vestiges; not progenetic functions with a future, but degenerating, archaic functions, survivors of a long past function—this is what the James theory represents. Its final word announces that emotion is a chance pathological reaction, a useless and unnecessary survivor of antiquity incapable of any development. This is even more distinct in the theory of Lange, who settles on the fact that the emotions are elicited mainly not by a simple impression from some organ of feeling, but by mental causes, recollection, and association of ideas, even if association itself is evoked by a sensual impression. To explain this, Lange develops the theory completely in the spirit of the teaching on conditioned reflexes, showing that the reflex act is initially connected with direct sensual impression and later is connected with other stimuli due to combination of the impression with new conditioned stimuli that become capable of eliciting it because of this.

Lange writes: "As an example of the simplest case, I want to present a fact, the truth of which every mother will confirm. The child cries when he sees a spoon from which he was several times compelled to take a medicine he did not like. How does this happen? Similar cases were quite frequently analyzed from the psychological point of view and we can find very different answers to our question. Some say: he cries because he believes the spoon is the cause of his previous suffering; but the matter is not at all explained in this way. Others say: because the spoon stimulates recollection of past suffering; this may be completely correct, but it does not transfer the problem to the realm of physiology. And yet another answer may be given: because the spoon elicits fear of a future unpleasant feeling; the problem consists specifically of how the sight of the spoon, because of its previous use, is capable of producing fear, that is, of eliciting a certain kind of activity in the vasomotor center" (1896, p. 70).

Lange's explanation consists in that "each time the child takes the medication, his feelings, gustatory and visual, are simultaneously impressed—the first impression from the medication and the second, from the spoon. The two impressions are connected, linked, and due to this, recollections can elicit emotions... If the child is shown a spoon that is not suspect for him, with which he did not previously experience the bitterness of medication it might contain, the child will not cry to the given sight of the spoon. However, if the child has seen the spoon with the medication several times and noticed that this involves a sensation of a repulsive taste each time, then seeing only the spoon (in itself) will compel the child to cry; in other words, it activates his vasomotor center" (ibid., pp. 70-71).

C. G. Lange develops a hypothesis on the establishment of a new, functional connection between centers, a connection that did not previously exist, by creating a new brain pathway. Pavlov's best student could not have explained more logically the origin of mental emotions through the conditioned reflex path. But Lange is more logical than contemporary physiologists and is bold enough to understand definitively that admitting a conditioned reflex emotional reaction changes nothing essentially in the nature of emotion itself. The whole matter consists only in "a much longer, circuitous path which the impulse generated externally must take before it reaches the vasomotor center. But as far as I can judge," Lange says, "the basic traits of the physiological process remain constantly the same: moving the stimulation from central organs of feeling to the cells of the cerebral substance, and from the latter to the vasomotor cells of the medulla oblongata" (ibid., p. 74). In other words, the conditioned reflex remains a reflex in full and absolute measure, although it is elicited by new stimuli.

"Therefore I was justiﬁed in saying that the difference between emotions of physical origin and emotions elicited by mental causes do not, from the physiological point of view, contain anything favorable, anything substantial. The main thing is that the determining factor in the origin of both emotions is one and the same thing: excitation of the vasomotor center. The difference is only in the path along which the impulse reaches this center. Another circumstance is added to this: in indirect mental emotions, the force of the impulse is increased over previously aroused and not yet extinguished brain activity which is combined with the impulse of the external impression" (ibid., pp. 74-75).

Actually, if we accept emotion as an innate, reflex reaction of the organism, the possibility for its development or increased complexity has a purely illusory character. Of what does development of a conditioned reflex consist? Exclusively of the fact that stimuli that elicit it and activate the reflex mechanism change. In Pavlov's experiments, the dog secretes saliva in a speciﬁc amount and of a speciﬁc quality when food is introduced. Then, when the conditioned reflex is established, it begins to respond with the same reaction to a new, previously neutral and indifferent stimulus, blue light, for example. But the salivation reaction itself remains completely unchanged in this case. The dog continues to secrete saliva in the same amount and of the same quality, but only for a different reason. The same thing is wholly applicable to all other reflex acts, particularly to emotional reactions.

