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Re: [xmca] Emotions and Culture

>From Wikipedia:

Many mathematicians derive aesthetic pleasure from their work, and from mathematics in general. They express this pleasure by describing mathematics (or, at 
least, some aspect of mathematics) as beautiful. Sometimes mathematicians describe mathematics as an art form or, at a minimum, as a creative activity. Comparisons are often made 
with music and poetry. Bertrand Russell expressed his sense of mathematical beauty in these words:
Mathematics, rightly viewed, possesses not only truth, but supreme beauty ? a beauty cold and austere, like that of sculpture, without appeal to any part of our weaker nature, without the gorgeous 
trappings of painting or music, yet sublimely pure, and capable of a stern perfection such as 
only the greatest art can show. The true spirit of delight, the 
exaltation, the sense of being more than Man, which is the touchstone of 
the highest excellence, is to be found in mathematics as surely as poetry.[1]

Here is what Tolstoy wrote about aesthetics in his "What is art?" essay:

We are accustomed to understand art to be only what we hear and see in 
theaters, concerts, and exhibitions; together with buildings, statues, 
poems, and novels. .. . But all this is but the smallest part of the art by which we communicate with one another in life. All human 
life is filled with works of art of every kind?from cradlesong, jest, 
mimicry, the ornamentation of houses, dress, and utensib to church 
services, buildings, monuments, and triumphal processions. It is all 
artistic activity. So that by art, in the limited sense of the word, we do 
not mean all human activity transmitting feelings but only that part which 
we for some reason select from it and to which we attach special 
importance. This special importance has always been given by men to that part of this activity which transmits 
feelings flowing from their religious perception, and this small part they 
have specifically called art, attaching to it the full meaning of the 
Is one of them right and the other wrong?  In the dialectic there is a 
place for both opinions.  Does this mean emotions the emotions of 
mathematics is different than that emoted from religios experiences?


Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
Sent by: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
12/06/2009 09:38 PM
Please respond to ablunden; Please respond to "eXtended Mind, Culture, 

        To:     "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
        Subject:        Re: [xmca] Emotions and Culture

Try subtracting dualism from our understanding of mental 
life as cognition/emotion. All mental life has both a 
physiological substrate and meaning (intention, teleology). 
True of emotion as much as cognition. What it is in the 
object perceived which is beautiful or fearful is perhaps 
different from understanding 'coldly' what its cause is or 
its value to human life, but really, when you think about, 
you cannot draw any kind of line here.


Jay Lemke wrote:
> Andy,
> Thanks so much for this great synopsis. I'm looking forward to reading 
> the LSV myself if Achilles does get an OCR version out to us all.
> And I'm very happy that I agree with all the points LSV makes, at least 
> as far as your summary relates them!
> It does seem really obvious after thinking about for a while that the 
> "higher" emotions (finer, more elaborated, subtler, "later" ...) are 
> both grounded in the bodily feelings and go substantially beyond them, 
> both in feeling and meaning.
> What really intrigues me is just how LSV might have imagined the ways in 

> which meaning is an integral part of emotion. It's certainly true, but 
> it's the How's that I want to understand more.
> JAY.
> Jay Lemke
> Professor (Adjunct, 2009-2010)
> Educational Studies
> University of Michigan
> Ann Arbor, MI 48109
> www.umich.edu/~jaylemke
> Visiting Scholar
> Laboratory for Comparative Human Communication
> University of California -- San Diego
> La Jolla, CA
> USA 92093
> On Dec 6, 2009, at 3:58 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>> *Vygotsky on the Teaching About Emotions*
>> After all these years I at last got around to reading Vygotsky's 
>> 'Teaching about Emotions'. So far as I know, this and the lecture on 
>> the development of emotions in Volume 1, are all that is available in 
>> English of Vygotsky on the emotions.
