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Re: [xmca] Consciousness: Ilyenkov



Not going against myself , I wholeheartedly appreciate dear Martin naming this little learner at last !! in Andy's message . 
 
Martin ! Once Ulvi Icil said in his/her country Vygotsky is defunct ! Yet I know there's there a little random talk at least . This person is now in the middle of translating the *Crisis* with all its complexity where Vygotsky is altogether denied and ... . Then be glad to help such people with all your efforts and energy . 
 
Steve will also be kind to help me with the paragraph I have long sent him . 
 
Thanks all !
 
Haydi

--- On Sat, 9/26/09, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> wrote:


From: Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>
Subject: Re: [xmca] Consciousness: Ilyenkov
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Date: Saturday, September 26, 2009, 4:15 PM


Andy,

In general I am in agreement with what you say in this message. That doesn't surprise me; we're both reasonable people, we are both working on articulating a materialist position, though we may disagree on the details, and we are both reading the same texts. But I think you've come a long way from the statement by Lenin that you offered as a definition of consciousness!

You've pressed me to offer a definition of consciousness that would be better, and I'm reluctant to do this. First, I'm less interested in my own definition than I am in the definitions of others who are far more qualified than I (Spinoza, LSV, Aristotle.... Please take a look at Merleau-Ponty's books on the topic; wonderful stuff that I'm tempted to quote...). Second, we clearly need much more empirical investigation of consciousness, informed by an appropriate ontology. In advance of such investigation we cannot, in my opinion, *define* consciousness, we can merely sketch where we would need to look to study it. And that sketch wouldn't rule out, in my view, slugs, dreams, and so on (I've lost the message where you listed these oddities).

My main concern is to insist on the aim that LSV defined for psychology - the scientific study of consciousness (avoiding a division between the natural and human sciences, IMHO) - and the radical character of that study: of Cs as a real and material phenomenon. Since LSV spent so much time arguing against dualism, it is clear, in my reading, that he was a monist (Haydi, are you saying that's a bad thing?). I get irritated that so many people (not on this list, I should quickly add) reduce LSV to a kind of Piaget with people; to the zoped plus internalization. LSV's psychology was much more complex, radical, and interesting than this.

Martin

On Sep 26, 2009, at 9:19 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:

> OK, let's see if I can handle these ...
> 
> Martin Packer wrote:
>> So in your view matter is independent of consciousness, but consciousness is not independent of matter?! That strikes me as a very strange phrasing. I have been using 'independent' in the sense 'not connected with another or with each other; separate.' You?
> 
> No, I do not mean "not connected, separate."
> 
> Consciousness depends on matter in the obvious sense. Without a nice climate on Earth and intact, mature, living human beings, there is no consciousness. And Everything that I have in my consciousness originates one way or another in material causes, in matter.
> 
> The independence of matter from consciousness does not negate the fact that through my body, in which my consciousness is a cause, things happen in the wider material world. The way consciousness gets to act as a cause in the world through material organisms obedient to the determinant laws of biology, chemistry and physics is an intriguing problem which we may get to soon.
> 
> But Cs is able to act as a cause in the material world only insofar as it acts in line with Nature and on the basis of a natural substrate. And if there is no Cs, matter is still there, just as it was for 6 billions years before we came along. The reverse does not apply.
> 
> 
>> An equally important point is that Cs is not 'given' to us, unless you mean that in the sense of some mysterious gift. Things are given to us *in* Cs. As Ilyenkov says, the world is given to us in consciousness. The child has Cs awareness of objects before they have awareness of Cs.
> 
> Mmmm, how can I say this? I don't mean "Cs is given to us"; I mean "Cs is what is given to us." And I don't mean by that the things we take to be the sources of sensations, etc. I mean: "What we are given; that is Cs." Does that make sense?
> 
> Andy
> 
>> Martin
>> On Sep 25, 2009, at 8:54 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>>> Martin Packer wrote:
>>>> I responded that this seemed dualistic. You seemed to be saying that we have access only to Cs and not to matter; that matter is  "independent" of consciousness (and presumably vice versa); and that two separate kinds of inquiry are needed.
>>> 
>>> *No way is consciousness independent of matter!* It is just what is given to us immediately.
>>> 
>>> The difference in methods of enquiry is that between natural science (which takes matter as its substance) and human science (the humanities), which takes (or should take) activity as its substance. Both are sciences.
>>> 
>>> -------------------------------
>>>>> We can 'contrast' Cs and matter, but that isn't necessarily to draw
>>>> a categorical distinction between them.
>>> 
>>> This is the point. The difference is a categorical one. I am still waiting for someone to give us a definition of consciousness which includes (or excludes) all the different entities and states found under this category, without descending into nonsense. Once you proceed down this path you will of course have a great big fuzzy boundary with things like the consciousness of rats and amoeba, deja vu, dreams, premonitions, reflexes, undefinable emotions and so on. There you will find no sharp dividing line. ... but you are still left asking: "What is consciousness?"
>>> 
>>> -------------------------------
>>> 
>>>> In the context of that debate it was important to insist that there is a material reality that is "independent" of consciousness. But within the context of a dialectical materialism that way of phrasing things is misleading. Human consciousness is derived from matter; and the material world is shaped by human activity, and so by human consciousness. There is not "independence," in either direction.
>>> 
>>> That human beings shape the material world does not alter the fact that matter exists independently of consciousness.
>>> 
>>> Matter *is* what is outside of and independent of consciousness. Surely there can't be *nothing* out there?! Some things out there are part of my consciousness. "My consciousness is my relation to my evironment." But not everything. No-one bothered about climate change. It was never part of our consciousness, ... but suddenly we are all thinking about it. Why? Because matter exists, i.e., there *are* things we don't know about. Climate change was there all the time! There are things which are independent of our consciousness.
>>> 
>>> (Metaphors are inherently dangerous in trying to make this distinction BTW. I am drawing on "examples" to try to clarify, but "illustrations" of the deepest categorical distinction necessarily open us up to trivalising matters.)
>>> 
>>> Andy
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> Tony may be on the right track to remind us of form. An Aristotelian materialism?
>>>> Martin
>>>> On Sep 25, 2009, at 11:40 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>>>>> OK. Obviously one can find plenty of true statements in Ilyenkov as elsewhere. The point is consciousness matter and was Ilyenkov wrong when he said:
>>>>> 
>>>>> "'Consciousness' ... is the most general concept which can only be defined by clearly contrasting it with the most general concept of 'matter', moreover as something secondary, produced and derived"?
>>>>> 
>>>>> Your claim is now that the claim that consciousness is an attribute of matter is tantamount to denying the above definition. I find the two statements (Spinoza and Ilyenkov) quite compatible.
>>>>> 
>>>>> I grant that Spinoza's formulation was a deliberate effort to get out of the hole that Descartes had dug by making Cs and matter the two substances, i.e., fundamental components of reality. It directed attention to the organization of matter rather than the presence of a "life force" or some such thing. A great move for the 17th century, and a better foundation for a science of consciousness. Though as it turned out it was cultural psychology not neuroscince which cracked the problem.
>>>>> 
>>>>> But being an attribute of something does not put it in the same catgory. If Spinoza's formulation helps you, that's good; combine it with the quoted sentence from Ilyenkov we have been discussing.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Andy
>>>>> 
>>>>> Martin Packer wrote:
>>>>>> On Sep 25, 2009, at 10:45 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>>>>>>> He means that if you deny the categorical difference between your consciousness and the world outside your consciousness, then you are an idealist. The fact that you do so by saying your thoughts are matter rather than by saying that the sun and the moon are thoughts, makes no difference.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Andy,
>>>>>> I've copied below more paragraph from Ilyenkov's text (thanks for the link) with my gloss interposed (in the style of Steve). You'll see that, on my reading, Ilyenkov agrees with Spinoza that thinking is one of the attributes of substance (matter).
>>>>>> Martin
>>>>>> ============