The emotional reaction of fear is elicited initially by the direct action of a frightening cause. Later, it can be elicited by some other stimulus that is combined several times with the initial cause. The child initially reacts with crying and fear when he is given the bitter medicine. Later just the sight of the spoon will elicit the same reaction in him. The direct cause of the reaction has undoubtedly changed, but the reaction as such remained unchanged. In a general form, we might express this idea as follows: if, according to James, numerous reflex acts are the essence of emotion, then the only possible change in emotions is that the stimuli eliciting them can change, replacing one another as conditioned stimuli, but the emotion itself, the feeling experienced by the person remains always the same, always equal to itself, so that in the history of the development of emotions, the concrete causes for their appearance may change, but emotions themselves cannot change.

For this reason, Lange maintains with complete justification: "... actually, the difference between the fury of those poisoned by amaunati mushrooms or maniacs and the anger of those dealt a deadly injury consists only in a difference in causes and in the presence of consciousness of the corresponding causes or in the absence of such consciousness" (1896, p. 65).

Thus, for Descartes, its founder, and for his involuntary followers, the visceral theory not only bypasses the problem of development, but factually resolves the problem in the sense of a full and complete denial of any possibility of emotional development in man. This is the inevitable conclusion from the teaching on innate passions.

Directly connected with the problem of development of emotions and central to our investigation is the problem of the uniqueness of human emotions in comparison with the emotions of animals. The question is whether emotions can become a chapter in human psychology. In solving this problem, the involuntary followers of Descartes evidently differ sharply with their teacher. Descartes establishes a sharp impassable difference between animals and man. He separates by an abyss the human organism capable of experiencing emotions from the animal organism absolutely devoid of passions. All passion is the distinctive
privilege of man. In animal nature there is nothing at all like the passions of the soul because in it the soul itself does not exist. Thus, the Cartesian teaching on passions refers wholly and completely to man and to him alone. At first glance, the teaching on the passions appears to us to be developed from the point of view of human psychology.

With James and Lange, the theory of emotions refers to man only to the extent to which he represents a higher animal. Their theory is essentially a zoopsychological theory of emotions pertaining to man only to the extent that he himself is a biological being. This is undoubtedly apparent from the teaching on the animal origin of man's passions, from the assertion of commonality of basic emotions in animals and man, and, finally, from the basic ideas of the whole theory on the innate, reflex, animal nature of emotions.

Little attention has been given to this aspect of the problem because the problem of man did not at all arise before contemporary psychology. But from the very beginning, even the authors of the theory and their critics understood that in the visceral hypothesis, they were speaking in essence of the animal nature of human emotions. We will cite Chabrier, who advanced this idea in the most complete form.

Chabrier says that with this problem, we penetrate into the heart of the problem and touch on the major objection that arises against the peripheral theory. When we are speaking about instincts, we have before us an absolutely and invariably established mechanism, which is activated automatically as soon as an appropriate stimulation appears. It is possible that this is true also with respect to the primitive emotions of the child, but it cannot be the same with respect to the usual emotions of adults.

We are not concerned here with the fact that in themselves, organic states that elicit one emotion or another depend directly on the organization of consciousness, on the number and systematization of ideas by means of which external impressions are processed. It is not just that our emotions express states of the body, and the states of the body themselves are an expression of the order of our perceptions. In the first place, and primarily, the matter pertains to the problem of emotions specific to the human. James himself was limiting his hypothesis to the sphere of lower emotions and not toward extending it to the finer and higher feelings. It seems, however, that all human emotions must be classified as finer emotions because, if we disregard idiots, the most limited man is always bound by some kind of more or less vague idea, some kind of more or less perceptible consciousness. The basest feelings arose under the influence of tradition, creeds, or religious presumptions. They are not of the sort that might be considered instinctive reactions to stimulation, reactions that do not depend on an established system of ideas. For this reason, if we put some pressure on the formula of our author, we could compel him to admit that his theory cannot explain anything in the feelings of man. At least he himself was not concerned with vindicating the differences he noted and overturns them with his own examples.

