Re: [xmca] Subject: Verb, Object

On Jan 2, 2008, at 12:41 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:
> The view that I have come to is that we need to set out from the
> very beginning a tripartite ontology. There are three kinds of
> entity in the world: ideas (or psyche), artefacts (including the
> human body, as well as signs, tools, means of production, etc.,
> culture in other words) and activities.

Whoa. "Three kinds of entity" (entities) - and from the way you state
this, as an "ontology," **only** these three kinds of entities - in
the world? How about nature, here on earth and the rest of the
universe? (And a secondary question - how are ideas not "artefacts"?
But that is another issue). Do you really mean these words, Andy?
If you do, where is this tripartite ontology argued? I can grasp this
kind of three-part all-inclusive list as attempting to describe human
subjectivity, the object of discussion in your paper. This focus
might make the above statement, in a sense, a tripartite
"epistemology" - a statement about the nature of human knowledge in
its broadest sense, and the three kinds of essential components human
knowledge or more broadly consciousness is comprised of. But as a
"tripartite ontology," a statement about the nature of reality, human
**and** not human, and the three entities it is comprised of, I can't
see how this could work. Surely, the universe is comprised of more
than human ideas (psyche), artefacts (culture) and activities. Not
that I would try to convince you otherwise, if this ontology is indeed
your real belief. Is it?

Not attacking, just genuinely puzzled.
- Steve

On Jan 2, 2008, at 12:41 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:

> I think it helps a lot if we don't at this fundamental level talk
> about "signs". In the Peircean sense of course "sign" includes tools
> as well as indexes in general, and icons as well as symbols, but it
> is easy to slip into forgetting this, and forgetting that signs are
> material things in every case. This is not the normal meaning of the
> word "sign." On the other hand, with "tool" or "sign" we think of
> tools having use and signs having meaning. Signs in the Peircean
> sense can "do" in the same way any material thing does something,
> like falling or expanding or flowing or whatever. Which is OK, but I
> think that is a slightly different take on "doing." Confusion
> without end.
>
> The thing which is important for psychology and I think the least
> ambiguous is "artefact". Artefacts have meaning and use and they are
> material things obedient to the laws of physics. They have by their
> nature the capacity for only a certain range of uses, and afford
> only certain meanings (A Confucion poem cannot be made to mean the
> Highway Code).
>
> "Artefact" also is helpful in avoiding the sort of conundrums with
> ideas like "reifying". I think artefacts cannot "do". I think doing
> in this context is something that people do and consciously to boot.
> Artefacts, like all material things, lend themselves to this or that
> use. So surely people do things with artefacts, all kinds of things
> actually, without limit. On the other hand, the human body has to be
> taken as an artefact, and that can be confusing.
>
> The view that I have come to is that we need to set out from the
> very beginning a tripartite ontology. There are three kinds of
> entity in the world: ideas (or psyche), artefacts (including the
> human body, as well as signs, tools, means of production, etc.,
> culture in other words) and activities. "Activity" in this sense it
> to be taken as very general, using artefacts with a certain idea in
> mind. Artefacts are material things and the laws of natural science
> deal with them.
>
>
> Andy
>
>
>
>
>
> At 03:57 PM 2/01/2008 +1100, you wrote:
>> Hi Tony, doesn't DO run the risk of reifying concepts (or if you
>> prefer, signs)? Surely people DO with signs? What people do depends
>> on
>> how they can use the sign. I agree with you that words do not have
>> meaning, but to know what meaning a sign has is to be able to use it.
>> I don't think signs generate interpretants, unless the perceiver
>> has a
>> use for it.
>>
>> Cheers, Geoff
>>
>> On 02/01/2008, Tony Whitson <twhitson@udel.edu> wrote:
>> > How about this: Words (or, more generally, signs) don't HAVE
>> meaning --
>> > meaning is not something that they HAVE or CONTAIN or CONVEY, but
>> what
>> > they DO -- words and signs MEAN, in the interpretants that they
>> generate.
>> >
>> > On Wed, 2 Jan 2008, Geoff wrote:
>> >
>> > > I'd like to add to Andy's explanation by referring to
>> Wittgenstein's
>> > > take on meaning - it's about use. I'd argue that words and
>> artifacts
>> > > derive their meaning by their usage as defined by the users.
