-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: [xmca] déjatel’ nost’
Date: Thu, 4 Sep 2008 15:27:28 -0400
From: Martin Packer <mpacker885@gmail.com>
To: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
Andy, I'm having technical problem sending email. Any
possibility you could forward this to XMCA? thanks!
Steve,
I'll admit I have some problems with Ilyenkov's reading of
Marx. Consider, for example, the following excerpt. Is he
saying we should study the hydrogen atom? Is this the
"elementary manifestation" that is analogous to the the
commodity in Capital? Yes, hydrogen is the simplest element,
and its analysis can enable us to understand the properties
of more complex elements. (The Schrodinger wave equation,
for example, can be solved for a hydrogen atom but is
unsolvable for more complex atoms, if I remember my college
chemistry).
>> Hydrogen appears in this
>> case as the elementary structure in the decomposition
of which
>> chemical properties of matter disappear in general,
whether the
>> analytical decomposition is performed in an actual
experiment or only
>> mentally. Hydrogen is therefore a concrete universal
element of
>> chemism.
But not all the properties of hydrogen show up (appear) in a
single atom. Hydrogen atoms bond to form H2 molecules, and
at low temperature and pressure show a more exotic bonding
form (the Bose-Einstein condensate). A single atom doesn't
go through phase changes (solid, liquid, gas). So, yes, "the
concrete universal concept registers a real objective
elementary form of the existence of the entire system rather
than an empty abstraction." But not in isolation.
Ilyenkov claims that with the "single form" of direct
exchange alone Marx was able to identity all the phenomena
and categories of advanced capitalism, "without exception."
I just don't think this is true. Marx traced the commodity
form back to these simple origins, but he analysed the
contemporary version of the form as well. So where Ilyenkov
says that to understand life we ought to study "the
elementary protein body" (I think this should be "protean"
body), which I take to mean unicellular organisms, yes of
course this is important, but surely we also need to study
modern complex multi-cellular organisms?
If it really were the case that Marx could come up with "all
phenomena and categories of advanced capitalism" from
studying only "direct exchange of one commodity for another"
this would amount to be being able to predict, or perhaps
logically deduce, the direction and outcome of cultural
evolution. It would be like studying a single-celled
organism and accurately predicting its evolution into ammals
and then humans. This might be possible if there were a
"universal dialectical law" unfolding everywhere. Ilyenkov
appears to believe that there is, and this is one way of
reading Marx. But it is not the way I read Marx, and I don't
believe that there is an "objectively universal" dialectical
logic that can be identified even in the simplest of forms.
Martin
On 9/3/08 10:05 AM, "Steve Gabosch" <stevegabosch@mac.com
<mailto:stevegabosch@mac.com>> wrote:
> You raise really good points, Martin. What are you
thoughts on the
> distinction between an "analytical unit" versus a "basic
unit of
> analysis", and where do you see the "concrete universal"
fitting in?
> - Steve
>
>
> On Sep 3, 2008, at 6:16 AM, Martin Packer wrote:
>
>> Andy, Steve,
>>
>> I like the idea of exploring further the way Marx's
analysis of the
>> commodity gives us a concrete (!) example of
methodology. A good
>> place to
>> start is with the fact that the commodity is the unit
of analysis in
>> Capital, in the sense that Andy defines, that it is the
smallest
>> component
>> that shows the properties of the whole: in this case,
it shows the
>> contradiction between use value and exchange value that
characterizes
>> capital as a whole.
>>
>> But at the same time, it is a constituted unit, no? Or,
better put,
>> it is at
>> the same time a process, which can be analytically
decomposed into
>> cycles of
>> production and exchange. Ilyenkov apparently focuses on
Marx's
>> analysis of
>> the historical development of the commodity, from
unmediated exchange
>> through to complex money forms. But there is a
synchronic dimension of
>> analysis too, and Marx explores how the process of
exchanging
>> commodities is
>> the basis for the abstraction in which they come to
have common
>> measure.
>> Equally the labor of producing commodities becomes
abstract, and what
>> remains in each case is value.
>>
>> So we learn little by looking at a unit in isolation.
"We may twist
>> and turn
>> a single commodity as we wish; it remains impossible to
grasp it as
>> a thing
>> possessing value... [its objective character as value]
can only
>> appear in
>> the social relation between commodity and commodity"
(Marx). We need
>> to
>> examine units in relation. This seems to me to suggest
that although
>> a unit
>> has the characteristics of the whole, this is the case
only when the
>> unit is
>> examined *in* the whole. We need to study a commodity
*in* capitalist
>> society.
>>
>> More specifically still, we need to study the unit in
the processes
>> of which
>> it is the product. So Chapter 2 of Capital considers
"The Process of
>> Exchange" in which "in order that these objects may
enter into
>> relation with
>> each other as commodities, their guardians must place
themselves in
>> relation
>> to one another as persons whose will resides in these
objects." Our
>> analysis
>> only *begins* with an examination of the unit, the
commodity. It must
>> proceed to an examination of the relations among units,
and then to
>> the
>> relations among people which bring the units into relation.
>>
>> Here of course the famous passage, "a commodity appears
at first
>> sight an
>> extremely obvious, trivial thing. But its analysis
brings out that
>> it is a
>> very strange thing, abounding in metapysical subtleties
and
>> theological
>> niceties." "The mysterious character" of the commodity
"reflects the
>> social
>> characteristics of men's own labour."
>>
>> My reading of this is that the analysis of a unit
cannot replace the
>> analysis of the whole, even though the unit "reflects"
the whole. We
>> must
>> analyze the unit *in* the whole which constitutes it,
for it is *we*
>> who
>> make the commodity what it is, "without being aware of
it." Analysis
>> is a
>> process in which we "try to decipher the hieroglyphic,
to get behind
>> the
>> secret of [our] own social product." This analysis has
an emancipatory
>> character because it enables us to see the contingent,
historical
>> genesis of
>> forms which had come to seem natural, immutable, and
finished. Marx is
>> interested in the commodity. But one might argue that
he is *more*
>> interested in the festishism with which we generally
understand
>> commodities,
>> the alienation which quantitative exchange of
commodities gives rise
>> to, and
>> the "metamorphosis" of commodities into money which is
the basis for
>> the
>> exploitation of labor (so Chapter 3 analyzes "The
Circulation of
>> Commodities" now as a process that becomes mediated by
money). None
>> of this
>> is exactly "in" the commodity, but only if we begin our
analysis
>> with the
>> commodity will we be able to understand the other
phenomena.
