RE: [xmca] DIALECTICAL PSYCHOLOGY SECTION, GROUPE and SEMINAR

From: Alexander Surmava <monada who-is-at netvox.ru>
Date: Tue Apr 29 2008 - 21:47:15 PDT

Hi, Martin, Peter, Andy et al…

Thank you Peter! I like your choice of words for translation of two
fundamentally important concepts. Now there remains to formulate the
interpretation of the distinction between them in dialectical tradition, to
give a concept of concept and a concept of conception.

But first of all we need to realize the basic distinction between two
opposite cultural trends marked with names of John Lock and Spinoza. Let’s
reread the first chapter of Ilyenkov’s “Dialectical logic”.

In concluding his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke defined the
subject matter and task of logic as follows: ‘The business [of logic] is to
consider the nature of signs the mind makes use of for the understanding of
things, or conveying its knowledge to others.’ He treated logic as ‘the
doctrine of signs’, i.e. as semiotics.

But philosophy, fortunately, did not jell at that level. The best brains of
the period understood very well that it might be all right for logic to be
interpreted in that spirit, but not for the science of thinking.

(Just now I’ve found that the underlined words are ABSOLUTELY FALSE
translation misrepresented the clear Ilyenkov’s idea. The Russian text of
the first edition (1974, p.9) sounds: “Luchshie umy etoi epohi prekrasno
ponimali, chto esli logiku traktovat' v vysheopisannom duhe, to ona yavitsya
chem ugodno, no tol'ko ne naukoi o myshlenii”. The correct translation will
be the follow: “The best brains of the period understood very well that the
logic being treated in this described above manner can be anything but not
the science of thinking”.

Ilyenkov evidently will never say something like the statement that semiotic
approach might be all right for logic and is unacceptable only for some
mysterious “science of thinking” opposed in this context to logic.

Unfortunately neither Ilyenkov, nor his close followers didn’t know English
to verify the translation and I’m afraid that this blunder is not something
exceptional.)

  Ilyenkov reckon himself among followers of tradition opposite to rooted in
medieval philosophy Nominalism. (Surely it doesn’t mean that he belongs to
medieval school of Realism.) This tradition is marked by such names as
Descart, Spinoza, classics of German philosophy and Marx. Alas, but in spite
of all absolutely sincere pro Marxist declarations, Vygotsky evidently stays
just on Nominalist position.

Ilyenkov insists:

At first glance (and people usually proceed from such a ‘first glance’,
adopting it absolutely uncritically from everyday usage), thought
represented one of man’s subjective psychic abilities along with others like
intuition, sensation, memory, will, and so on and so forth. By thinking was
also understood a special kind of activity directed, unlike practice, at
altering ideas, at reorganising the images that were in the individual’s
consciousness, and directly at the verbal shaping of these ideas in speech;
ideas, when expressed in speech (words, terms) were called concepts. When
man altered real things outside his head, and not ideas, that was no longer
considered thinking, but at best only activities in accordance with thought,
according to the laws and rules dictated by it…

Here Ilyenkov argues that thinking (as well as concept) per se is usually
associated with unilaterally theoretical, mental activity, while the
practical, sensual activity is believed as opposite to thinking or at best
as “activities in accordance with thought”. This position is open to
criticism. We can after Spinoza (and Vygotsky) ask its advocates: how can a
thought slightly shift just one atom in our brains or body to have a chance
to control its sensual activity? With aid of Cartesian pineal body? Or with
aid of John Eccles’ demon living in synaptic gap?

Meanwhile Ilyenkov continues his argumentation.

Language (speech) is, nevertheless, not the sole empirically observed form
in which human thought manifests itself. Does man really not discover
himself as a thinking being in his actions, in the course of actually
shaping the world around him, in the making of things? Does he really only
function as a thinking being when talking? The question is surely purely
rhetorical. The thought of which Hegel spoke discloses itself in human
affairs every bit as obviously as in words, in chains of terms, in the
lacework of word combinations. Furthermore, in real affairs man demonstrates
the real modes of his thinking more adequately than in his narrations of
them.

I’ll stop quoting and return to Martin’s and other discussant’s reflections.