>> (Those in
>> > > the language game in Wittgensteinian terms.) One of the nice
>> things
>> > > about Wittgenstein's definition is that it sets up a fluid
>> boundary,
>> > > leaving scope for changing habitus.
>> > >
>> > > Cheers, Geoff
>> > >
>> > > On 02/01/2008, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>> > >> I plead guilty to all charges of misuse of the names of parts/
>> types of
>> > >> psychology.
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >> Re culture as both material and ideal. Let's take an example,
>> the American
>> > >> gun culture. Now, it's true as the NRA always say "It is
>> people that commit
>> > >> murder, not guns". But, nonetheless, the presence of 500
>> million guns
>> > >> scattered around suburban America is a danger, isn't it?
>> because people
>> > >> *can* use them to murder .... and do. So culture, being made
>> up of material
>> > >> things, has properties which are relatively independent of the
>> activities
>> > >> in which they are used. But if the country was populated
>> solely by
>> > >> pacifists they would not be a danger. Clearing land makes for
>> consequences
>> > >> which were not intended by the people who cleared the land.
>> (land=artefact,
>> > >> erosion and farming=meaning).
>> > >>
>> > >> Conversely, a library full of book written in the Gothic
>> script is no use
>> > >> when Germans can no longer read the old fashioned script.
>> "Affordances" is
>> > >> a word which is relevant here I guess.
>> > >>
>> > >> Jim Wertsch's article on narrative tools which was circulated
>> earlier this
>> > >> week, was full of observations about the fact that cultural
>> tools are
>> > >> involved in shaping action, but never determine it. (Great
>> article BTW. I
>> > >> am now an admirer of Jim W.)
>> > >>
>> > >> Because activity, thought and artefacts (culture) have
>> different material
>> > >> bases, they are never perfectly identified. A word may have
>> different
>> > >> meanings in different contexts and among different people, but
>> acquaintance
>> > >> with the word both conditions and affords certain kinds of
>> activity and
>> > >> consciousness.
>> > >>
>> > >> So an artefact and its use (meaning) necessarily coincide at a
>> certain
>> > >> point, but the artefact may have existed before people found
>> that it could
>> > >> have a certain use and later on, the artefact may find
>> different uses. Like
>> > >> words and meanings and "intelligent speech".
>> > >>
>> > >> Meaning is, I would say, the place of an artefact in some
>> specific
>> > >> activity. Meaning is particular, artefact is universal. So one
>> and the same
>> > >> artefact may have different meanings because it will play a
>> part in
>> > >> different systems of activity. And actually, it can mean
>> different things
>> > >> in one and the same system of activity because I have skated
>> over the role
>> > >> of consciousness in this explanation. "Christmas" means
>> something different
>> > >> to a housewife, a child, a parent, a moslem, etc., etc. even
>> though the
>> > >> festival is the self-same one. Different people see it and
>> participate in
>> > >> it differently.
>> > >>
>> > >> Does that help?
>> > >> Andy
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >> At 06:24 PM 1/01/2008 -0800, you wrote:
>> > >>> Andy,
>> > >>>
>> > >>> This definition of culture as mediating artefcts given in
>> your message:
>> > >>> "an artefact is what it is only in connection with its use
>> in a certain
>> > >>> range of activities with a certain meaning."
>> > >>> simply moves the problem onto "a certain meaning".
>> > >>>
>> > >>> Coud you explain how to distinguish meaning from
>> meaninglessness and
>> > >>> how it is possible to separate the meanings from the
>> activities in which
>> > >>> ?it? is inscribed.
>> > >>> .
>> > >>>
>> > >>> Paul
>> > >>>
>> > >>>
>> > >>> Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>> > >>> Paul,
>> > >>> my understanding is that in the CHAT tradition, "culture" has
>> a specific
>> > >>> meaning, being the sum of artefacts produced and consumed by
>> a group of
>> > >>> people, inclusive of the understanding that an artefact is
>> what it is only
>> > >>> in connection with its use in a certain range of activities
>> with a certain
>> > >>> meaning.