>>
>> Does this all get played out in Vygotsky's analyses?
>>
>> Martin
>>
>>
>>
>> On 9/2/08 8:19 AM, "Steve Gabosch" <stevegabosch@mac.com
<mailto:stevegabosch@mac.com>> wrote:
>>
>>> Andy, I am still absorbing your last message. While
doing that I
>>> wanted to look at Ilyenkov's 1960 book The Dialectics
of the Abstract
>>> & the Concrete in Marx's Capital, which deals with
many things we
>>> are
>>> talking about in this thread.
>>>
>>> ****************
>>>
>>> The lengthy passage below is a helpful description of
the concrete
>>> universal by Ilyenkov. After pointing out how Marx
uses value as the
>>> concrete universal in the development of the
capitalist economy,
>>> Ilyenkov gives helpful examples of concrete universals
in chemistry
>>> and life in general.
>>>
>>> Btw, this transcription on Marxist Internet Archive is
by Andy.
>>>
>>>
http://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/abstract/abstra5a.htm
>>>
>>> Ilyenkov
>>> The dialectics of the Abstract & the Concrete in
Marx's Capital
>>>
>>> from Chapter 5 – The Method of Ascent from the
Abstract to the
>>> Concrete in Marx's Capital
>>>
>>> the beginning of the section Concrete fullness of
Abstraction and
>>> Analysis as a Condition of Theoretical Synthesis
>>>
>>> We shall now turn to a consideration of the logical
structure of
>>> Capital, comparing it both with the logic of Ricardian
thought and
>>> the
>>> theoretical views of Marx's predecessors in the field
of logic;
>>> this
>>> discussion should reveal Marx's logic in its actual
practical
>>> application to the analysis of facts, to the analysis
of empirical
>>> data.
>>>
>>> Our task is that of singling out the universal logical
elements of
>>> Marx's treatment of economic materials, the logical
forms that are
>>> applicable, due to their universality, to any other
theoretical
>>> discipline.
>>>
>>> Capital, as is well known, begins with a most thorough
and detailed
>>> analysis of the category of value, i.e., of the real
form of economic
>>> relations that is the universal and elementary form of
the being of
>>> capital. In this analysis, Marx's field of vision
encompasses a
>>> single and, as we have already noted, extremely rare,
in developed
>>> capitalism, factual relation between men – direct
exchange of one
>>> commodity for another. At this stage of his inquiry
into the
>>> capitalist system, Marx intentionally leaves out of
account any other
>>> forms – money or profit or wages. All of these things
are as yet
>>> believed to be non-existent.
>>>
>>> Nevertheless, analysis of this single form of economic
relations
>>> yields, as its result, a theoretical expression of the
objectively
>>> universal form of all phenomena and categories of
developed
>>> capitalism
>>> without exception, an expression of a developed
concreteness, a
>>> theoretical expression of value as such, of the
universal form of
>>> value.
>>>
>>> The elementary type of the existence of value
coincides with value in
>>> general, and the real actually traceable development
of this form of
>>> value into other forms constitutes the objective
content of the
>>> deduction of the categories of Capital. Deduction in
this conception,
>>> unlike the Ricardian one, loses its formal character:
here it
>>> directly
>>> expresses the real content of some forms of economic
interaction from
>>> others.
>>>
>>> That is precisely the point missing in the systems of
Ricardo and of
>>> his followers from the bourgeois camp.
>>>
>>> The conception of a universal concept underlying the
entire system of
>>> the categories of science, applied here by Marx,
cannot be explained
>>> by the specificity of the subject-matter of political
economy. It
>>> reflects the universal dialectical law of the
unfolding of any
>>> objective concreteness – natural, socio-historical, or
spiritual.
>>>
>>>
>>> This conception is of great significance for any
modern science. To
>>> give a concrete theoretical definition of life as the
basic category
>>> of biology, to answer the question of what is life in
general, life
>>> as
>>> such, one ought to act in the same way as Marx acted
with value in
>>> general, that is, one should undertake a concrete
analysis of the
>>> composition and mode of existence of an elementary
manifestation of
>>> life – the elementary protein body. That is the only
way of
>>> obtaining
>>> a real definition and of revealing the essence of the
matter.
>>>
>>> Only in this way, and not at all by abstraction of the
general
>>> features of all phenomena of life without exception,
can one attain a
>>> really scientific and materialist conception of life,
creating the
>>> concept of life as such.
>>>
>>> The situation is the same in chemistry. The concept of
chemical
>>> element as such, of chemical element in general,
cannot be worked out
>>> through abstraction of the general and identical
features that helium
>>> has in common with uranium or silicon with nitrogen,
or the common
>>> features of all the elements of the periodic table.
The concept of
>>> chemical element may be formed by detailed
consideration of the
>>> simplest element of the system – hydrogen. Hydrogen
appears in this
>>> case as the elementary structure in the decomposition
of which
>>> chemical properties of matter disappear in general,
whether the
>>> analytical decomposition is performed in an actual
experiment or only
>>> mentally. Hydrogen is therefore a concrete universal
element of
>>> chemism. The universal necessary laws that emerge and
disappear with
>>> it, are the simplest laws of the existence of the
chemical element in
>>> general. As elementary and universal laws they will
occur in uranium,
>>> gold, silicon, and so on. And any of these wore
complex elements may
>>> in principle be reduced to hydrogen, which, by the
way, happens both
>>> in nature and in experiments with nuclear processes.
>>>
>>> In other words, what takes place here is the same
living mutual
>>> transformation of the universal and the particular, of
the elementary
>>> and the complex which we observed in the categories of
capital, where
>>> profit emerges as developed value, as a developed
elementary form of
>>> commodity, to which profit is continually reduced in
the real
>>> movement
>>> of the economic system and therefore in thought
reproducing this
>>> movement. Here as everywhere else, the concrete
universal concept
>>> registers a real objective elementary form of the
existence of the
>>> entire system rather than an empty abstraction.
