach. Thus the emotional reaction in our guts mediates our feeling about the thought. etc.
2. Donald Winnicott's current of psychoanalysis for all its faults brings Freud much closer to CHAT by his study of (transitional) objects which act as mediating elements for us, bearers of affect and association. Same kind of thing as 1., but the artifact is external to the body, but has personal meaning.

Andy

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**007 - RE: [xmca] Vygotsky and J. F. Chabrier - about emotions**

De: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu em nome de Achilles Delari Junior (achilles_delari@hotmail.com)
Enviada: quarta-feira, 25 de novembro de 2009 6:36:41
Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity (xmca@weber.ucsd.edu)

Oh, sure, this is a problem, above all, a problem not only a postulate. I don't know about Winnicott, but human objects have a meaning too, this semiotic dimension of an object, by any process is converted from social relations to the social structure of personality... Vygotsky emphasizes ideological process in human emotion constitutions, for instance the difference between cellos in the Mussulman culture and in occidental culture... And even historical transformations in our way to feel something... including love... This seems to be an interesting approach, because seems to trace a kind of anthropological view to the question. Not only our tools, actions and signs historically developed, but our emotions too, in a systemic and inter-functional set. These are some ideas that pass through me reading this chapter. But most part of time Vygotsky is criticizing Descartes, James/Lange, Freud, Scheler/Lotze... and his own affirmative position is only announced. Winnicott can be a good contribution, I don't know, how important is the culture and the history to Winnicott? These transitional objects changes only in form, retaining the unconscious contends? Or the unconscious contends can change ideologically, culturally and historically? How constitutional can be history, culture and ideology in human feelings? The sample of Alighieri is very interesting... How many social process are important in love, for instance... not immediate ones, has you say, but mediated process... Its complex, Vygotsky refuses the "peripheral hypothesis, than the central, properly human, neuro-functional formations will take a decisive role in the entire process... I don't know, I only have a problem, not sufficiently organized of course. I had read about "perezhivanie" and its methodological role as "dynamic unit"... and emotions are close, even they are not the same.

Thank you, Andy.
Best wishes.
Achilles.

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**008 - RE: [xmca] about emotions**

De: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu em nome de ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org
Enviada: quarta-feira, 25 de novembro de 2009 15:31:10
Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity (xmca@weber.ucsd.edu)

I thought this was a well done review of the philosophy of emotion: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/emotion/
As I was reading the summary referenced below I was struck by the dichotomy of emotions and society. So much so that they can instigate an interruption to a person's participation in society. Perhaps emotions are societies nemesis? what do other's think?

eric

The place of emotions. Where are they located and what is their relation to cognition, discourse, social structure, history. One thought that comes to "mind" is Anna Sfards notion of commognition as a single nondualistic process of discourse located "internally - interpersonally". However emotions, as well as being discursive constructions, also have a cultural and relational process from the first moments of the infants life. Winnicott's discourse emerged from "object" relational theory and talks about "transitional" objects which carry psychological meaning. This line of thinking has advanced within the "attachment literature" that extends Bowlby's constructs to embrace the "relational" turn in psychoanalysis. Within this discourse infant development is a central focus as they explore the "emergence" of the "self"(self is still a construct being theorized within this discourse) as fundamentally social. The "communication" of affective states which are "regulated" by attunement BETWEEN the caregiver and infant. This is not a linear process but is a process of MUTUAL recognition. What is being engaged within the discourse of relational psychoanalysis is the recognition that the affective communication processes that are observed in infant development continue to be elaborated at the affective level throughout the lifespan and therefore the processes affective processes observed in infants are central to our understanding of being human. The discussions of how the emotions are "experienced" and "understood" and "expressed" and "enacted" become "transformed" (in Sfard's commognition model) BUT from a relational psychoanalytic discourse the INTERSUBJECTIVE affective relational process is foregrounded or privileged as needing theorizing alongside the explorations of commognition and discourses. I personally am enjoying the commognitive process of the CHAT, sociocultural, and the relational psychoanalytic conversations scrambling the fallible perspectives I'm engaging with.

Larry

Thank you Larry,
What do you think about Vygotsky's critics against a supposed dualism in Freud's option in see
psyche as an especial domain in it substance dispensing neuro-functional explanations? (See chapter 18 from "The teaching about emotions" that I have attached before).

Achilles.

012 - RE: [xmca] about emotions
De: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu em nome de Achilles Delari Junior (achilles_delari@hotmail.com)
Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity (xmca@weber.ucsd.edu)

Thank you very much, Eric.  
Best wishes.

[see post 008]

013 - Subject: RE: [xmca] about emotions
From: ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org

As I was reading the summary referenced below I was struck by the dichotomy of emotions and society. So much so that they can instigate an interruption to a person's participation in society. Perhaps emotions are societies nemesis? what do other's think?

eric

014 - RE: [xmca] about emotions
De: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu em nome de Achilles Delari Junior (achilles_delari@hotmail.com)
Enviada: quarta-feira, 25 de novembro de 2009 22:54:05
Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity (xmca@weber.ucsd.edu)

That dichotomy is the way of thinking against Vygotsky and Chabrier were at that time.
Achilles.

[see post 009]

015 - RE: [xmca] about emotions
De: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu em nome de Achilles Delari Junior (achilles_delari@hotmail.com)
Enviada: quinta-feira, 26 de novembro de 2009 0:30:50
Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity (xmca@weber.ucsd.edu)

Thank you, very much.

It's a wonderful page, I will read with attention I have interest in Chabrier because some of the Vygotsky's critics against James/Lange was made by Chabrier before (1911). It's historical curiosity of mine.
From that Stanford's list, I only read this title:


It is nothing really great, "emotion as magic" is the main idea... and some kind of moralistic approach, common to this author. Zaporozhets understand that emotions have a realistic importance too, and criticizes several visions of emotion only as a kind of disintegration of consciousness, including Sartre's one. This you can see in recent publication of a translation from a Zaporozhets article in the Journal of Russian and East European Psychology. But I read Aristotle Rhetoric that has a long section about how to elicit emotions in the audience, (see the Book Second, with 26 chapters)... Unfortunately I saw more contributions in Aristotle than in Sartre, at least Aristotle have a long typology, and some kind of ancient understanding about some relations between emotions and language, despite his only descriptive not genetic approach. And I read, of course, Spinoza's Ethics, much better than Aristotle, certainly. But both this references are not at that the Stanford bibliographic list. I consider curious these omissions; there are only indirect quotes... If Eric's observation about dichotomy in the summary have something related to dualistic views, Spinoza's absence, at least, is justifiable... I have Damasio's book about Spinoza and emotions too, it is very interesting, but he don't have problems in put together Spinoza and William James, some think that is not so in this way for Vygotsky, for instance...

I don't know what happens to Chabrier, why he had only one work... Why only Vygostky seems to be concerned in quote him. There is a revision about emotions from the year 1912, in "Psychological Bulletin"... and Chabrier is quoted:

http://www.archive.org/stream/psychologicalbul09ameruoft/psychologicalbul09ameruoft_djvu.txt

Thank you very much.

Achilles.
017 - Re: [xmca] about emotions
De: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu em nome de mike cole (lchcmike@gmail.com)
Enviada: quinta-feira, 26 de novembro de 2009 16:09:54
Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity (xmca@weber.ucsd.edu)

With so much interest in achieving an integrated understanding of emotion, cognition, and development, Achilles, your focus on this topic is a helpful reminder of its continued importance.

Seems like one of those many areas in psychological research where we cannot keep from murdering to dissect.

mike

018 - Re: [xmca] about emotions
De: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu em nome de Jay Lemke (jaylemke@umich.edu)
Enviada: sábado, 28 de novembro de 2009 3:31:48
Para: lchcmike@gmail.com; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity (xmca@weber.ucsd.edu)

I am certainly one of those people interested in emotion, or feeling, or affect, or whatever we choose to make of the phenomenon.

The topic seems to have historically accumulated a lot of ideological baggage. And while its expression may be more sophisticated today than in times past, there doesn't seem to be that much less of it (as for example in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy review noted by someone earlier).

Emotion tends to be seen as bad in our philosophical tradition. As the enemy of reason, the motor of self-deception, etc. It links us to the animals, to our "baser" nature, etc. A bit of this in the pagan tradition, a lot of it in christian asceticism, and tons of it in Enlightenment rationalism and its successors.

Emotions are also associated with the unreliable feminine vs. the cool and collected masculine, with the passions of the mob vs. the thoughtful elite, with peasants, workers, and children, and pretty much every social category whose oppression needs some legitimation. Indeed one of the near universal legitimations of elite power is "we know what's good for you", not just because of what we know, but because you can't be trusted to see your own best interests through the haze of your emotions.

Useful as this is to elite interests, it combines further with the cult of individualism to make emotions a purely individual, mental, subjective matter. Non-material, non-social, non-cultural, and universal (the easier to apply the stigma of emotionality to non-European cultures). It is rather hard to crawl out of this pit of mud.

As I've been trying to do for the last year or two. There would be too much to say for a short post on this list, but here are a few basic suggestions:

Feeling is a broad enough category to get back to the phenomenology of affect/emotion, whereas "emotion" is too narrowly defined within the tradition of animal-like and universal.
There are a LOT of different feelings, and that is more important than efforts to identify some small number of basic emotions.

Many feelings are associated with evaluative judgments and this may be a key link to re-unify affective and cognitive.

Feelings do differ significantly across cultures, and are part of a larger system of meanings-and-feelings specific to a community.

You can't make meanings across any longer term process of reasoning without feelings and evaluative judgments.

It is likely that feelings have histories, both in cultures and in individuals.

Feelings are often reliable guides to survival, to adaptive action, and to finding ways to meet our needs.

Feelings are just as situated and distributed as are cognitions. And just as active and actively made and produced.