I do think that the proper, culturally developed use of a hammer includes
not only a bit but entire concept of hammer. A carpenter or shoemaker
handling with a hammer masterly doesn’t need any extra “theoretic” concept
or formal verbal definition of it taken from Wikipedia.

On the contrary, the specialist in history of human technology having
written a thick book about hammers can have a real understanding, real
concept of the historical origin of hammers, but only a vague conception of
hammer per se if he can’t hammer a nail not hitting his fingers.

The use a hammer properly means to understand what is a hammer in human’s
culture, it means to hammer nails not as automaton, but as a conscious human
subject, it means to have a concept, to act “conceptly” (ponyatiino) even if
one (being deaf and dumb) have never heard the very word “hammer” and have
never heard academic lectures about history of this nice and necessary tool.

I guess that for most of researchers based on tradition of analytical
philosophy, or various forms of positivism such interpretation of concept is
looking rather odd. They used to understand concept as a meaning of word and
correspondingly the science as a logically coordinated system of words.

The dialectical tradition is quite different.

According to Marx and Ilyenkov the relation between practical and
theoretical relation is the follows. Just as in self-increasing movement of
capital the formula looks like this: money – commodity – money', the
movement of humans cognition goes the same way: practical relation
(practical, but genuine concept) – theoretical relation (system of abstract
conceptions moving, or not moving to the concrete concept) – practical
relation'(practical and genuine developed concept). It’s easy to see that
the second stage is the most dangerous. It easily slides into banal
verbalism and scholasticism. Only third stage if it takes place can witness
that the “theoretic” movement wasn’t just an imitation of thinking in
concepts, but real theoretic movement.

Martin, I <file:///E:\Users\MAPASON%20VISTA\AppData\Local\Temp\Word_1> not
half insist that “practical understanding is more adequate than a scientific
understanding”. But I do insist that “scientific” understanding which is not
based on practical understanding and what is more which doesn’t ends in more
developed practice is an empty and as a rule not without a selfish motivated
game with “scientific” words.

You are right, according Il’enkov’s as well as Marx’ and Spinoza’s position
intelligent human thought and action are possible without “mental
representations”, if we realize this mental representation in Cartesian
style as modus of thinking substance. Ilyenkov after Spinoza and later with
Leont’ev insisted that intelligent (and not only human, but animal as well)
action is not a result of ridiculous coordination of abstract Cartesian
bodiless soul and abstract Cartesian senseless body. Intelligent action, the
ability to such an action is an attribute of substance and thus can be
appropriated by special class of natural bodies – “thinking bodies”.

So called “mental” representation, if we realize it in Cartesian style, is
not merely useless for smart practical action, but it can be estimated as a
rudiment of mythological thinking. In exists only in imagination of idealist
(=dualist) thinkers.

You say: “I can't agree that the ability to use the tool is all that is
needed, or all that is possible”.

But, Martin, I’ve never asserted it. I just assert that to hammer nails or
to eat with spoon we doesn’t need in “scientific” theory of hammering or
“spooning” and we can realize this functions not as Cartesian senseless
automatons, but as alive and smart humans, as humans acting with
understanding=acting in concepts. I realize that modern farmer needs in more
and more profound theoretic knowledge to plant corn or melons basing on new
technologies, but he needs in real scientific, i.e. leading to successful
practice theory. And I assert that there is more similarity in type of
thinking between practically producing his material life illiterate peasant
and real profound researcher than between both of them and multiple
“specialists” in combining empty words in academic sphere, in politics
<file:///E:\Users\MAPASON%20VISTA\AppData\Local\Temp\Word_0> and so forth.
Those which unifiers a “primitives” and really advanced thinkers is their
common object oriented activity, their common smart movement according the
objective shape of their objects, while their antagonists specialized in
some type of ideology which according to Marx’ definition is a false form
of consciousness. I do seriously insist that “tribal people” as well as
little children use genuine concepts (of objects of their practical life)
wile “Logical Positivist philosophers” using the genuine concepts in their
practical personal life in their professional thinking are standing lower
that “tribal people” and children because “Logical Positivist philosophers”
can’t go further empty words, or general, abstract “conceptions”.

