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Philosophy of practice and the culture



**Spinoza and his study about the emotions**

[*Hp [Vygotskiy]*](http://66.196.80.202/babelfish/translate_url_content?.intl=br&lp=ru_en&trurl=http%3a%2f%2fwww.situation.ru%2fapp%2faut_s_380.htm)

*In Spinoza's study it is contained, forming its deepest and internal nucleus, precisely, that, which there is not in one of two parts, into which was decomposed contemporary psychology of the emotions of causal- causal explanation and problem of the [zhizneniogo] value of human passions, unity of descriptive and explanatory psychology of a feeling. Spinoza therefore is very intimately connected with most vital, sharpest acute topic of the day of contemporary psychology of emotions, which prevails over it, determining its envelopped paroxysm of crisis. Spinoza's problems in the unresolved form wait their solution, without which is impossible tomorrow of our psychology.*

**Spinoza and his study**

**on the emotions in light of the contemporary of [psikhonevrologii]\***

HP [VYGOTSKIY]

*The further the significant period of Soviet psychology (middle the 20-X- middle of the 30th years) will move away into the past, the more grows before us the figure hp Of [vygotskogo]. It did die of pulmonary tuberculosis of incomplete 37 year olds? only 10 years it was psychologist and in the last 6 years only made that the fact that now we connect with its name. In these a few years [Vygotskiy] wrote more than 120 works; from them more than 10 compose the large books. Short life, filled with the inspired, tireless, heroic labor. The substantial part of that written remained unpublished and much - not finished. Now is planned the [semitomnoe] (and also incomplete) meeting of its compositions; into the last volume must enter “the sense of psychological crisis” and “the study of Spinoza about the passions”.*

*In the portion Of [vygotskogo] it fell out to make the first and perhaps most difficult step in the conversion of the Marxist-Leninist understanding of man into the concrete psychological study. This was the study Of [vygotskogo] about a distinction in kind in the highest, public, and lowest, natural, mental functions; about the fact that, similar to working activity, the highest mental functions are define by exampled by unique instrument- signs, in essence by the signs of language; that the highest mental functions first are formed as the forms of the vocal contact between the people, which then become the internal forms of vocal thinking; what, thus, general way of the development of human psyche goes “from without - inward”. This idea, which received experimental confirmation in a study Of [a]. [N]. Leont'yev, meant much. But, first of all, it indicated the fundamental wreck of two basic condition of old psychology: on the age long and absolute closure of individual consciousness and about the same original and absolute heterogeneity “mental” and entire remaining “physical” peace.*

*Since then two tasks persistently occupied The [vygotskogo]: the critical analysis of bourgeois psychology (in history of which are combined the increasing rates of development with the increasing desperation in the possibility to become present science) and the development of the new positive study about the human consciousness. Basic landmarks of this study in The [vygotskogo]: sign - value, value - concept, concept - cell of consciousness; the development of concepts is basic line of the development of human consciousness.*

*So [Vygotskiy] proved to be by rationalist in psychology. He felt itself uncomfortably in this role, constantly noted the insufficiency of rationalism, it fought with the mechanical rationalism of bourgeois psychology, with contrast of reason and feeling, intellect and passion so characteristic for it. Hence the interest Of [vygotskogo] in dispute “physiological (explaining) psychology” and “psychology of descriptive (understanding)” - in the study about feelings. Hence its interest in Spinoza, in whom it saw thinker, who anticipated the elimination of this false antithesis.*

*Even those, who are well familiar with the works Of [vygotskogo], will find in the fragment published something new and, perhaps, not expected. But each reader will feel the stressed tendency of large thought toward that elevated ([Vygotskiy] it loved to say: “apical”) to understanding man in his possibilities.*

*[P].[YA]. HALPERIN*

*The text published is extraction from the last head of the monograph hp Of [vygotskogo] “the study about the emotions in light of contemporary psychoneurology. [Ietoriko]-[psnkhologicheskie] of [issledovaniya]> (monograph had also titles “Spinoza”, “the descriptions of psychology. Problem of emotions”). See about this monograph in commentary to the book hp Of [vygotskogo] “psychology of skill”, M, 1958, p. 502 I 504. This publication is prepared [R]. [N]. [Vygotskoy].*

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The problem, with which begins descriptive psychology of emotions, is the question about nature of the highest sensations. Are the highest emotions simply complex 'combinations and modifications of elementary or something completely new in comparison with them, which does require completely special scientific approach? Descriptive psychology assumes as its basic prerequisite the second part of the present dilemma, advancing [intentsionalnost] of the highest sensations, their directivity, their intelligent intelligible connection with its object as their principal, distinctive property. Without this intelligent connection with the object, directly survived by us, high sensation ceases to be itself itself.