In short -- pretty much everything in our dominant tradition about emotions and feelings is exactly wrong -- and for the worst possible ideological-political reasons, I believe.

JAY.

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USA 92093

019 - RE: [xmca] about emotions
De: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu em nome de Achilles Delari Junior (achilles_delari@hotmail.com)
Enviada: sábado, 28 de novembro de 2009 6:45:54
Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity (xmca@weber.ucsd.edu)

Jay,

Thank you very much.
Something near to this distinction between feelings and emotions was posed by William James too, according Vygotsky, but James saw this distinction in terms that these social dimension of affective world, the higher feelings, have almost nothing related to biological, physiological, material, body, conditions. And Vygotsky criticizes this like a way of dualistic thinking - this dualism can be understood as based in ideological motivations too: "the human is not an animal, nor a material been, but a divine been, in his higher, superior feelings..."

A distinction between feelings and emotions is present in Damasio too in neurofunctional terms... But Vygotsky proposed the question of a systemic inter-relationship in that the lower can turns higher, and vice versa... I don't know what we can thing about this... In this case, distinction between feelings and emotions are useful, but if we want to understand the entire human been, his/her whole personality, the integration and inter-functional relations between feelings and emotions turns relevant too, In my point of view.

Best wishes.
Achilles.

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020 - Re: [xmca] about emotions

De: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu em nome de Andy Blunden (ablunden@mira.net)
Enviada: sábado, 28 de novembro de 2009 6:56:28
Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity (xmca@weber.ucsd.edu)

But you still need a distinction between a physiological reaction and a cognitive disposition, don't you, Achilles?

What is the specific problem you are trying to solve?

Andy

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021 - RE: [xmca] about emotions

De: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu em nome de Achilles Delari Junior (achilles_delari@hotmail.com)
Enviada: sábado, 28 de novembro de 2009 7:24:32
Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity (xmca@weber.ucsd.edu)

Andy,

I think that Vygotsky was trying to solve the problem of dualism in theory of emotions. He worked with the principle of "psychophysical unit" - the "main principle of Soviet psychology" in the words from Rubinshtein. The difference between the cognitive and the instinctive is not because the cognitive have not physiological conditions, but the complexity of that conditions and it mediated character... Vygotsky said that "the psyche do not appears isolated from the world or from the process form organism neither for a 0,001 second" (1926/1991 - Prólogo a la versión russa del libro de E. Thorndike 'Principios de enseñanza basados a la psicología - this is the Volume I of the Works in Russian and Spanish, I don't remeber the number in English, because they do not follow the Russian numeration). You can see that psyche are not isolated from the organism and not isolated from the world. In fact human beens are constituted by the same substance that the world, we are not an "Impire inside the impire" - but to be the same substance
do not means that we are in the same way... the same "mode" - I Spinoza’s words. Vygotsky fight against a dualistic approach to emotions. And to him James is an "involuntary disciple of Descartes" because his especial emphasis in cultural feelings as spiritual process. Much common even today.

I only don't uderstand why you say that there is a problem that I am trying to solve. If cognition have not material support what kind of substance is cognition? This is not a problem, the problem is how to understand ideological, historical, conscious, cultural, constitution of human emotions in his/her whole personality without repeat a dualistic approach. I understand this problem is not only mine... this is a problem posed by Vygotsky himself. And I only agree that is good question... I don't if Damasio already answer that. Can you tell me who did?

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022 - RE: [xmca] about emotions

De: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu em nome de Achilles Delari Junior (achilles_delari@hotmail.com)
Enviada: sábado, 28 de novembro de 2009 7:43:12
Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity (xmca@weber.ucsd.edu)

[response to 018]

[Andy,] I did not write the word "reaction"... this is what you said. Human neurophysiology is very beyond simple reactions... I was talking about functional systems and inter-functional relations, and I did not deny distinction between lower and Higher mental functions, Vygotsky did not do this undifferentiation, but he said that something lower can turns higher and vice-verse, of course in genetic terms... This was quoted before. Note that Vygotsky and Chabrier are refusing "peripheral hypothesis"... Well, if emotions are not only "peripheral" as believed James/Lange, then it must be "central" too (i.e. related to the properly human neurofunctional systems and cortical areas...) - this is confirmed by Damasio. Maybe the subtle difference could stay in the discussion about relations between lower and higher... The systemic approach, the difficult to establishes very strict classifications between what is cultural and what is organic, for instance...

See what say Vygotsky himself:

Little attention has been given to this aspect of the problem because the problem of man did not at all arise before contemporary psychology. But from the very beginning, even the authors of the theory and their critics understood that in the visceral hypothesis, they were speaking in essence of the animal nature of human emotions. We will cite Chabrier, who advanced this idea in the most complete form. Chabrier says that with this problem, we penetrate into the heart of the problem and touch on the major objection that rises against the peripheral theory. When we are speaking about instincts, we have before us an absolutely and invariably established mechanism, which is activated automatically as soon as an appropriate stimulation appears. It is possible that this is true also with respect to the primitive emotions of the child, but it cannot be the same with respect to the usual emotions of adults. (Vygotsky, 1999, p. 206 – emphasis added)

Chabrier completely justifiably refers to the fact that a feeling of hunger, usually considered in the group of lower bodily feelings in civilized man, is already a fine feeling from the point of view of the nomenclature of James, that the simple need of food can acquire a religious sense when it leads to the appearance of a symbolic rite of mystical communication between man and God. And conversely, a religious feeling, usually considered as a purely spiritual emotion, in pious cannibals bringing human sacrifices to the gods, can scarcely he referred to the group of higher emotions.
Consequently, there is no emotion that by nature would be independent of the body and not connected with it. James' book, The Varieties of Religious Experience, shows incontrovertibly the extent to which higher feelings are closely connected with all the fibers of our body. (Vygotsky, 1999, p. 207 – emphasis added)

Separating emotions from the development of a system of ideas and establishing their dependence exclusively on organic structures, James inevitably comes to the fatalistic conception of emotions which encompasses animals and man equally. The serious differences that human emotions display depending on the era, the degree of civilization, the difference between mystical adoration of a knight for his lady and the noble gallantry of the seventeenth century, remain unexplained from the point of view of this theory. Chabrier says, if we imagine the infinitely rich nature of the poorest emotion, if we pay less attention to the imaginary psychology of single-celled organisms than to the remarkable analysis of novelists and writers, if we simply make use of valuable data supplied by observations of people around us, we cannot but admit the complete failure of the peripheral theory. Actually, it is impossible to admit that simple perception of a female silhouette automatically evoked an endless series of organic reactions of which could be born love such as the love of Dante for Beatrice if we do not previously assume the whole ensemble of theological, political, esthetic, and scientific ideas that comprised the consciousness of the genius, Alighieri. (Vygotsky, 1999, p. 207 – emphasis added)


023 - Re: [xmca] about emotions
De: Andy Blunden (ablunden@mira.net)
Enviada: sábado, 28 de novembro de 2009 7:47:32
Para: Achilles Delari (achilles_delari@hotmail.com)

Achilles, I'm trying to find the passage you quote in LSV CW Volume 3. How many paragraphs from the beginning of the Preface is it? Or what % of the way through?

a

024 - RE: [xmca] about emotions
De: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu em nome de Achilles Delari Junior (achilles_delari@hotmail.com)
Enviada: sábado, 28 de novembro de 2009 7:51:26
Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity (xmca@weber.ucsd.edu)

I will see, Andy, right now. Just a moment please.
027 - Re: [xmca] about emotions
De: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu em nome de Andy Blunden (ablunden@mira.net)
Enviada: sábado, 28 de novembro de 2009 7:57:37
Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity (xmca@weber.ucsd.edu)

Achilles, I am looking at the English version in LSV CW v.3. I can't find the passage you quote, but I see on p. 155 that Vygotsky puts "other somatic reactions that form the basis of emotion" in the same category as "the first component of an organism's perception of this environmental influence."

Personally, I don't think emotion has anything to do with instinct or higher vs lower mental functions. We perceive the reaction of our body and that affects our thinking and our whole process of perception, just like our vision does. Vygotsky compares it to inner speech actually. :) 

Andy

028 - Re: [xmca] about emotions
De: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu em nome de Andy Blunden (ablunden@mira.net)
Enviada: sábado, 28 de novembro de 2009 7:59:18
Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity (xmca@weber.ucsd.edu)

Achilles, I always ask "what is the problem to be solved?" My own view is that it is impossible to find an answer without first formulating the question. Just a general methodological point.

Andy

[see post 021]
029 - RE: [xmca] about emotions
De: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu em nome de Achilles Delari Junior (achilles_delari@hotmail.com)
Enviada: sábado, 28 de novembro de 2009 8:13:12
Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity (xmca@weber.ucsd.edu)

The position about emotions from Vygotsky that I quote twice is on the Volume 6, this is the same volume in English and Russian. That that I quote about the problem of organism and world, I find in Russian too, but my e-book doesn’t permit copy and paste. If you want the chapter of Volume six... With Chabrier, etc., that I attached here at the begging This is attached here again. Thank you for your questions.

Best.
Achilles.

030 - RE: [xmca] about emotions
De: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu em nome de Achilles Delari Junior (achilles_delari@hotmail.com)
Enviada: sábado, 28 de novembro de 2009 8:35:06
Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity (xmca@weber.ucsd.edu)

Please Andy,

Please if you are with the text about Thonrdike. The passage is in the part 2, paragraph 4th - The paragraph immediately above has the following reference (N. N. Langue, 1914, p 42)... 

"The psyche and any its delicates and complex mechanisms, is inserted in the general system of the human behavior, each one of its manifestations is totally impregnated by this mutual relation. Do not appears isolated nor separated from the rest of the world and from the process of organism even a millisecond, that is the time that psychologists calculate to the psychic process. Who sustains in their investigations the contrary, will be studying an unreal configuration of the own intelligence, chimeras in the place of facts, terminological constructs in the places of real authentic facts"....

