Re: subjective, objective Re: [xmca] Natural vs. Human Dialectics

From: Tony Whitson <twhitson who-is-at UDel.Edu>
Date: Sun Sep 23 2007 - 14:00:12 PDT

Catherine,

Could you say more about this concept? (Sorry if I've missed it in
previous posts -- I'm afraid I'm not able to read everything that comes
over XMCA :-)

On Sun, 23 Sep 2007, Cathrene Connery wrote:

I like Vygotsky's concept of perezshivanie as it captures both sides of
this dichotomy and places it into a dialectic.

-- 
Dr. M. Cathrene Connery
> Geoff wrote:
>> So do we have a false dichotomy in object(ive)/subject(ive)? Objective
>> being knowledge of a thing external to self, subjective being
>> knowledge of self. (And I suppose, these may correspond.) I read an
>> assertion recently that we'd be better off not talking about
>> subject/object but talking about private and public, Would Deely
>> agree?
>> 
>> Cheers, Geoff
>> 
>> On 19/09/2007, Tony Whitson <twhitson@udel.edu> wrote:
>> 
>>> A very different ... almost opposite ... usage for "subjective" and
>>> "objective" -- one that's highly relevant for this topic -- is offered 
>>> by
>>> Peirce scholar John Deely.
>>> 
>>> Deely argues that modernism (from, say, Descartes and Locke, through
>>> contemporaries like Foucault, Derrida, Jameson, Lyotard, etc. who might 
>>> be
>>> considered "postmodern" [Deely argues these have not escaped the crucial
>>> misstep of the early moderns, and he sees Peirce as inaugurating a
>>> genuine post-modern development that does offer a way out from 
>>> modernism])
>>> inverted the understanding of subject and object that can be excavated
>>> from pre-modern Latin thinkers. Things exist objectively as objects of
>>> signification. Things exist subjectively and express themselves
>>> subjectively in how their qualities (characteristics of their properly
>>> subjective existence, independent of their objectivization) inform 
>>> (i.e.,
>>> participate in the formation of) the semiosic relations in which they
>>> participate as sign-elements.
>>> 
>>> The subjective characteristics of something in nature are those
>>> characteristics proper to it as an existing subject, apart from being an
>>> object of knowledge, thought, perception, etc. It's objective
>>> characteristics are characteristics it takes on as an object of 
>>> knowledge,
>>> thought, etc.
>>> 
>>> This makes a lot of sense to me.
>>> 
>>> My explanation mixes in some of my own language. Deely's exposition 
>>> makes
>>> constant use of Latin words and Latin syntax. I'm not sure how
>>> comprehensible it would be to someone who has never studied Latin. (You
>>> don't need to be literate in Latin to read Deely, but some elementary
>>> knowledge of the language is an enormous help.)
>>> 
>>> Plus, you need to be tolerant of, if not appreciative of, the musty
>>> Scholastic aroma of Deely's sources, which infects his own style as 
>>> well.
>>> 
>>> So, if anyone on this list is up to it, I think the rest of us would
>>> appreciate what you'd get out of Deely's work. For a start on these
>>> topics, I'd recommend:
>>> 
>>> http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/50866885
>>> (the second part: the "dialogue between a 'semiotist' and a 'realist'"
>>> 
>>> and (more recent, with a critique of modernist phenomenology):
>>> http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/123114389
>>> 
>>> On Tue, 18 Sep 2007, armando perez wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> It s late but........of course, Bourdieu always mantein the nalitical 
>>>> unity
>>>> between the subjectivity and the objectivity of habitus....What do you 
>>>> think
>>>> realy about bourdieu....    In my personal feeling, I more often (not
>>>> always) do what I believe I want do..... But I recognize that it is 
>>>> not so
>>>> easy to resolve and proof any theory about the dialectics of subject 
>>>> and
>>>> object. The last 40 years (for not move much more back) in 
>>>> Sociological
>>>> Thought proof that.