>> It is an amazing article. For 170 pages, Vygotsky is like a tiger 
>> circling the hunter, preparing to attack, circling and circling: 
>> ranging from Descartes to James and contemporary writers and back 
>> again, he brings out the contradiction and dualism of descriptive 
>> psychology and explanatory psychology, centrifugal or centripetal 
>> sources of emotion, higher and lower emotions, causal or intentional 
>> explanations, physiological or intentional descriptions, natural 
>> scientific or theological approaches, etc., etc. It is a protracted 
>> immanent critique of the teaching about emotions from Descartes to his 
>> own time, allowing each voice to speak against the others, or itself. 
>> Occasionally, Vygotsky notes something with approval or makes the 
>> occasional characterisation of his own, but generally every system is 
>> eventually drawn into contradiction with itself. We are left with only 
>> the barest hints of a way out. This is the only case I know of an 
>> immanent critique which does not conclude or follow up with a 
>> transcending proposal. Dated 1933, I can only conclude that Vygotsky 
>> died before he could complete the exercise. It does read like someone 
>> trying to solve a puzzle. It is not polemical; it's like thinking 
>> So, people like Achilles and Mabel who are working on emotions along 
>> Vygotsky's lines have a marvellous and challenging task before them! 
>> Not just completing Schubert's unfinished symphony, more like writing 
>> Shakespeare's 'Elizabeth I'.
>> One of the surprising things, to me, was that Vygotsky says, in 
>> effect, that the entire history of the teaching about emotions is 
>> contained in Descartes. Those who came after picked up one side or 
>> other of Descartes' dualism, but soon or later found them forced back 
>> to some kind of dualism. Spinoza gets a mention, and is credited with 
>> some correct criticisms of Descartes, but given how much others make 
>> of Spinoza on emotions, and how much we know Vygotsky admired Spinoza, 
>> he has surprisingly little to say about Spinoza. Also, in the entire 
>> article there is only one mention of words, so anyone who thinks that 
>> Vygotsky reduced consciousness to word meaning must be mistaken. 
>> Because what Vygotsky is discussing is not just emotion, but really 
>> the whole history of psychology.
>> As I say, I don't think Vygotsky actually comes to a conclusion, but a 
>> few points can be made I think.
>> 1. A science of the emotions worthy of the name must be able to deal 
>> fully with the 'higher' or 'finer' emotions - like the satisfaction a 
>> mathematician feels on completing a theorem or the pain of a composer 
>> whose arpeggio is not quite right - and yet must be explanatory; if 
>> limited to descriptive psychology (like a phenomenology of the 
>> emotions) it cannot claim to be science.
>> 2. The physiological substrate of emotions (adrenalin, blood pressure, 
>> tightening of muscles, etc), including body chemistry and motor 
>> functions, and the associated sensations, are _diffuse_ in nature, and 
>> can only give a limited range of qualities to emotional experience, 
>> compared with the infinite range of emotions known to literature. Both 
>> great joy and great sadness can be associated with tears and shaking; 
>> both anger and fear include heightened heart rate.
>> 3. The perception of these 'peripheral' changes are merely 
>> supplementary to the experience of emotion, not essential and 
>> certainly not the _substance_ of emotions as claimed by James. 
>> Vygotsky seems satisfied that an emotion can be experienced with no 
>> measureable changes in the relevant peripheral functions. (I don't 
>> know if the idea of 'brain maps' of the body has any impact on this.)
>> 4. Emotions are intentional, in the philosophical sense, i.e., 
>> directed at something in the objective world. (Thomas Scheff includes 
>> what an emotion is directed to as part of his categorization of 
>> emotions too, e.g., other-directed or self-directed or 
>> object-directed.) And words like teleological and will come into 
>> Vygotsky's text, but he does not explicitly introduce striving as part 
>> of the essence of emotion. But it seems to me, it is hard to see how 
>> affect can be independent of meaning in relation to a person's 
>> striving or desire. And that is outside the person.