You say that you feel confusion if “any” kind of intelligent behavior
requires the use of concepts. It sounds for my ear rather strange. To act
smartly means to act with understanding of the object of my action and the
objective context of it. Just this means to act with concepts. Nothing more.

As for Vygotsky’s utilization of concept of concept, it’s easy to illustrate
that term “concept” (ponyatie) in his theorizing means accurately those
which Peter translated as “conception” or Vorstellung. But this topic is
worthy of special discussion.

The real process of development of children which starts from active and
creative acquiring of practical concepts of spoon, pot, cloths etc. and than
goes to school and often stops in his/her development and become degrade to
formal, “verbal” “knowledge”, go down from real concepts to abstract
conceptions has to be an object of our detailed analysis and based on this
analysis practical transformation or even an attempt…

Sahsa

 

P.S. Dear Peter, help us again. How to translate into English the basic for
Dialectical logic and psychology distinction between “Razum” and “Rassudok”
because without this distinction it is difficult to discuss our issues.
Thank you in advance :-)…

 

-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
Behalf Of Martin Packer
Sent: Tuesday, April 29, 2008 6:59 PM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] DIALECTICAL PSYCHOLOGY SECTION, GROUPE and SEMINAR

 

Ed,

 

My message came from a genuine confusion about the links among messages from

Andy, Elinami and David. Three types of confusion seemed to me to be going

on, though I'm still not sure.

 

First, a confusion between the analytic categories used by academics and

everyday understanding. Linguists use concepts such as 'subject,' 'verb' and

'grammar' in their intellectual reconstruction of speech. But there is

little reason to think that the everyday use of language requires the use of

such concepts, even at an unconscious level. This is something that Bourdieu

writes about convincingly. Researchers, in his view, generally fail to

examine their own procedures of objectification, and as a result attribute

the products of their analyses to the people being studied.

 

But, second, a more prevalent confusion, in my view, is to think that *any*

kind of intelligent behavior requires the use of concepts. Here the guilty

party is Kant, as Andy was pointing out some time back. Kant pretty much

gave birth to the view that has become common-sense today, that humans

construct mental representations of the world around us. Once one has

accepted a dualistic ontology of mind and world the relationship between the

two becomes a problem, and Kant's attempt at a solution was to propose that

the relationship is one of representation. Mental categories and concepts

underly all human action and knowledge, to this way of thinking. Hegel, Marx

and Vygotsky can be read as collaborators in an attempt to reject this view

and find a good alternative. If I understand it correctly (a dubious

presumption!), Ilyenkov's notion of the "thinking-body" is intended to be

the center of a model which proposes that intelligent human thought and

action is possible without mental representations. Humans are first of all a

corporal, incarnate intelligence. This is not to say that mental

representations are impossible, but that they are not necessary for smart

practical action. The formation of both mind and mental representations

might be a result of living in modern society, somewhere along the

ontogenetic line. (Bourdieu also explores such a model with his concept of

habitus. Merleau-Ponty is important too.)

 

But, third, I find I cannot completely agree with Sasha when he suggests

that practical understanding is more adequate than a scientfic

understanding. Of course it all depends on what one means by scientific. But

when Sasha writes that "the knife is something basically simple" and that a

"practical notion" of it is fully adequate, I find myself wondering how this

squares with Marx's description of the apparently simply commodities of

everyday life. The ability to use a knife to cut is certainly a "valid"

understanding of it. And (again) it is an understanding which requires no

mental representation. (Perhaps we will want to say (as I think Vygotsky

does) that there is a concept (or complex) *in* the practical action. That

is a notion that in my view deserves to be explored in much more detail.)

But is a knife only this? I think Marx would have said that a more

scientific understanding of a knife would include a grasp of the history of

its cultural evolution, its links with others tools, how to make it and keep

it sharp, and the relations of its production and exchange... I share

Shasha's frustration with the kind of scholastic (schoolboy, scholarly)

knowledge which seeks to replace practical knowledge and declare its

superiority, but I can't agree that the ability to use the tool is all that

is needed, or all that is possible.