>>>> Armando
>>>> ----- Original Message -----
>>>> From: "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net>
>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>>> Sent: Saturday, September 08, 2007 7:01 AM
>>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Natural vs. Human Dialectics
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>>> Fair enough Geoff.
>>>>> 
>>>>> But the problem is like this for me. I have known "experts" who 
>>>>> claim that
>>>>> their ability to raise their arm when they want to and their ability 
>>>>> to
>>>>> know when it is them that is raising their arm and not someone else, 
>>>>> is
>>>>> evidence of their agency - analytical, positivist types. I have also 
>>>>> known
>>>>> "experts" who claim that great leaders who have led revolutions 
>>>>> which
>>>>> overthrew entire states were after all only carrying out an 
>>>>> historical
>>>>> 
>>>> task
>>>> 
>>>>> that someone else would have done if they hadn't, that history 
>>>>> worked
>>>>> "through" them, so to speak. Indeed, if I look back across my own 
>>>>> life,
>>>>> while I know that I made choices for better or worse in my own life 
>>>>> and
>>>>> bore the consequences, the ideas I had as a teenager, as a young 
>>>>> adult,
>>>>> 
>>>> the
>>>> 
>>>>> political choices I made in my late-20s, etc., etc., although I
>>>>> passionately believed in them at the time, even thought I was 
>>>>> original, I
>>>>> now know were little more than stereotypical versions of ideas that 
>>>>> were
>>>>> quite typical of the social stratum (habitus) of which I was a part. 
>>>>> So,
>>>>> 
>>>> is
>>>> 
>>>>> there a line, this side of which we have agency in and the other 
>>>>> side of
>>>>> which we don't? And where the hell would that line be if our 
>>>>> passionate
>>>>> beliefs are on the far side of it? I like Bourdieu as well, and I 
>>>>> too
>>>>> 
>>>> think
>>>> 
>>>>> his idea of habitus is a useful concept for dealing  with this 
>>>>> problem,
>>>>> 
>>>> but
>>>> 
>>>>> most people regard him as an extreme objectivist, i.e., that even 
>>>>> our
>>>>> highly personal tastes and preferences are actually "programmed" by 
>>>>> our
>>>>> social environment.
>>>>> 
>>>>> What do you think?
>>>>> Andy
>>>>> 
>>>>> At 03:45 PM 8/09/2007 +1000, you wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>>> Thanks for the welcome Andy.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Yes, I'd agree with the idea that we adapt to and add to culture. 
>>>>>> I've
>>>>>> been wrestling with the idea of agency to identify the "add to" 
>>>>>> part of
>>>>>> this process.  I think I want to define agency as a type of doing 
>>>>>> where
>>>>>> we have to respond beyond what is already habitual (learned). This 
>>>>>> would
>>>>>> range from an average driver (as far as skill is concerned) having 
>>>>>> to
>>>>>> respond immediately to avoid an impending car accident, through to
>>>>>> working creatively. I'm not sure if this is a valid definition of
>>>>>> agency, but it's one that I've come to after thinking about 
>>>>>> innovation.
>>>>>> I think Vygotsky's ZPD could be used to describe how humans live, 
>>>>>> not
>>>>>> just "learn" vis a vie pedagogy. And that Vygotsky's idea that
>>>>>> development is scaffolded, the new being built upon the old, seems 
>>>>>> to
>>>>>> fit nicely with Bourdieu's idea of habitus, the habitus being the 
>>>>>> "old".
>>>>>>  (I don't have a sense of what Bourdieu's position would be on how
>>>>>> habitus is added to.)
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> I haven't give animal bahaviour a lot of thought regarding agency, 
>>>>>> but
>>>>>> off the top of my head I don't think that animals are capable of 
>>>>>> agency,
>>>>>> or if they are it is limited because they lack a developed culture 
>>>>>> to
>>>>>> transmit what is learned and can only learn in limited contexts or
>>>>>> periods, like chicks imprinting who (or what) their mums are.  Non 
>>>>>> human
>>>>>> animals don't seem to be able to adapt inter-generationally - one
>>>>>> generation bootstrapping itself. Humans on the other hand........ 