>> > >>>
>> > >>> Nevertheless, the use of the word to indicate the *society*
>> (as a
>> > >>> continuing self-reproducing collectivity of communities)
>> which produces and
>> > >>> consumes the given collection of artefacts is so deeply
>> embedded, I think
>> > >>> that we have to accept that as a legitimate usage of the
>> word. Mike is the
>> > >>> person who has defined "cultural psychology" so maybe Mike
>> will tell us
>> > >>> what he means?
>> > >>>
>> > >>> Andy
>> > >>> At 04:35 PM 1/01/2008 -0800, you wrote:
>> > >>>> great, but would someone please tell me exactly what
>> "culture" means.
>> > >>>>
>> > >>>> Paul
>> > >>>>
>> > >>>> Andy Blunden wrote:
>> > >>>> Sure.
>> > >>>> Andy
>> > >>>> At 10:43 PM 1/01/2008 +0000, you wrote:
>> > >>>>> Andy
>> > >>>>> ... why not "cultural psychology"?
>> > >>>>>
>> > >>>>> Luísa Aires
>> > >>>>>
>> > >>>>>> Good question Mike. I never thought about that, and it is
>> certainly in
>> > >>>>>> ignorance of how these terms are used in academia generally.
>> > >>>>>>
>> > >>>>>> I suppose by 'social psychology' I mean a current of
>> psychology which
>> > >>>>>> utilises a concept of 'extended mind' as its foundational
>> principle.
>> > >>>> It is
>> > >>>>>> always the case that other currents contribute insights
>> which are
>> > >>> not so
>> > >>>>>> easily accessible from one's own (so to speak) - even if
>> you don't
>> > >>> accept
>> > >>>>>> the principles of Psychoanalysis, there are still things
>> to learn
>> > >>>> from it;
>> > >>>>>> and the same goes for all currents and schools of
>> psychology. But by
>> > >>>>>> 'social psychology' I mean a real psychology, that is
>> practical and
>> > >>>> useful
>> > >>>>>> in dealing with psychological problems and copes with the
>> reality of
>> > >>>>>> individual difference and so on. A 'social psychology'
>> which sees
>> > >>>>>> individuals as purely and simply instances of their social
>> position
>> > >>> does
>> > >>>>>> not warrant the name in my opinion. And 'social
>> psychology' in the
>> > >>> sense
>> > >>>>>> that Max Horkheimer (I think) used it, which deal only
>> with the
>> > >>> phenomena
>> > >>>>>> of crowds and so on, is also 'not worthy' of the name.
>> > >>>>>>
>> > >>>>>> So I am looking for a tool which can give me a way of
>> understanding how
>> > >>>>>> the
>> > >>>>>> Zeitgeist is formed, how it is changed, practically how to
>> intervene in
>> > >>>>>> it.
>> > >>>>>> I do not expect a 'social psychology' to go further and
>> provide me
>> > >>> with a
>> > >>>>>> social or political theory as such, but it need to be able
>> to
>> > >>> bridge the
>> > >>>>>> gap, so to speak. Let's face it! If we can change the
>> Zeitgeist which
>> > >>>> gets
>> > >>>>>> people like George W Bush and John Howard elected in
>> democratic
>> > >>>> countries,
>> > >>>>>> into one in which genuinely good people get elected, then
>> the rest will
>> > >>>>>> look after itself and I can enjoy my retirement.
>> > >>>>>>
>> > >>>>>> Why not a meta-psychology? Apart form my idiosyncratic
>> dislike of
>> > >>>> "meta" I
>> > >>>>>> don't want a metapsychology, I want a psychology which has a
>> > >>>>>> metapsychology
>> > >>>>>> which is sound and able to cope with the sociality of
>> consciousness.
>> > >>>>>>
>> > >>>>>> Why not a "science of human nature"? "Human nature" is
>> such a
>> > >>> problematic
>> > >>>>>> term, it carries such a lot of unwanted 19th century
>> baggage. And I am
>> > >>>>>> interested in consciousness, not "nature" in general.
>> > >>>>>>
>> > >>>>>> Sure, social psychology is a sub-discipline within
>> psychology.
>> > >>> There are
>> > >>>>>> things which belong to psychology which are not centre-
>> stage for me.
>> > >>>> Sure,
>> > >>>>>> brain injury or other defects are a serious topic, as is
>> child
>> > >>>>>> development,
>> > >>>>>> etc., etc.. I guess I am talking about a psychology whose
>> central
>> > >>> thread
>> > >>>>>> is
>> > >>>>>> a social psychology rather than a neurobiology, for example.