In one of its early works Of [sheler] precisely on this bases the discrimination between the highest and lowest feelings conducted by it. The connection of the lowest feelings with the object occurs always mediated, installed the subsequent reports of reference. To this feeling is immanent no directivity. Sometimes it is necessary to find the object of our grief. On the contrary, a high feeling is always directed on something in exactly the same way as idea. This is the intelligent process, the principally accessible only to understanding, while elementary sensual states allow only the establishment and causal explanation. When I am glad or am sad, the experiences of value cause the specific feelings. Intentional in the strictest sense, as this indicated already [Brentano], they are to [lyubov].[i]\_[nenavist]. We love not about by anything, but anything. ,

Thus, the highest sensations require the not establishing and causal- explaining psychological study, but only understanding psychology, which does not have as another goal, except the understanding of the directly survived connections. The experience of values causes the specific highest sensations not according to the logical connection meanwhile, etc like the connection, which unites in the syllogism of message and conclusion. Connection here proves to be teleologic. Nature of conscious life is organized in such a way that I answer happiness everything that I survive that having known value as and how my will he is impelled to the appropriate tendencies. This connection of [dopuskaet]' only understanding, connected with the experience of its expediency; on the contrary, for us that connection, according to which sweet causes pleasure, remains incomprehensible, and bitter - displeasure. These connections I can only accept as the facts, which are not by themselves for me intelligible.

This fundamental incomprehensibility of basic or primitive sensations, as we already mentioned, composes one of the cornerstones of the Cartesian study about the passions. Descartes asserts that grief and happiness as passions not only are different from the pain and the pleasure as sensations, but also they can be completely isolated from them. It is possible to visualize that the most living pain will survive with the same emotional indifference as the most usual sensation. It is possible even to be surprised so that the pain so frequently is accompanied by grief, and pleasure happiness. It is possible to be surprised so that the hunger (this - simple sensation) and the appetite (this - desire) so it is intimately connected together, that they always accompany each other. Contemporary descriptive psychology of emotions, thus, only repeats by the mouths Of [shelera] old Cartesian thesis about the complete senselessness of the elementary emotions, which principally prevent any possibility of their intelligent understanding, and it asserts this privilege only with respect to the highest sensations.

This study about intentional nature of the highest sensations, developed [Brentano], By [shelerom], By [pfenderom], by Geiger and other, placed the bases of contemporary descriptive psychology of emotions. With the aid of this study descriptive psychology of emotions attempts to overcome the reached a deadlock naturalistic theory of a feeling, which is inclined to consider the highest sensations as complex or the product of the development of simpler mental elements. The error of this theory Of [shsler] it sees not in the fact that it erroneously explains facts from the life of the highest sensations, but in the fact that it simply does not see these phenomena, it is blind with respect to them. If naturalistic theory simply “would see the phenomena of holy or sincere love, it instead of with the fact saw that they in any way cannot be either understood from any facts, which relate to the sphere of vital love, or derived of them. But in that consists the main disadvantage in this and other opinions of naturalistic theory, that entire its installation makes with its blind to the fact that in the course of the development of the life of man the completely new reports and qualities appear and can constantly appear; that these qualities are seemed to us arisen and their most essential content spasmodically and never they can be considered as simple, the gradual- development of old forms as this, at least principally, is permissible with respect to the solid organism of the living being. Its installation makes with its blind with respect to the fact that in the course of vital development the fundamentally new and deeper steps of existence and value can come out and the entire new regions of objects and values for the self-developing life on their basis can be developed, that only in proportion to the development of life these new regions of existence and values begin to reveal and to include full weight of those determining their qual. each new quality it indicates for this theory new illusion. It, as any naturalistic philosophy, is the fundamental speculation, which plays for the reduction.

It is difficultly more clear than this is done in the given fragment, to show, as insolvency and the limitedness of explanatory psychology they unavoidably generate this theological study about the highest sensations. In the life of feelings descriptive psychology finds its deepest and most living object. Here we see, tells In [diltey], before itself the authentic center of sincere life. Poetry of all times finds here its objects. The interests of humanity are constantly inverted to the aspect of the life of feelings. Happiness and misfortune of human existence are found in the dependence on it. Therefore psychology of the 17th Century, which thoughtfully directed its attention to the content of sincere life, and was concentrated during the study about the sensual states, since these were its passions.