>>>>>> :-)
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Cheers, Geoff
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> PS, do chicks learn a fear of hawk-like silhouettes or is it hard 
>>>>>> wired?
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> 08/09/07 12:40 PM >>>
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Welcome Geoff. It's good to hear new voices.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Many animals are intelligent though, and respond to their 
>>>>>> environment by
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> learning. Whatever "agentive" means, I don't think that a chick 
>>>>>> learning
>>>>>> to
>>>>>> recognise and a avoid a predator by learning the shape of their
>>>>>> silhouette
>>>>>> is thereby "agentive". Surely it's what you mention in passing, 
>>>>>> that our
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> environment is cultural, that is, we adapt to products of previous
>>>>>> generations and create more cultural artefacts in the process?
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> BTW, what *do* you mean by "agentive"? :-)
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>> At 11:50 AM 8/09/2007 +1000, you wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Hi I'm new here and feeling my way through these ideas.....
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> On natural selection, while a driver might be chaos and random
>>>>>>> mutation, the important thing is not the mutation but the 
>>>>>>> adaptation.
>>>>>>> What matters is the relationship between the organism and its 
>>>>>>> context.
>>>>>>> Human learning is not best described in these terms but as a 
>>>>>>> fast
>>>>>>> track (non genetic) form of adaptation. The difference between 
>>>>>>> our
>>>>>>> genetic and cultural adaptations is that our cultural 
>>>>>>> adaptations are
>>>>>>> not random but responsive (agentive) to the physical and 
>>>>>>> cultural
>>>>>>> niches that we are adapted to via our abilities to, amongst 
>>>>>>> others,
>>>>>>> learn and, importantly to forget. Our practices, those things 
>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>> we've already learned, underpin our ability to learn and or 
>>>>>>> respond to
>>>>>>> changes in our relationships to our physical/cultural world(s).
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Cheers, Geoff
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> On 08/09/07, David Kellogg <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com> wrote:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Steve and Andy:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>   Here's a puzzle. On p. 120 of "Mind in Society", the 
>>>>>>>> Afterword by
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Vera John-Steiner and Ellen Souberman begins with the following
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> epigraph
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> (pardon the long quote, but it's necessary to explain the 
>>>>>>> puzzle):
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>   "The great basic idea that the world is not to be viewed as 
>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> complex
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> of fully fashioned objects but as a complex of processes in 
>>>>>>> which
>>>>>>> apparently stable objects, no less thatn the images of them 
>>>>>>> inside our
>>>>>>>             heads (our concepts) are undergoing incessant 
>>>>>>> changes. (...) In the
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> eyes
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> of dialectical philosophy, nothing is established for all time,
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> nothing
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> is absolute or sacred. On everything and in everything it sees 
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> stamp
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> of inevitable decline; nothing can resist it sav the unceasing 
>>>>>>> process
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> of
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> formation and destruction, the unending ascent form lower to 
>>>>>>> higher--a
>>>>>>>             process of which that philosophy itself is only a 
>>>>>>> simple reflection
>>>>>>> within the thinking brain."
