RE: [xmca] LSV and materialisms

From: Alexander Surmava (monada@netvox.ru)
Date: Mon Dec 18 2006 - 17:54:18 PST


Hi Martin,

 

You surely know, that the very distinction between so called "dialectical
materialism" and "historical materialism" is entirely false Soviet
misinterpretation which has nothing to do with real Marx.

Actually in Marxist theoretic culture both notions are identical. The
distinction between them as the distinction between two different
disciplines lies in completely positivist approach. So you are quite right
stating that Vygotsky evidently “saw neither as the appropriate basis for
his Marxist psychology!”

As for Vygotsky he was absolutely exact refuting completely attempts to
build new materialistic psychology by simple merging of positivist empirical
psychology with "dialectical materialism" or "historical materialism" and
insisting on the necessity of elaborating of "psychological Das Kapital". So
all his as well as Leont'ev's investigations we can consider as more or less
good attempts to find approaches to this task.

Only the works of Il'enkov came closely to play a role of first chapters of
such "psychological Das Kapital". I mean Il'enkov's analysis of
psychophysical problem and the great Il'enkov-Spinoza's idea of "thinking
body" can be considered as such first chapters.

 

Sasha

 

P.S. I don’t forget about my promise to comment LSV’s “mirror metaphor”. It
is ready in Russian and now it’s only waiting for free time in my timetable
to translate them into English for XMCA.

 

    

-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
Behalf Of Martin Packer
Sent: Tuesday, December 19, 2006 2:15 AM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] LSV and materialisms

 

Mike, Joao,

 

There are two or three places in the Crisis where V refers to dialectical

materialism and historical materialism. The most interesting in my view is

this passage (which I'm clumsily copying):

 

" Engels¹ formula ‹ not to foist the dialectical principles on nature, but

to find them in it ‹ is changed into its opposite here. The principles of

dialectics are

introduced into psychology from outside. The way of Marxists should be

different. The direct application of the theory of dialectical materialism

to the

problems of natural science and in particular to the group of biological

sciences or psychology is impossible, just as it is impossible to apply it

directly

to history and sociology. In Russia it is thought that the problem of

³psychology and Marxism² can be reduced to creating a psychology which is

up to Marxism, but in reality it is far more complex. Like history,

sociology is

in need of the intermediate special theory of historical materialism which

explains the concrete meaning, for the given group of phenomena, of the

abstract laws of dialectical materialism. In exactly the same way we are in

need of an as yet undeveloped but inevitable theory of biological

materialism

and psychological materialism as an intermediate science which explains the

concrete application of the abstract theses of dialectical materialism to

the

given field of phenomena.

Dialectics covers nature, thinking, history ‹ it is the most general,

maximally

universal science. The theory of the psychological materialism or dialectics

of

psychology is what I call general psychology.

In order to create such intermediate theories ‹ methodologies, general

sciences ‹ we must reveal the essence of the given area of phenomena, the

laws of their change, their qualitative and quantitative characteristics,

their

causality, we must create categories and concepts appropriate to it, in

short,

we must create our own Das Kapital. It suffices to imagine Marx operating

with the general principles and categories of dialectics, like

quantity-quality,

the triad, the universal connection, the knot [of contradictions], leap etc.


without the abstract and historical categories of value, class, commodity,

capital, interest, production forces, basis, superstructure etc. ‹ to see

the

whole monstrous absurdity of the assumption that it is possible to create

any

Marxist science while by-passing by Das Kapital. Psychology is in need of

its

own Das Kapital ‹ its own concepts of class, basis, value etc. ‹ in which it

might express, describe and study its object." (pp. 329-330, roughly, in the

Essential Vygotsky version)

 

My gloss of this is that the only appropriate way to apply Marxism to

psychology was, for V, to create what he called a "general psychology² (p.