[Diltey] it proceeds from that fact that the sensual states so persistently resist breakdown, to what extent these states are important and central. Our feelings on. of larger part they merge into the general states, in which separate component parts become already indistinguishable. Our feelings, and motives, cannot be arbitrarily reproduced or brought to the consciousness. To renew sincere states we can only in this way that we experimentally cause in the consciousness those conditions, with which these states appear. Hence it follows that our determinations of the sincere states do not dismember their content, but only they indicate the conditions, with which set in given sincere states. Nature of all determinations of sincere states in Spinoza and Hobbes is such; therefore for us it is necessary to, first of all, improve the methods of these thinkers. Definition, precise nomenclature and classification compose the first task of descriptive psychology in this region. True, in the study of expressive motions and symbols of ideas for the sincere states new booster agents are opened; in particular the comparative method, which leads more affine ratios into feelings and motives of animal and primitive peoples, makes it possible to leave the limits of anthropology of the 17th Century. But even application of these booster agents does not give durable fulcrums for the explanatory method, which is attempted to derive the phenomena of this region from the limited number of unambiguously determined elements.

Here [Diltey] allows the logically in no way justified mixing of three positions, which everyone coincides in their practical conclusions, but which from the theoretical side not only cannot be united together, but they, on the contrary, present the most shining example of internally contradictory anecdotic logic. First, it establishes that actual attempts at the explanation to life of our feelings are between themselves in the state of the fight, output from which decisively it will not foresee. Already basic questions about the ratio of feelings to the motives and the will and about the ratio of qualitative sensual states to the ideas confluent with them do not allow convincing answer. Thus, explanatory psychology of feelings proves to be actually unfounded and yet not realized in reality.

This actual failure of explanatory psychology of feelings Of [diltey] now makes with base for the conclusion about needlessness and the impossibility of explanation in application to the feeling: in this its second position consists. If we throw view, he speaks, on surprisingly rich in all peoples literature, which is concerned sincere states and passions of human, then one cannot fail to see that all fruitful and illuminating this region positions do not need this type of explanatory assumptions. In them are described only the complex and salient forms of the processes, in which the mentioned different sides are connected with each other, and it is necessary only sufficiently deeply to enter into the analysis of facts in this region in order to be convinced of the uselessness here of such explanatory hypotheses. By [diltey] it refers into the proof of this thought to an example of the aesthetical of enjoyment, the caused by artistic work and characterized by majority psychologists as the state of pleasure. But aesthetics, he speaks, that investigates the actions of different kind of styles in different artistic works, will prove to be forced to recognize the insufficiency of this understanding. The style of any fresco of Michelangelos or [bakhovskoy] seam escapes from the mood of great soul and understanding of these works of skill, it reports to the soul of that being delighting in the defined form of mood, in which it is enlarged, is raised and seemingly is extended.

If the actual insolvency of explanatory psychology of the emotions Of [diltey] is mixed up with the fundamental uselessness of explanatory hypotheses in this the field and the fundamental impossibility of the causal explanation of the highest forms of the moods, in which the soul is enlarged, is raised and seemingly is extended, then now

it returns again to actual state of affairs and it is ready, to recognize following this of.[on] that explanatory psychology still simply did not mature for the solution of the problem of feelings and that, therefore, descriptive psychology must prepare and clear for it way, > in this consists .[ego] the third position. Therefore, he speaks, the region of most sincere life in actuality yet did not mature for the complete analytical processing. It is necessary that to that descriptive and dismembering psychology would complete its task on the details.

Thus, the mixing of these three different in their content assertions amazingly resembles the logic of the anecdote, given By [freydom] in its study of the witticism: the woman, whom the neighbor charges with the fact that she broke the pot lent in it, lead into their justification for the larger persuasiveness three arguments immediately: she first, speaks, I u. you took no pot; in the second place, when I took him, he was already broken; thirdly, I to you him returned, by completely whole. In [diltey] he tells: first, explanatory psychology did not give, until now, of the satisfactory explanation to life of our feelings; in the second place, this explanation is completely useless, unnecessarily and not at all it can be given; thirdly, explanatory psychology will know how to give this explanation after descriptive psychology it will complete to the end the task of breakdown and analysis. The I

The same mixing of the positions most different in the content consists also in the positive study program, which By [diltey] it plans for descriptive psychology of feelings. A study, he speaks, must move predominantly in three directions. It reflects the basic types of the flow of sincere processes. That the great poets, in particular Shakespeare, gave to us in the means, it attempts to make by a concept accessible for the analysis. It separates some basic relations, passing through the life of feelings and motives of man, and it attempts to establish the separate component parts of the state of feelings, .[i] of motives. The advantage of the descriptive and dismembering method over the explanatory Of [diltey] sees in the fact that it is limited to the examination of the solvable tasks. Obviously, the task of explanatory psychology of a feeling, it seems it insoluble. Pot there was not at all - not broken, n “whole, despite the fact that we recently asserted that the pot was undertaken broken and returned in the soundness.