>>>
>>> <end>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sep 1, 2008, at 10:27 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>>>
>>>> Steve,
>>>> as I understand it, the concept of "concrete
universal" is closely
>>>> related to UoA (or notion or "abstract concept") in
this way. In
>>>> approaching the understanding of a complex
phenomenon, the
>>>> researcher tries to determine a notion which will
reveal at least
>>>> the aspects of that whole she is interested in. One
and the same
>>>> phenomenon (e.g. "the real life of people" or
"personality") may be
>>>> approached using different units of analysis
(abstract notions) and
>>>> the result will be different insights into the same
phenomena.
>>>>
>>>> This is where the ascent from the abstract to the
concrete comes in:
>>>> the complex whole is to be "reconstructed" in
thought, beginning
>>>> from this abstract concept of it, and the end result
of such a
>>>> reconstruction is a "concrete universal". So if (for
example) a
>>>> certain social formation is to be understood as a
"concrete
>>>> universal", then you must begin by determining an
"anstract notion"
>>>> of it. (The tricky bit is discovery of the "abstract
notion" and the
>>>> only place to read about that process is in Hegel's
Doctrine of
>>>> Essence in the Logic.)
>>>>
>>>> The contrary method is to begin with a thoughtlessly
chosen element
>>>> and analyse it into its properties (or "attributes"
or in old
>>>> English "accidents"). (The subject is the sum of all
the predicates
>>>> which can be attached to it?) These attributes may
then be used to
>>>> reconstuct a whole, which would be an "abstract
general". For
>>>> example, someone who thinks that the working class
are people who
>>>> work for a wage, then define the working class as the
set of all
>>>> wage earners, and include policemen and senior
managers among the
>>>> proletariat--+, whilst ecluding housewives. The same
person might
>>>> define a bourseois as someone with a lot of money,
and decide that
>>>> the Professor of FIne Arts is not a bourgeois,
because he does not
>>>> own capital, only culture.
>>>>
>>>> Does that help?
>>>> Andy
>>>>
>>>> Steve Gabosch wrote:
>>>>> That is very helpful, Andy. The problem to solve, of
course, is
>>>>> determining the "simplest" component of a whole,
without entering
>>>>> into the realm of "elements," as Vygotsky would warn
against in his
>>>>> example of water, which is not flammable, whereas
its elements
>>>>> hydrogen and oxygen are. Your history of the
concept is a very
>>>>> useful place to start and is appreciated. I got
from Ilyenkov's
>>>>> writings, btw, that he thought "value" was the basic
unit of
>>>>> analysis of commodities, money, capital, etc. and
that Marx chose
>>>>> the simplest manifestation of value - the commodity
- to build his
>>>>> case on what capital is and how it works. But that
does not take
>>>>> anything away from the central points you are making.
>>>>> Here are some more questions, for you, anyone.
Ilyenkov also
>>>>> speaks of the concrete universal. How does the
"concrete
>>>>> universal" concept fit in with the "unit of
analysis" concept?
>>>>> Also, what is the distinction between unit of
analysis, basic unit
>>>>> of analysis, and analytical units? And to just make
sure there is
>>>>> no confusion, what is the difference between a
"unit" and an
>>>>> "element"?
>>>>> - Steve
>>>>> On Sep 1, 2008, at 7:20 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>>>>>> Others may chine in on this. I am in the midst of
writing stuff on
>>>>>> the topic, but a few basics:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> "Unit of analysis" is the simplest component of
something which
>>>>>> exhibits all the properties of the whole. It
originates from
>>>>>> Goethe who called it the *Urphanomenon*, and David
tells me that
>>>>>> Goethe got it from Vico, though I haven't been able
to confirm
>>>>>> that myself. Goethe insisted that the UoA had to be
itself a
>>>>>> "phenomenon" rather than a hypothesis or principle
or mechanism
>>>>>> lying behind and beyond appearances, like an
*embryo* or *germ-
>>>>>> cell*. Hegel took over the idea and he called it
the *Notion*
>>>>>> (Begriff), and it is the key idea in his logic and
his theory of
>>>>>> science. Marx applied the idea to political economy
and came up
>>>>>> with the *Commodity*, as the simplest relation of
bourgeois
>>>>>> society and the simplest unit of capital. Vygotsky
took up the
>>>>>> idea and his study of Pavlov's work on the
*conditioned reflex*
>>>>>> was his first idea for a UoA for psychology, and
then of course
>>>>>> the famous *word meaning* as a UoA for the study of
intelligent
>>>>>> speech. ANL then (it seems) took it further with
the idea of *(an)
>>>>>> activity* as the UoA for the social life of humans.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It is important that the UoA contains nothing
outside within
>>>>>> itself (preconditions, axioms, etc.), and is in
that sense
>>>>>> absolutely simple, and that it _is itself_ "an
example" of what it
>>>>>> is the simplest component of, for example the
*molecule* for
>>>>>> chemistry and the *particle* for physics. Hegel
took *right*
>>>>>> (which he took as private property) for the UoA for
the study of
>>>>>> modern society.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Hegel explained that a science must begin from the
*Concept* (is
>>>>>> UoA) of its subject matter, and then while studying
the field of
>>>>>> phenomena to guide perception, unfold out of the
conception,
>>>>>> logically so to speak, everything that is contained
within it.
>>>>>> Davydov and Elkonin's method of teaching the
science of number
>>>>>> actually takes that conception of science as a
research program
>>>>>> and applies it to teaching and learning, with *external
>>>>>> comparison* as the UoA for mathematics.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Hope that helps,
>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Steve Gabosch wrote:
>>>>>>> On your last comment, Andy, I for sure have much
to learn about
>>>>>>> the concept "unit of analysis". I like the way
Dot speaks of a
>>>>>>> "system" of units, levels, methodology, etc. A
very quick read
>>>>>>> of the AA Leontiev article on "Units" that Dot
refers us to
>>>>>>> reveals that it will take some serious study for
me to absorb -
>>>>>>> in a way, it is a summary of many key themes over
the history of
>>>>>>> activity theory, a history I most certainly have
much to learn
>>>>>>> about. I know that one thing I do as I am
learning a new concept
>>>>>>> is try to find ways to use it, to apply its terms,
to incorporate
>>>>>>> it wherever I can, including into everyday
situations if
>>>>>>> possible; in short, play with it - and sometimes I
will stretch
>>>>>>> it too far from its intended meaning, throw it
around too
>>>>>>> loosely, as you put it, and I will need to get
reined in, which
>>>>>>> appears to be what you are graciously doing.
>>>>>>> So would you, or anyone, help me out: what is the
"precise
>>>>>>> meaning" of "unit of analysis"?