329). What this required was neither the direct application of dialectical

materialism (too abstract) nor the application of historical materialism

(too specific). Historical materialism was appropriate for sociology, but

psychology needed a new "theory of biological materialism and psychological

materialism" that would be an "intermediate science which explains the

concrete application of the abstract theses of dialectical materialism to

the given field of phenomena² (p. 330). This intermediate science would be

³a critique of psychology² (p. 331); this ³theory of the psychological

materialism or dialectics of psychology is what I call general psychology²

(330). It would not take from Marx, but learn from Marx. To do this ³we must

create our own Das Kapital² (p. 330).

 

Evidently V was aware of the distinction between dialectical materialism and

historical materialism. Equally evidently he saw neither as the appropriare

basis for his marxist psychology! We need a "psychological materialism"!

 

Hope this helps. back to the grading!

 

Martin

 

 

 

 

On 12/18/06 2:16 PM, "Mike Cole" <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:

 

> David Answered the Question as follows.

>

> V. refers favourably to historical materialism in his "The Socialist

> Alternation of Man" (in *The Vygotsky Reader*) but otherwise, to my

> knowledge, does not have much to say about the diamat/histmat distinction.

> Not really his style.

> _______________________________________________

> xmca mailing list

> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu

> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca

 

Engels¹ formula ‹ not to foist the dialectical principles on nature, but to

find

them in it ‹ is changed into its opposite here. The principles of dialectics

are

introduced into psychology from outside. The way of Marxists should be

different. The direct application of the theory of dialectical materialism

to the

problems of natural science and in particular to the group of biological

sciences or psychology is impossible, just as it is impossible to apply it

directly

to history and sociology. In Russia it is thought that the problem of

³psychology and Marxism² can be reduced to creating a psychology which is

up to Marxism, but in reality it is far more complex. Like history,

sociology is

in need of the intermediate special theory of historical materialism which

explains the concrete meaning, for the given group of phenomena, of the

abstract laws of dialectical materialism. In exactly the same way we are in

need of an as yet undeveloped but inevitable theory of biological

materialism

and psychological materialism as an intermediate science which explains the

concrete application of the abstract theses of dialectical materialism to

the

given field of phenomena.

Dialectics covers nature, thinking, history ‹ it is the most general,

maximally

universal science. The theory of the psychological materialism or dialectics

of

psychology is what I call general psychology.

In order to create such intermediate theories ‹ methodologies, general

sciences ‹ we must reveal the essence of the given area of phenomena, the

laws of their change, their qualitative and quantitative characteristics,

their

causality, we must create categories and concepts appropriate to it, in

short,

we must create our own Das Kapital. It suffices to imagine Marx operating

with the general principles and categories of dialectics, like

quantity-quality,

the triad, the universal connection, the knot [of contradictions], leap etc.


without the abstract and historical categories of value, class, commodity,

capital, interest, production forces, basis, superstructure etc. ‹ to see

the

whole monstrous absurdity of the assumption that it is possible to create

any

Marxist science while by-passing by Das Kapital. Psychology is in need of

its

own Das Kapital ‹ its own concepts of class, basis, value etc. ‹ in which it

might express, describe and study its object.

 

 

            ³The only rightful application of Marxism to psychology would be

to create a general psychology² (p. 329e), but what this required was

neither the direct application of dialectical materialism (too abstract) nor

the application of historical materialism (too specific). Historical

materialism was appropriate for sociology, but psychology is ³in need of an

as yet undeveloped but inevitable theory of biological materialism and

psychological materialism as an intermediate science which explains the

concrete application of the abstract theses of dialectical materialism to

the given field of phenomena² (p. 330e). This intermediate science would be

³a critique of psychology² (p. 331e); this ³theory of the psychological

materialism or dialectics of psychology is what I call general psychology²

(330e). It would not take from Marx, but learn from Marx. To do this ³we

must create our own Das Kapital² (p. 330e). ³I do not want to learn what

constitutes the mind for free, by picking out a couple of citations, I want

to learn from Marx¹s whole method how to build a science, how to approach

the investigation of the mind² (p. 331e).

 

 

 

 

 

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