He is discussing methodological problem of definition of the psyche... Just trying to posing about what king of things psychologist want make his questions. And stating that a psyche without orgnism is not a real thing about what make questions... because if you ask for something that doesn't exist, you can find answers that can not exist too. It’s what I understand about that formulation. And I guess that in "The teaching about emotions" the problem is methodological too. Let me say, about the own conditions to you make a good question related to emotions, at that time, and even in our time, I can conclude...

I will see a manner to type the Russian, for any additional checking about this quoting. Because there are two problems:

1) How it was translated from Russian to Spanish.
2) How, of course, I translate from Spanish to English... (this very worse, of course)

Thank you Andy. Again.
Sorry about my persistence.
Achilles.
In Russian seems very like the Spanish to me... except questions about order of words in construction of some phrases... But my version from Spanish to English can be not satisfactory, of course. I will no try to translate from Russian to English, for the same reason.

Text about Thorndike (1926), part 2, paragraph 4. (Volume 1, in Russian, and Spanish)

"Apart from its purely psychological barrenness, traditional psychology suffers from another flaw. The point is that reality, as it obvious to anyone, does not at all justify such a view of mind. On the contrary, every fact and event loudly testifies to another and directly opposite state of affairs: the mind with all its subtle and complex mechanisms forms part of the general system of human behavior. It is in every point nourished and permeated by these interdependences. Not for a single millisecond, used by psychology to measure the exact duration of mental processes, is it isolated and separated from the rest of the world and the other organic processes. Who claims and studies the opposite, studies the unreal constructions of his own mind, chimeras instead of facts, scholastic, verbal constructions instead of genuine reality." LSW CW v. 3, p. 152-3.

Reading this together with the preceding 3 sections, I take it that "traditional psychology" means introspective, or subjective psychology, and the view that introspection provides direct access to a distinct part of reality (soul, spiritual beings, something nonphysical, above matter). Vygotsky is
saying that this view is mistaken.

Andy

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**033 - Re: [xmca] about emotions**

From: achilles_delari@hotmail.com  
To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu  
Subject: RE: [xmca] about emotions  
Date: Sat, 28 Nov 2009 10:04:36 +0000

Of course this view is a mistake, because this view does not consider what he said after, that is that mind is not separate from organism. He not only denying old psychology, he is making an affirmation against it. The same affirmation that I quote.

Achilles.

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**034 - RE: [xmca] about emotions**

De: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu em nome de Achilles Delari Junior (achilles_delari@hotmail.com)  
Enviada: sábado, 28 de novembro de 2009 10:28:54  
Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity (xmca@weber.ucsd.edu)

So, now, compare the two contexts

**1926 - Fighting against general dualistic view in old psychology:**

"Apart from its purely psychological barrenness, traditional psychology suffers from another flaw. The point is that reality, as it obvious to anyone, does not at all justify such a view of mind. On the contrary, every fact and event loudly testifies to another and directly opposite state of affairs: the mind with all its subtle and complex mechanisms forms part of the general system of human behavior. It is in every point nourished and permeated by these interdependences. NOT FOR A SINGLE MILISECOND, PSYCHOLOGY TO MEASURE THE EXACT DURATION OF MENTAL PROCESSES, IS IT ISOLATED AND SEPARATED FROM THE REST OF THE WORLD ANDA THE OTHER ORGANIC PROCESS. Who claims and studies the opposite, studies the unreal constructions of his own mind, chimeras instead of facts, scholastic, verbal constructions instead of genuine reality." (caps mine)

**1931-33 - Fighting against specific dualistic view in theory of emotions**

“Chabrier completely justifiably refers to the fact that a feeling of hunger, usually considered in the group of lower bodily feelings in civilized man, is already a fine feeling from the point of view of the nomenclature of James, that the simple need of food can acquire a religious sense when it leads to the appearance of a symbolic rite of mystical communication between man and God. And conversely, a religious feeling, usually considered as a purely spiritual emotion, in pious cannibals bringing human sacrifices to the gods, can scarcely he referred to the group of higher emotions. Consequently, THERE IS NO EMOTION THAT BY NATURE WOULD BE INDEPENDENT OF THE BODY AND NOT CONNECTED WITH IT.” (caps mine)
Thank you, for the English version. Where in English is "Psychology to measure", in Russian is "Psychologists". The Spanish is more correct - I don’t know about other mistakes.

Achilles.

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035 - RE: [xmca] about emotions

De: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu em nome de ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org
Enviada: sábado, 28 de novembro de 2009 15:49:00
Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity (xmca@weber.ucsd.edu)

Hello All:

I would like to point out that when I suggested that emotion appeared to be societies nemesis I did not bring in the dialectic but rather used the word dichotomy. Dichotomy does bring out the notion of either/or where dialectic is rather a wholeness a both sidedness within the same 'gestalt' (for lack of a better word). I believe in the dialectic and would like someone to stage this aspect of emotions in the form of the dialectic. Does this make sense?

much thanks and turkey gravy

eric

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036 - RE: [xmca] about emotions

De: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu em nome de Achilles Delari Junior (achilles_delari@hotmail.com)
Enviada: sábado, 28 de novembro de 2009 18:48:46
Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity (xmca@weber.ucsd.edu)

Vygotsky believed in dialectics too, I presume. All that he said in "The teaching about emotions" is against dichotomy and dualism. This make sense to me, because is coherent with all his work and aspirations in psychology, at that time. I guess Vygotsky/Chabrier approach was more comprehensive (in the meaning of "broader") than other theories at that time, because they didn't create a vision of too separated worlds (physical X psychical) for the substance of emotions (emotions are never separated from body) AND didn't deny the qualitatively specific character of human emotions (cultural, ideological [in the sense of "world view"], historical, conscious and personality related) - in order to integrate these two aspects without dichotomy is needed a dialectical, and genetic (developmental) approach. This approach, perhaps was not yet well consolidated in "The Teaching about emotions" (1931-33) - that was an unfinished work... Vygotsky is more effective in criticize dualistic/dichotomic views, than in propose is own perspective. But he quotes Chabrier in affimartive terms, and was curious about this author because this.

Achilles.
Not just believed, it is IN his writing, which is what many (perhaps most) do not seem to get --- good job that Western metaphysics has done.

Michael (On the way to Oz)

Michael,

Exactly, dialects constitutes the own way to write and think of this author. To me this is since the very begging, as in "Psychology of art" (1925), for instance. All the methodological (i.e. epistemological) approach both to General psychology and Theory of emotions is dialect in principle, and in way to proceed. A materialistic and monist dialects, of course, then the fight against dichotomy and dualism, that I have quoted, before "Not for a single millisecond... mental process is isolated and separated from the rest of the world and the other organic process" (Vygotsky, 1926) and "There is no emotion that by nature would be independent of the body and not connected with it" (Vygotsky, 1931-33). A monistic approach like that only makes sense in a broader dialectical and developmental theoretical frame... to avoid reductionism. However this seems to be more a starting point, a philosophical premise to establish the main parameters of the investigation of this matter "emotions", for instance... And we can list some other important criteria to approach emotions, in Vygotsky's work "Teaching about emotions", mainly the understanding that emotions are process inseparable from: consciousness; culture; ideology (world view); history; and the whole social personality. This complex character of emotions demands a dialectic approach, because at the same time, Vygotsky do not want saw emotion as a different kind of substance that not material, not corporal, not body... It's important to remember the discussion Descartes (2 substances) x Spinoza (1 substance)...

And because of this I was searching for Chabrier, once Vygotsky quotes him to aid his own argument against dualistic views in Descartes, James/Lang, Freud, and Scheler/Lotze... I was taken Vygotskian dialect approach as a common principle for the forum. But thank you to remember that dialectics is IN Vygotsky's writings, sometimes the obvious is the most necessary.

Mike tell us some notices about the possibility of get a copy from Chabrier, than I thank to him, and wait for. Perhaps Chabrier can't give us nothing beyond obvious too, but lets try... At least Vygotsky himself gives some credit to this unknown French writer, much more credit than he gives to Freud, for instance, to quote a good sample of the "Western metaphysics" tradition prevalent even today.

Thank you.Good discussions to all.
Good bye.
Achilles.
Achilles, and friends –

I am not sure of the best interpretation of LSV’s position on these matters, but it seems to me to be in the spirit of his work and the later CHAT tradition that we imagine a culturally informed "development" (probably with phylogenetic antecedents) in which the "higher" functions develop out of the earlier ones by a progressive layering or refinement, specialization, and differentiation – both for higher feelings as well as higher cognitions.

Indeed I don’t think we want to separate affect and cognition, or feeling and meaning, emotion and reason, too much. A little distinction is useful to give us purchase on understanding their integration. I would assume that in the developmental and evolutionary sequence, these two aspects of our adaptive operating-with-the-world, are initially less separable and less distinguishable, aspects of a single functional process. And that later in the sequence we LEARN to MAKE a distinction, and perhaps even to FEEL a difference between them.

But it is their functional integration which is of the greatest importance, not their difference (in my opinion). So to the higher mental functions viewed cognitively (and it is not at all clear that LSV did view them ONLY cognitively in our modern sense) there must correspond also "higher feelings", what we might call culturally refined or culturally differentiated and functionally specialized feelings, which function as part of the whole engagement in activity that enables us to sometimes get a bit ahead of our semi-predictable environments. Insight. Intuition. A feeling for the organism. Good hunches. Good judgment. A nose for useful lines of research. And so on.

