Re: [xmca] Empirical Evidence for ZPD

From: Martin Packer (
Date: Mon Dec 04 2006 - 10:08:37 PST


I actually don't see a contradiction in the passage from Pedology. (I do,
however, still find a contradiction in the paragraphs on ontology from the
Crisis.) No, I cited this passage for two reasons. First, because it seems
to tell us something, perhaps something important, about the way Vygotsky
read both Hegel and Lenin. Second, because it show that Vygotsky viewed
abstraction not as a simple move away from the concrete, and reflection not
as a passive reception and copying of information about the world (the view
that Richard Rorty rejects in his 'Philosophy of the Mirror of nature') but
as a very active process.

Like you, I read this passage as very Hegelian. I appreciate your filling in
the background of context and history - very helpful. It's interesting that
V was not pitting Marx against Hegel, as one might anticipate. So I agree
with you that grasping at least the rudiments of Hegel is very helpful for
understanding Vygotsky.

And I agree with you that this account of abstraction is often
misunderstood. I think it has a lot of interesting implications, but that's
a topic for another discussion.


On 12/4/06 3:54 AM, "Andy Blunden" <> wrote:

> Martin, I had a second read through your post, trying to figure out what
> you saw as contradictory and again read those chapters of "Pedology of
> Adolesence", and I think the contradictions here are illusory, though there
> certainly are intriguing questions raised.
> I think it would be a mistake to conclude (for example as a result of
> reading Ilyenkov on abstract and concrete) that the words "abstract" and
> "concrete" have special meanings in Hegel, Marx and Co., that is opposite
> and mutually exclusive to what they mean in ordinary language. Hegel also
> uses the words "concrete" and "abstract" in the ordinary senses as well.
> For example, Hegel understands "abstract" to mean "removed from actuality"
> or "only a thought" or "not yet developed" or "thin" but he has a deeper
> understanding of what this abstractness entails, so he can show that the
> sense-impression or superficial everyday observation is "abstract" and even
> more so than the philosopher's thought. All thoughts are abstract, but some
> are more abstract than others. When Hegel arrives at the proof that the
> concept is *concrete* this is in deliberate and direct contradiction to the
> belief that all concepts are abstractions. Note however that the when a
> concept first appears it is an "abstract notion", specifically
> Subjectivity, and only becomes objective and real through a long-drawn out
> process of concretisation, which means positing itself in the world though
> the artefact-creating and -using activity of human beings. I think
> Vygotsky's apparent ambivalence in the way he uses the words "concrete" and
> "abstract" mirrors the way Hegel uses these terms. For example, Hegel opens
> the Preliminary Notion of the Encyclopedia with the words "... the Idea is
> in the abstract medium of Thought."
> The brilliance
> of Hegel's move with these words actually depends on them *also* retaining
> their ordinary, common meanings. The undeveloped notion and the isolated
> sense impression are both abstract; the complex actual situation and the
> developed concept are both concrete.
> I would be interested if anyone can confirm it, but it seems to me certain
> that Vygotsky was thoroughly familiar with Hegel. He rarely quotes Hegel.
> But for example, the approx. 10 stages of concept from the infant's
> syncretism to scientific concepts attained by the adolescent, although not
> corresponding at all to the hundreds of stages in Hegel's Logic from
> Being/Nothing to the Absolute Idea, nevertheless, the most significant
> nodal points along both paths *do* correspond. Vygotsky's exposition of the
> ontogenesis of the concept is, relative to Hegel, a completely new
> creation, but still thoroughly Hegelian. It seems to me that it would be
> inconceivable that Vygotsky could have formulated his notion of "scientific
> concept" without having first studied Hegel. Nothing of this kind can be
> found in any of the Enlightenment philosophers; one would have to go back
> to either Aristotle or to followers of Hegel or someone like Lukacs, to
> find anything like Vygotsky's idea of the "Concept proper." It is in short
> a thoroughly Hegelian notion. And I don't believe that anyone who reads
> Vygotsky without having already understood this idea of Hegel's either
> directly or perhaps via Marx, can grasp what Vygotsky is saying. For
> example, in the book about Vygotsky which Jim Werstch wrote 20 years ago,
> it is clear to me that Wertsch did not understand what Vygotsky meant by
> "scientific concept" and he kind of assimilated it to a Logical Positivist
> conception of scientific concepts. But you have to go to Hegel's Logic to
> get what Vygotsky is talking about. I may be wrong, but I just can't see it
> any other way.
> Then Lenin. I am sure that Vygotsky admired Lenin every bit as much as he
> said he did, as did Ilyenkov. Lenin was a genius whatever mistakes he did
> make. Lenin's reading of Hegel took place during a few months of "homework"
> in 1914/15, in isolation. We have his notebooks, so we know exactly what he
> read and what he made of it. I took the trouble to follow his reading