>> > >>>>>>
>> > >>>>>> I need a social psychology which recognises that social
>> movements
>> > >>> are not
>> > >>>>>> just large numbers of people with the same feeling, but
>> subjects, and
>> > >>>>>> individuals are neither passive victims of social
>> processes nor
>> > >>>> absolutely
>> > >>>>>> free agents. But a *real*, practical, living school of
>> psychology, with
>> > >>>>>> people using it in designing curricula, healing depressed
>> people,
>> > >>> running
>> > >>>>>> half-way houses, training teachers, organising self-help
>> groups, etc.,
>> > >>>>>> etc.
>> > >>>>>> and doing real, experimental science with it, critiquing and
>> > >>>> improving its
>> > >>>>>> concepts down the years.
>> > >>>>>>
>> > >>>>>> Does that make sense?
>> > >>>>>>
>> > >>>>>> Andy
>> > >>>>>>
>> > >>>>>> At 05:14 PM 30/12/2007 -0800, you wrote:
>> > >>>>>>> Andy-- This is the second time you have declared your
>> goal to be
>> > >>>>>>> answering
>> > >>>>>>> questions within the framework of social psychology. Why
>> do you use
>> > >>> this
>> > >>>>>>> term? Why not a
>> > >>>>>>> meta-psychology? Why not a "science of human nature"?
>> > >>>>>>>
>> > >>>>>>> I ask because I am used to social psychology being viewed
>> as a
>> > >>>>>>> sub-discipline within psychology.
>> > >>>>>>> The only dept of social psych I know of that takes on
>> your questions
>> > >>>>>>> seriously is at the LSE. One branch of cultural
>> psychology in the US
>> > >>>>>>> comes
>> > >>>>>>> out of experimental social
>> > >>>>>>> psychology here, but I do not think you have that in mind.
>> > >>>>>>>
>> > >>>>>>> This query is not to distract from the main line of
>> discussion, but
>> > >>>>>>> rather
>> > >>>>>>> to locate what you are striving for better.
>> > >>>>>>>
>> > >>>>>>> mike
>> > >>>>>>> On Dec 30, 2007 4:34 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>> > >>>>>>>
>> > >>>>>>>> I think David and Peg's messages were out of sync., yes?
>> > >>>>>>>>
>> > >>>>>>>> This all raises that most difficult of questions for a
>> social
>> > >>>>>>> psychology
>> > >>>>>>>> that wants to deal with the tasks I am asking it to deal
>> with,
>> > >>> how do
>> > >>>>>>> you
>> > >>>>>>>> deal with the knock-on effect of an action, which is
>> predictable
>> > >>> from
>> > >>>>>>>> on-high, but unknown to the actors themselves? We rely
>> on the basic
>> > >>>>>>>> insight
>> > >>>>>>>> that what goes on in the head first went on between
>> people - whether
>> > >>>>>>> in
>> > >>>>>>>> the
>> > >>>>>>>> form given to it by Fichte, Hegel, Marx, CS Peirce or
>> Vygotsky. What
>> > >>>>>>> is
>> > >>>>>>>> Hegel's Logic about? About the underlying "logic of
>> events", how
>> > >>> this
>> > >>>>>>> or
>> > >>>>>>>> that policy or statement or whatever ultimately leads to
>> this or
>> > >>> that
>> > >>>>>>>> problem which was at first invisible. Life experience
>> will tell you
>> > >>>>>>> this,
>> > >>>>>>>> but if you don't have life experience, it will happen
>> according
>> > >>> to the
>> > >>>>>>>> logic of events anyways and you should learn. Basically,
>> I think we
>> > >>>>>>> can
>> > >>>>>>>> only make sense of this if we get right away from the
>> idea of the
>> > >>>>>>>> "individual-as-subject" but remember that no subject
>> exists
>> > >>> other than
>> > >>>>>>> in
>> > >>>>>>>> and through individual human beings.