Of course once we are immersed in a complex world of highly culturally differentiated feelings, we realize that their functions are not simply practical, not simply dictated by evolutionary fitness. Or at least not in very obvious ways. And so I have taken to making a heuristic distinction of my own in terminology among emotions (the more classical ones, triggered by environmental events, with obvious adaptive significance, like those listed by Darwin and borrowed by James, such as fear, anger, disgust, desire, etc.), affects (which I use to mean the "higher" feelings, the more culturally specific and "refined" ones, like feeling noble or feeling guilty), and feelings as such (the general category, of which emotions and affects are subclasses, and which also includes the more auto-perceptual feelings like feeling tired or feeling dizzy).

Again it is not so much the distinctions here that I value theoretically, but getting a sense of the scope of the whole domain of feelings, and how to make sense of any particular feeling-type within it. (Distinguishing again between the uniqueness of a particular feeling on a particular occasion and the more generic feeling-types recognized or recognizable culturally across instances.)

Whew! A lot to chew on ...

JAY.

Jay Lemke
Professor (Adjunct, 2009-2010)
Educational Studies
Thomas Scheff
http://www.soc.ucsb.edu/faculty/scheff/
makes a good case that guilt is among the basic emotions, Jay.

Andy

So, would we begin with the simple contradiction: emotion is society's principal support? (vs. "nemesis"?)

Reasonable on the grounds that "fellow-feeling" or primary sociality, our empathic bond to our fellow humans, is what counters any notion that the "state of nature" is ONLY "red in tooth, claw, and nail". We do not begin from a war of all against all, but from family ties, and cultural extensions of kinship feelings to notional kin, and loyalties and identifications with larger groups and with lineages, clans, moieties, age cohorts, initiation cohorts, totemic subgroups, etc. etc.

Without fellow-feeling, no society. Can the same be said as convincingly of reason? Do we imagine that social systems cohere because we rationally recognize our advantage from them? And that that bond is strong enough to stand the test of conflict? That we would sacrifice our lives to defend others solely out of rational calculation? I doubt it. It seems clearly that sociality is rooted in feeling.

Or, rather, in the unity and functional integration of kinds of meaning making (e.g. to determine culturally who is in-group and who is out-group) and kinds of feeling (loyalty, love, and alas their opposites).

Emotions may be the nemesis of abstract and arbitrary, perhaps even ideologically suspect, social ties. The "rational" grounds of the capitalist nation-state, and its efforts to recruit loyalty emotionally (songs, flags, rhetoric) seem rather easily interrupted by the emotions of anger and
resentment and the feeling of righteous wrath against the oppressor, not just of myself, but also of others, that leads to revolution, or at least to throwing a brick or two.

So I hope I am being a bit dialectical here in seeing even the sense in which emotions ARE the nemesis of society as also and more fundamentally being the same sense in which they ground the very possibility of society.

JAY.

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042 - Re: [xmca] about emotions
De: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu em nome de Jay Lemke (jaylemke@umich.edu)
Enviada: domingo, 29 de novembro de 2009 5:03:09
Para: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity (xmca@weber.ucsd.edu)

I have had Scheff on my reading list for a while, but was away from the right kinds of libraries most of last year.

I'm afraid I just don't see why it's important to list something as a "basic" emotion? That usually just means that someone wants it to count as having academic or intellectual importance, or that they want to link it to our baser animal nature, or that it's a candidate for some sort of biological universal, pre-determined by evolution. All of which agendas give me the creeps!

But I've heard good things about Scheff, so I will get round to him soon.

How about this: there are several hundred "basic" emotions?

In any case, I was thinking of anthropological arguments about "guilt cultures" vs. "shame cultures" and the kind of analysis Achilles was citing from LSV about how feelings, whatever their biological functions or antecedents, get infused and transformed by culture into something a great deal more.

Thanks for the reminder about Scheff!

JAY.

Jay Lemke
Jay,

I am thinking about a three year old I knew very well explaining that the girl next door was his best friend because she made him cry — apparently a good thing, at least until he learned otherwise from the older people in his life!

But we adults relearn all the time from the children around us that sadness (maybe not fear and its opposite, but certainly sadness), is not as different from happiness as we tend to assume.

Beth

You help me a lot, Jay. Thank you very much.

I think that I understand your explanation, based in heuristics needs - and I agree. I think a vision that don't differentiate qualitative distinctions between a number of process don't help us very much... My guess is that Vygotsky's Chabrier-based hypothesis can have a methodological contribution perhaps in the sense of think relations between emotions, feelings and affects in genetic and dynamic terms... But in typological terms they are not very helpful. I understand Vygotsky didn't conclude this project in that 1931-33 manuscripts, maybe because his focus justly was much methodological one than strictly psychological. Maybe... I don't know about the best interpretation too... but seems to be interesting to think that cellos, for instance, is not the same in different cultures... as LVS says in the text about “Psychological Systems”... And the sample of the Dante's love for Beatrice, is very interesting too, the impossibility to reduce all to the perception of a silhouette - the role of philosophy, theology, and other cultural conditions in that love... Even the concerns to the different king of love in different historical period seems to be...
reasonable, if we search about "History of emotions" for instance, including there is "History of Fear" (Jean Delumeau, and others). Perhaps, ever perhaps, a problem in Vygotsky text is that non-differentiation in the use of the terms "affect", "emotion", "feeling". I could not check word by word in Russian... but even so, I didn't find any very explicit definitions for each term yet. This is a problem. But I understand to be interesting, for instance, to think that even something like "fear" have not so definite boundaries in my consciousness, because in my personal experience I had many kinds of fears, since the more basic, in process of military repression to me and my comrades from marxist social movement, until the more subtle: fear to lost my father because his cancer... Then we can search different definitions to these two kinds of fear... we can give different names for the "basic fear" (a emotion) and the "subtle fear" (a feeling), but... I don´t know... If we try grasp the concrete historical cultural situation, both in Class Struggle and in family affective relations, the systemic and inter-functional relations are very singular, really... And have any kind of cognition involved, as well as any kind of peripheral (vasomotor, visceral) process involved too. Can I say that the own very polissemic nature of the words that we use to define emotions, feelings and affects; can turns a little problem in this area too? And can exist some kinds of ideological problems in this too? Sometimes guilt as a higher process, sometimes like a lower process, and so on? Well, I must to ask if a man/woman in a culture in which guilt is sawed as lower process (feel guilt to feeling guilt?) have the same guilt that in a culture in which the guilt is a higher process (feel honor to feel guilt?)?

Do you already publish something about this heuristic distinction that you expose to us? Can you indicate something to me? I appreciate your contributions.

Thank you very much.

Achilles.

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045 - Re: [xmca] about emotions
De: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu em nome de Larry Purss (lpurss@shaw.ca)
Envia: domingo, 29 de novembro de 2009 7:16:36
Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity (xmca@weber.ucsd.edu)

Emotions is a central topic to reflect on in our ways of being human.

I was watching Moyers on PBS yesterday and he was interviewing Jane Goodal. She described an incident when a chimp reached out and took her hand and their eyes met. She described this as a profound moment of recognition for both of them and changed their way of being with each other. In our theories of emotions we must include an explanation of what changed in their relationship because of that moment of connection that was not symbolic and was pre-linguistic, but was communication.

Larry
Achilles and all,

You emphasize some important points in this last message (below). Especially useful to know about a history of fear, and of course we have many histories of love.

And what gets called a "basic" emotion is rarely all that basic in the sense of being uniform and universal. Yes, these feelings, and perhaps most feelings have physiological aspects and evolutionary antecedents, even survival-adaptive functions. But that does not mean that they do not undergo differentiation in many different kinds of love, and many different kinds of fear, in their integration with what we tend to call more "cognitive" processes, and so in the development of "higher" mental-emotional functions.

Cultural differences therefore are to be expected, as in your example of cultures where we might feel guilty about feeling guilt vs. those where we feel noble or honorable because we feel guilt.

I have not yet reached the point of publishing my work in this area, though I have given some talks at conferences and universities about it.

JAY.

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Larry,

I certainly agree about the importance of understanding how "moments of connection" occur, even across species, and to do so as a meaningful-and-feelingful process.

In Goodall's case, I wonder how long a prior period of interaction there may have been with this particular chimp? and whether some sort of bond was building up, with this special moment as an
emergent threshold for a qualitatively new relationship.

In the case of chimps, however, I don't think we can exclude that the processes involved may have been "symbolic" in some sense, as something like a symbolic capacity is well developed in their species. The gesture of touching hands, it seems to me, has a lot of symbolic potential in it: trust (cf. the human handshake or open-hand, no weapon gesture), and intimacy, and whatever relationships between chimps may involve light peripheral body contact, etc. How does an act become symbolic? at least in part because of its associations, sometimes even accidental ones, with other actions or activities. For instance, would we say that grooming behavior between chimps is not simply functional (to eliminate parasites), but also symbolic of nurturance relationships? or at least proto-symbolic?

Here is a hypothesis: no meaning without feeling, and no feeling without meaning.

JAY.

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048 - RE: [xmca] about emotions
De: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu em nome de Achilles Delari Junior (achilles_delari@hotmail.com)
Enviada: domingo, 29 de novembro de 2009 19:00:24
Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity (xmca@weber.ucsd.edu)

Jay, thank you, once more.
Best wishes.

049 - Re: [xmca] about emotions
De: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu em nome de Larry Purss (lpurss@shaw.ca)
Enviada: domingo, 29 de novembro de 2009 19:18:46
Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity (xmca@weber.ucsd.edu)

Jay

I agree that acts become symbolic because of there ASSOCIATIONS and patterns with other acts which are experienced as meaningful.
The question I struggle with is the focus on "higher" symbolic and "higher" cognitive relational patterns superceding and transforming these initial "moments of connection". I agree that complexity is emergent and is formative of cultural historical patterns of activity and all the theories that try to understand this matrix is foundational to understanding human science.

However, this is where the "relational psychoanalytic" discourse points to a recognition that these "moments of connection" continue to be central (at the level of affect attunement) to all the further elaboration of culture.