>> 5. It seems that Vygotsky wants to include _meaning_ as an irreducible 
>> part of emotion. If the silhouette of a woman engenders an emotion, 
>> then that image and all its associations are part of the emotion, not 
>> just an external stimulus for a feeling; the grief of a woman over the 
>> death of her son cannot be separated from her whole consciousness of 
>> her son and his death, memories, etc., all of which impart qualities 
>> to the emotion This means that an exclusively physiological 
>> explanation of emotion is absolutely ruled out. Jay's point about 
>> emotions being to some extent shared is supported here by Vygotsky, I 
>> think.
>> I suspect that because of the various kinds of visceral phenomena 
>> associated with strong emotions and shared with the animals, there has 
>> historically been a tendency for thinkers to abstract emotion from 
>> other, 'cold' or 'higher' modes of consciousness. The more so I 
>> suspect that all such speculations are the work of a class of people 
>> for whom calculation not passion is the norm. The whole ethos of 
>> intellect versus animal passions, etc.
>> Vygotsky wants I think to put these pieces back together, to accept 
>> that certain extreme perceptions engender modes of response in the 
>> body appropriate to the perception, and these produce affects which 
>> _accompany_ a perception and add further quality to the affect. It is 
>> as if the categorizing impulse that drives positivist (abstract 
>> empirical) science, in its effort to tear the subject apart, tears 
>> affect away from apprehension, and then goes about categorizing 
>> affects, and seems to believe that because of this act of cognition, 
>> there must be, in the subject itself, an abstraction of causes. But 
>> all perception is also affect, isn't it. There is no such thing as 
>> purely intellectual perception or intention. To understand grief, one 
>> does need that perception of powerlessness and depression, but also 
>> the disorganization of consciousness which loss of a person close to 
>> you brings. Vygotsky mentions the difference between fear of a ghost 
>> and fear of an approaching bear. There is a difference. And the 
>> difference lies in the object of fear, and cannot be separated from 
>> consciousness as a whole and it structure.
>> ............
>> For those who have high speed internet, Achilles has created a PDF of 
>> images of the text which is at 
>> http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1933/emotions/emotions.pdf (65Mb) 
>> but Achilles has also OCR-ed the text and is currently correcting it 
>> and it should be available at the same location in a few days.
>> -----------------
>> Achilles Delari Junior wrote:
>>> Hi, excuse-me,
>>> It's only to share a little  information. Some time
>>> ago, Anton provide us a copy from the text from
>>> Vygotsky, Samukhin an Birembaum about Pick's Disease  - and it had 
>>> important influences from
>>> Lewin and others. That two Vygotsky's collaborators
>>> studied in Germany, I guess, as did Zeiganik. There
>>> are something about the problem of that they
>>> call the "affective systems" of two patients...
>>> It is from 1934, and was not translated yet.
>>> Thank you, nothing to detour the discussion, only
>>> an information about Vygotsky and Gestalt in
>>> clinical settings...
>>> Best.
>>> Achilles.
>>>> From: liliamabel@hotmail.com
>>>> To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>> Subject: RE: [xmca] Emotions and culture
>>>> Date: Thu, 3 Dec 2009 07:16:28 +0000
>>>> Hi, Larry.
>>>> Just for the records, I am really not interested in relational 
>>>> gestalt theory neither psychoanalisis. I will not change that in my 
>>>> thesis, much less at this stage. I define myself as a Gestalt 
>>>> psychotherapist, because I have a paper that says so, and it is the 
>>>> way in which I make (or theoreticallycan make) a living. I use art 
>>>> (but I do not have a paper that says that I am an art-therapist or 
>>>> an artist :).
>>>> Theoretically speaking, and that is how I understand what happens in 
>>>> my practice, and in all the other practices of which I participate, 
>>>> what I know a bit is Vygotsky. Just cause, I do not like those other 
>>>> labels, sorry.
>>>> Cheers,
>>>> Mabel
>>>>> Date: Wed, 2 Dec 2009 22:07:07 -0800
>>>>> From: lpurss@shaw.ca
>>>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Emotions and culture
>>>>> To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>> Hi Jay
>>>>> Yes, your summary of emotions at different time scales seems to be 
>>>>> in "sympathy" with my perspective. I've welcomed the opportunity 
>>>>> from the CHAT community to find out what I "think" and "feel". Mabel
>>>>> Your interst in relational psychoanlysis and Gestalt theory is 
>>>>> shared by others.