 

Martin

 

 

On 4/28/08 6:36 PM, "Ed Wall" <ewall@umich.edu> wrote:

 

> Martin

>

> I was composing a reply and thinking that it doesn't seem, for

> example, that a particular conception of hammer would contain all its

> uses. Perhaps what is confusing for me is 'use' is a little like

> game (re Wittgenstein) and 'the concept' isn't. What happens if one

> introduces 'the use' and 'conception' into the mix?

>

> Ed

>

>

>

> On Apr 28, 2008, at 4:13 PM, Martin Packer wrote:

>

>> Ed,

>>

>> I suppose that arguably the concept of a hammer will include a bit

>> of use.

>> (Though it's interesting how many are declaring that they don't

>> know what a

>> concept is!) But does that mean that the use of a hammer will

>> include a bit

>> of concept?

>>

>> Martin

>>

>>

>> On 4/28/08 2:36 PM, "Ed Wall" <ewall@umich.edu> wrote:

>>

>>> Martin

>>>

>>> Now I'm confused. You say 'use a hammer' and then 'not use the

>>> concept of a 'hammer."' I suspect I don't know what a 'concept' of a

>>> hammer is, but wouldn't it include a bit of use?

>>>

>>> Ed

>>>

>>> On Apr 28, 2008, at 12:18 PM, Martin Packer wrote:

>>>

>>>> David, I'm confused. Are you saying it would be impossible for

>>>> someone to

>>>> use a hammer and not use the concept of "hammer"?

>>>>

>>>> Martin

>>>>

>>>>

>>>> On 4/28/08 7:25 AM, "David Kellogg" <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com>

>>>> wrote:

>>>>

>>>>> I don't understand, Elinami. How is it possible to be a language

>>>>> user and NOT

>>>>> use concepts like "subject", "verb", "speaker", "grammar" etc.?

>>>>> Even if you

>>>>> say that concept use has to be conscious, isn't the self itself a

>>>>> concept?

>>>>>

>>>>> David Kellogg

>>>>> Seoul National University of Education

>>>>>

>>>>>

>>>>>

>>>>> Elinami Swai <swaiev@gmail.com> wrote:

>>>>> I cannot resist Andy, who are these tribal people?

>>>>> Elinami.

>>>>>

>>>>> On 4/27/08, Andy Blunden wrote:

>>>>>> Sasha,

>>>>>> I just wanted to probe you little on this question of concept

>>>>>> (Begriff) vs

>>>>>> "abstract general" (or complex or "representation", etc).

>>>>>>

>>>>>> It seems to me that all of us, unless we have a psychiatric

>>>>>> problem or brain

>>>>>> damage or something serious, by the time we become adults operate

>>>>>> with

>>>>>> concepts. I notice that most theorists do not understand well

>>>>>> what a concept

>>>>>> is and even the average Nobel Prize Winner cannot distinguish

>>>>>> clearly

>>>>>> between an abstract general notion and a genuine concept. But

>>>>>> nonetheless we

>>>>>> all use genuine concepts. Difficulty in theoretically making this

>>>>>> distinction explicit is a matter really of whether you have been

>>>>>> exposed to

>>>>>> Hegelian ideas or Marx, Vygotsky, or other philosophy which

>>>>>> incorporates

>>>>>> these insights. Tribal people for example, just as much as Logical

>>>>>> Positivist philosophers, use concepts. Is that your understanding

>>>>>> as well?

>>>>>>

>>>>>> Andy

>>>>>>

>>>>>>

>>>>>> Martin Packer wrote:

>>>>>>> ------ Forwarded Message

>>>>>>> From: Alexander Surmava

>>>>>>> Date: Sun, 27 Apr 2008 13:01:03 +0400

>>>>>>> To: 'Martin Packer'

>>>>>

>>>>>>> Cc: Mike Cole

>>>>>>> Subject: RE: Life, psyche, consciousness.doc

>>>>>>>

>>>>>>> Dear Martin,

>>>>>>> You write:

>>>>>>> To my reading, Ilyenkov's concept of ideality, based on the

>>>>>>> notion of the

>>>>>>> thinking-body, is not the same as suggesting that artifacts

>>>>>>> have a

>>>>>> cultural

>>>>>>> meaning. To me, this risks reintroducing a dualism between

>>>>>>> matter and

>>>>>>> meaning. It is a short step, to my view mistaken, to the belief

>>>>>>> that the

>>>>>>> natural sciences study matter, while the social sciences study

>>>>>>> meaning. It

>>>>>>> also leads one to think that each artifact has a single meaning.