If these "moments of connection" become disconnected (as a regular pattern) the whole cultural ediface collapses for that person who is disconnected.

Larry

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**Hi Jay**

I want to take another stab at emotions from another discourse (not relational psychoanalysis) but rather symbolic interactionism (pragmatism) and the contrasting approaches to emotion between George Herbert Mead and Charles Horton Cooley.


Jacobs' article points out that the contrasting discursive styles of Mead's and Cooley's writings were instrumental in Mead being seen as the founding father of symbolic interactionism and Cooley becoming just a footnote. Jacobs believes Cooley's writing was expressed in a literary essayist style while Mead's theories were articulated in a more social scientific style of discourse. Following is an extended summary of some of Jacobs major points of the consequences of these different styles or ways of knowing. Remember these scholars were writing at the turn of the last century into the 1920's so their vocabulary may be dated but the themes they discuss seem very contemporary. Cooley conceived the social in a LITERARY sense, as a matter of SHIFTING PERSPECTIVES to understand social phenomena on three scalar levels (micro=self) (meso=primary group) (macro=institutions) Society and the individual are "simply collective and distributive aspects of the same thing" the difference between them being "rather in our point of view than in the object we are looking at" (Cooley, 1922) "SElf and society go together, as phases of a common whole. For Cooley communication was foundational as he states "public opinion is no mere aggregate of separate individual judgements, but an organization, a cooperative product of communication and reciprocal influence." Its unity "is not one of identity, but of life and action" (Cooley 1909)

Jacobs points out the reason Cooley's ideas were not given the status of Mead's ideas were because he PLACED FEELING AT THE CENTER of social processes and the formation of the self (in
contrast to Mead's more logocentric perspective which focused on the VERBAL gesture) Cooley conceived of the intellectual process and the work of science and WRITING in a very different way than Mead. For Cooley human intelligence is DRAMATIC AND SCENARIC, meeting difficulties through the formulation of fresh lines of action. "It is, then, essentially a kind of foresight, a mental reaction that anticipates the operation of forces at work and is prepared in advance to adjust to them" Intelligence is "inseparably bound up with communication and discussion" (Cooley, 1918) For Cooley intelligence is DRAMATIC in character and is required to forecast how they will react to one another and how the situation will work out. Cooley wrote "the literary drama, including fiction and whatever other forms have a dramatic character, may be regarded as INTELLIGENCE striving to interpret the social process BY ART." (1918)

However Cooley's analyzing social process as METAPHORICALLY weaving the process into a DRAMATURAL -SYMPATHETIC conception of the operation of intelligence in action was a discursive position that was not well received in the 1920's when positivist science models of social process were gaining status in academic departments. Mead's discursive style, laced with the the rhetoric of science dimissed Cooley's literary discursive style and its rhetorical expression as MERE SOCIAL COMMENTARY As Jacobs points out if we interpret writing as behavior, we can also interpret writing STYLE as a kind of cultural form and writers as BOTH CREATORS AND INSTRUMENTS OF this cultural form. However style may determine the inclusion or exclusion of a writer within a disciplinary canon. In a sense as Jacob's article elaborates Cooley's open avowal of a literary style "could be interpreted as inviting the criticism of fellow social scientists" (p.132) who in the 1920'2 were staking out disciplinary discourses which privileged objective data analysis. Cooley's sociology, his writing style, and his intellectual self-concept derived in great measure from a different intellectual context which embraced the literary essay style. Jacob's elaborates in his article how the essay TRADITION stresses the CENTRALITY of the CONVERSING subject, an autobiographical approach, and a DIALOGIC or INTERTEXTUAL focus on the importance of the impact of the reader and other texts on the writer and the written product. This reframe of the writing process points to recognition of STYLE AS PERSON (Jacobs, quoting Green p132) Green, in discussing Cooley's writing style points out that for Cooley "a text is an emergent organization of meanings, within which nothing is FIXED and where origin is absent" (Green, 1988,quoted in Jacobs, p.132)

From this literary standpoint Cooley would be a voice in the wilderness of positivist science discourse. Both Mead and Cooley discuss "taking the role of the other" but Cooley discribed this human capacity of taking the perspective of the other as a process of SYMPATHY, the FOUNDATIONAL element in his construction of the "looking glass self. For Cooley the self is founded on the human species RECEPTIVITY OF FEELING and the SYMPATHETIC CAPACITY to register or perceive the FEELINGS OF OTHERS toward oneself, which entails a REFLECTIVE PROCESS which results in SELF- FEELING Cooley's looking glass self integrates FEELING into the process matrix of self-formation within the larger context of COMMUNICATION. For COOLEY person's are SENTIMENTALLY GROUNDED SYMBOLS. Sentiment and imagination are generated in the life of communication, having no separate existence except in OUR FORMS OF SPEECH (Cooley, 1922) "The thing that moves us to pride or shame, is not the mere mechanical reflection of ourselves, but an imputed SENTIMENT, the imagined judgement, which is quite ESSENTIAL.

Jay it seems to me this debate about the role of emotions, which was debated between Cooley and Mead seems quite current to our continuing discussion. What is fascinating to me is how talk od "sympathy" and "sentiment" and "feeling" and "emotion" are not given the same status and validation in many of the social science discourses that they seem to merit. Feminist discourse is another discursive tradition that has a lot to say about this topic.
Leaves me wondering and curious.
Larry

051 - A Vygotskian view of emotions
De: Andy Blunden (ablunden@mira.net)
Enviada: segunda-feira, 30 de novembro de 2009 10:21:02
Para: Achilles Delari (achilles_delari@hotmail.com)

Achilles, I noticed this:


Maybe Vera could let you see a copy?
mailto:vygotsky@unm.edu

Andy

052 - [xmca] RE: A Vygotskian view of emotions
De: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu em nome de Achilles Delari Junior (achilles_delari@hotmail.com)
Enviada: segunda-feira, 30 de novembro de 2009 10:40:19
Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity (xmca@weber.ucsd.edu)

Andy, thank you very much - this is a great reference.

Thanks for the link to Sheff's site too. I was looking today. Excellent page, contemporary and polemic subjects, many full-version papers, and so on.

Best wishes.
Achilles.

053- Re: [xmca] about emotions
De: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu em nome de ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org
Enviada: segunda-feira, 30 de novembro de 2009 16:01:51
Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity (xmca@weber.ucsd.edu)

[see post 039]

Jay:

I believe this to be a great start to what I was thinking on the issue.

eric
To Eric, Jay Achillies, and Andy

Andy

I wanted to pick up a thread you wrote about there not being higher or lower emotions. It is just a reaction of the body responding. I agree whatever we label emotions is just the body responding which then becomes reified in language (the map not the territory) However I wonder if one of the central ways the body picks up cues and responds through learned habits, patterns, to the social matrix in particular ways is to monitor "attachment" (biological) and "intersubjective" (psychological) needs for connection as primary to being human. This way of viewing communication as connection (and disconnection and re-connection) seems to me a central and primary framework to "understand" (cognitive) the primacy of the sociocultural contexts to the emergence of "self," "subjectivity," or "identity" (different discourses which seem to me to be pointing to the same horizon of understanding.

Larry

Hello Larry,

After your post, I am struck with two ideas at present when considering this thread on emotions:

1. the social smile that appears in infants between 2 and 6 months
2. the need for people to anthropomorphize animals; i.e. seeing emotions in our pets

do these two ideas provide the cornerstone for understand how human communication has advanced?

what do other's think or do?

eric
Hi Eric

Yes these are valid questions to what I'm suggesting.

As far as antropamorphizing animals, I am curious if chimps, being primates may share some aspects of social matrix with humans, not as a metaphorical construction but as a social construction.

As for what we share with 2 to 6 month old babies, I'm suggesting the answer is more than many people realize.

The question that intrigues me is the term "advanced" Does this term imply transcendence and moving beyond earlier ways of communicating OR a developing COMPEXITY and an expanding "horizon of understanding" within sociocultural contexts. If the latter is true, then the centrality of affect attunement may continue to be a primary and "foundational" aspect of being human which is as central to adult ways of being in the world as it is for infants.

This affective way of connecting is usually taken-for-granted and part of our "background" BUT when this way of being connected threatens our sense of connection, our emotional reactions can have many parallels to the needs expressed by that 6 month old child.

The discussions of "higher order" may be viewed as moving to a new level of epistemology (piaget) and the lower levels in all aspects being transformed, OR it could possibly be viewed as adding a new way epistemology, but the previous ways of organizing experience continue to exist IN RELATION TO the newer epistemology.

This is more an intuitive question I have. Call it a hunch.

Larry

Hi Eric,

These are fascinating questions. You might be interested in a book called When Elephants Weep: The Emotional Lives of Animals by Masson & McCarthy. It pre-dates Goodall's preface to Mark Beckoff's work by two years, but is a really interesting read. We need to be careful not to impose the Cartesian box on our thinking if we are to progress in this area.

Cathrene
This is from our translation of Thinking and Speech, Chapter One, and it corresponds roughly to p. 50 of the Minick translation:

"The first question which arises when we speak of the relationship between thinking and speech (on the one hand—DK) and the other aspects of the life of consciousness (on the other—DK) is the question of the connection between intellect and the passions. As is well known, the detachment of the intellectual side of our consciousness from its affective, volitional side represents one of the basic and radical defects of the whole of traditional psychology. Thinking is in this way unavoidably converted into an autonomous flow of thoughts which think themselves, torn off from the full weight of life as it is lived, occurring completely separately from the living motives, the interests, the inclinations of the thinking person and appearing as an unnecessary epiphenomenon, which can change nothing in the life and behavior of man, or else it is converted into some ancient, primordial and autonomous force, which, interfering in the life of the consciousness and in the life of the personality, has an inexplicable effect on both."