>>>>> I googled "relational gestalt theory" and found many references to 
>>>>> Gestalt theorists who are bringing relational theory into their 
>>>>> practice.
>>>>> A general question for the CHAT community on the contrasts between 
>>>>> "genetic" and "stage" theories of development. If genetic implies 
>>>>> emergence and greater complexity whereas stages imply transcendence 
>>>>> from one epistemology to a radically "other" stage why is Piaget's 
>>>>> "genetic epistemology" theory describe various stages?
>>>>> This contrast in perspectives seems to have profound implications 
>>>>> to how we view development.
>>>>> Larry
>>>>> ----- Original Message -----
>>>>> From: Jay Lemke <jaylemke@umich.edu>
>>>>> Date: Wednesday, December 2, 2009 8:31 pm
>>>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Emotions and culture
>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>>>>> Mabel and Larry focus on what I think is a key issue in 
>>>>>> understanding emotion. First, that emotions are generated in time, 
>>>>>> as a process. It is a process in which we ourselves are ACTIVE, 
>>>>>> and not, as in some folk theories taken over into psychological 
>>>>>> models, merely reacting to external events and conditions. Second, 
>>>>>> its genesis takes place over multiple timescales. There is the 
>>>>>> very short term, moment-to-
>>>>>> moment, rise and fall of various feelings, their layering onto one 
>>>>>> another, the transitions from one to another. Then there is a 
>>>>>> term tendency, closer to the mood of the "moment" (which is a much 
>>>>>> longer moment than the first timescale), which may define a trend 
>>>>>> in the progression of our feelings. And this in turn is coupled 
>>>>>> more into the situation and setting, who else is there, what is 
>>>>>> going on, what is the activity and the goals that we are engaged 
>>>>>> with. Then further, there are still longer term scales, over 
>>>>>> months or years of our lives, which merge more into social 
>>>>>> processes and the expectations of the culture and subcultures, the 
>>>>>> communities we operate within.
>>>>>> I very much like the idea of ethnographic neuroscience, and I wish 
>>>>>> there were more neuroscientists who did! but they are not trained 
>>>>>> in this way, and it requires a collaboration at least. It is so 
>>>>>> much easier for them to study only short-term, isolated, 
>>>>>> laboratory- controlled events as they appear in their neuro-
>>>>>> physiological correlates, which makes sense if they imagine that 
>>>>>> they are looking at universal processes, which occur in the same 
>>>>>> way every time.
>>>>>> But of course they don't, and how they appear is very context 
>>>>>> dependent. At least we know this is the case in terms of how they 
>>>>>> feel to us, and how they emerge over the shorter and longer 
>>>>>> timescales of relevance. It would be very interesting to know what 
>>>>>> is the same and what is different across cases and events, in 
>>>>>> different situations and settings, for "the same" emotional 
>>>>>> response. This will, I think, be on the agenda of the neuroscience 
>>>>>> of a decade or two from now.
>>>>>> JAY.
>>>>>> Jay Lemke
>>>>>> Professor (Adjunct, 2009-2010)
>>>>>> Educational Studies
>>>>>> University of Michigan
>>>>>> Ann Arbor, MI 48109
>>>>>> www.umich.edu/~jaylemke
>>>>>> Visiting Scholar
>>>>>> Laboratory for Comparative Human Communication
>>>>>> University of California -- San Diego
>>>>>> La Jolla, CA
>>>>>> USA 92093
>>>>>> On Dec 1, 2009, at 1:58 PM, Mabel Encinas wrote:
>>>>>>> Hi, Larry and all.