>>>>>>> Sasha,

>>>>>> when

>>>>>>> you said that the child really understands "the meaning" of the

>>>>>>> knife, I'm

>>>>>>> sure you would agree that a child cannot grasp the complexity of

>>>>>>> the

>>>>>>> relations that a single artifact like a knife has with society

>>>>>>> as a whole.

>>>>>>> Nor can a peasant understand the full complexity of the social

>>>>>>> world in

>>>>>>> which they are living, even though they have great practical

>>>>>>> wisdom.

>>>>>>>

>>>>>>>

>>>>>>> I entirely share your idea that ³Ilyenkov's concept of ideality,

>>>>>>> based on

>>>>>>> the notion of the thinking-body, is not the same as suggesting

>>>>>>> that

>>>>>>> artifacts have a cultural meaning? The latter is something banal

>>>>>>> and

>>>>>>> doesnıt need the first. No one of semiotics will disagree with

>>>>>>> the

>>>>>> statement

>>>>>>> that each artifact has some ³cultural meaning? while all of them

>>>>>>> have

>>>>>>> hardly ever heard the very concept of ³thinking body?and

>>>>>>> evidently donıt

>>>>>>> need in this notion.

>>>>>>> As well we never declare something like the statement ³that the

>>>>>>> natural

>>>>>>> sciences study matter, while the social sciences study meaning?

>>>>>>> As for a child with a knife we do insist that to have a real

>>>>>> understanding,

>>>>>>> real idea of knife a child needs only to be taught by adult how

>>>>>>> to use it

>>>>>> in

>>>>>>> historically developed cultural manner. The knife is a tool

>>>>>>> which helps

>>>>>>> humans to cut something and a child who practically grasps this

>>>>>>> mode of

>>>>>>> operation and adequately utilizes the knife has a valid idea of

>>>>>>> knife. All

>>>>>>> complexities ³of the relations that a single artifact like a

>>>>>>> knife has

>>>>>> with

>>>>>>> society as a whole?can add nothing to this plain fact. The

>>>>>>> role of

>>>>>> society

>>>>>>> consists in elaborating the artifact and in teaching new

>>>>>>> generations the

>>>>>> way

>>>>>>> to utilize it.

>>>>>>> The knife is something basically simple. The absolute majority

>>>>>>> of mankind,

>>>>>>> those who use knifes in their everyday life needs and have only

>>>>>>> practical

>>>>>>> notion of knives. On the contrary something that pretends to be a

>>>>>>> ³scientific notion?of knife is something ridiculous and

>>>>>>> scholastic.

>>>>>>> In exactly the same way illiterate, but experienced peasant has

>>>>>>> real,

>>>>>>> practical notion say of melon, while a schoolboy with all his

>>>>>>> ³scientific

>>>>>>> definitions?is far from real comprehension of it. He can

>>>>>>> successfully eat

>>>>>>> melon but he hardly can plant it. And here just as in previous

>>>>>>> case ³the

>>>>>>> full complexity of the social world in which they are living?has

>>>>>>> nothing

>>>>>> to

>>>>>>> do with the idea of melon.

>>>>>>> Surely there are objects which canıt be grasped practically by a

>>>>>>> single

>>>>>>> person. Thus for example an idea of agriculture as a socially and

>>>>>>> historically developed system of relations which combines

>>>>>>> individual

>>>>>> forces

>>>>>>> of people over the cooperative process of production and

>>>>>>> distribution

>>>>>> canıt be realized in abstract practical manner. Such attempts

>>>>>> can be

>>>>>> resulted in a

>>>>>>> way similar to famous fable about three blind and an elephant.

>>>>>>> The same we can say about such an object as atom or nuclear

>>>>>>> particle. A

>>>>>>> single person never deals practically with such objects. Only a

>>>>>> theoretical

>>>>>>> culture ?which is essentially a special type of cooperative

>>>>>>> practice

>>>>>>> ?lt;br>> can

>>>>>>> grasp the notion of such objects.