> paragraph by paragraph with my copies of the Logics. I think it can be said
> that Lenin already had an extremely dialectical mind, thanks to his
> training under Plekhanov, life experience in revolutionary struggle, and
> natural talent (so to speak), but I can say for certain that he only
> partially understood what he read in Hegel's Logic. He virtually skipped
> over the entire section on Subjectivity, (which is the section where Hegel
> talks about the philosophical basis of class consciousness, the state and
> the party) without understanding what it was about. The philosophical
> notebooks which Vygotsky was quoting in the passage Martin reproduced were
> first published in Russian in the USSR only in 1929. Given how these notes
> compare to Lenin's publications on philosophy, it can be understood that
> they created a real stir amongst everyone interested in Marxist Philosophy.
> They may have saved Lukacs' skin. Vygotsky would be one of many who would
> quote these notebooks to reinforce the legitimacy of more nuanced readings
> of Marxism than "orthodox" Marxism would otherwise allow. Defeating
> Behaviourism in 1924 was a real coup for Vygotsky, but in general promoting
> the kind of Marxism which is discernible in Lenin's Notebooks and was being
> promoted by Lukacs in 1923, and which Vygotsky needed to overcome
> Behaviourism, was a life-threatening occupation. Lenin's authority on the
> matter was no small thing. A good enough reason to throw in a gratuitous
> footnote.
> I think we can only regret that Lenin died so early and had so little
> opportunity for quiet philosophical study and reflection. The Notebooks
> certainly show a person getting enormous value out of his (presumably)
> first reading of Hegel. Christ! I hardly understood a word on my first
> reading, and it took me several years to really penetrate Hegel.
> Andy
> At 05:30 PM 3/12/2006 -0500, you wrote:
>> Andy,
>> I would very much like to get clearer on Vygotsky's use of both Hegel and
>> Lenin. Perhaps you can help me?
>> For example, in Pedology of the Adolescent (around 1931) V wrote on concept
>> development, and in particular on counting and the number concept. It seems
>> to me he oscillates between a simple view in which the concrete is primitive
>> and the abstract is advanced, and a very different view in which seemingly
>> abstract concepts are actually a reorganization of the relationship between
>> concrete and abstract: "a completely new form of relation between abstract
>> and concrete factors in thinking arises, a new form of their merging and
>> synthesis" (p. 39). The latter strikes me as distinctly Hegelian. The former
>> seems to come up when Vygotsky refers to Hegel. But my reading must be too
>> naive, because on page 79 we find V citing Lenin citing Hegel!
>> First on concepts: The young child's perception of number "is based on
>> number images, on concrete perception of form and size of a given number of
>> objects. With [the] transition to thinking in concepts, the child is
>> liberated from purely concrete numerical thinking. In place of a number
>> image, a number concept appears. If we compare the concept of number with a
>> number image, at first glance it may seem to justify [the] premises of
>> formal logic relative to the extreme poverty in content of the concept in
>> comparison with the riches of the concrete content contained in the image"
>> (vol 5, 78)
>> But Vygotsky immediately continues: "Actually, this is not so. The concept
>> not only excludes from its content a number of points proper to the concrete
>> perception, but for the first time, it also discloses in the concrete
>> perception a number of such points that are completely inaccessible to
>> direct perception or contemplation, points that are introduced by thinking
>> and are identified through processing the data of experience and synthesized
>> into a single whole with elements of direct perception.
>> “Thus all number concepts, for example, the concept ‘7,’ are
>> included in a
>> complex number system, occupy a certain place in it, and when this concept
>> is found and processed, then all the complex connections and relations that
>> exist between this concept and the rest of the system of concepts in which
>> it is included are given. The concept not only reflects reality, but also
>> systematizes it, includes data of concrete perception into a complex system
>> of connections and relations, and discloses the connections and relations
>> that are inaccessible to simple comprehension. For this reason many
>> properties of size become clear and perceptible only when we begin to think
>> of them in concepts” (78-79)
>> This is all rather nice. But then, surprisingly, comes a footnote quoting
>> Lenin on Hegel!
>> Lenin: “In opposition to Kant, Hegel was essentially completely correct.
>> Thinking going from the concrete to the abstract does not deviate if itt is
>> correct from truth, but approaches it. The abstraction of material, a laaw
>> of nature, abstraction of value, etc., in a word, all scientific (correct,
>> serious, not foolish) abstractions reflect nature more deeply, more
>> reliably, more fully. From a living contemplation to abstract thinking and
>> from it to practice such is the dialectical path of recognizing truth,
>> recognizing objective reality” (Complete Works, Vol. 29, pp. 152-153).
>> [Vol.