James refers in the same way to the fear of a man confronted by a bear and the grief of a mother learning of the death of a son as examples to which his theory can apply. But if the first case pertains to a group of lower emotions, the same cannot be said of the second case, and we cannot but be surprised that the author does not refer it to the class of finer feelings. If James does not draw a demarcation line, perhaps it is because for him it does not exist. It seems that he accepts the classical, traditional differentiation between higher moral feelings pertaining to such ideal objects as good and beauty, arising from purely spiritual activity, and lower, physical feelings, whose beginning and end is connected with the body and which, for this reason, are subject to physiological explanation.

Chabrier completely justifiably refers to the fact that a feeling of hunger, usually considered in the group of lower bodily feelings in civilized man, is already a fine feeling from the point of view of the nomenclature of James, that the simple need of food can acquire a religious sense when it leads to the appearance of a symbolic rite of mystical communication between man and God. And conversely, a religious feeling, usually considered as a purely spiritual emotion, in pious cannibals bringing human sacrifices to the gods, can scarcely be referred to the group of higher emotions. Consequently, there is no emotion that by nature would be independent of the body and not connected with it. James' book, The Varieties of Religious Experience, shows in particular the extent to which higher feelings are closely connected with all the fibers of our body.

For this reason, we must not cut the enormous sphere of emotions into two parts, one to which the peripheral hypothesis would apply and another, to which it would not apply. No feelings exist which, because of privilege of origin, would belong to a higher class while others, by their nature, would be placed in the lower class. The natural difference is a difference in richness and complexity, and all of our emotions are capable of rising along all the degrees of sentimental evolution. Every emotion can be qualified not otherwise than from the point of view of the degree of its development. For this reason, only that theory of emotions can be considered satisfactory which can be applied to all degrees of development of feeling.

Separating emotions from the development of a system of ideas and establishing their dependence exclusively on organic structures, James inevitably comes to the fatalistic conception of emotions which encompasses animals and man equally. The serious differences that human emotions display depending on the degree of civilization, the difference between mystical adoration of a knight for his lady and the noble gallantry of the seventeenth century, remain unexplained from the point of view of this theory. Chabrier says, if we imagine the infinitely rich nature of the poorest emotion, if we pay less attention to the imaginary psychology of single-celled organisms than to the remarkable analysis of novelists and writers, if we simply take use of the data supplied by observations of people around us, we cannot but admit the complete failure of the peripheral theory. Actually, it is impossible to admit that simple perception of a female silhouette automatically evoked an endless series of organic reactions of which could be born love such as the love of Dante for Beatrice if we do not previously assume the whole ensemble of theological, political, esthetic, and scientific ideas that comprised the consciousness of the genius, Alighieri.

Partisans of the organic theory have forgotten in their hypothesis nothing more than the human spirit. All emotion is a function of personality; this is specifically what the peripheral theory loses sight of. Thus, a purely naturalistic theory of emotions requires as a supplement a real and adequate theory of human emotions. Thus arises the problem of a descriptive human psychology that contrasts itself with an explanatory, physiological psychology of emotions. It seeks a scientific path to those problems of the human spirit that are solved by great artists in novels and tragedies. It wants to make accessible to a study in concepts what these writers made the subject of an artistic representation.

The problem of higher feelings connected with the teaching on values, is usually considered as an area completely inaccessible to a psychology occupied with a psychophysical and psychophysiological investigation of elementary processes of consciousness and their bodily substrate. Thus arises a teleological, descriptive psychology of higher feelings directly generated by the complete failure of the contemporary explanatory psychology of emotions. If it is true, as one of the more
prominent investigators in contemporary comparative psychology maintains, that in man, emotions attain a higher development in complexity, fineness, and variability of manifestation, but that their genesis, their evolution, and psychological nature remain the same as that of higher animals, then the need for something of different, non-explanatory psychology is really inevitable. Even from the point of view of the most complex affect of a human-like simian closest to man, it is impossible to explain the most elementary human passions. For this reason, great psychology must break sharply with natural-science, causal psychology and seek its own path somewhere outside it and apart from it. As S. Freud says, a completely different approach to the problem of feelings is needed than that which was formed in the official school of psychology, particularly in medical psychology.