Here Vygotsky is taking a strikingly SPINOZAN view, and it is reflected even in his choice of words: passion and reason are not at all opposed to each other, or even simply mutually defining. They are mutually generating, and indispensable to each other.

Unfortunately, Minick’s translation fails to convey this because he breaks up Vygotsky’s stream of thoughts into short sentences which are easy to understand but which fail to convey the sweep of his thinking, his opposition between a psychology of thoughts without passions (the psychology of intelligence) and a psychology of passions without thoughts (the unconscious).

Intellect without passion is, of course, the dominant paradigm in educational psychology: Binet, Simon, and above all Thorndike. But passion without intellect leads to a Nietzschean psychology which Volosinov criticizes in his critique of Freudianism: the irruption of the irrational into the life of the mind in absolutely inscrutable ways. Once again, Vygotsky echoes Volosinov’s critique without citing it.

I wonder if we are ever going to get the promised issue of MCA on play which was supposed to be a tribute to the work of Gunilla Lindqvist. I know there were some problems in production, but I also know that there is at least one article which is quite relevant to this theme.

In all languages that I know, the words "good" and "bad" have an aesthetic as well as an ethical meaning, and in the research we did on play in preschoolers here in Seoul we found that the latter tends to develop out of the former, ontegenetically.

I think the same thing can clearly be seen phylogenetically, in the history of literature. For example, if you read the "revenge tragedies" of the sixteenth century (Kyd, Webster, and eventually Shakespeare’s "Hamlet", and so to Vygotsky's work on this topic), you notice that they are all concerned with the emergence of a rationally mediated concept of justice from the raw emotion of rage.

Now it really seems to me that there is no sense in which volitional attention, logical thinking, voluntary memory are higher psychological functions which is not equally true of the ethical
meaning of "good" compared to its purely culinary one, or the rationally mediated concept of
fairness compared to the purely retributive one.

Both sets of functions are culturally mediated, both involve the use of artefacts, both are the
objects of internalization, and both, ultimately, depend on the replacement of other regulation
with self regulation.

Therefore it seems to me that not only do the higher emotional functions exist, but that they are
an essential line of child development, without which we can't really talk of holistic development
in the field of aesthetics, ethics, or more generally the child as a whole being. Worse, without the
higher emotional functions, there is no hope any reciprocal effect of ontogenesis on social
progress. Perhaps that is why a disbelief in the existence of higher emotional functions is rife in
our own period.

There might be another reason though. There is an important sense in which the development of
the higher cognitive functions is a story of the child’s discovery of the real, as well as of the
imaginative. But the development of the higher emotional functions is more often the story of the
child's discovery of the ideal.

In Chapter Two, Vygotsky and Karl Buhler pours some scorn on the notion, attributed to Freud
and by association Piaget, that a child might prefer an imaginary apple to a real one; the child is
an indefatigable realist in these matters. But in other matters, the child is not so; it is not hard to
see that a child might prefer an imaginary hunger or an imaginary death to the real thing.

David Kellogg
Seoul National University of Education

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059 - Re: [xmca] about emotions
De: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu em nome de Andy Blunden (ablunden@mira.net)
Enviada: terça-feira, 1 de dezembro de 2009 0:35:02
Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity (xmca@weber.ucsd.edu)

You may be right Larry. I'm open on all this. "Higher" and "Lower" emotions may well have a
place. Feelings and emotions is another way to go. All this is the task of empirical investigation.
But our knowledge of the world is always mediated by our bodies. Emotion is part of that. We are
suffering human beings.

Andy

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060 - Re: [xmca] about emotions
De: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu em nome de Jay Lemke (jaylemke@umich.edu)
Enviada: terça-feira, 1 de dezembro de 2009 4:49:25
Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity (xmca@weber.ucsd.edu)

Yes, Larry, I can agree that the originary moments of connection for an individual persist in some
form as core constituents even of the later, more elaborated or "higher" cultural formations of
feeling. So, were they to be undermined in an individual's psyche, by some conflicts of denials
that blocked their participation in the higher forms, then those forms would lose their meaning and/or their emotional support. I find this an interesting way to look at psychoanalytic views of the emotion-culture relationship, at least for individuals. Would we get something similar also at the societal-historical level of analysis? (I confess I never really understood Eros and Thanatos.)

JAY.

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061 - Re: [xmca] about emotions
De: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu em nome de Jay Lemke (jaylemke@umich.edu)
Enviada: terça-feira, 1 de dezembro de 2009 4:59:22
Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity (xmca@weber.ucsd.edu)

Well, "wondering and curious" is a good feeling-place to be!

I do not know of Cooley, but I feel a strong similarity to the work of Kenneth Burke. Burke wrote in and for the humanistic disciplines, where such perspectives were much more welcome, but since the 60s or 70s, I think Burke has come to have considerable influence in the humanistic turn in the social sciences, especially given its linguistic and discursive foundations.

It would be interesting to know more of Cooley's view of the individual-societal relation, as it sounds pretty radical. And also how he develops this in relation to the different timescales, which resonates with my own recent views, and those Mike Cole has expressed for a long time now.

I'm going to google Cooley and Burke together and see what happens!

JAY.

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Insofar as meaning, and so culture, comes to infuse all our feelings (even pain, much less fear or love) they are all "higher". HOW meaning/culture transforms the biological roots of feeling, and into what range of possibilities for feeling is what continues to fascinate me.

So, in general, I'm in agreement with what you are saying.

JAY.

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Jay
I am not a Freudian scholar and have as much resistance to Freudian and neo-Freudian constructions as everybody on CHAT. It is the newer relational and intersubjective psychoanalytic theories that focus on interpretive meaning that I find interesting. They are looking at Peirce and the other Pragmatists, Gadamer, and are embracing the discursive and interpretive turn in the human studies. The point you have just conceded has implications which they are deeply involved in exploring. Infant studies is one of the central focuses for their understanding.

At the cultural-historical level they are engaging with the same themes as CHAT and I see many parallels. They are passionately trying to move beyond a Cartesian subject/object split and are looking at the linguistic turn, and also at the dramaturgical framework of enactments and
scenarios. I personally find it generative of new and novel perspectives to engage with discourses which on the surface seem so opposed.

Jay,

I don't have an academic background and except for CHAT most of my thoughts are personal reveries on the development of "the self"

Larry

064 - Re: [xmca] about emotions
De: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu em nome de Jay Lemke (jaylemke@umich.edu)
Enviada: terça-feira, 1 de dezembro de 2009 5:22:21
Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity (xmca@weber.ucsd.edu)

Andy B. and I have been having a sidebar conversation off-list about wolves as a social species and what sorts of emotions, following Scheff, might be foundational for sociality and social bonds.

Scheff suggests pride and shame as constitutive of social bonding. They may play a role, but I was leaning more towards empathy/sympathy or "fellow-feeling", and there seems to be room for more.

It certainly seems important to acknowledge that there is an emotional basis to infant communication, though the nature of those feelings in the infant may be quite different from what we experience as adults (i.e. as linguistic-cultural products to a much greater extent). And those same emotions must surely be important ones in the general ontogeny of sociality and social bond formation.

Something similar may well occur in other social species, especially mammalian ones. Though the nature of those feelings would again be significantly different from ours experientially or in their qualia (via differences in body-mediation), even if perhaps similar in functions.

I think Andy and I got started from some example about human-dog relationships, and in the case of domestic animals which are also highly social (e.g. dogs), we might imagine a capacity for a feeling like shame, perhaps rooted in dominance hierarchies, and/or a disposition to mimic or mirror the emotional patterns of the human households in which they live (and eat)?

So while it may be true in part that people "anthropomorphize" dog behavior in human-emotional terms, it may also be partly the case that the dogs are genuinely coming to have feelings that are at least functionally, if not experientially for them, like some of our human feelings. Or maybe they are just cynomorphizing us!

JAY.

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<td><strong>De:</strong> <a href="mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu">xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu</a> em nome de Larry Purss (<a href="mailto:lpurss@shaw.ca">lpurss@shaw.ca</a>)</td>
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Thanks Jay for the extended conversation.

I'm glad that Cooley caught your imagination in the same way I experienced reading about his journey.

He sure was swimming in the same ocean that we are currently traversing but I wasn't sure if anyone else would have a similar "sympathetic" response to the readings. My sense is that Cooley would have a more responsive hearing in todays fertile discourses which are breaking down disciplinary barriers and expanding everyone's horizon of understanding.

Larry

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<td><strong>De:</strong> <a href="mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu">xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu</a> em nome de Andy Blunden (<a href="mailto:ablunden@mira.net">ablunden@mira.net</a>)</td>
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<td><strong>Para:</strong> eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity (<a href="mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu">xmca@weber.ucsd.edu</a>)</td>
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We're all in thunderous agreement here, I think. And I would have thought that the counterposition of rationality to emotion would be the quintessential mistake according to our collective view. So the questions are: under what circumstances do positive or negative affect associated with an artifact or action make problem-solving better/worse; under what conditions do positive or negative affect assist or obstruct learning? Or is all this just too obvious to your learning scientists?

Another thought: emotion is tied to (ontological, individual) consciousness, isn't it? Or can we understand social knowledge, e.g., science, as having inherently emotional significance? I mean, we often talk as if knowledge in a book can be more or less true even before someone reads it. But we don't say it is "excited" or "sad" rather than "exciting" or "depressing"? And is this just a question or form, or is content affective in that way? "a depressing fact" etc.

Andy
I don't feel a strong resistance to Freud, though maybe to some uses of his work. I think the Interpretation of Dreams is one of the best works of semiotics to be found, and very interesting to put beside Levi-Strauss work on myth, for example.

Freud and Jung were, at different times in their careers, both as obsessed with the issue of individual vs. culture/society as we are. Jung seems to have put culture first, a sort of top-down view. Freud in his mid-career seems more bottom-up, going from emotionally intense childhood experiences to later structures of ego and feeling. Late in his life, he turned to more of a Big Picture, and that's where I sort of lost him.