>>>>>>> - Steve
>>>>>>> On Sep 1, 2008, at 4:46 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>>>>>>>> This is a bog topic, Steve. Marx's own views were
hindered by
>>>>>>>> the non-existence of workers' states and
substantial welfare
>>>>>>>> states, so he took quite an extreme position in
relation to "the
>>>>>>>> public sector". But obviously I am saying that
*labour which has
>>>>>>>> been subsumed under Capital* - the expression
Marx uses in the
>>>>>>>> "unpublished sixth chapter of Capital" - has the
object only of
>>>>>>>> expanding capital. Most people refer to house
work as the
>>>>>>>> production of labour power for sale. Although
over the yearws,
>>>>>>>> capital subsumes a greater and greater proportion
of the social
>>>>>>>> labour, it has not yet subsumed all. That is obvious.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I am mixing two sligtly different genres here,
marxist political
>>>>>>>> economy and soviet cultural-historical activity
theory, but I'd
>>>>>>>> be interested in reactions. The Soviets always
intended to be
>>>>>>>> faithful to Marx and political economy after all.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> PS, Steve please revise the meaning of "unit of
analysis". It
>>>>>>>> has a precise meaning and IMHO should not be
thrown around so
>>>>>>>> loosely."
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Steve Gabosch wrote:
>>>>>>>>> Andy wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> One could go on, but if one were to ask what
object is served
>>>>>>>>>> by work then the answer is "expansion of
capital". I caould
>>>>>>>>>> give 1000 examples of Marx making ths claim.
The idea that the
>>>>>>>>>> object of one's labour is profit is always
problemtatic for
>>>>>>>>>> people that work in the public sector,
especially in education
>>>>>>>>>> or health, but if you were in the USSR where
the state is
>>>>>>>>>> paying the wages, it would seem strange indeed.
The idea that
>>>>>>>>>> one's work is part of the reproduction of the
community in a
>>>>>>>>>> division of labour seems far more appealing.
But that turned
>>>>>>>>>> out to be a passing episode in twentieth
century history.
>>>>>>>>> Perhaps you didn't mean this, but it sounds like
you are saying
>>>>>>>>> that all work serves the accumulation or
expansion of capital.
>>>>>>>>> But as you know, there are many kinds of work
that don't. Here
>>>>>>>>> are three examples, as I see it:
>>>>>>>>> 1) House work (cleaning your own house) does not
produce
>>>>>>>>> surplus value.
>>>>>>>>> 2) Cuban workers today don't contribute to the
accumulation of
>>>>>>>>> capital, except in some small businesses and
enterprises (such
>>>>>>>>> as some restaurants, farms), where how much gets
accumulated is
>>>>>>>>> highly restricted. There is no capitalist class
of any
>>>>>>>>> significance in Cuba today.
>>>>>>>>> 3) Public sector workers in the US are not
producing surplus
>>>>>>>>> value. The health and education sectors
especially are
>>>>>>>>> examples of workers and other oppressed layers
demanding and
>>>>>>>>> fighting for social programs that enhance their
quality of
>>>>>>>>> life, forcing the capitalists to devote a small
percentage of
>>>>>>>>> the surplus value they accumulate to such
programs - which have
>>>>>>>>> been under attack for some years now by the
capitalists and
>>>>>>>>> political forces that support them precisely
because these
>>>>>>>>> programs do not produce surplus value - they
consume it.
>>>>>>>>> When one begins to look at economies, blocks of
capital, wages,
>>>>>>>>> government, public service workers, workers
states, classes,
>>>>>>>>> and other such issues, many of the core features
of activity
>>>>>>>>> theory appear on a new level of analysis:
historical
>>>>>>>>> materialism. There are of course other world
views, but this
>>>>>>>>> is the one Vygotsky used. Vygotsky said he was
applying
>>>>>>>>> historical materialism to psychology, which he
explained would
>>>>>>>>> require the discovery of new laws of development
and a new
>>>>>>>>> basic unit of analysis.
>>>>>>>>> Andy and I had some conversation about class and
activity
>>>>>>>>> offline recently and I said that "class" is a
unit of analysis
>>>>>>>>> in Marxism, as in "class analysis" and "the
history of all
>>>>>>>>> hitherto existing society is the history of class
>>>>>>>>> struggle" (Communist Manifesto).
>>>>>>>>> But on further thought, that is incorrect. Marx
and Engels say
>>>>>>>>> it right in that quote - they say **class
struggle**, not
>>>>>>>>> "class". Thinking about this, a common error in
sociology is
>>>>>>>>> to use class as the unit of analysis. Classes
are only
>>>>>>>>> elements of class struggles. Class is an
analytical unit, but
>>>>>>>>> not a basic unit of analysis.
>>>>>>>>> Relating this to CHAT, as I see it, classes are
to class
>>>>>>>>> struggles as actions are to activity. Class
struggle is a unit
>>>>>>>>> of analysis in historical materialism in the way
that activity
>>>>>>>>> is seen as a unit of analysis in cultural
historical
>>>>>>>>> psychology.
>>>>>>>>> But is activity really the **basic** unit of
human existence?
>>>>>>>>> As David was saying, there is a difference
between units of
>>>>>>>>> analysis and analytical units. Is activity an
analytical unit,
>>>>>>>>> but not the basic unit of analysis? This would
not overturn
>>>>>>>>> any work CHAT has done, just shift its attention
to a different
>>>>>>>>> basic unit of analysis, and "demote" activity to
an analytical
>>>>>>>>> unit, albeit a very useful and powerful one.
>>>>>>>>> Mohammed Elhammoumi argues in a paper he will
present at ISCAR
>>>>>>>>> that the unit of analysis is the social relations of
>>>>>>>>> production. If that is the case - I find this
idea thought
>>>>>>>>> provoking - then activity would be an element in
that larger
>>>>>>>>> entity - activities are carved out of the
existing social
>>>>>>>>> relations and artifacts (artifacts include
nature insofar as
>>>>>>>>> humans directly interact with it). Activity
could be
>>>>>>>>> understood as mutually constitutive with the
aggregate social
>>>>>>>>> relations in a particular society, in the way
that Michael
>>>>>>>>> describes actions and activity as mutually
constitutive.
>>>>>>>>> Interesting to think about.