This contradiction avoid another researcher, [Myunsterberg], which just as it is distinct as [Diltey] as many others, makes the distinction between causal and teleologic psychology as by two independent and equal sciences. This idea, prompted by entire historical motion of the development of contemporary psychology, matured simultaneously in different researchers: thus, apples, on Goethe's word, fall simultaneously in the different gardens. But [Myunsterberg] is more sequential than [Dilteya], and, although entire its concrete work it itself dedicated to the permission of the tasks of explanatory psychology, nevertheless it with the greatest completeness developed program and plan of a study of descriptive psychology.

The disastrous state of contemporary psychology, which is expressed in that, that we incomparably greater know about the psychological facts, than sometimes, until now, but much less we know about the fact that, strictly, there is psychology, in his opinion, it derives from the fact that psychology of our days fights with the prejudice, as if there is only one form of psychology. The concept of psychology includes two you will completely distinguish the scientific tasks, which should be principally distinguished, also, for which best to use special designations. In actuality there is two kinds psychology, but if

rules prejudice, which to science is sufficient one of them, then it is natural, that some psychologists cultivate only first form of psychology, and the second is laid aside; others worry exactly about this second form and disregard first; either finally both forms are mixed up into the imaginary unity, moreover material arbitrarily is divided between them, or one of them more or less intertwines with another. All these possibilities are occurred in contemporary scientific psychology.

It goes without saying that so not similar to each other of form psychology could not exist next to each other and be located in the spiritual contact, if between them there was nothing in common. This general consists, first of all, in the fact that any psychology deals concerning the experiences of individual. In terms of this it differs from the sciences about solid nature and from normative sciences. Individual personality is the, thus, decisive starting point for any psychology.

But the fundamental divergence of two possible psychology begins after this general starting point. In each beating of the pulse of our life experience, speaks [Myunsterberg], they become obvious that its own internal [zhizn]\_[my]\_[mozhem] to understand in two ways, acquiring by such of [obraZOM], the double knowledge of it namely: in

one case we understand the sense of our feeling and desire, our attention and thinking, our recollection and idea. All this we attempt to understand and to hold in that quality, which is located presently in each experience, i.e., as the activity of our “I” as the directed toward the known the target intention of our personality. We can then trace, how one desire includes another, as one idea indicates another, as in our spirit the peace of internal relations is revealed. But we can completely otherwise look at our experiences. We can contradict ourselves against [svrim] experiences not as the spiritually acting personality, as the simple spectator, and then experiences become for us the contents of our perception. Certainly, these contents differ from the content of nature. We delimit them from the external contents as the contents of our consciousness, but we are interested by them so, as interest us external things and processes. And we examine the contents of consciousness only from the point of view of the observer, who describes their flow and understands their necessary connection, i.e., it attempts to explain them. By means of this description the content of consciousness becomes the combination of elements, by means of the explanation these elements become the chain of reasons and actions. We so come to completely different understanding of the same sincere life. In one case - to the comprehension of internal relations and the understanding of internal [namerepiy] 'and the connection between them, in other - to description and explanation of elements and their actions.

If we in both directions conduct to the end these different methods of understanding our internal life and will give the scientifically final form to it, we actually had to obtain two, principally different theoretical disciplines. One of them describes sincere life as the totality of the content of consciousness and explains her. Another - interprets and is understood the same sincere life as the totality of purposeful and semantic relations. One there is [kauzalnaya]\_[psikhologiya], another teleologic and intentional. Here there is no differentiation of material whatever between that and other psychology, since any material must be examined from both points of view. Any feeling, any recollection and any desire can be understood as much in the category of causality as the content of consciousness, as, also, from an intentional point of view as spiritual activity.

In historical and contemporary psychology both forms are mixed up into the imaginary unity, each of them rarely is revealed actually purely and consecutively. But partly teleologic psychology is found larger in any external confluence with the elements of causal psychology. In that case the processes of memory, for example, are depicted as causal, and the processes of a feeling and will as intentional - mixing, which easily appears under the effect of the naive ideas of daily life. Thus, we can together with causal psychology speak about intentional psychology or about psychology of spirit, about psychology of consciousness or about understanding psychology together with the explanatory.

