Re: [xmca] Dewey and Prolepsis

From: Mike Cole <lchcmike who-is-at gmail.com>
Date: Mon Apr 30 2007 - 10:32:49 PDT

Seems to me that inquiry is the method, Michael. No solution, until after
the "fact" just a method of inquiry.
mike

On 4/30/07, ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org <ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org> wrote:
>
>
> That is helpful Michael. Knowledge is a process rather than an outcome?
>
> I will look into securing a copy of the suggested text.
>
> eric
>
>
>
> "Michael Glassman"
> <MGlassman@ehe.ohio To: "eXtended Mind,
> Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> -state.edu> cc:
> Sent by: Subject: RE: [xmca]
> Dewey and Prolepsis
> xmca-bounces@weber.
> ucsd.edu
>
>
> 04/30/2007 12:17 PM
> Please respond to
> "eXtended Mind,
> Culture, Activity"
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Eric,
>
> The way I read Dewey right now there is no method for knowledge, because
> knowledge is something of an illusion unless kept within its confines as
> instrument (rather than answer). Related to Mike's earlier post, I
> think he sees knowledge as something that occurred to solve a previous
> problem and must now serve as a jumping off point (and nothing more) for
> the next problem. In other words knowledge does not have a special
> place in the current problem beyond other possible instruments. I think
> Dewey might instead talk about a method of knowing, understanding how to
> solve the problem at hand - and of course that method is logical inquiry
> (I would argue without the positivist implications which change the
> whole tenor of the idea from how most people approach it). I think
> Dewey ties this all together best in his late book "The Knowing and the
> Known" with Bentley. I don't think it's something new he came to - in
> many ways I see his chapters in that book as a summing up, a chance to
> lay out a theory of knowing once and for all.
>
> Michael
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> On Behalf Of ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org
> Sent: Monday, April 30, 2007 11:58 AM
> To: mcole@weber.ucsd.edu; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: Re: [xmca] Dewey and Prolepsis
>
>
> Mike:
>
> Dewey has been on my mind a lot lately, the text I have been studying is
> "Nature and Experience". Rereading it has been an attempt to understand
> the 'unit' of study for psychology. I like Vygotsky's use of" word" as
> a
> unit of measure but others have not, so I have tried a different
> approach
> by turning to Dewey. ON page 318 of "Nature and Experience": When it
> is
> denied that we are conscious of events as such it is not meant that we
> are
> not aware of objects. Objects are precisely what we are aware of. FOr
> objects are events with meanings. . .so intimate is the connection of
> meanings with consciousness that there is no great difficulty in
> resolving
> "consciousness". . ."
>
> However, I am still unclear as to what Dewey views as a method for
> knowledge? I do know he refutes the dualism of realism but other than
> that
> . . .
>
> eric
>
>
>
>
> "Mike Cole"
>
> <lchcmike@gmail. To: "eXtended Mind,
> Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> com> cc: Reijo Miettinen
> <reijo.miettinen@helsinki.fi>
> Sent by: Subject: [xmca] Dewey and
> Prolepsis
> xmca-bounces@web
>
> er.ucsd.edu
>
>
>
>
>
> 04/29/2007 03:49
>
> PM
>
> Please respond
>
> to mcole; Please
>
> respond to
>
> "eXtended Mind,
>
> Culture,
>
> Activity"
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Dear colleagues--
>
> We have often stumbled over the notion of object in our discussions of
> activity. Yesterday, reading
> in Dewey's Logic I came across the following passage that I found
> particularly interesting because it
> relates the notion of object to prolepsis, a term I did not know Dewey
> used,
> but which has been important
> in my thinking. Here is the passage (p. 119).
>
> The name objects will be reserved for subject-matter so far as it has
> been
> produced and ordered in settled form by
> by means of inquiry; proleptically, objects are the objectives of
> inquiry.
> The apparent ambiguity of using "objects"
> for this purpose (since the word is regularly applied to things that are
> observed of thought of) is only apparent. For
> things exist as objects for us only as they have been previously
> determined
> as outcomes of inquiries. When used in
> carrying on new inquiries in new problematic situations, they are known
> as
> objects in virtue of prior inquires which warrant
> their assertibility. In the new situation, they are means of attaining
> knowledge of something else. In the strict sense, they
> are part of the contents of inquiry as the word content was defined
> above.
> But retrospectively (that is, as products of prior
> determination in inquiry, they are objects).
>
> This way of expressing the temporally double sided, or double
> directionality
> of action in activity seemed useful.
> On a Sunday afternoon.
> mike
> _______________________________________________
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> _______________________________________________
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
Received on Mon Apr 30 11:34 PDT 2007

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.8 : Fri Mar 21 2008 - 16:41:48 PDT