>>>>>>> Thank you very much Larry, for having introduced Stern. I am
>>>>>> not
>>>>>>> into psychoanalysis. I am a Gestalt psychotherapist, and
>>>>>> maybe
>>>>>>> because this perspective emphasizes the 'here and now', I
>>>>>> realised
>>>>>>> that I had to discuss the present moment, and the
>>>>>> performative
>>>>>>> making sense of the situation when I faced the challenge to
>>>>>> analyse
>>>>>>> my videos about classroom interaction. Also, I discuss
>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> difference of actions that seem intentionally loaded, with
>>>>>> others in
>>>>>>> which intentionality is quite contestable. My research is
>>>>>> based in
>>>>>>> microanalysis. For being able to study emotions, I decided to
>>>>>> study
>>>>>>> Vygotsy's understanding of emotions. Also I found in this
>>>>>> analysis
>>>>>>> of video (I did not interview neither the teachers or the
>>>>>> students
>>>>>>> about their emotional experience, although I did had
>>>>>> long
>>>>>>> conversations with the teachers), that in order to
>>>>>> understand
>>>>>>> videos, there was important to find 'whole' situations in
>>>>>> which
>>>>>>> emotions were first of all 'evident'. The segments then were
>>>>>> from
>>>>>>> about 1 to 4 minutes long, and I then describe them in
>>>>>> depth,
>>>>>>> including drawings of the interactions. I study this excerpts
>>>>>> as
>>>>>>> developmental in terms of emotions. I already said that the
>>>>>> metaphor
>>>>>>> I use is that I study certain threads without taking them away
>>>>>> from
>>>>>>> the tissue. In my descriptions, I present the richness of the
>>>>>> tissue
>>>>>>> and I relay in the concept of context that weave together
>>>>>> (Cole,
>>>>>>> 1996). I discuss how emotions emerge and impact the situation,
>>>>>> and
>>>>>>> how this impact 'informes' in turn the sense that individuals
>>>>>> keep
>>>>>>> making of the situation instant after instant.
>>>>>>> My conclusions are more about the way in which emotions can
>>>>>> be
>>>>>>> studied, and I pose questions to neuroscience, as I see Stern
>>>>>> does!
>>>>>>> I suggest to do 'ethnographic nueroscience'. Stern (2004) says:
>>>>>>> " Two kinds of data are needed. First, accurate timing of
>>>>>> brain
>>>>>>> activity correlated with phenomenal experiences. Second, the
>>>>>> timing
>>>>>>> of th analogic shifts in intensity or magnitude of neural
>>>>>> firing
>>>>>>> during the same phenomenal expereinces".
>>>>>>> I have to read more about Stern, I would like to understand
>>>>>> what are
>>>>>>> the similarities and differences with Vygotsky's thought, and
>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> usefulness of Stern's contribution. So far, so good :)
>>>>>>> Best wishes,
>>>>>>> Mabel
>>>>>>>> Date: Tue, 1 Dec 2009 12:45:44 -0800
>>>>>>>> From: lpurss@shaw.ca
>>>>>>>> To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>>> Subject: [xmca] Emotions and culture
>>>>>>>> Hi everyone
>>>>>>>> I wanted to look at another level of the discourse on
>>>>>> emotions.
>>>>>>>> This is to add to the recognition of the other levels such
>>>>>> as
>>>>>>>> institutionally and historically contexts of emotion. This in
>>>>>> no
>>>>>>>> way minimizes the critical importance of these levels of
>>>>>> process
>>>>>>>> for understanding emotion.
>>>>>>>> But, in the same spirit of discourse analysis which loos at
>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> micro level of conversation I believe we expand our horizon
>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>> understanding by exploring the microgenesis of emotions as
>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> interface between biology and culture. I have posted before
>>>>>> on the
>>>>>>>> position of Daniel Stern and the moment by moment generation
>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>> emotion. Today I want to summarize the thoughts of a DONNEL
>>>>>> B.
>>>>>>>> Stern to this discussion in his book "Unformulated Experience"
>>>>>>>> (p.43)When we talk about content or structure or experience
>>>>>> it is
>>>>>>>> not a THING at all, but a PROCESS, one that has CONTINUITY
>>>>>> OVER
>>>>>>>> TIME. Some processes have more continuity (organization) some
>>>>>> less.