In this differentiation of the tasks of two kinds of psychology Of [myunsterberg] consecutively develops the thought to her logical end. It completely excludes any necessity and possibility of causal explanation for descriptive psychology, which allows only understanding and understanding of the purposeful and semantic relations between the experiences and it consequently requires the examination of spiritual activity as the completely autonomous region of reality, which lies out of nature and out of the life, which, speaking in Spinoza's language, it is not the natural thing, which follows to the general laws of nature, but by the thing, which lies beyond the limits of nature, as if state within the state. But is worth only look intently and consider the line of reasoning Of [dilteya] and [Myunsterberga], in order to immediately open its force and weakness, its positive and negative poles, its [bezuslovnuyu] rightness and so [bezuslovnuyu] an inaccuracy. Force and rightness of this line of reasoning consist exclusively of the acknowledgement of insolvency, insufficiency, fundamental inadequacy of those explanations, which were advanced, until now, by physiological psychology with respect to the highest manifestations of the mental life of man. Its rightness and its force consist exclusively in the fact that it advances to the foreground actually the paramount key problems of the highest in the man and thus for the first time generally is placed in entire increase the problem of psychology of real, living person.

But in the same of [samoig] point consists both weakness and inaccuracy of the examined by us line of reasoning. Generally speaking, new psychology is not so already different from the old. In some ways and even, perhaps, in the quite central and the main thing they completely coincide with each other, in spite of their visible opposition. Specifically, descriptive psychology completely assumes the basic idea of explanatory psychology, which is consisted in the fact that the causal explanation cannot be not than different, except mechanical reducing of complex and highest processes to the atomistic separate elements of sincere life. Thus new psychology completely becomes to the same positions, on the basis of which was developed always old psychology. The acknowledgement of mechanical causality as the only possible category explanations to mental life, limitation of the causal explanation to psychology by the narrow limits of [sokratovskoy] parody are the general point, in which are encountered and coincide new and old psychology. The only, thus, valid argument in favor of the development of independent descriptive psychology is the insolvency of explanatory psychology, which did not know how to exceed the limits of mechanical causality in the explanation to sincere life. In the broken pot of its neighbor new psychology sees the only reason in favor of the fact that it must cook meat in its own and completely special pot. This line of reasoning from the broken pot composes simultaneously force and weakness. the supporters of new psychology it is completely unquestionable that explanatory psychology, on the accurate observation Of [shelera], the fact that did not give the false explanation to the authentic problems of human psychology, but simply it did not note these problems and it was blind with respect to them. It is so unquestionable that these problems must be advanced before scientific psychology as its first priority and central tasks, which imperatively require their permission. But from this, logically discussing, in any way it is not possible to derive another conclusion, except the need to radically reconstruct the bases, upon which rests contemporary psychology. However, to conclude from these messages to the need for transmitting the permission of these problems some to the new and completely special science, which generally principally excludes possibility 'causal explanation, means to completely justify the contemporary state of explanatory psychology with all its errors, to wholly divide with it its errors, not to rise above it and not to overcome it, but it is simple to ask it to be made room and to construct on its that rotten foundation, on which cannot be held anything, except castle in the air or card house, spectral building “psychology of spirit”.

Therefore theory James - Lange with its parody of the causal explanation of human feelings unavoidably generates the theory Of [shelera] with its complete failure of any explanation of the highest sensations, replaced by understanding their teleologic connection, but [Sheler] so not far left from James as entire new psychology from the old. It, apparently, assumes that together with James the only accessible to psychology explanation is an explanation from the laws of physiological mechanics. Therefore it, as entire descriptive psychology, does not solve problem, but it goes around it. To the presented before the entire contemporary ^[psikhologiey] question, which we consider as the prototype of all. the basic problems, which require causal explanation, to a question why Socrates sat in the Athenian jail, theory James - Lange it answers reference for tension and weakening of the muscles, which curve inwards members, and the theory Of [shelera] by indication that a stay in the jail had as a goal to satisfy a high feeling of value. Both that and, etc is equally indisputable and so obviously, how and in vain. Both that and, etc is equally far from the actually scientific answer to a question. Both that and, etc does not equally turn attention to the true reason. Certainly, Socrates speaks, who would say that without such things as the bones and vein, I could not make, which to me is convenient, that would say truth. Of course without the reduction of muscles Socrates could not arrive into the jail and, after bending, to sit in it. But event in entire real its content could be completed in exactly the same manner, if it was brought or brought into the jail, and the same motions of muscles could take away it there, where students persuaded it to run.