>>>>>>>>> Steve
>>>>>>>>> On Aug 31, 2008, at 7:57 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> Thanks for all that Michael. I actually hardly
slept last
>>>>>>>>>> night going over in my mind the points you
made. I think I can
>>>>>>>>>> see my way through this now, and that "(a
system of) activity"
>>>>>>>>>> or "an activity" is indeed a very good
candidate for a "unit
>>>>>>>>>> of analysis". You will doubtless get something
from me on your
>>>>>>>>>> editor's desk in a couple of months on the
topic. But
>>>>>>>>>> altogether I feel much better about ANL now.
Thank you.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> But the questions about word meanings here are
still
>>>>>>>>>> outstanding:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> (1) "activity" - as used in Hegel and Marx and
Leontyev when
>>>>>>>>>> he says:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> "[The processes that mediate the influences of
the objective
>>>>>>>>>> world reflected in the human brain] are those
that realise a
>>>>>>>>>> person's actual life in the objective world by
which he is
>>>>>>>>>> surrounded, his social being in all the
richness and variety
>>>>>>>>>> of its forms. In other words, these processes
are his
>>>>>>>>>> activity."
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> - is not a unit of analysis, but a
presupposition, whilst "an
>>>>>>>>>> activity" or "system of activity", you have
convinced me, is a
>>>>>>>>>> good "unit of analysis" for the study of the
social life of
>>>>>>>>>> human beings. As when Marx says:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> "The premises from which we begin are not
arbitrary ones, not
>>>>>>>>>> dogmas, but real premises from which
abstraction can only be
>>>>>>>>>> made in the imagination. They are the real
individuals, their
>>>>>>>>>> activity and the material conditions under
which they live,
>>>>>>>>>> both those which they find already existing and
those produced
>>>>>>>>>> by their activity." (The German Ideology, 1a, 1845)
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> My concern is that we use the same word and I
suspect the
>>>>>>>>>> observation that we have here two qute distinct
concepts is
>>>>>>>>>> not something which is widely recognised.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> (2) "activity" and "work" - I am going to spend
some time
>>>>>>>>>> revising how ANL takes labour as the prototype
of an activity
>>>>>>>>>> and the bases on which "an activity" and "a
type of activity"
>>>>>>>>>> are delineated or developed. This is my major
concern.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> But look. Marx, Capital Vol 1:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> "As a capitalist, he is only capital
personified. His soul is
>>>>>>>>>> the soul of capital. But capital has one sole
driving force,
>>>>>>>>>> the drive to valorize itself, to create surplus
value, to make
>>>>>>>>>> its constant part, the means of production,
absorb the
>>>>>>>>>> greatest possible amount of surplus labour.
Capital is dead
>>>>>>>>>> labour which, vampire-like, lives only by
sucking living
>>>>>>>>>> labour, and lives the more, the more labour it
sucks." -
>>>>>>>>>> Capital, p.342
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> One could go on, but if one were to ask what
object is served
>>>>>>>>>> by work then the answer is "expansion of
capital". I caould
>>>>>>>>>> give 1000 examples of Marx making ths claim.
The idea that the
>>>>>>>>>> object of one's labour is profit is always
problemtatic for
>>>>>>>>>> people that work in the public sector,
especially in education
>>>>>>>>>> or health, but if you were in the USSR where
the state is
>>>>>>>>>> paying the wages, it would seem strange indeed.
The idea that
>>>>>>>>>> one's work is part of the reproduction of the
community in a
>>>>>>>>>> division of labour seems far more appealing.
But that turned
>>>>>>>>>> out to be a passing episode in twentieth
century history.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I.e., the most important "activity" today is
"capital." That
>>>>>>>>>> seems to have been lost somewhere, at least to
some extent.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Andy,
>>>>>>>>>>> I am not trying to give you advice. I am
talking about my own
>>>>>>>>>>> experiences of having struggled.
>>>>>>>>>>> One of the things Marx criticized his
contemporaries for is
>>>>>>>>>>> that they looked at value abstractly. He wrote
Das Kapital as
>>>>>>>>>>> a concrete analysis of value, its one-sided
expressions in
>>>>>>>>>>> use-value and exchange-value, and how these
concretized
>>>>>>>>>>> themselves in possible cases. Any time I want
to think about
>>>>>>>>>>> activity abstractly, I get into trouble, which
resolve
>>>>>>>>>>> themselves when I take concrete cases of
activity and work
>>>>>>>>>>> them through, culturally and historically. I
then realize
>>>>>>>>>>> that activity concretizes itself very
differently, the
>>>>>>>>>>> activity of schooling is very different in
U.S. suburbia then
>>>>>>>>>>> it is in inner-city neighborhood schools in
Philadelphia. Not
>>>>>>>>>>> when I do an abstract analysis, but when I go
concretely into
>>>>>>>>>>> the nitty-gritty details of everyday life in
the schools.
>>>>>>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>>>>> On 31-Aug-08, at 8:07 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> Oh Gosh, Micahel I thought we were going to
have a good ol'
>>>>>>>>>>> flame! :) and I was just getting started.
>>>>>>>>>>> OK. As I said, I will study those quotes, and
their contexts,
>>>>>>>>>>> where I can, and think some more about it, but
I really don't
>>>>>>>>>>> think I want to shift to "concrete cases" to
clarify a
>>>>>>>>>>> concept if the concept isn't clear at the
start. That's just
>>>>>>>>>>> not my style, if you know what I mean. I am
not anywhere
>>>>>>>>>>> saying that the work Leontyev and others have
done with these
>>>>>>>>>>> ideas is not perfectly good, valid science.
But there *are*
>>>>>>>>>>> problems, there *are* limts to the
applicability of these
>>>>>>>>>>> ideas, and I am exploring them.
>>>>>>>>>>> More later, and thanks heaps for laying hold
of those quote
>>>>>>>>>>> and your explanations so speedily!
>>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>>>> Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Andy, After I sent off the mail I thought
you might
>>>>>>>>>>>> misunderstand. I do understand and know your
background. I
>>>>>>>>>>>> meant to say rather than discussing activity
in the general,
>>>>>>>>>>>> take a concrete one and talk about it. I
meant discuss
>>>>>>>>>>>> concrete cases. I think if you were to have
taken a concrete
>>>>>>>>>>>> case of activity from your experience and
discussed activity
>>>>>>>>>>>> in this situation some of the problems that
appear when you
>>>>>>>>>>>> discuss it in the abstract would not show up.