>>>>>>>> We act AS IF these discrete abstractions which our folk
>>>>>> psychologhy
>>>>>>>> labels thoughts, memories, feelings, are REAL but they are
>>>>>> socially
>>>>>>>> mediated constructions that locates experience in PARTICULAR
>>>>>> stable
>>>>>>>> ways. Psychoanalysis is interested in how these processes
>>>>>> keep
>>>>>>>> reproducing experience in similar shapes or patterns
>>>>>> through
>>>>>>>> interpretive organizing ACTIVITY.
>>>>>>>> Stern discusses a psychoanalyst "ROY SCHAFER" who attempts
>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>> translate all psychological events and language games into
>>>>>> ACTION
>>>>>>>> LANGUAGE to recognize these psychological events as
>>>>>> ACTIVITY.
>>>>>>>> Schafer chooses not to take this approach because
>>>>>> communication
>>>>>>>> becomes awkward.
>>>>>>>> However he does elaborate the processes of REFLECTIVE
>>>>>>>> (where we stand back from and observe our
>>>>>> phenomicological
>>>>>>>> processes. Folk psychology (common sense) leaves the
>>>>>> impression
>>>>>>>> that thoughts and emotions just arrive or leap into
>>>>>> existence
>>>>>>>> without the DEVELOPMENT of the thought or emotion. In reality
>>>>>> each
>>>>>>>> moment of experience is a process of emergence (MICROGENESIS)
>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>> sequence of necessary steps that must occur as experience
>>>>>> UNFOLDS.
>>>>>>>> Microgenesis, applied to thought and emotion develops from
>>>>>> moment
>>>>>>>> to moment in a process Donnel Stern calls FORMULATIND
>>>>>> THE
>>>>>>>> UNFORMULATED. The microgenetic lens emphasizes the
>>>>>> developmental
>>>>>>>> life (Dewey's "arc") of each present moment OUT OF the
>>>>>> experience
>>>>>>>> of the recently formulated experience. Conscious,
>>>>>> explicit,
>>>>>>>> liquistically articulated experience (formulated)emerges
>>>>>> from
>>>>>>>> activity (verbal and nonverbal) that took place in the
>>>>>> preceding
>>>>>>>> (sociocultural) moments. This emergence of experience
>>>>>> and is
>>>>>>>> a continuous dynamic process. Sometimes AFTER THE FACT the
>>>>>> way one
>>>>>>>> moment developed from the PREVIOUS one COMES TO OUR ATTENTION
>>>>>> but
>>>>>>>> more often it does not.
>>>>>>>> Donnel Stern uses the terms thought and emotion as
>>>>>> heuristic
>>>>>>>> devices and stress that he sees these processes as a single
>>>>>> process
>>>>>>>> of COGNITION (which for him is emotional-thought or
>>>>>> thoughtful-
>>>>>>>> emotion) Cognition is formulated as a process of emergence
>>>>>> within
>>>>>>>> sociocultural activity.
>>>>>>>> William Blake's metaphor "seeing the world in a grain of
>>>>>> sand"
>>>>>>>> captures the spirit of this inquiry at the microgenetic
>>>>>> level. If
>>>>>>>> this is seen as the unit of analysis it posits
>>>>>> identity,
>>>>>>>> subjectivity, and self-ing as emergent in moment to
>>>>>> moment
>>>>>>>> enactments which become organized into cultural patterns.
>>>>>>>> I hope this captures the spirit of the relational frame
>>>>>> emerging in
>>>>>>>> psychoanalytic discourse. They also are elaborating how the
>>>>>> micro,
>>>>>>>> meso, and macro levels of process develop in particulat
>>>>>> historical
>>>>>>>> contexts.
>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
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>> -- 
>> Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
>> Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, Ilyenkov 
>> $20 ea
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Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
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Ilyenkov $20 ea

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