Freud says that there they are evidently interested most of all in the anatomical paths along which the state of fear develops. Speaking of the fact that he devoted much time and effort to the study of fear, Freud notes that he knows of nothing that would be more indifferent for the psychological understanding of fear than knowing the nerve path along which its excitation travels. He continues: what is affect with respect to dynamics? First, affect includes certain motor innervations or outflows of energy, and, second, a certain sensation of delight or dissatisfaction that give the affect its basic tone, so to speak. But it does not follow from this that all that was listed comprised the essence of affect. With other affects it seems that we might look deeper and discover a nucleus that unifies the specified ensemble.

In this way a 'deep' psychology of affects arises that tries to disclose the internal nucleus and to make a heroic attempt to preserve a strictly deterministic, causal psychology of affects through a complete self-containment in the sphere of pure mental causality. This special and unique branch of pure psychology, which goes into the depths, arises as a necessary reaction of scientific thought to the failure of academic psychology that treats only the surface of phenomena. Naturally, it does not find a common language with physiological psychology. Freud says, do not think that what has just been said about affect is a generally recognized property of normal psychology. On the contrary, these are views that have grown in the soil of psychoanalysis and are recognized only there. What you can know about affects in psychology, for example, the James-Lange theory, is for us psychoanalysts something simply incomprehensible and not subject to discussion. Thus, the attempt to preserve a strictly causal consideration of psychological facts, and, at the same time, not to bring psychology as an independent science to bankruptcy and not to turn its work over into the hands of physiology, will make depth psychology admit the full substantial independence of mental processes and autonomy of mental causality.

Another trend in contemporary psychology of emotions that developed as a reaction to the failed reflex theory of emotions solves the same problem of adequate psychological knowledge of affects in a different way. Mainly, it rejects a causal consideration of feelings and develops as a purely descriptive phenomenology of emotional life. In the words of M. Scheler (M. Scheler, 1923), one of the conspicuous representatives of this trend, long forgotten was the fact that together with causal laws and psychophysical dependence of emotional life on bodily processes, there are also independent laws of meaning of the so-called higher emotional acts and functions distinct from the sensation of feeling. The intentional and value-cognitive nature of the life of our higher feelings was established anew first by Lotze, who did not develop it, since he maintained only in the most general form this logic of the heart and did not consider it in detail. It was his idea and dictum that

Thus, if we take contemporary psychology of feelings in all its fullness, if we understand the necessity with which the mechanistic theory of lower feelings assumes the teleological theory of higher feelings, and how inevitably the teaching on the animal nature of emotions requires as its supplement the teaching on extra-vital feelings, feelings outside life in man, it becomes clear that contemporary
psychology of feelings, taken as a whole, cannot in any way be accused of divergence from Cartesian teaching. On the contrary, it is its living embodiment, the continuance and development in a science-like form. It doesn't make any difference that it fell to James-Lange to develop only one of two principles of this teaching, that their theory was limited to applying the naturalistic point of view to explaining emotions. Just as in the system of Descartes himself, the naturalistic explanation for passions of the soul leads to the spiritualistic teaching on human feeling, so the most consistent and naturalistic theory of emotions in contemporary psychology creates at the other pole, as a counterweight, the teleological teaching on the logic of the revelation of higher feelings.

The equilibrium to which the Cartesian system holds is again reestablished in contemporary psychology of emotions, in which the naturalistic and teleological principles balance each other. If we add that James not only was not hostile to the second method of considering human feelings, but came very close to it in the teaching on emotions not dependent on the body and in investigating the variety of religious experience, it is easy to be convinced of the fact that the author of the physiological theory of emotions himself essentially accepted the Cartesian teaching in all its fullness, although he did develop one of its aspects predominantly. Thus, if we speak of the theoretical aspect of the matter, then this divergence of James from Descartes also becomes illusory.

Returning again to the Cartesian teaching, we can be definitively convinced of this. As we established earlier, its seeming divergence with the theory of James before the problem of man. Descartes ascribes passions only to man and denies them in animals. James, on the other hand, considers human emotions as a manifestation of man's purely animal life. The real, and not imaginary divergence consists only in the fact that James, together with all of contemporary science, rejects the Cartesian view of the absolute separateness of man and animals. But if we recall of what the essence of Descartes' teaching on passions consists, it is easy to see that he solves the problem of human passions completely in the same spirit and on the same theoretical plane as James does.