Is complete [analogichno]' the real grief of mother, who mourns death of her child, if we recall the example to Lange, it is directly connected with its tears, although it could be completed in its soul, without being accompanied by tears, and although tears could be the manifestation of an opposite feeling, for example, of happiness. All this is indisputable, but to perceive reason in this would be, speaking in the language of Plato, foolishly far and wide.

So it is accurately completely indisputable and in an obvious most direct manner that the decision of Socrates to remain in the jail was connected with the pursuit of the specific vital purpose and the satisfaction of the specific feeling of value. But the same purposeful and value nature would have and event opposite according to the sense - its flight. In the essence, the failure of any causal explanation and the attempt to go around problem, relying on teleologic analysis, not only they do not move us forward in comparison with explanatory psychology of a feeling with its all undoubted imperfections, but, on the contrary, take away us [glu]-; side back. This magnificently realizes itself Of [diltey], when it, planning the program of descriptive psychology of feelings, proposes to, first of all, improve the methods of Spinoza and Hobbes. Definition, precise nomenclature and classification, he speaks, compose the first task of I descriptive psychology in this region. He forgets in this case, that/this way of determinations and classification, which made psychology for a period of several centuries, led to the fact that psychology! feelings it proved to be most barren and dullest of all heads of this science.

In this the indisputable rightness of James, as it is indisputably correct to must be acknowledged and his assertion, that the description and classification are the lowest steps in the development of science. Thus, from the insolvency of that causal explanation of emotions, which advanced James, descriptive psychology not that singularly correct conclusion that this explanation must be substituted with the best and more true, that emanate from other, more fundamental substantiations, but it proposes to recognize as unfounded possibility itself and idea of causal explanation. It raises the actual failure of one theory and false principles lying at its basis into the rank of fundamental failure, dividing together with [vsparivaemoy] it by doctrine persuasion in the truth of these in the root of erroneous principles.

It is natural that before new psychology is revealed in this case the way not forward, but back. [Diltey] it consecutively calls us therefore to turn to anthropology XVI of century and to improve its methods. Remarkable in this case is that [on]\_[beret] in The xVII.[veka] thinkers, in particular in Spinoza, then that it is that most become obsolete, extinct and lifeless: its nomenclature, classification the definitions, which do not reveal the content of our passions, but only indicate the conditions, with which sets in this sincere state. „

Thus, from Spinoza's study about the passions descriptive [psikhologtsa] draws to its side its not living, inverted to future, but dead and inverted to past part. The only possibility, which makes possible for new psychology to exceed the limits of anthropology of the 17th Century, [Diltey] it sees in the application of a comparative method in the study of expressive motions and symbols of ideas for the sincere states. But that, etc allows at our disposal only new booster agent for the solutions of the same problem, without deriving us principally beyond the limits of psychology of the passions of the 17th Century. Thus, is deleted by one stroke of feather almost three-hundred-year development (psychological thought and knowledge and motion backwards, back to the 17th Century, into the depth of history it declares by the only way of the scientific progress of psychology.

In a certain sense descriptive psychology, which is outstanding in the place of causal explanation the teleologic and spiritualistic examination of sincere phenomena, returns us to the epoch of philosophical, thought, which ruled to Spinoza. Specifically, Spinoza fought for the [e]c[testvennoe] deterministic, materialist, causal explanation of human passions. Specifically, he fought with the spectral explanation with the aid of the purpose. Specifically, he was that thinker, who for the first time philosophically substantiated the very possibility of explanatory psychology of man as sciences in the real significance of this word and | it traced the ways of its further development

In this sense Spinoza resists entire contemporary descriptive psychology as its irreconcilable enemy. This he fought with those revived in contemporary descriptive psychology by Cartesian dualism, spiritualism and [teleologizmom]. In this respect we had to contradict in most extreme measure our understanding of the real connection of Spinoza's study about the passions with contemporary psychology of emotions against the opinion Of [dilteya]. But remarkable is the fact that, advancing the basic problems of psychology of man, new direction it had to turn to psychology of the 17th Century, which thoughtfully directed its attention to authentic .[tsentr] of spiritual life, to the content of our passions, and to name Spinoza's name as the lighthouse, which illuminates way for new studies. In Spinoza the supporters of new direction find not only nomenclature and classification of passions, but also some basic relations, which pass through entire life of feelings and motives, that have decisive importance for the comprehension of man and comprising of theme for the precise descriptive method. Such, for example, the basic relation, which is consisted in the fact that also the stoics, and Hobbes, and Spinoza designated as the instinct of self-preservation or increase “[ya]>>: tendency toward the completeness of spiritual states, toward the eradication itself, toward the development of forces and motives. Thus, not only the method, but also the content of the [spinozovskogo] study about the passions is advanced as the leading beginning for the development of studies in the new direction - in the direction of the comprehension of man.