>> > >>>>>>>>
>> > >>>>>>>> With the ANL example of the child and the father, I have
>> always had
>> > >>>>>>>> trouble
>> > >>>>>>>> with "examples" and methods which presuppose a leader or a
>> > >>> father or a
>> > >>>>>>>> facilitator, a person who knows what the experimental
>> subject or
>> > >>>>>>> student
>> > >>>>>>>> or
>> > >>>>>>>> self-help group really needs to do, and organises things
>> > >>> accordingly.
>> > >>>>>>> Of
>> > >>>>>>>> course, I understand that all you teachers and teacher-
>> trainers,
>> > >>> child
>> > >>>>>>>> psychologists, etc., work and have a responsibility to
>> work in
>> > >>>>>>> precisely
>> > >>>>>>>> that circumstance. But I do not think this is the
>> paradigmatic
>> > >>>>>>>> relationship. The father can only do his bit in
>> "leading" the child
>> > >>>>>>> into
>> > >>>>>>>> an
>> > >>>>>>>> activity where its "best interests" will be served if
>> the father can
>> > >>>>>>> act
>> > >>>>>>>> as
>> > >>>>>>>> a kind of transmitter of life experience, and kind of
>> short-cut the
>> > >>>>>>>> process
>> > >>>>>>>> for the child. So it is not the father's technique which
>> is the
>> > >>>>>>> paradigm,
>> > >>>>>>>> but the bitter life experience which the child may or
>> may not
>> > >>> have as
>> > >>>>>>> a
>> > >>>>>>>> result of choosing to do this or that.
>> > >>>>>>>>
>> > >>>>>>>> Andy
>> > >>>>>>>>
>> > >>>>>>>>
>> > >>>>>>>>
>> > >>>>>>>> At 07:54 AM 30/12/2007 -0800, you wrote:
>> > >>>>>>>>> Dear Andy and Peg:
>> > >>>>>>>>>
>> > >>>>>>>>> Here's some stuff from my notes; I happen to know that
>> Andy can't
>> > >>>>>>> get
>> > >>>>>>>>> ahold of a copy of ANL's Problems of the Development of
>> the
>> > >>> Mind. I
>> > >>>>>>> hope
>> > >>>>>>>>> I don't get those funny marks that always show up when
>> I paste
>> > >>> in...
>> > >>>>>>>>>
>> > >>>>>>>>> p. 402 ANL points out how 'only understandable' motives
>> for
>> > >>>>>>> homework
>> > >>>>>>>>> such as wanting to get a good mark can be replaced by
>> 'really
>> > >>>>>>> effective'
>> > >>>>>>>>> motives such as doing it so you can go out to play.
>> However, after
>> > >>>>>>> some
>> > >>>>>>>>> weeks of really effective motives, it is also possible
>> that the
>> > >>>>>>> child
>> > >>>>>>>>> will find that the only understandable motives become
>> really
>> > >>>>>>> effective,
>> > >>>>>>>>> e.g. the child will leave off doing homework because
>> it¡¯s untidy
>> > >>>>>>> and
>> > >>>>>>>> the
>> > >>>>>>>>> child is now afraid of getting a bad mark.
>> > >>>>>>>>>
>> > >>>>>>>>> p. 403: ANL writes: 'It is a matter of an action¡¯s
>> result being
>> > >>>>>>> more
>> > >>>>>>>>> significant in certain conditions than the motive that
>> actually
>> > >>>>>>> induces
>> > >>>>>>>>> it. The child begins doing its homework conscientiously
>> because it
>> > >>>>>>> wants
>> > >>>>>>>>> to go out quickly and play. In the end this leads to
>> much more not
>> > >>>>>>>> simply
>> > >>>>>>>>> that it will get the chance to go and play but also
>> that it
>> > >>> will get
>> > >>>>>>> a
>> > >>>>>>>>> good mark. A new "objectivation" of its needs come
>> about which
>> > >>> means
>> > >>>>>>>> they
>> > >>>>>>>>> are understood at a higher level.'