I think there is a lot of resistance to Freud (I don't know about how it stands here on xmca or in the CHAT community), but I suspect it comes more from the ideological antipathy to anything that counts emotion as more fundamental to human behavior than reason. For all the reasons I cited before about why the study of affect has been disparaged until recently, while cognition is a perfectly respectable topic to focus on.

In fact, outside the Anglo-Saxon world, Freud stands in much higher respect, especially in those Latin/Romance cultures where emotionality is itself more accepted (even for males!), Spanish, Portuguese, French, Italian, etc. I don't know how things stand in the Slavic world now. Of course Freud was disparaged by orthodox Marxism, and I would expect a counter-reaction in the post-Soviet era, and then some sort of balance being reached, perhaps consistent with the longterm slavic cultural attitude toward the respectability of emotion(s). Does someone know?

I bring all this up in response to Larry's point, only because it may provide a sort of index or window on cultural attitudes toward taking affect seriously in academic and intellectual terms.

JAY.

I think it's more that dogs respond to us according to their social norms rather than the other way around, if you now what I mean.

a
Well, learning science has a lot to say about the role of positive and negative emotions in learning and problem-solving. But unfortunately, because of methodology, the focus is on short-term learning/problem-solving and "retention". The conclusion being that strong emotion of either sort gets in the way of efficient learning, etc. Which fits nicely with the ideological stigma attached to strong emotion. It's also pretty counter-intuitive (and I think simply wrong) when applied to many examples of passionate learning, committed problem-solving outside the laboratory. It's just too simple. It is the way in which the particular emotions interact with the learning processes that matters, and that varies a lot.

There is also the matter of what counts as "emotion". Is patience or persistence, motivation or commitment, or even calm detachment, not a feeling state, an emotion by a different name? Not to mention joy in learning, excitement in learning, etc. There is a tendency to focus more on negative emotions when that suits the ideological bias. No doubt panic interferes with learning, but a good dose of fear may focus the mind wonderfully!

I had not thought about public or propositional knowledge having inherent affect. I think it depends on how it is construed by the person who comes to take up this knowledge. But in a cultural context, we could certainly imagine that some sorts of knowledge could provoke predictable affective responses by many people. I certainly doubt that I am alone in feeling depressed by knowledge of the state and trends of the global environment, endangered species, etc. Or knowledge of political and social injustice, etc. Which can also provoke anger, etc.

But I do not think that emotion, feeling, or affect should be considered inherently aspects of strictly individual consciousness. Many emotions are shared and distributed, and indeed arise only in dyadic or larger social group interactions. There are certainly also collective feelings of many kinds (mob frenzy being the most famous, but also collective religious mania/fervor and any others). As cognition is not purely individual, so affect is not either.

JAY.

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But are their "social norms" the same in the wild among one another as they are after early development and/or long life mostly with humans?

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In trying to formulate this question, it occurred to me that our tendency to place the emotional content of an artefact squarely in the person using the artefact, not the artefact itself is correct, and when we ascribe knowledge to an artefact, we are wrong. A book is not full of knowledge; knowledge, like emotion, only arises in the social context of its use. "Public or propositional knowledge" has neither emotional nor cognitive content. The knowledge/affect only arises in a context of use. (It was not the 'individual' or 'social' I was on about, but the attribution to artefact or human being.)

Andy

Hi!

I have to take any tip of the thread to start posting otherwise, I will never be able to post. I have been writing something and trying to catch up. I know, though, that one cannot tug on the end of the string without having the entire skein unravel about my ears. So, I post some few ideas from here and there to start being in the discussion.
I consider that Vygotsky's way of dealing with emotions is quite consistent with the rest of his work (still, recognising that he had a process as well). However, as it has been pointed here, he does not finish his proposal. If we do not want to have a dychotomy, if the task is to create a general psychology, then how could/should we study emotions. Nowadays, still we have the same struggle in psychology: emotions have to do with the unconscious, or they have to do with cognition, or they have to do with the body functions. As it has been pointed out here, as well, all those approaches can be reduced to two psychologies (The Crisis in Psychology, Collected works - W- vol. 3), defined in philosophical terms, as materialist ('vulgar') and idealist psychologies (The Teachings about emotions, CW vol. 6), and again one of the biggest struggles is how to study them. Vygotsky gives an answer, and the answer could be taken only as the dream of a post-Russian-Revolution psycholoists: in the light of applied psychology, and so, in the construction of the new society. However, this line I think can offer some points to think about the present, facing the problems you mention, Jay, and then understanding what is what psychology can offer to us today in the construction of the world (this implies a political agenda).

I think the issue of the dychotomies is in itself quite a big issue to deal with, and then there is the issue of how to move forward. Because one thing is to have the principle of 'rejecting dychotomies', the other thing is to start doing something practical with that premise, for example research. I suppose you can see that I am breaking reality in two: one thing is 'to think', the other 'to apply'. However, I think that this practice of discussing is important in the possible practices of researching. I suppose, that this is the kind of problems one has to address at the end of research, if I could express what I say. I guess we cannot scape so easily the logics of certain dominant approaches. I guess as well that this is not by chance, because of the fact that consciousness in fact has a relative independence, and allows us to detach from the very present moment, and that is why it has a programmatic element that makes us so particular beings, and have history... Does this make sense?

One important question that Vygotsky posed was how to understand both the continuity and the difference of humans and animals. To be honest, I am not interested in animal psychology. I think that the issue of 'continuity but difference' is an important reason for studying things historically. History is one important clue for understanding emotions. However, part of the problem that this entails are linked to Fodor's paradox. Michael Roth gently suggested that I studied Turner. Turner (it is J. Turner, for example in 'On the origins of human emotions. a sociological inquiry into the evolution of human affect) has done quite an important and consistent work in the study of emotions. He is a very productive and talented scholar in the field. He has been interested in solving the issues of biology and history in relation to emotions. However, because he focuses on the premise, that the only way in which we can feel, let's call them, 'sublime' emotions is thanks to the fact that they were already hardwired when we came down the trees (otherwise we would have them appear? and Jay, you have pointed at this in a way in your recount on 'solidarity' feelings and the like). There is then something a-historical in this premise: emotions were hardwire once and forever, so, we should study the essential emotions that make us human. I think we could bring here, Vygotsky's criticism to James and Lange, because emotions depend and only depend on the body, then there seem to be no history. The question about dichotomies would be, why do we talk about dichotomy when we have such a plain explanation: we have a problem, and an answer, and it is unidirectional and 'transparent'. As I understand the issue of dichotomy is the fact that once one make such a big claim, lots of things are left aside. I remember, Andy, your discussion about the fact that we are brains. If we are brains, according to the neurocientist you were quoting some few weeks ago, then when he is asked: "but what about ethics and society?". His answer, as far as I remember, was: "ah, that is another thing". This
phenomenon of the appearance of "the other thing", is what we call dychotomy, isn't it? Two separated things, and one explanation.

The other side of the coin is studied by approaches based in social construction: emotions are built socially, so they are diverse, and it is impossible to encapsulate. We can study their history. Nowadays we have so many references to emotions in social science (some people call them the affective turn, so many turns we have!). The most important aspect of them is the historisation of emotions. Emotions are social and historically constructed. Personally, I study a paradigmatic author, Hochschild and his study of emotional labour. Emotions are socially constructed, they have to be study in context, they have a history. Individuals sell their emotions to institutions. Then we can study for example the emotions involved in particular practices. This side, in psychology, the historical one, has been studied in psychology. Vygotsky mentions this about Freud. He recognises Freud's enormous contribution, when he studied emotions in the history of individuals. Hochschild, among many, emphasises the history of emotions. Is a sociocultural approach in coincidence with a socioconstructionist approach? I would think the answer is know. There is a difference between socioconstructionist or interactionist approaches with a sociocultural (or more concretely Vygotskian approach). This could be another thread of discussion. I am aware that this has been discussed here in the past, but it is still work in progress, I recon :)

I am not sure about how to think artefacts an emotions, but I guess, being consistent with the idea that artefacts are both, material and ideal, and if 'ideal' is not free of emotions (the neutrality is a view from positivistic approaches, in my understanding and one important element of those approaches is to eradicate all subjectivity, being emotions one of the most 'dangerous' subjective human features in the task of knowledge construction)... I was saying, if artefacts are both, material and ideal, and if 'ideal' can not be considered as separated from emotions, then artefacts involve emotions, even the emotions of being able to control a situation, but many others emotions at stake could be materialised, like the possibility of winning the market to a competitor or solving a family problem -and then linked to solidarity- and so on. However, the use of the artefact, is important, and emotions change. Driving the first engine car involved very different emotons than those involved in driving a car today; as it is different driving your first car, a car that is a bit broken, when you are in a trafic jam, while arguing with your partner, etc. I would not go by this track for the moment, though, but as this is the tip that I took to start posting, this is my little grain here, Andy. Also, I think a car is full of knowledge.

Some ideas to start being in. I will try to catch up with other ideas that have been expressed.

Best wishes,
Mabel
exploring the specific physiological basis of emotion. If we take Vygotsky to be talking about the intersection of two objective processes: human behavior and human physiology, this makes sense.

On artefacts and emotion: I take the body to be an artefact, so I don't think you can have emotion without artefacts. But yes, the ideal properties of artefacts are also affect-laden, that is beyond question. Think of a picture of a sunset, the face of an old friend, or a suffering child, a toy from one's own childhood, Pascabelle's Canon, the smell of wet straw, ...

Andy

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074 - FW: [xmca] emotions and general psychology
De: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu em nome de Mabel Encinas (liliamabel@hotmail.com)
Enviada: terça-feira, 1 de dezembro de 2009 11:20:42
Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity (xmca@weber.ucsd.edu)

Sorry this message was meant to everybody... this is how I was pushed by Andy ;) to discuss publicly (as he thought one message was for everybody and not for him) this one is the other ways round, but I sent it only to him...