In this assertion, in this turning to Spinoza the truth is mixed with the lie in such measure, that it with difficulty it is possible to separate from the error. In order to make this, it is necessary to recall whereas that we already once had a case to encounter similar that mixed from the truth and the error by indication of the connection of the [spinozovskogo] study about the passions with contemporary psychology of emotions. In order to understand entire value of this thought Of [dilteya], that descriptive psychology of feelings must be the successor of Spinoza's psychology, one should recall that also Lange called Spinoza as thinker, it is more than all being approached the developed them physiological theory of emotions, on the strength of the fact that it the solid manifestations of emotions not only does not consider it depending on the sincere motions, but are placed they next to them, even almost it advances them to the foreground.

By [takim]^[brazom], Lange and [Diltey], descriptive and explanatory psychology of emotions, the forming two antipoles contemporary scientific knowledge about feelings of man, equally turn themselves as to their sources, to the [spinozovskomu] study about the passions. This agreement cannot be random. In it the deepest historical and theoretical sense, to open which for us is in prospect in the third part of our study, consists. But already and now we must extract something essential for our purposes from this fact of the joint ownership of two opposite studies in the united aspiration to the [spinozistskoy] thought as to our ideological beginning.

With Spinoza's study about the passions we spoke already higher relative to the connection of Lange's theory. We could establish that in its significant part the acknowledgement of the direct and direct, historical and ideological connection between the study of Spinoza about the passions and the theory of James- Lange is based on the illusion. Lange's itself was vaguely understood the inaccuracy of its indication of the proximity of [spinozovskogo] study to his theory. With a feeling of admiration it finds complete vasomotor theory about the solid manifestations of emotions in [Malbransha], which with the insight of genius, opened the true connection between the phenomena. In this thinker we actually meet the schematic of emotional mechanism, expressed in the vague language of the physiology of those days, which allows transfer into the language of contemporary physiology and in this form actually can be approached with James- Lange hypothesis. The same actual agreement was very early established By [ayronsom], which showed that Descartes costs on the same position as James. We saw that the subsequent studies, in particular the work Of [kerzhi], completely confirmed this opinion. But this it is small. We attempted themselves to explain in the course of our study that not only the actual description of the mechanism of emotional reaction brings together these theories, divided by almost three centuries from each other, but that same this actual agreement

it is the consequence of the deeper methodological relationship between them, the relationship, based on what contemporary physiological psychology wholly inherited from Descartes the naturalistic and mechanical principle of the interpretation of emotions. Cartesian mechanism, automatism and dualism are the true bases of the hypothesis of Lange and James, and this gave the complete right To [denlapu] to name great philosopher the true father of entire contemporary reactologic psychology.

We see, thus, that Lange's theory it goes back in reality not to the [spinozovskomu], but to the Cartesian study about the passions of soul. In this sense it is possible to say that Lange in the final note to his study in vain calls Spinoza's name. Is such in the short words the result, at which we arrived as a result the previous study of this problem.

But now we could supplement this conclusion one more, and the highest degree with the essential and important feature, which comes out in the clear light in connection with the contrast to descriptive and explanatory psychology of emotions. New, that we learn from this contrast, consists in the fact that in known sense the [spinozovskoe] study actually is located in much the closer relationship with the explanatory, than with descriptive psychology, and, which means, rather must be approached - with Lange's hypothesis, in which the basic principles of explanatory psychology of emotions found their bright expression, than with the program of descriptive psychology of feelings, planned [Dilteem]. In the dispute of causal and teleologic psychology, in the fight of the deterministic and [indeterministicheskoy] concepts of feelings, in the collision of spiritualistic and materialist hypotheses Spinoza, of course, must be set on the side of those, who protect the scientific knowledge of human feelings against the metaphysical.