>> > >>>>>>>>>
>> > >>>>>>>>> 'The transition to a new leading activity differs from
>> the process
>> > >>>>>>>>> described simply in the really effective motives
>> becoming in the
>> > >>>>>>> case of
>> > >>>>>>>>> a change of leading activity, those understandable
>> motives that
>> > >>>>>>> exist in
>> > >>>>>>>>> the sphere of relations characterizing the place the
>> child can
>> > >>>>>>> occupy
>> > >>>>>>>>> only in the next higher stage of development rather
>> than in the
>> > >>>>>>> sphere
>> > >>>>>>>> of
>> > >>>>>>>>> relations in which it still actually is. The
>> preparation of these
>> > >>>>>>>>> transitions therefore takes a long time because it is
>> > >>> necessary for
>> > >>>>>>> the
>> > >>>>>>>>> child to become quite fully aware of a sphere of
>> relations
>> > >>> that are
>> > >>>>>>> new
>> > >>>>>>>>> for it.¡±
>> > >>>>>>>>>
>> > >>>>>>>>> ANL compares a child¡¯s performance in a school play
>> with the
>> > >>>>>>> child¡¯s
>> > >>>>>>>>> learning of study as an independent activity. The child
>> begins the
>> > >>>>>>>> school
>> > >>>>>>>>> play as an assignment, and later continues for the
>> approbation the
>> > >>>>>>> child
>> > >>>>>>>>> receives during a successful performance. As with
>> learning to
>> > >>> study
>> > >>>>>>> for
>> > >>>>>>>> a
>> > >>>>>>>>> good mark instead of just studying for the opportunity
>> to go
>> > >>> out and
>> > >>>>>>>>> play, a ¡°merely understandable¡± motive has now become
>> ¡°really
>> > >>>>>>>>> effective¡± and a new activity is established.
>> > >>>>>>>>>
>> > >>>>>>>>> But only in the case of independent study (according to
>> ANL) is
>> > >>>>>>> the
>> > >>>>>>>> new
>> > >>>>>>>>> activity developmentally significant (¡°objectively¡±)
>> because the
>> > >>>>>>> child
>> > >>>>>>>>> is not going to become a professional dramatist (if the
>> child
>> > >>> were,
>> > >>>>>>> then
>> > >>>>>>>>> the performance in the play would be study). Thus only
>> in the
>> > >>> latter
>> > >>>>>>>> case
>> > >>>>>>>>> can we say there is a new leading activity.
>> > >>>>>>>>>
>> > >>>>>>>>> Here's what I make of this:
>> > >>>>>>>>>
>> > >>>>>>>>>
>> > >>>>>>>>> a) ANL really does NOT interrogate the subject as to
>> the object
>> > >>>>>>>>> orientation of the activity: the object (study, the
>> completed
>> > >>> play)
>> > >>>>>>> is
>> > >>>>>>>>> indeed given in advance. As far as ANL is concerned, ONLY
>> > >>> Chaiklin's
>> > >>>>>>>>> "objective" ZPD exists, and there is NO subjective ZPD.
>> But Andy's
>> > >>>>>>> idea
>> > >>>>>>>>> of "immanent critique" is NOT an objective critique; it
>> has to do
>> > >>>>>>> with
>> > >>>>>>>>> following up (just like Sarah's) the subject's way of
>> seeing
>> > >>> things
>> > >>>>>>> and
>> > >>>>>>>>> seeing where it leads.
>> > >>>>>>>>>
>> > >>>>>>>>> b) In the development discussion (San Diego-Helsinki)
>> Dr. Olga
>> > >>>>>>> Vasquez
>> > >>>>>>>>> raised the question of whether "leading activity" is
>> the same as
>> > >>>>>>>>> "neoformation", and Dr. Pentti Harakarainnen really did
>> not answer
>> > >>>>>>> it
>> > >>>>>>>> and
>> > >>>>>>>>> instead talked about Dr. Engestrom's even more general
>> concept of
>> > >>>>>>>>> activity. But here we can see that "leading activity" and
>> > >>>>>>> "neoformation"
>> > >>>>>>>>> are quite different: LSV used "neoformation" to talk
>> about
>> > >>>>>>> transitional
>> > >>>>>>>>> structures during crisis periods that COMPLETELY
>> disappear (for
>> > >>>>>>> example,
>> > >>>>>>>>> the child's autonomous speech at one and the child's
>> > >>> "negativism" at
>> > >>>>>>>>> three) as well as neoformations which become the
>> leading activity
>> > >>>>>>> during
>> > >>>>>>>>> normal growth. Only the latter is a "leading activity"
>> for ANL.
