Re: [xmca] DIALECTICAL PSYCHOLOGY SECTION, GROUPE and SEMINAR

------ Forwarded Message
From: Alexander Surmava <surmava@yandex.ru>
Date: Sun, 27 Apr 2008 13:01:03 +0400
To: 'Martin Packer' <packer@duq.edu>
Cc: Mike Cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
Subject: RE: Life, psyche, consciousness.doc

Dear Martin,
You write:
To my reading, Ilyenkov's concept of ideality, based on the notion of the
thinking-body, is not the same as suggesting that artifacts have a cultural
meaning. To me, this risks reintroducing a dualism between matter and
meaning. It is a short step, to my view mistaken, to the belief that the
natural sciences study matter, while the social sciences study meaning. It
also leads one to think that each artifact has a single meaning. Sasha, when
you said that the child really understands "the meaning" of the knife, I'm
sure you would agree that a child cannot grasp the complexity of the
relations that a single artifact like a knife has with society as a whole.
Nor can a peasant understand the full complexity of the social world in
which they are living, even though they have great practical wisdom.

I entirely share your idea that ³Ilyenkov's concept of ideality, based on
the notion of the thinking-body, is not the same as suggesting that
artifacts have a cultural meaning². The latter is something banal and
doesn¹t need the first. No one of semiotics will disagree with the statement
that each artifact has some ³cultural meaning², while all of them have
hardly ever heard the very concept of ³thinking body² and evidently don¹t
need in this notion.
As well we never declare something like the statement ³that the natural
sciences study matter, while the social sciences study meaning².
As for a child with a knife we do insist that to have a real understanding,
real idea of knife a child needs only to be taught by adult how to use it in
historically developed cultural manner. The knife is a tool which helps
humans to cut something and a child who practically grasps this mode of
operation and adequately utilizes the knife has a valid idea of knife. All
complexities ³of the relations that a single artifact like a knife has with
society as a whole² can add nothing to this plain fact. The role of society
consists in elaborating the artifact and in teaching new generations the way
to utilize it.
The knife is something basically simple. The absolute majority of mankind,
those who use knifes in their everyday life needs and have only practical
notion of knives. On the contrary something that pretends to be a
³scientific notion² of knife is something ridiculous and scholastic.
In exactly the same way illiterate, but experienced peasant has real,
practical notion say of melon, while a schoolboy with all his ³scientific
definitions³ is far from real comprehension of it. He can successfully eat
melon but he hardly can plant it. And here just as in previous case ³the
full complexity of the social world in which they are living² has nothing to
do with the idea of melon.
Surely there are objects which can¹t be grasped practically by a single
person. Thus for example an idea of agriculture as a socially and
historically developed system of relations which combines individual forces
of people over the cooperative process of production and distribution can¹t 
be realized in abstract practical manner. Such attempts can be resulted in a
way similar to famous fable about three blind and an elephant.
The same we can say about such an object as atom or nuclear particle. A
single person never deals practically with such objects. Only a theoretical
culture ­ which is essentially a special type of cooperative practice ­ can
grasp the notion of such objects.
Explaining all this I meet a great difficultness with the lack of proper
English terminology (or, probably, my poor knowledge of English). In German
and in Russian there is a clear distinction between two notions, and two
terms: Begriff = pon¹atie, and Vorstellung = predstavlenije.
The highest form in development of thinking is obviously pon¹atie (Begriff).
And in the same time it is the universal form of thinking. While
predstavlenije (Vorstellung) is subordinated notion. The obscheje (general)
predstavlenije is understood in dialectical culture as a meaning of word,
like something that enables us to distinguish among the known and fixed in
the matter of language culture objects. But one can have predsatavlenije
without having understanding of the essence of the object.
Thus the brilliant illustration of such divergence of two forms of thinking
(Predstavlenija and Pon¹atia) are so called ³artificial notions² from
Vygotsky-Sakharov¹s experiments, as well as many similar constructions from
psychological theory. The artificial notion is an empty notion, which is
something that cannot be understood not because their utmost complexity but
because their utmost vacancy. Logically as ³artifcial notion² we have an
evident example of general definition (obshchego predstavlenija), not
understanding (ne pon¹atie). So it corresponds not with dialectic logic both
in its Hegel and Marxist form, but with formal logic, with logic of John
Locke.
And this distinction is not something academically formal but the core
distinction for dialectically thinking researcher. Thus Davydov based all
his theory of developmental instruction just on this distinction. (I¹m going
to ask Peter Moxhay ­ the translator of Davidov¹s latest book - how he cope
the problem with insufficiency of English terminology in this case.)
 As for the idea of ³thinking body² it is equal to basically new and in the
same time genuine Marxist and Spinozian idea of thinking as not banal
manipulation with words and other conventional signs, but as a special way
of acting of one (active or ³thinking² body) according to the shape of the
other body, taken in the moment of its live realization.
All this was fundamentally explored in Ilyenkov¹s works and I agree with you
that the joint rereading of this works would be extremely useful for all of
us as a step to rethinking the traditional understanding of CHAT.
Sincerely,

Sasha
 

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Received on Sun Apr 27 15:33 PDT 2008