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>   You can see that this quote, if accurate, answers quite well
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Andy's
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> question about in what sense nature can be said to be 
>>>>>>> dialectical. It
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> is
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> the same sense in which dialectical philosophy can be said to be
>>>>>>> dialectical, and for the one and same reason: dialectics is 
>>>>>>> simply a
>>>>>>> description of how change takes place.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>   But IS the quote accurate? Here's the SAME passage from my 
>>>>>>>> copy of
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Marx and Engels' selected works (Moscow: Progress, 1970, Vol. 3, 
>>>>>>> pp.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 362-363):
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>   "The great basic thought that the world is not to be 
>>>>>>>> comprehended
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> as
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> a complex of ready-made things but as a complex of processes, in 
>>>>>>> wich
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> things apparently stable no less than their mind images in our 
>>>>>>> heads,
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> concepts, go through an uninterrupted change of coming into 
>>>>>>> being and
>>>>>>> passing away, in which, in spite of all seeming accidentality 
>>>>>>> and of
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> all
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> temporary retrogression, a progressive development asserts 
>>>>>>> itself in
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> end--this great fundametnal thought has, especially since the 
>>>>>>> time of
>>>>>>> Hegel, so throughly permeated ordinary conscousness that in this
>>>>>>> generality it is now scarcely ever contradicted. But to 
>>>>>>> acknowledge
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> this
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> fundamental though in words and to apply it in reality in detail 
>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> each
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> domain of investigation are two different things. If, however,
>>>>>>> investigation always proceeds from this standpoint, the demand 
>>>>>>> for
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> final
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> soclutions and eternal truth ceases once and for all; one is 
>>>>>>> always
>>>>>>> conscious of the necessary limitation of all acquired knowledge, 
>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>  the fact that it is conditioned by the circumstances in which 
>>>>>>>> it
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> was
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> acquired."
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>   NOTHING here about the "reflection of the dialectics of 
>>>>>>>> nature" in
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> the thinking brain--only the much weaker idea that the 
>>>>>>> transience of
>>>>>>> concepts is reflected in the limited nature of human knowledge! 
>>>>>>> That's
>>>>>>>             the puzzle.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>   I'm sorry if I sounded flippant in my last post--my position 
>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> rather like that in the SECOND version of Engels' quote (not the
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> version
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> in Mind in Society), and it's quite serious. I think that the 
>>>>>>> idea
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> that
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Jews are a particularly intelligent race (and also the idea that
>>>>>>> fertility and intelligence are inversely correlated, and this 
>>>>>>> somehow
>>>>>>> represents a threat to human survival) is a very serious 
>>>>>>> misconception
>>>>>>>             about the relationship between ontogenesis and 
>>>>>>> phylogenesis. Humans
>>>>>>> "choose"; nature "selects", and for humans to "choose" to select 
>>>>>>> when
>>>>>>> they cannot even manage to make economic and social relations 
>>>>>>> obey
>>>>>>> rational will is a little like a lay person trying to cure 
>>>>>>> obesity by
>>>>>>> vivisection rather than by diet and self-control.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>   Right now, I think that the attempt to reduce human 
>>>>>>>> creativity to
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> chaos/complexity is flawed in the opposite direction; not too 
>>>>>>> much
>>>>>>> chutzpah but too little. It reduces learning to a 
>>>>>>> trial-and-error
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> process
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> driven by random variations. Lorenz's wonderful book "The 
>>>>>>> Origins of
>>>>>>> Chaos" points out that MOST games are not good producers of 
>>>>>>> chaos,
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> either
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> because they are really random (and chaos is only apparently 
>>>>>>> random)
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> or
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> contrariwise, because they are subject to deliberate strategy 
>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> skill
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> (he gives the marvelous example of pinball, which was initially 
>>>>>>> banned
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> in
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> his hometown as a game of chance, but then legalized as a game 
>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> skill).
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>   Natural selection really is random and bottom up, at least 
>>>>>>>> at
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> first.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> But it gives rise to humans, and these replace natural selection 
>>>>>>> with
>>>>>>> human choices, at least in the terrain of ideas. Learning is not
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> usefully
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> described in chaos/complexity terms; the principle of human 
>>>>>>> choice has
>>>>>>>             clearly replaced random variation and natural 
>>>>>>> selection as soon as the
>>>>>>>             process of variation itself is subject to volitional 
>>>>>>> control (as soon
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> as
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> people start to generate particular language strings and not 
>>>>>>> others
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> and
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> then select these).
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>   Amongst humans, at the level of culture, language, games, 
>>>>>>>> and that
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> great cultural language game we call philosophy, the idea of
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> deliberate
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> choice is clearly more powerful than the principle of natural
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> selection.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> That is why I think nature is dialectical, at least in the weak 
>>>>>>> sense
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> of
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> incompletable (if you will pardon a bit of volitional linguistic
>>>>>>> creativity) indicated by Engels.But dialectical philosophy is a
>>>>>>> non-natural selection rather than a natural reflection of the
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> dialectics
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> of nature in the human brain.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>   David Kellogg
>>>>>>>>   Seoul National University of Education
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>>>>>>>>   Steve, could you give a simple, 2 or 3 lines maybe, 
>>>>>>>> explanation of
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> what you
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> *mean* by "nature is dialectical"?