Illusory also is the idea that Descartes, accepting passions as a basic phenomenon of human nature belonging exclusively to it alone, does not solve the problem of human feelings in all their specificity to any extent, but only poses it. The dualism between higher and lower feelings, as we tried to establish above, inevitably leads them to man, with his living and intelligent passions, forgetting himself and firmly locking himself into a lifeless psychology of incorporeal spirits and into a senseless psychology of soulless robots.

The words of Chabrier, which he said about the theory of James, are fully applicable to Descartes: if we put some pressure on the formula of the author, it might compel him to admit that his theory can explain nothing in human feeling. The dualistic solution of the problem of human passions in Cartesian teaching, the insolubility, from the point of this teaching, of the problem of development, problems of man and his life, already contains in itself the break-up of contemporary psychology of emotions into explanatory and descriptive theories of human feeling. In the James-Lange theory, which resorts to the laws of physiological mechanics as to a final explanatory instance, and behind the theory of Scheler, which resorts to the metaphysics of teleological intentional bonds as this instance, again arises in all its magnitude the grandiose contradiction that the great philosopher introduced at the base of his teaching on the passions of the soul.

The Teaching about Emotions

The second most common problem from the point of view of which we must sum up our investigation of the ultimate bases of the old and the contemporary Cartesian psychology of passions is the problem of connections, dependencies, and relations between passions and the rest of the body and spiritual life of man. This problem is connected directly with the problem we have just considered, the problem of development and specific features of human feelings. As we have seen, in it, the question of a causal explanation of emotions is brought to the forefront.

Real knowledge is possible only as causal knowledge. Without it, no science is possible. As James notes, explaining causes belongs to investigation of a higher order and forms a higher degree in the development of science. It is natural for this reason that in the psychology of passions, beginning with Descartes and ending with James and contemporary investigators, the problem of causal explanation of human feelings is considered the central and basic problem of the teaching on the passions. How can a causal consideration of facts of the emotional life of man be possible?

We have already mentioned the caustic remark of Spranger, one of the more prominent representatives of descriptive psychology, that causal explanation given by explanatory psychology is extremely suggestive of the celebrated parody of Socrates on inadequate explanation. This example may serve as a paradigm in our consideration of the problem of causality in Cartesian and Spinozist psychology of passions and in their contemporary branches.

As we have tried to show above, the possibility of a causal explanation of emotions is purchased by James and Lange at a very high price—the price of complete rejection of any intelligible connections of emotions with the rest of the mental life of man. In the opinion of its authors, what the theory wins in this way in establishing a real causal connection between physiological manifestations and emotional experience, it loses in the possibility of establishing any kind of understandable and intelligible connection between feeling as a function of personality and all the rest of the life of consciousness. For this reason, it is not surprising that the causal explanation cited by this theory sharply contradicts our direct experience and the actual connection of emotions with all the internal content of our personality. The direct experiential connection advanced by the founders of descriptive psychology as a basis for all comprehension of the facts of a spiritual, historical, and social order actually inevitably must become the subject of a completely special science if a causal explanation of a type contained in the James-Lange theory is the only one possible in explanatory psychology.

Dilthey states: "We can be delivered from all the difficulties cited above only by the development of the science which I propose to call descriptive and analytical psychology in contrast to explanatory and constructive psychology. As descriptive psychology, I understand a representation of the component parts and connections uniformly manifested in all developed human emotional life that is neither devised nor derived, but experienced. Thus, psychology of this kind would be a description and analysis of the connection that we are given at the outset and always in the form of itself. An important consequence follows from this. The subject of this kind of psychology is the systematic development of the connection of developed emotional life. It represents the connection of internal life in a certain kind of typical man" (1924, pp. 17-18).

"The uniformity comprising the main subject of psychology of our time pertains to formulas of the internal process. The reality of emotional life, powerful in content, is beyond the limits of this psychology. The works of poets, the reflections on