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Re: [xmca] concept



It is precisely the limitations of this theory of concepts as words that we have tried to deal with in the piece I recently shared the reference to. Concepts cannot be words with attachments, or you are in the same waters as with the concept of meaning. What about the concept of concept? What about the meaning of concept? And the concept of meaning? How come you privilege words, which really denote material patterns (scratches and traces in some medium, sound patterns). I think it would be worthwhile to pick up in Derrida and his analysis and critique of language, that begins with looking at the ancient Greek thoughts about how the soul gets imprinted from nature, and the soul then is expressed in the voice, and the voice gets doubled in writing. It is this chain, which begins with an imprint of nature in the soul that metaphysics is concerned, and I am afraid that all writing about concepts and meaning are but further metaphysical efforts.
Michael


On 2009-10-28, at 4:20 AM, Steve Gabosch wrote:

You've packed a lot of ideas in a few sentences, Andy! Saying that concepts are words that are associated with systems of actions makes sense to me in that it links word-meaning with human action. But you say next that a concept is "the basic unit of the life of some system of practice." Could you clarify a little? Just trying to follow your thinking here ...

- Steve


On Oct 27, 2009, at 6:15 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:

Eric,

Ultimately, a concept is a word associated with some system of actions and known to some individual(s). The word is a sign for the concept, and a concept is the basic unit of the life of some system of practice.

A concept must be distinguished from the properties or attributes of a thing. The list of something's attributes is not a concept of the thing. A true concept is independent of the attributes of any thing and indicates some innovation in a system of practice to overcome some problem which arose in the development of the relevant social formation.

But thinking in concepts requires both sensuous perception of the attibutes of things and the (true) concepts of the things. Perception of the attributes of things is called a "pseudoconcept" in the CHAT tradition. Real, genuinely conscious human activity is the unity of a true concept and a pseudoconcept.

Andy

ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org wrote:
Hello all:
Recent discussions have caused me to ponder the "concept of concept". It is not merely a property that something posseses; for water certainly contains hydrogen and oxygen regardless of whether it is labeled as such. However; if I am learning about water than I am provided the opportunity to observe and experiment with the properties water exhibits/contains. At zero degrees celsius the water freezes, at one hundred degrees celsius it boils. Again these are properties but as I am learning about them do they become concepts? That liquids freeze and boil. Is answering these questions on a science quiz enough to claim a student can conceptualize boiling and freezing? I believe LSV would answer no. So then back to the blocks experiment and what precisely was LSV proposing about the development of concepts?
eric
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Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, Ilyenkov $20 ea

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