>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>> At 09:23 AM 7/09/2007 -0700, you wrote:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> This is a dense but not too long post on this discussion of
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> volition and
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> complexity theory. I think we bump into the question of 
>>>>>>>>> whether
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> "nature
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> is dialectical" in thinking about the question of how 
>>>>>>>>> complexity
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> theory
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> can figure into the study of consciousness. Yesterday I sent 
>>>>>>>>> David
>>>>>>>>> Kellog some links to Ethel Tobach (integrative levels) and 
>>>>>>>>> Ken
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Richardson
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> (levels of self-regulation), two authors I find to be on the 
>>>>>>>>> right
>>>>>>>>> track. Both Tobach and Richardson use important ideas from 
>>>>>>>>> CHAT in
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> their
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> theorizing, and have a strong leaning toward integrating 
>>>>>>>>> natural
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> and
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> social science, in ways I find both dialectical and 
>>>>>>>>> materialist.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky was a strong advocate of Engels' position that 
>>>>>>>>> nature is
>>>>>>>>> dialectical, as was of course Marx, who I believe 
>>>>>>>>> contributed two
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> chapters
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> to the book Anti-Duhring, where Engels develops this 
>>>>>>>>> concept. The
>>>>>>>>> Dialectics of Nature by Engels, a manuscript never published 
>>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Engels'
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> lifetime, was first published in Russia in the 1920's and is
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> clearly
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> influential on Vygotsky, who quotes it favorably numerous 
>>>>>>>>> times in
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> his
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> manuscript "The Meaning of the Historical Crisis of 
>>>>>>>>> Psychology"
>>>>>>>>> (1927). But this is a minority viewpoint today, it seems.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> I found myself spending some time browsing the book Mike 
>>>>>>>>> mentioned
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> earlier
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> this week, Human activity - contributions to the 
>>>>>>>>> anthropological
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> sciences
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> from a perspective of activity theory by Benny Karpatschof,
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> available
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> online at 
>>>>>>>>> http://informationr.net/ir/12-3/Karpatschof/Karp00.html .
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> This
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> book is a rich and highly worthy exploration of the 
>>>>>>>>> philosophical
>>>>>>>>> underpinnings of CHAT, one of the best I have seen on that 
>>>>>>>>> level,
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> but
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Benny adopts the position that nature is not dialectical,
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> disagreeing
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> sharply with Engels - and therefore, Marx, Vygotsky, 
>>>>>>>>> Leontiev, and
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> all the
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> classical Marxists on this question. This idea that Engels 
>>>>>>>>> was
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> wrong,
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> that nature is not dialectical, that dialectics does not 
>>>>>>>>> apply to
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> nature
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> (Karpatschof allies with Sartre on this), is quite popular 
>>>>>>>>> among
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> many
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> dialectical thinkers today, all around the world. The 
>>>>>>>>> position I
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> lean
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> toward, that nature is dialectical, is a minority view 
>>>>>>>>> today.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> I think we bump into this question of the dialectics of 
>>>>>>>>> nature
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> every time
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> we try to integrate explanations across different domains of
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> complexity -
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> from the behavior of atoms, to genes, to embryos, to 
>>>>>>>>> children
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> learning to
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> speak, for example - so the question "is nature 
>>>>>>>>> dialectical?" is
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> both an
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> ontological question (what is the nature of reality) and
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> epistemological
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> (how do we know anything). I think Andy's remarks offer an
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> excellent
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> basis for a critique of the incorrect view that conscious 
>>>>>>>>> human
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> behavior
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> (volition) can be reduced to the laws of complexity science. 