>>>>>> Lenin's position isn't formulated here very precisely. It doesn't consist in the simple acknowledgment of 'the existence of an external world and its cognoscibility in our sensations', but in something else: for materialism, matter – the objective reality given to us in sensation, is the basis of the theory of knowledge (epistemology), at the same time as for idealism of any type, the basis of epistemology is consciousness, under one or another of its pseudonyms (be it the 'psychical', 'conscious' or 'unconscious', be it the 'system of forms of collectively-organised experience' or 'objective spirit', the individual or collective psyche, individual or social consciousness).
>>>>>> <Lenin shouldn't be interpreted as saying merely that matter exists and we can perceive and know it. His position was that matter is the *basis* for knowledge. For idealism, the basis of knowledge is taken to be Cs, but this is an error>
>>>>>> The question about the relationship of matter to consciousness is complicated by the fact that social consciousness ('collectively-organised', 'harmonised' experience, cleansed of contradiction) from the very beginning precedes individual consciousness as something already given, and existing before, outside, and independent of individual consciousness. just as matter does. And even more than that. This social consciousness – of course, in its individualised form, in the form of the consciousness of one's closest teachers, and after that, of the entire circle of people who appear in the field of vision of a person, forms his consciousness to a much greater degree than the 'material world'.
>>>>>> <Social Cs comes before and forms individual Cs, much more than experience of the material world does.>
>>>>>> But social consciousness (Bogdanov and Lunacharsky take precisely this as the 'immediately given', as a premise not subject to further analysis and as the foundation of their theory of knowledge), according to Marx, is not 'primary', but secondary, derived from social being, i.e. the system of material and economic relations between people.
>>>>>> <But this social Cs is not basic; it itself is based on something more fundamental: social *being*, the system of material and economic relations among people.>
>>>>>> It is also not true that the world is cognised in our sensations. In sensations the external world is only given to us, just as it is given to a dog. It is cognised not in sensations, but in the activity of thought, the science of which is after all, according to Lenin, the theory of knowledge of contemporary materialism.
>>>>>> <We are *given* the world in sensation. But it is in thought that the world is *cognised.* If we want to understand the basis for human knowledge,  we will need to consider the character of thought.>
>>>>>> ... Spinoza. He understands thinking to be an inherent capability, characteristic not of all bodies, but only of thinking material bodies. With the help of this capability, a body can construct its activities in the spatially determined world, in conformity with the 'form and disposition' of all other bodies external to it, both 'thinking' and 'non-thinking'. Spinoza therefore includes thinking among the categories of the attributes of substance, such as extension. In this form it is, according to Spinoza, characteristic also of animals. For him even an animal possesses a soul, and this view distinguishes Spinoza from Descartes, who considered that an animal is simply an 'automaton', a very complex 'machine'.
>>>>>> <We agree with Spinoza, who considered thinking to be a capability of certain kinds of material bodies. Bodies with this capacity can adjust their activities with respect to other material bodies. This is to say that one of the attributes of substance (matter) is thinking.>
>>>>>> Thought arises within and during the process of material action as one of its features, one of its aspects, and only later is divided into a special activity (isolated in space and time), finding 'sign' form only in man.
>>>>>> <Thought arises in material activity, even in animals. In humans it takes a more advanced form, in which activity is adjusted to signs.>
>>>>>> [...] If one proceeds from individual experience, making it the point of departure and basis of the theory of knowledge, then idealism is inevitable. But it is also inevitable if one relies on 'collective experience', if the latter is interpreted as something independent of being, as something existing independently, as something primary.
>>>>>> <It is a mistake to try to understand human knowledge in terms of individual consciousness or experience. But it is also a mistake to try to understand knowledge in terms of *social* consciousness. As we have said, social *being* - collective practical activity is primary.  Nonetheless, we can learn a lot from Hegel...:>
>>>>>> [...]The collective psyche of mankind (spirit), which has already been developing for thousands of years, is actually primary in relation to every separate 'psychic molecule', to every individual consciousness (soul). An individual soul is born and dies (in contrast to Kant, Hegel caustically and ironically ridiculed the idea of the immortality of the soul), but the aggregate – 'total' – spirit of mankind lives and has been developing for thousands of years already, giving birth to ever newer and newer separate souls and once again swallowing them up, thereby preserving them in the make-up of spiritual culture, in the make-up of the spirit. In the make-up of today's living spirit live the souls of Socrates, Newton, Mozart and Raphael – herein lies the meaning and essence of Hegel's – dialectical – interpretation of the immortality of the spirit, notwithstanding the mortality of the soul. One comes into being through the other. Through
 its opposite.
>>>>>> <Hegel recognized how an individual's Cs is based on the collective. Individuals come and go, but humankind as a whole has been developing for many thousands of years and in this sense is immortal. The individual soul is mortal, but the human spirit endures, and gives rise to one individual after another. At the same time, it is individuals who make up the collective psyche.>
>>>>>> With all that, Hegel always remains inside the sphere of the spirit, within the bounds of the relationship of the soul to the spirit. All that lies outside this sphere and exists completely separate from it the material world in general – interests him just as little as it interests Mach or any other idealist. But his idealism is much more intelligent, much broader, and for that reason much more dialectical, than the petty, vulgar and narrow idealism of Mach.
>>>>>> <But Hegel remained thoroughly idealist, and phased all this in the idealist terminology of 'soul,' 'spirit,' etc. He tried to explain the character and development of consciousness without reference to the material world.>
>>>>> 
>>>>> --------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>> Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
>>>>> Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, Ilyenkov $20 ea
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>>> --------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
>>> Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, Ilyenkov $20 ea
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> --------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
> Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, Ilyenkov $20 ea
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