>>>>>>>>>>>> Sorry for having written a message that could
have been and
>>>>>>>>>>>> was mistaken in its intention.
>>>>>>>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 31-Aug-08, at 7:41 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> C'mon Michael. I spent 30 years as a union
activist
>>>>>>>>>>>> transforming activity and thinking about what
I was doing.
>>>>>>>>>>>> At 62 I am now reflecting on that work. I
don't need to be
>>>>>>>>>>>> told to "go out" and put someone under my
microscope and
>>>>>>>>>>>> observe them.
>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>>>>> Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Andy, it is and is not a system of
actions. Actions and
>>>>>>>>>>>> activity stand in a constitutive
relationship. There are no
>>>>>>>>>>>> actions independent of activity and no
activity independent
>>>>>>>>>>>> of action. One of the problems that can arise
is because---
>>>>>>>>>>>> as we have done today----we talk about
activity in the
>>>>>>>>>>>> abstract, and this is what Marx didn't like
about Hegel, we
>>>>>>>>>>>> talk about ideal things, not about concrete
sensual
>>>>>>>>>>>> activity, which you only get when you analyze
real activity
>>>>>>>>>>>> rather than the idea of activity. I see you
struggle with
>>>>>>>>>>>> the idea, when what you should be doing is go
out and study
>>>>>>>>>>>> concrete activity. What you need to do is
study concrete
>>>>>>>>>>>> everyday activity, that is, actual cases
where an activity
>>>>>>>>>>>> realizes itself. And here you will find that
people act but
>>>>>>>>>>>> in the process concretize the activity in
THIS rather than
>>>>>>>>>>>> other possible ways. Their actions are not
JUST actions,
>>>>>>>>>>>> they are oriented toward the activity, which
only comes
>>>>>>>>>>>> about in and through the actions; yet the actions
>>>>>>>>>>>> presuppose the activity that they realize.
>>>>>>>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 31-Aug-08, at 7:25 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> Apologies. I sent two mails just to Michael
instead of the
>>>>>>>>>>>> list by mistake!
>>>>>>>>>>>> I will think about this some more. "Activity"
here means a
>>>>>>>>>>>> system of actions which have a common
societally-determined
>>>>>>>>>>>> object, like the collective hunt in his
famous example. But
>>>>>>>>>>>> it seems to me that the idea of "activity"
(in this sense)
>>>>>>>>>>>> as a "unit of analysis" poses some problems.
>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>>>>> Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Andy, you can always identify structure,
the question
>>>>>>>>>>>> is whether you can understand it own its own
or only in
>>>>>>>>>>>> its relation to other structures. I think it
is the
>>>>>>>>>>>> latter. So even within the unit you can
identify all sorts
>>>>>>>>>>>> of things, but they are not independent and
constitute
>>>>>>>>>>>> each other. That is why Yrjö's website is a bit
>>>>>>>>>>>> deceiving,
>>>>>>>>>>>> because he talks about elements----I think
the word
>>>>>>>>>>>> appears 6 times----when Vygotsky and Leont'ev
always talk
>>>>>>>>>>>> about doing unit analysis. So there is
structure, just
>>>>>>>>>>>> that it cannot be understood independently of
other
>>>>>>>>>>>> structures, each of which is a one-sided
expression of the
>>>>>>>>>>>> unit, which is activity. Or so I read it.
>>>>>>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 31-Aug-08, at 6:55 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> Well spotted, Michael.
>>>>>>>>>>>> In that same paragraph he says: "activity is
... a system
>>>>>>>>>>>> that has structure" so he is here referring
to what might
>>>>>>>>>>>> be called the "*system of* activity", as
opposed to acts
>>>>>>>>>>>> or operations, and actions - this entity that
Robert
>>>>>>>>>>>> explained to me is constituted as an entity
by means of
>>>>>>>>>>>> system-theoretic means.
>>>>>>>>>>>> Is that right?
>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>>>>> Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Andy,
>>>>>>>>>>>> I think he does say something that is at
least very close
>>>>>>>>>>>> to naming it unit analysis on p.50:
>>>>>>>>>>>> Activity is a molar, not an additive unit of
the life of
>>>>>>>>>>>> the physical, material subject. In a narrower
sense, that
>>>>>>>>>>>> is, at the psychological level, it is a unit of
>>>>>>>>>>>> life, mediated by psychic reflection, the
real function of
>>>>>>>>>>>> which is that it orients the subject in the
objective
>>>>>>>>>>>> world. In other words, activity is
>>>>>>>>>>>> not a reaction and not a totality of
reactions but a
>>>>>>>>>>>> system that has structure, its own internal
transitions
>>>>>>>>>>>> and transformations, its own development.
>>>>>>>>>>>> Where I would accentuate as follows:
>>>>>>>>>>>> Activity is "a *unit of life*", "a system
that has
>>>>>>>>>>>> structure, *its own* internal transitions and
>>>>>>>>>>>> transformations, *its own *development."
>>>>>>>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 31-Aug-08, at 6:27 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> OK, thanks for that Michael. I understand
Tätigkeit, so
>>>>>>>>>>>> that settles some questions, though not all.
>>>>>>>>>>>> I have another question about Activity to add
to these.
>>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky, Davydov, Engstrom (to take just
three) all talk
>>>>>>>>>>>> about "unit of analysis", "germ-cell" or
single instance
>>>>>>>>>>>> (as in Pavolv's study of the reflex), but in
the works of
>>>>>>>>>>>> AN Leontyev that I have access to (on
marxists.org
<http://marxists.org>) he
>>>>>>>>>>>> makes no reference to any of these terms.
This seems not
>>>>>>>>>>>> accidental to me actually. Can anyone clarify
this?
>>>>>>>>>>>> Did Leonteyv (a) think that "activity" passes
as a "unit
>>>>>>>>>>>> of analaysis", (b) disagree with the idea
that a science
>>>>>>>>>>>> should begin from a Unit of analysis, or (c)
define
>>>>>>>>>>>> subject-activity-object as the "unit of analysis
>>>>>>>>>>>> somewhere?
>>>>>>>>>>>> And I need citation, I'm afraid.