075 - Re: [Spam:*****] Re: [xmca] about emotions
De: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu em nome de ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org
Enviada: terça-feira, 1 de dezembro de 2009 14:25:51
Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity (xmca@weber.ucsd.edu)

Catherine:

thank you for the recommendation!

076 - Re: [xmca] about emotions
De: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu em nome de ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org
Enviada: terça-feira, 1 de dezembro de 2009 15:10:16
Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity (xmca@weber.ucsd.edu)

Hello to all who have shared on this thread. Thank you Achilles for beginning the thread and the thoughts and activity that have followed!

My investment into this topic is that I work in a school that has a population of high school students labeled "emotionally-behaviorally disordered". What does that mean? It is an easy answer and a very complex answer. The easy answer is that the student's behaviors fall outside the expected 'norm' for 16 to 21 year old U.S. high school students. The complex answer is that much of the baggage that they bring to our small program (100 students) is wrapped up in the socio-cultural-historical milieu of the U.S. educational system and more specifically the tendencies and systemic processes of the urban school district I work for. Something that does indeed work for our staff is to separate the systemic behaviors from the individual emotions. What that looks like would take a textbook to break down but I just would like to thank all who
have contributed to this thread because it has provided me great insight into the topic of emotion from a CHAT perspective.

Eric

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077 - Re: [xmca] emotions and general psychology

De: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu em nome de Jay Lemke (jaylemke@umich.edu)
Enviada: terça-feira, 1 de dezembro de 2009 18:27:25
Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity (xmca@weber.ucsd.edu)

Thank you, Mabel, for so many well-placed grains for thought!

I will see about adding J. Turner to my growing list of readings, along with Scheff (whom I’ve read a little) and Cooley.

I was especially taken by your last comments about the emotional aspect of artifacts. Unlike Andy, I think, I want to frame feeling as something that is often, maybe always, distributed across a material substrate that includes more than an individual human body. Perhaps another person/body, perhaps an artifact, an environment or setting, etc.

You argue from the ideality of material artifacts, and that certainly seems clear in the case of made or built artifacts, which is what we are supposed to mean by this term. I think we also use it for natura or found objects, which acquire an ideality, a symbolic value, a use function for us when we pay some special kind of attention to them, when we pick them up and take them home, when we use them as a rough tool, when we frame them as an art object, when we study them as natural specimens, etc.

I think that it is very important to try to understand the ways in which there is an emotional-affective element in person-object interactions, and the ways in which it may make as much sense to talk about the affective aspects of the object as about those of the person. Much to think about here.

I am also totally in agreement that we must consider the historical dimension of feeling processes of all kinds, beginning with those that are our primary objects of study in our own research.

JAY.

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Hi everyone

I wanted to look at another level of the discourse on emotions. This is to add to the recognition of the other levels such as institutionally and historically contexts of emotion. This in no way minimizes the critical importance of these levels of process for understanding emotion.

But, in the same spirit of discourse analysis which looks at the micro level of conversation I believe we expand our horizon of understanding by exploring the microgenesis of emotions as the interface between biology and culture. I have posted before on the position of Daniel Stern and the moment by moment generation of emotion. Today I want to summarize the thoughts of Donnel B. Stern to this discussion in his book "Unformulated Experience" (p.43) When we talk about content or structure or experience it is not a THING at all, but a PROCESS, one that has CONTINUITY OVER TIME. Some processes have more continuity (organization) some less. We act AS IF these discrete abstractions which our folk psychology labels thoughts, memories, feelings, are REAL but they are socially mediated constructions that locates experience in PARTICULAR table ways. Psychoanalysis is interested in how these processes keep reproducing experience in similar shapes or patterns through interpretive organizing ACTIVITY.

Stern discusses a psychoanalyst "ROY SCHAFFER" who attempts to translate all psychological events and language games into ACTION LANGUAGE to recognize these psychological events as ACTIVITY. Schafer chooses not to take this approach because communication becomes awkward.

However he does elaborate the processes of REFLECTIVE EXPERIENCE (where we stand back from and observe our phenomological processes. Folk psychology (common sense) leaves the impression that thoughts and emotions just arrive or leap into existence without the DEVELOPMENT of the thought or emotion. In reality each moment of experience is a process of emergence (MICROGENESIS) a sequence of necessary steps that must occur as experience NFOLDS. Microgenesis, applied to thought and emotion develops from moment to moment in a process onnel Stern calls FORMULATING THE UNFORMULATED. The microgenetic lens emphasizes the developmental life (Dewey's "arc") of each present moment OUT OF the experience of the recently formulated experience. Conscious, explicit, linguistically articulated experience formulated) emerges from activity (verbal and nonverbal) that took place in the preceding (sociocultural) moments. This emergence of experience INCLUDING THAT PART THAT ARRIVES IN AWARENESS is ORGANIC and CULTURAL and is a continuous dynamic process. Sometimes AFTER THE FACT the way one moment developed from the PREVIOUS one COMES TO OUR ATTENTION but more often it does not.

Donnel Stern uses the terms thought and emotion as heuristic devices and stress that he sees these processes as a single process of COGNITION (which for him is emotional-thought or thoughtful-emotion) Cognition is formulated as a process of emergence within sociocultural activity.

William Blake's metaphor "seeing the world in a grain of sand" captures the spirit of this inquiry at the microgenetic level. If this is seen as the unit of analysis it posits identity, subjectivity, and self-ing as emergent in moment to moment enactments which become organized into cultural patterns.
I hope this captures the spirit of the relational frame emerging in psychoanalytic discourse. They also are elaborating how the micro, meso, and macro levels of process develop in particular historical contexts.

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079 - [xmca] Language as the link between emotions and culture.
De: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu em nome de Joseph Gilbert (joeg4us@roadrunner.com)
Enviada: terça-feira, 1 de dezembro de 2009 21:45:35
Para: Activity eXtended Mind Culture (xmca@weber.ucsd.edu)

Emotions result from either conscious or subconscious cognitive activity. We feel the, "What-does-this-mean-to-me", conclusion of cognitive processes as emotion. Emotion motivates us to action. From. its spelling, the word emotion means "that which causes motion" or "motion born out of something". We do what we do because it seems to be in our interest. The thought processes, whether conscious or subconscious, provides us with the information. (information), the implications of which give rise to emotions. When our forebears vocally expressed these emotions and those vocal expressions subsequently were used referentially as words, the original vocal emotional expressions became cultural institutions.

Joseph Gilbert

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080 - RE: [xmca] Emotions and culture
De: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu em nome de Mabel Encinas (liliamabel@hotmail.com)
Enviada: terça-feira, 1 de dezembro de 2009 21:59:10
Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity (xmca@weber.ucsd.edu)

Hi, Larry and all.

Thank you very much Larry, for having introduced Stern. I am not into psychoanalysis. I am a Gestalt psychotherapist, and maybe because this perspective emphasizes the 'here and now', I realised that I had to discuss the present moment, and the performative making sense of the situation when I faced the challenge to analyse my videos about classroom interaction. Also, I discuss the difference of actions that seem intentionally loaded, with others in which intentionality is quite contestable. My research is based in microanalysis. For being able to study emotions, I decided to study Vygotsy's understanding of emotions. Also I found in this analysis of video (I did not interview neither the teachers or the students about their emotional experience, although I did had long conversations with the teachers), that in order to understand videos, there was important to find 'whole' situations in which emotions were first of all 'evident'. The segments then were from about 1 to 4 minutes long, and I then describe them in depth, including drawings of the interactions. I study this excerpts as developmental in terms of emotions. I already said that the metaphor I use is that I study certain threads without taking them away from the tissue. In my descriptions, I present the richness of the tissue and I relay in the concept of context that weave together (Cole, 1996). I discuss how emotions emerge and impact the situation, and how this impact 'informes' in turn the sense that individuals keep making of the situation instant after instant.

My conclusions are more about the way in which emotions can be studied, and I pose questions...
to neuroscience, as I see Stern does! I suggest to do 'ethnographic neuroscience'. Stern (2004) says:

"Two kinds of data are needed. First, accurate timing of brain activity correlated with phenomenal experiences. Second, the timing of the analogic shifts in intensity or magnitude of neural firing during the same phenomenal experiences".

I have to read more about Stern, I would like to understand what are the similarities and differences with Vygotsky's thought, and the usefulness of Stern's contribution. So far, so good :)

Best wishes,

Mabel

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**081 - Re: RE: [xmca] Emotions and culture**

De: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu em nome de Larry Purss (lpurss@shaw.ca)
Enviada: terça-feira, 1 de dezembro de 2009 23:55:52
Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity (xmca@weber.ucsd.edu)

Hi Mabel

I'm glad you are enjoying Stern's book. I recently saw a book that was written exploring the interface of gestalt psychology with relational perspectives. I will try to find it.

Your research and the tools you use to slow down and observe the microgenetic developmental moments with video and playback were not available to Vygotsky, so the information we now generate with freeze framing of video and film may give us a window into patterns of communication that were not available to Vygotsky. Of course our theories also influence what we perceive.

Larry

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**082 - Re: [xmca] Emotions and culture**

De: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu em nome de Andy Blunden (ablunden@mira.net)
Enviada: quarta-feira, 2 de dezembro de 2009 0:08:37
Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity (xmca@weber.ucsd.edu)

I really like your approach to context in terms of threads Mabel. The weaving together has a lot of power which "that which surrounds" doesn't have. And presumably threads could be traced into and out of the immediate context? I have just started reading Vygotsky's "Teaching on the Emotions", Volume 6 pp 71-235. I will see if I can scan some of it to share when I need a break from reading.

Andy