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Re: [xmca] Types of Generalization: concepts and pseudoconcepts
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- Subject: Re: [xmca] Types of Generalization: concepts and pseudoconcepts
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- Date: Sun, 13 Sep 2009 13:33:10 +1000
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Steve Gabosch wrote:
One, what do you mean by "an absolutely non-empirical social factor"
One. When I say "absolutely non-empirical" I do not try to
deny that all knowledge begins from the senses. For example,
if I drive on the left because the law requires me to, I
still have to be able to read signs, understand speech etc.
to know and obey that law. But you wouldn't call that
"empirical" would you? Concepts come to us through using
artefacts in joint actions with other people, i.e.,
activity, not passive contemplation. See "Theses on
Feuerbach." Conceptual knowledge presupposes all the senses,
but is not thereby "empirical."
any game. In chess, for example, rooks and pawns are "concepts" - yes?
Two. I thought about exactly this one as well. So if playing
a good game of chess, knowing the moves for Kings and
Knights etc., and how to play a good strategy, implies
*conceptual* thought, then all the primary school children
who participate in chess championships are alredy masters of
true concepts. And it doesn't stop there, does it? The
implication is that *logical thinking* is ipso facto,
conceptual thought. But primary school kids in general use
logical argument, apply strategies in games, learn
arithmetic and grammatical rules, etc, etc.
So why is LSV so insistent that conceptual thought is
possible only for adolescents? I couldn't find the
reference, maybe someone can, but I am sure LSV believes
that logical thinking and argument by giving reasons
"belongs" to the 7-11 age group, not 15+ - like with LSV's
example of a "dog", "rook" may be a concept for you, but for
a child "rook" is a potential concept.
The point is that "machine-like" logical thought is not
conceptual thought. It relies on pre-concepts, or what
Davydov calls (charitably in my view) "empirical concepts"
or on one occasion "general notions."
Does that help?
http://www.erythrospress.com/ Classics in Activity Theory:
Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, Ilyenkov $20 ea
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