>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>>>>> Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Andy,
>>>>>>>>>>>> it's not just the Russian. In German there is the
>>>>>>>>>>>> parallel distinction between "Tätigkeit"
(deiatel'nost')
>>>>>>>>>>>> and Aktivität (aktivnost'). In the former
there is an
>>>>>>>>>>>> orientation----toward object/motive, which is
not in the
>>>>>>>>>>>> latter, and the former is oriented toward and
a result
>>>>>>>>>>>> of society (Gesellschaft), whereas the latter
is not
>>>>>>>>>>>> (necessarily). When Leont'ev is translated
into German,
>>>>>>>>>>>> you find the words Tätigkeit and the adjective
>>>>>>>>>>>> "gesellschaftlich" (societal) whereas in
English there
>>>>>>>>>>>> is activity and social----and that has made
all the
>>>>>>>>>>>> difference, to quote Robert Frost.
>>>>>>>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 31-Aug-08, at 4:18 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> I wonder if our Russian speakers could
indulge me again
>>>>>>>>>>>> with a point of clarification. déjatel'nost' (or
>>>>>>>>>>>> деятельность) is the Russian word for
>>>>>>>>>>>> "activity".
>>>>>>>>>>>> 1. I understand that in Russian the use of
definite and
>>>>>>>>>>>> indefeinite partcles (a and the) is rare, so
in the
>>>>>>>>>>>> title to AN Leontyev's famous book, does
déjatel'nost'
>>>>>>>>>>>> mean "an activity" or "activity" - with the
connotation
>>>>>>>>>>>> of substance that a word has in English if
used without
>>>>>>>>>>>> a or the. When we have "act, action and
activity," is
>>>>>>>>>>>> that third category the same word, déjatel'nost'?
>>>>>>>>>>>> 2. déjatel'nost' can also be translated as
"work". How
>>>>>>>>>>>> strong is the connection between "work" and
"activity"
>>>>>>>>>>>> in the Russian mind when talking of "activity
theory"?
>>>>>>>>>>>> Does that sound like "work theory"? Or is
this just like
>>>>>>>>>>>> any ambiguous word. I mean, English speakers
would not
>>>>>>>>>>>> think that in this context "activity" referred to
>>>>>>>>>>>> autonomous physiological processes, which can
also be
>>>>>>>>>>>> called "Activity". When "Theses on Feuerbach" is
>>>>>>>>>>>> translated into Russian, can Russian readers
see the
>>>>>>>>>>>> diffrence between "work" and "activity"?
>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> Fascinating response, Robert. So let's see if I
>>>>>>>>>>>> understand you right. A mass of
interconnected actions
>>>>>>>>>>>> can be understood as some *whole* (and not
just an
>>>>>>>>>>>> arbitrary collection of individual things) if
we can
>>>>>>>>>>>> perceive some kind of *constraint*, operating
over the
>>>>>>>>>>>> domain, which limits the domain of possible
>>>>>>>>>>>> configurations? Is that it?
>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>>>>> Robert Bracewell wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Andy and all,
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I agree with Michael that the relationship
between
>>>>>>>>>>>> activity and action is a
>>>>>>>>>>>> constitutive one, but I think this points to
a big
>>>>>>>>>>>> theoretical gap in CHAT
>>>>>>>>>>>> generally. If actions are the constituents of
>>>>>>>>>>>> activity, then the issue
>>>>>>>>>>>> arises as to how the constituents are arranged in
>>>>>>>>>>>> order to constitute
>>>>>>>>>>>> activity (and there may be other types of
constituents
>>>>>>>>>>>> in activity also). As
>>>>>>>>>>>> Leont¹ev said, this arrangement cannot be serial
>>>>>>>>>>>> (e.g., chains of s-r
>>>>>>>>>>>> pairs), nor additive in the sense of
accumulative (as
>>>>>>>>>>>> contrasted with the
>>>>>>>>>>>> mathematical sense). So how are we to
theorize the
>>>>>>>>>>>> arrangement? The issue of
>>>>>>>>>>>> arranging constituents to achieve higher order
>>>>>>>>>>>> structures has been treated
>>>>>>>>>>>> by both linguistics and artificial
intelligence. The
>>>>>>>>>>>> general approach is to
>>>>>>>>>>>> constrain the possible relationships between
>>>>>>>>>>>> constituents--in linguistics
>>>>>>>>>>>> this usually done via a grammar, in AI via a
program.
>>>>>>>>>>>> For CHAT I think our
>>>>>>>>>>>> task may be to build on Leont¹ev and figure
out these
>>>>>>>>>>>> constraints.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> --Bob Bracewell
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 8/29/08 1:24 PM, "Wolff-Michael Roth"
>>>>>>>>>>>> <mroth@uvic.ca <mailto:mroth@uvic.ca>
<mailto:mroth@uvic.ca <mailto:mroth@uvic.ca>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Andy,
>>>>>>>>>>>> I think he expresses the constitutive relation
>>>>>>>>>>>> between actions and
>>>>>>>>>>>> activity. Activity is not just the sum of
actions, it
>>>>>>>>>>>> presupposes
>>>>>>>>>>>> them but is itself presupposed by the actions
that
>>>>>>>>>>>> constitute it. I
>>>>>>>>>>>> am pasting the definition from OED, which
appears to
>>>>>>>>>>>> be consistent
>>>>>>>>>>>> with this (my) reading of Leont'ev. Leont'ev and
>>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky want to do
>>>>>>>>>>>> unit analysis, not element/al analysis. That
is, even
>>>>>>>>>>>> if you can
>>>>>>>>>>>> identify structures within activity, these cannot
>>>>>>>>>>>> stand on their own
>>>>>>>>>>>> like elements. What they are is dependent on
all the
>>>>>>>>>>>> other structures
>>>>>>>>>>>> that can be identified, with which they stand
in a
>>>>>>>>>>>> constitutive unit,
>>>>>>>>>>>> and which are subordinate to activity. :-)
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> molar, adj.3
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> 2. Psychol. Designating a large-scale unit of
>>>>>>>>>>>> behaviour, esp. an
>>>>>>>>>>>> integrated set of responses serving to bring
about a
>>>>>>>>>>>> common goal, as
>>>>>>>>>>>> distinguished from an elementary unit of
behaviour
>>>>>>>>>>>> such as a
>>>>>>>>>>>> physiological response (cf. MOLECULAR adj.