>>>>>>>>> But if
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> we go
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> the route Benny Karpatschof suggests and reject the thesis 
>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> nature is
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> dialectical altogether, I think we can lose a vital link 
>>>>>>>>> between
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> natural and the social, both ontologically and 
>>>>>>>>> epistemologically,
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> and how
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> we can use, as Engels began to, the discoveries of natural 
>>>>>>>>> science
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> (laws
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> of mechanics, chemistry in his time, quantum 
>>>>>>>>> electrodynamics,
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> complexity
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> theory, etc. in our time) to understand how the even more 
>>>>>>>>> complex
>>>>>>>>> activities of human society and the still even more complex 
>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> chaotic
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> actions and operations of the human individual, emerge. In 
>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> way, I
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> think complexity theory is very much a powerful tool in 
>>>>>>>>> trying to
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> link the
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> explanatory laws of nature and society, although by no means 
>>>>>>>>> is it
>>>>>>>>> sufficient. That will require a new level of integrated 
>>>>>>>>> science and
>>>>>>>>> general psychology along the lines that Vygotsky envisioned.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> - Steve
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> At 04:18 PM 9/7/2007 +1000, you wrote:
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Welcome aboard Steve.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> I have always thought that the proposition that thinking 
>>>>>>>>>> is like
>>>>>>>>>> computation is so barren, so stupid and so obviously an 
>>>>>>>>>> reflected
>>>>>>>>>> projection, that to argue against it is to enter into the
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> stupidity, and
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> I would rather not. It's similar to people finding proof 
>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> neo-liberal
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> economics in Darwinian biology, overlooking the fact that 
>>>>>>>>>> Darwin
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> imported
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> liberal economic ideas into his view of Nature in the 
>>>>>>>>>> first place.
>>>>>>>>>> Computers are the latest thing, and information scientists 
>>>>>>>>>> develop
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> tools
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> for humans to use by emulating human activity, and then 
>>>>>>>>>> other
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> people
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> discover that people think like computers. Upside-down. 
>>>>>>>>>> Generates
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> lots of
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> academic salaries and popular book sales anyway.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Although I think complexity theory and the concept of 
>>>>>>>>>> chaos are
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> very rich
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> and interesting ideas, I think they are out of place in 
>>>>>>>>>> describing
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> working of such a "well-oiled machine" (he, he) as the 
>>>>>>>>>> human mind.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> One
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> thing about the application of this theory to the mind, 
>>>>>>>>>> and this
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> is
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> David's issue I believe, is that it is a radically unfree 
>>>>>>>>>> concept
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> of the
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> human condition. Allied with the concept of emergence, it 
>>>>>>>>>> is a fig
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> leaf
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> to cover a lacuna in positivist knowledge of the mind. We 
>>>>>>>>>> cannot
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> explain
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> how a few bits of flesh can be so creative and so clever, 
>>>>>>>>>> so its
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> must be
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> emergence, complexity, chaos, etc., etc.,
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> I am intrigued also by David's question as to why learners 
>>>>>>>>>> should
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> be so
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> in favour of learning theories which give them no power. 
>>>>>>>>>> Perhaps
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> it is
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> because those learning theories also give them no 
>>>>>>>>>> responsibility?