>> > >>>>>>>>>
>> > >>>>>>>>> c) There is still a STRONG behaviorist streak in ANL's
>> reasoning:
>> > >>>>>>> the
>> > >>>>>>>>> difference between the "really effective" and "merely
>> understood"
>> > >>>>>>>>> reasoning can very easily be described, in ALL of ANL's
>> > >>> examples, as
>> > >>>>>>> a
>> > >>>>>>>>> simple lengthening of the time distance between the
>> behavior
>> > >>> and the
>> > >>>>>>>>> positive reinforcement. Bruner, in a quote that I have
>> long since
>> > >>>>>>> lost,
>> > >>>>>>>>> suggests that development can be described this way,
>> but I don't
>> > >>>>>>> think
>> > >>>>>>>>> LSV ever would have done so: for LSV the key thing
>> about humans is
>> > >>>>>>> that
>> > >>>>>>>>> they are dogs that can ring their own bells.
>> > >>>>>>>>>
>> > >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg
>> > >>>>>>>>> Seoul National University of Education
>> > >>>>>>>>>
>> > >>>>>>>>>
>> > >>>>>>>>> ---------------------------------
>> > >>>>>>>>> Looking for last minute shopping deals? Find them fast
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>> > >>>>>>>> Search.
>> > >>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
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>> > >>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>> > >>>>>>>>
>> > >>>>>>>> Andy Blunden :
>> > >>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy/tel (H) +61 3
>> > >>>>>>> 9380 9435,
>> > >>>>>>>> mobile 0409 358 651
>> > >>>>>>>>
>> > >>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>> > >>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>> > >>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>> > >>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>> > >>>>>>>>
>> > >>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>> > >>>>>>> xmca mailing list
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>> > >>>>>>
>> > >>>>>> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3
>> 9380 9435,
>> > >>>>>> mobile 0409 358 651
>> > >>>>>>
>> > >>>>>> _______________________________________________
>> > >>>>>> xmca mailing list
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>> > >>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>> > >>>>>>
>> > >>>>>>
>> > >>>>>
>> > >>>>>
>> > >>>>> _______________________________________________
>> > >>>>> xmca mailing list
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>> > >>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>> > >>>>
>> > >>>> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3
>> 9380 9435,
>> > >>>> mobile 0409 358 651
>> > >>>>
>> > >>>> _______________________________________________
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>> > >>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>> > >>>
>> > >>> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380
>> 9435,
>> > >>> mobile 0409 358 651
>> > >>>
>> > >>> _______________________________________________
>> > >>> xmca mailing list
>> > >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>> > >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>> > >>>
>> > >>>
>> > >>>
>> > >>> ---------------------------------
>> > >>> Never miss a thing. Make Yahoo your homepage.
>> > >>> _______________________________________________
>> > >>> xmca mailing list
>> > >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>> > >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>> > >>
>> > >> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3
>> 9380 9435,
>> > >> mobile 0409 358 651
>> > >>
>> > >> _______________________________________________
>> > >> xmca mailing list
>> > >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>> > >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>> > >>
>> > >
>> > >
>> > > --
>> > > Geoffrey Binder
>> > > BA (SS) La Trobe, BArch (Hons) RMIT
>> > > PhD Candidate
>> > > Global Studies, Social Sciences and Planning RMIT
>> > > Ph B. 9925 9951
>> > > M. 0422 968 567
>> > > _______________________________________________
>> > > xmca mailing list
>> > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>> > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>> > >
>> >
>> > Tony Whitson
>> > UD School of Education
>> > NEWARK DE 19716
>> >
>> > twhitson@udel.edu
>> > _______________________________
>> >
>> > "those who fail to reread
>> > are obliged to read the same story everywhere"
>> > -- Roland Barthes, S/Z (1970)
>> > _______________________________________________
>> > xmca mailing list
>> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>> >
>> >
>>
>>
>> --
>> Geoffrey Binder
>> BA (SS) La Trobe, BArch (Hons) RMIT
>> PhD Candidate
>> Global Studies, Social Sciences and Planning RMIT
>> Ph B. 9925 9951
>> M. 0422 968 567
>> _______________________________________________
>> xmca mailing list
>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435,
> mobile 0409 358 651
>
> _______________________________________________
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca

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Received on Wed Jan 2 17:59 PST 2008