5); of or
>>>>>>>>>>>> relating to (the
>>>>>>>>>>>> study of) such behaviour.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 29-Aug-08, at 7:11 AM, Michael Glassman wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy,
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> This is just my perspective, but I still believe
>>>>>>>>>>>> Activity Theory goes
>>>>>>>>>>>> back to roots in work done by Stanislavsky - in
>>>>>>>>>>>> particular "On Being
>>>>>>>>>>>> an Actor" and his book on character
development. I
>>>>>>>>>>>> think the
>>>>>>>>>>>> argument that Stanislavsky makes is that you
should
>>>>>>>>>>>> never consider
>>>>>>>>>>>> each scene individually, as encapsulated and
whole, I
>>>>>>>>>>>> guess you could
>>>>>>>>>>>> say there should be no reification of a
scene. You
>>>>>>>>>>>> have to consider
>>>>>>>>>>>> a scene, and the actions of a character, not
only in
>>>>>>>>>>>> terms of the
>>>>>>>>>>>> entire play, but in terms of what has come
before and
>>>>>>>>>>>> what comes
>>>>>>>>>>>> after - that activity is part of an ongoing
process.
>>>>>>>>>>>> Stanislavsky
>>>>>>>>>>>> was working off the new form of playwrights
such as
>>>>>>>>>>>> Ibsen, Strindberg
>>>>>>>>>>>> and especially Chekhov of course. To give an
>>>>>>>>>>>> example, when Nora
>>>>>>>>>>>> walks out on Torvald and her father at the
end of "A
>>>>>>>>>>>> Doll's House"
>>>>>>>>>>>> the scene makes little sense in an of itself,
and if
>>>>>>>>>>>> you think of the
>>>>>>>>>>>> scenes of the play as simply being additive
you are
>>>>>>>>>>>> shocked. But if
>>>>>>>>>>>> you consider it as part of a moral activity,
with a
>>>>>>>>>>>> building
>>>>>>>>>>>> motivation that leads to a choice of action it is
>>>>>>>>>>>> extraordinarily
>>>>>>>>>>>> complelling.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Anyway, that's my two cents.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> ________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
<mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>>>>>>>>>>> <mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
<mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>>>>>>>>>>> on behalf of Andy Blunden
>>>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Fri 8/29/2008 9:53 AM
>>>>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [xmca] Molar, Molecular and Additive
behaviour
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Can anyone help me out here. Leontyev says:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> "But human practice is not just a series or a
sum of
>>>>>>>>>>>> actions. In other words, 'activity is a
molar, not an
>>>>>>>>>>>> additive unit'."
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> OED says:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Molar, Psychol. Designating a large-scale unit of
>>>>>>>>>>>> behaviour,
>>>>>>>>>>>> esp. an integrated set of responses serving
to bring
>>>>>>>>>>>> about a
>>>>>>>>>>>> common goal, as distinguished from an
elementary unit
>>>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>> behaviour such as a physiological response (cf.
>>>>>>>>>>>> MOLECULAR
>>>>>>>>>>>> adj. 5); of or relating to (the study of) such
>>>>>>>>>>>> behaviour.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> 1932 E. C. TOLMAN Purposive Behavior "On the
one hand,
>>>>>>>>>>>> Watson has defined behavior in terms of its
strict
>>>>>>>>>>>> physical
>>>>>>>>>>>> and physiological details, i.e., in terms of
>>>>>>>>>>>> receptor-process, conductor-process, and
effector-
>>>>>>>>>>>> process
>>>>>>>>>>>> per se. We shall designate this as the molecular
>>>>>>>>>>>> definition
>>>>>>>>>>>> of behavior. And on the other hand, he has
come to
>>>>>>>>>>>> recognize
>>>>>>>>>>>> that behavior is more than and different from
the sum
>>>>>>>>>>>> of its
>>>>>>>>>>>> physiological parts. Behavior has descriptive and
>>>>>>>>>>>> defining
>>>>>>>>>>>> properties of its own. And we shall designate
this
>>>>>>>>>>>> latter as
>>>>>>>>>>>> the molar definition of behavior."
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Am I missing something. By "not additive"
does Leontyev
>>>>>>>>>>>> simply mean that there's more to it than S -> R ?
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> David Preiss wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> based on the work made by max plank and run
by san
>>>>>>>>>>>> francisco's
>>>>>>>>>>>> exploratorium
>>>>>>>>>>>> http://www.exploratorium.edu/evidence/
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> David Preiss, Ph.D.
>>>>>>>>>>>> Subdirector de Extensión y Comunicaciones
>>>>>>>>>>>> Escuela de Psicología
>>>>>>>>>>>> Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
>>>>>>>>>>>> Av Vicuña Mackenna - 4860
>>>>>>>>>>>> 7820436 Macul
>>>>>>>>>>>> Santiago, Chile
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Fono: 3544605
>>>>>>>>>>>> Fax: 3544844
>>>>>>>>>>>> e-mail: davidpreiss@uc.cl
<mailto:davidpreiss@uc.cl>
<mailto:davidpreiss@uc.cl <mailto:davidpreiss@uc.cl>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> web personal: http://web.mac.com/ddpreiss/
>>>>>>>>>>>> web institucional:
http://www.epuc.cl/profesores/dpreiss
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
<mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>>>>
-------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>>>> ----- Andy
>>>>>>>>>>>> Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/ +61 3
9380 9435
>>>>>>>>>>>> Skype andy.blunden
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
<mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> <
>>>>>>>>>>>> winmail
>>>>>>>>>>>>
.dat>_______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
<mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
<mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
<mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>>>>
-------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>>>> -----
>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/ +61
3 9380 9435
>>>>>>>>>>>> Skype andy.blunden
>>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
<mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>>
>>
----------------------------------------------------------------------->
>>>>>>>>>
>> -
>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/ +61 3
9380 9435 Skype
>>>>>>>>>> andy.blunden
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>
----------------------------------------------------------------------->>>>>>>>
-
>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/ +61 3
9380 9435 Skype
>>>>>>>> andy.blunden
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>>
>>>>>> --
>>>>>>
------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>> Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/ +61 3 9380
9435 Skype
>>>>>> andy.blunden
>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>>
------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>> Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/ +61 3 9380
9435 Skype
>>>> andy.blunden
>>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> xmca mailing list
>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
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>
> _______________________________________________
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-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/ +61 3 9380 9435 Skype andy.blunden Hegel's Logic with a Foreword by Andy Blunden: http://www.marxists.org/admin/books/index.htm _______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmcaReceived on Thu Sep 4 16:47 PDT 2008
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