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> At 09:41 PM 6/09/2007 -0700, you wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> First time poster here and this may be from out of
>>>>>>>>>>> left field, I'm not sure. I am not active in the
>>>>>>>>>>> field so forgive me if but:
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Roger Penrose, a prominent asttrophysicist, (among
>>>>>>>>>>> others) has advanced the case that human
>>>>>>>>>>> thinking/consciousness/cognition is not
>>>>>>>>>>> "computational". Here he follows Kurt Goedel in the
>>>>>>>>>>> use of the term computational. He wrote a book that
>>>>>>>>>>> started with this premise and then further wrote a
>>>>>>>>>>> response to a chorus of influential academics, all of
>>>>>>>>>>> whom issued polemics against his book and especially
>>>>>>>>>>> the "non-computational" thesis.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> The contents of his reply somewhat step into the
>>>>>>>>>>> middle of the debate but should be perfectly
>>>>>>>>>>> understandable even to someone who hasn't read the
>>>>>>>>>>> book or the scathing reviews. The Contents are
>>>>>>>>>>> numbered and I recommend especiallyr reading #s 3 and
>>>>>>>>>>> 4 and then some of the later items at your own
>>>>>>>>>>> discretion, evocatively titled "Free Will", "What Is
>>>>>>>>>>> Consciousness?" and so on.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Penrose is not really trying to answer those
>>>>>>>>>>> questions, by the way, only remove them from a
>>>>>>>>>>> reductive, emergent from matter, reducible to physical
>>>>>>>>>>> properties and laws, perspective.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Might at least help center your search for how and
>>>>>>>>>>> where volition fits into the puzzle.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> This is a wonderful list by the way, thanks guys
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> It's a good read too, but it wasn't what I was
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> looking for. I need
>>>>>>>>>>> some
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> way of integrating complexity theory and VOLITION
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> (or
>>>>>>>>>>> CONSCIOUSNESS). In
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> language teaching (which is what I do)
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> volition-free approaches are
>>>>>>>>>>> very
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> popular (nativism, subconscious acquisition, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> now
>>>>>>>>>>> chaos-complexity
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> _____________________________________________________________________
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> _______________
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Need a vacation? Get great deals
>>>>>>>>>>> to amazing places on Yahoo! Travel.
>>>>>>>>>>> http://travel.yahoo.com/
>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 
>>>>>>>>>> 9380
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 9435, AIM
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 
>>>>>>>> 9435,
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> AIM
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> ---------------------------------
>>>>>>>> Got a little couch potato?
>>>>>>>> Check out fun summer activities for kids.
>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>> Geoffrey Binder
>>>>>>> BA (SS) La Trobe, BArch (Hons) RMIT
>>>>>>> PhD Candidate
>>>>>>> Global Studies, Social Sciences and Planning RMIT
>>>>>>> Ph B. 9925 9951
>>>>>>> M. 0422 968 567
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>   Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 
>>>>>> 9435,
>>>>>> AIM
>>>>>> identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>> 
>>>>>   Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 
>>>>> 9435, AIM
>>>>> identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651
>>>>> 
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> GRU:
>>>> Servicio de correo UCLV.
>>>> 
>>>> __________________________________________________________________
>>>> Servicio de Correos del Grupo de Redes. UCLV
>>>> 30 de noviembre 1952-2007 -55 Aniversario de la Universidad Central 
>>>> Marta Abreu de Las Villas
>>>> Orgullosa de su historia, comprometida con el presente, abierta hacia 
>>>> el futuro
>>>> - Universidad 2008 del 11 al 15 de febrero del 2008.
>>>> Palacio de Convenciones. La Habana. Cuba. http: 
>>>> //www.universidad2008.cu
>>>> - II Taller internacional -Vitualización en la Educación Superior-, 
>>>> del 11 al 15 de febrero de 2008
>>>> Palacio de Convenciones. La Habana, Cuba. 
>>>> http://virtual-es.uclv.edu.cu
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> Tony Whitson
>>> UD School of Education
>>> NEWARK  DE  19716
>>> 
>>> twhitson@udel.edu
>>> _______________________________
>>> 
>>> "those who fail to reread
>>>   are obliged to read the same story everywhere"
>>>                    -- Roland Barthes, S/Z (1970)
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> xmca mailing list
>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
> I like Vygotsky's concept of perezshivanie as it captures both sides of this 
> dichotomy and places it into a dialectic.
>
> -- 
> Dr. M. Cathrene Connery
> Assistant Professor of Education
> 607.274.7382
> Ithaca College
>
> _______________________________________________
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
Tony Whitson
UD School of Education
NEWARK  DE  19716
twhitson@udel.edu
_______________________________
"those who fail to reread
  are obliged to read the same story everywhere"
                   -- Roland Barthes, S/Z (1970)

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Received on Sun Sep 23 14:09 PDT 2007

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