Specifically, in that point, in which the [spinozovskoe] study about the passions converges with explanatory psychology of emotions, it disperses in a most irreconcilable manner from descriptive psychology. This time by already [Diltey], but not Lange in vain mentions Spinoza's name at the very beginning his program of future of studies. In fact, what is common it can be between these researchers, who consciously revive the teleologic and metaphysical concepts of anthropology of the 17th Century, with which did fight always Spinoza, with a strict determinism, by causality n by the materialism of its system? Not without reason, as we already indicated, [Diltey] advances to the foreground Spinoza's studies his most obsolete, inverted to the past formal and speculative part, his nomenclature, classification and determination. With the great principles of the [spinozovskoy] system of psychology Of [dilteya] not only not along the way, but its own way can be laid only by means of the most bitter fight against these principles. After entire aforesaid above hardly can remain any doubt, that, reviving the spiritualistic and teleologic principles of the 17th Century, descriptive psychology in its basic nucleus goes back not to Spinoza, but to Descartes, in study of whom about the passions of soul it finds its complete and true program.

However, Spinoza, of course, not [Dilteem] and By [myunsterbergom], not with their study about the autonomous and the independent variable, that exists exclusively in view of the purposeful connections n of the semantic relations of sincere life, and with Lange and James at their fight against the constant spiritual essences, eternal n of protected, against the concept, which considers emotions not as the emotions of man, but as which lie for the limits of nature of the essence of the forces, whose demons seize man. It, of course, never would agree to recognize - [k] in this the [bezuslovnaya] rightness of Lange, that mental fear by itself can explain, why they turn pale, they shake and so forth it with those, who description and classification consider as James, the lowest steps in the development of science, but the explanation of causal connection is recognized itself for a more in-depth research, a study of higher order. But the complexity of the matter is aggravated by the fact that, is however obvious the inaccuracy of the attempt to lean descriptive psychology of feelings on the [spinozovskoe] study about the passions, nevertheless in known sense this attempt includes some portion of truth. We above attempted to perceive it in the fact that the problem, advanced in descriptive psychology of feelings, the problem of the specific special features of human feelings, the problem of the vital value of a feeling, the problem of the highest in the emotional life person, all these problems, to which was blind explanatory psychology and which by their quite nature exceed the limits of mechanical interpretation, actually they were for the first time set in entire increase in Spinoza's study about the passions. In this point [spinozovskoe] study occurs actually on the side of new psychology against the old, it supports [Dilteya] against Lange.

We occur, thus, before the final sum, which cannot but confuse us by the extraordinary complexity of the results being contained in it. We saw that the line of [spinozistskoy] thought finds in by something its historical continuation both in Lange and in [Dilteya], i.e., both in the explanatory and in descriptive psychology of our days. Something from the [spinozovskogo] study is contained in each of these being fought between themselves theories. Breaking through to the causal natural-science explanation of emotions, James- Lange theory solves thus one of the central problems of [spinozovskoy] materialist and deterministic psychology. But descriptive psychology, as we saw, advancing to the foreground the problem of sense and vital value of human feelings, attempts to solve thus also the basic and central problems of [sshchshozovskoy] ethics.

- It is possible to determine in few and short words the true ratio of the [spinozovskogo] study about the passions to explanatory and descriptive psychology of emotions, after saying that in this study, dedicated, generally speaking, to the permission of one- only problem - the problem of the deterministic, causal explanation of the highest in the life of human passions, partially it is contained and explanatory psychology, which preserved the idea of causal explanation, but which rejected the problem of the highest in the passions person, and descriptive psychology, “rejected the idea of causal explanation and preserved the problem of the highest in the life of human passions. Thus, in Spinoza's study it is contained, forming its deepest and internal nucleus, precisely, that, which there is not in one of two parts, into which was decomposed contemporary psychology of the emotions of the [didssav]-[lrinlnnogo] explanation and \_[problemy]\_[zhizneniogo] value of human passions,” the unity of descriptive and explanatory psychology of a feeling. Spinoza therefore is very intimately connected with most vital, sharpest acute topic of the day of contemporary psychology of emotions, which prevails over it, determining its envelopped paroxysm of crisis. Spinoza's problems in the unresolved form wait their solution, without which is impossible tomorrow of our psychology. But explanatory and descriptive psychology of the emotions of Lange and [Dilteya], in how they solve Spinoza's problem, wholly they move away themselves from his study and, as we attempted to show above, wholly they are contained in the Cartesian study about the passions of soul. Thus, the crisis of contemporary psychology of emotions, after being decomposed into two irreconcilable and which quarrel with each other of part, presents to us the historical fate not [spinozistskoy], but Cartesian philosophical thought. This entire more clearly it appears in the main point, which serves as the watershed between explanatory and descriptive psychology, in a question about the causal explanation of human emotions.

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