>>>>>>> Explaining all this I meet a great difficultness with the lack

>>>>>>> of proper

>>>>>>> English terminology (or, probably, my poor knowledge of

>>>>>>> English). In

>>>>>> German

>>>>>>> and in Russian there is a clear distinction between two notions,

>>>>>>> and two

>>>>>>> terms: Begriff = ponıatie, and Vorstellung = predstavlenije.

>>>>>>> The highest form in development of thinking is obviously ponıatie

>>>>>> (Begriff).

>>>>>>> And in the same time it is the universal form of thinking. While

>>>>>>> predstavlenije (Vorstellung) is subordinated notion. The obscheje

>>>>>> (general)

>>>>>>> predstavlenije is understood in dialectical culture as a meaning

>>>>>>> of word,

>>>>>>> like something that enables us to distinguish among the known

>>>>>>> and fixed in

>>>>>>> the matter of language culture objects. But one can have

>>>>>>> predsatavlenije

>>>>>>> without having understanding of the essence of the object.

>>>>>>> Thus the brilliant illustration of such divergence of two

>>>>>>> forms of

>>>>>> thinking

>>>>>>> (Predstavlenija and Ponıatia) are so called ³artificial notions?

>>>>>>> from

>>>>>>> Vygotsky-Sakharovıs experiments, as well as many similar

>>>>>>> constructions

>>>>>> from

>>>>>>> psychological theory. The artificial notion is an empty notion,

>>>>>>> which is

>>>>>>> something that cannot be understood not because their utmost

>>>>>>> complexity

>>>>>> but

>>>>>>> because their utmost vacancy. Logically as ³artifcial notion?we

>>>>>>> have an

>>>>>>> evident example of general definition (obshchego

>>>>>>> predstavlenija), not

>>>>>>> understanding (ne ponıatie). So it corresponds not with

>>>>>>> dialectic logic

>>>>>> both

>>>>>>> in its Hegel and Marxist form, but with formal logic, with logic

>>>>>>> of John

>>>>>>> Locke.

>>>>>>> And this distinction is not something academically formal but

>>>>>>> the core

>>>>>>> distinction for dialectically thinking researcher. Thus Davydov

>>>>>>> based all

>>>>>>> his theory of developmental instruction just on this

>>>>>>> distinction. (Iım

>>>>>> going

>>>>>>> to ask Peter Moxhay ?the translator of Davidovıs latest book -

>>>>>>> how he

>>>>>> cope

>>>>>>> the problem with insufficiency of English terminology in this

>>>>>>> case.)

>>>>>>> As for the idea of ³thinking body?it is equal to basically new

>>>>>>> and in

>>>>>> the

>>>>>>> same time genuine Marxist and Spinozian idea of thinking as not

>>>>>>> banal

>>>>>>> manipulation with words and other conventional signs, but as a

>>>>>>> special way

>>>>>>> of acting of one (active or ³thinking?body) according to the

>>>>>>> shape of the

>>>>>>> other body, taken in the moment of its live realization.

>>>>>>> All this was fundamentally explored in Ilyenkovıs works and I

>>>>>>> agree with

>>>>>> you

>>>>>>> that the joint rereading of this works would be extremely useful

>>>>>>> for all

>>>>>> of

>>>>>>> us as a step to rethinking the traditional understanding of CHAT.

>>>>>>> Sincerely,

>>>>>>>

>>>>>>> Sasha

>>>>>>>

>>>>>>>

>>>>>>> _______________________________________________

>>>>>>> xmca mailing list

>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu

>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca

>>>>>>>

>>>>>>>

>>>>>>

>>>>>> --

>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------

>>>>>> --

>>>>>> ----

>>>>>> Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/ +61 3 9380 9435 Skype

>>>>>> andy.blunden

>>>>>>

>>>>>>

>>>>>> _______________________________________________

>>>>>> xmca mailing list

>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu

>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca

>>>>>>

>>>>>

>>>>

>>>>

>>>> _______________________________________________

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>>>>

>>>>

>>>

>>> _______________________________________________

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>>

>>

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>

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