Derrida’s position will be clarified to some degree in the exposition that follows; but it should be noted that this is not intended as a general exposition of Derrida’s grammatological analysis. My more limited purpose at this point is to highlight those aspects of his critique that are especially relevant to our own examination of the discourses of action and of expression. In the discourse of expression, for example, we noted a view of communication as the transportation of signified ideas along a chain of expressive representations, a view which Derrida (1981) explicitly examines and rejects:

We will never have, and in fact have never had, to do with some ‘transport’ of pure signifieds from one language to another, or within one and the same language, that the signifying instrument would leave virgin and untouched. (p. 20)

The view rejected here has been identified as

[the Saussurean concept] of communication, which in effect implies a transmission charged with making pass, from one subject to another, the identity of a signified object, of a meaning or of a concept rightfully separable from the process of passage and from the signifying operation. Communication presupposes subjects (whose identity and presence are constituted before the signifying operation) and objects (signified concepts, a thought meaning that the passage of communication will have neither to constitute, nor, by all rights, to transform). A communicates B to C. (p. 23)


Note: The text image above the line is copied from page 219 of