>> 29 is March Aug 1919]
>> So here, apparently, are Vygotsky, Hegel and Lenin all agreeing that
>> reflection is an active way of thinking which gets beyond appearances to
>> essences, systematizes concrete detail, grasps complex interconnections,
>> recognizes objective reality, achieves truth, and guides practice!
>> I've tried to find this excerpt from Lenin on, but without
>> success.
>> Martin
>> On 12/3/06 4:58 PM, "Andy Blunden" <> wrote:
>>> I don't know, Paul. I guess I would ask you to give me page references to
>>> justify this observation.
>>> The Lenin of the 1914/15 Notebooks certainly reads as a very different
>>> character from the Lenin of the 1908 ME&C, but I am sure that if Lenin had
>>> anywhere in those Notebooks made any kind of self-criticism of his 1908
>>> position I would have noticed it. The same Trotskyist group which spent
>>> countless hours bashing M&EC into my head spent even more hours bashing
>>> "Volume 38" into my head, and it was this experience which prompted me to
>>> make my own study of Hegel.
>>> As to Ilyenkov, yes, Ilyenkov has been my guiding light to get out of the
>>> dogmatism of M&EC. The problem is that while A&C and the Essays are at odds
>>> with M&EC, Ilyenkov chooses to back Lenin to the hilt when he writes a book
>>> about M&EC. As I said, there is nothing actually incorrect in M&EC; it
>>> just, IMO, makes the wrong call in terms of emphasis and what is said/not
>>> said. I am not aware that anywhere Ilyenkov said something like "M&EC was a
>>> bad book".
>>> Andy
>>> At 06:07 AM 3/12/2006 -0800, you wrote:
>>>> Andy,
>>>> Isn't it the case that Lenin rejected his early position of M&EC in the
>>>> Philosophic Notebooks and his study of Hegel's logic? Also, isn't
>>>> Ilyenkov's position in 'From the Abstract to the Concrete' also at odds
>>>> with the position in M&EC?
>>>> Paul
>>>> Andy Blunden <> wrote:
>>>> Can I see if I can say what I think Mike means by the "Russian"
>> meaning of
>>>> "reflection"?
>>>> I was introduced both to Lenin and Vygotsky through a British Trotskyist
>>>> group in the early 1980s, and this involved intensive study of Lenin's
>>>> "Materialism and Empirio-criticism". This book was regarded in that
>> quarter
>>>> as more or less the last word in philosophy. Ilyenkov's book on
>> Positivism,
>>>> was published in English by the same group, and is a full-on defence of
>>>> this book of Lenin's. In M&EC, Lenin uses "reflection" to mean a universal
>>>> property of matter, more or less the propensity of any material thing to
>>>> retain impressions of another material thing with which it has interacted.
>>>> So this view of cognition as something utterly divorced from
>>>> self-consciousness or even living organisms, let alone human beings, but
>>>> rather as a universal property of matter, was encoded in the meaning
>>>> attached by Lenin to the word "reflection."
>>>> Now, my experiences in British Trotskyism may have been paralleled by the
>>>> experience of others in Russian Stalinism, I don't know. But much as I
>> love
>>>> Ilyenkov, it has always been hard for me to understand his enthusiasm for
>>>> M&EC. The political effect of ME&C as I received it was very
>>>> retrograde. In the same book, Lenin blasts all forms of semiotics, by the
>>>> way. There was a definite and valid purpose for Lenin's book when it was
>>>> written in 1908, and he doesn't say anything in the whole several hundred
>>>> pages which is actually wrong, but the drift of the polemic is
>> crushing. In
>>>> arguing against subjectivist epistemology, it encourages an absolutely
>>>> devastatingly objectivist view of the human condition in general and
>>>> cognition in particular.
>>>> Personally, I find the notion of "reflection" an extremely *passive*
>>>> rendering of the process of knowledge and life. The idea emphasises the
>>>> dominant place of the object in a true subjective image, and the
>>>> indifference of the image to the internal structure of the subject, but I
>>>> have never found that it convinced anyone that didn't already understand
>>>> these issues. The likening of human society to inorganic natural processes
>>>> is not a point which needs to be made today.
>>>> Is that what you meant Mike?
>>>> Andy
>>>> At 10:59 PM 2/12/2006 -0500, you wrote:
>>>>> Agreed!
>>>>> The version of 'The Historical Meaning of the Crisis in Psychology'
>> that I
>>>>> have to hand is in 'The Esssential Vygostky' (2004, R. W. Rieber & D. K.
>>>>> Robinson, eds. Kluger). It's a compilation of the 'best' of the 6 vol
>>>>> Collected Works. The mirror example is on page 327.
>>>>> Regarding reflection, which is another concept I'm puzzled by (what
>> is the
>>>>> Russian manner, Mike?), I'd forgotten that this paragraph begins:
>>>>> "Let us compare consciousness, as is often done, with a mirror
>> image..." At
>>>>> the end of the paragraph I still can't tell whether V is suggesting
>> it's a
>>>>> good comparison or not.
>>>>> ...and 3 pages earlier (p. 324) when he cites Lenin (1975, p. 260)
>> along the
>>>>> lines that I've mentioned, here again the work reflection is used:
>>>>> "the only 'property' of matter connected with philosophical
>> materialism is
>>>>> the property of being an objective reality, of existing outside of our
>>>>> consciousness.... Epistemologically the concept of matter means NOTHING
>>>>> other than objective reality, existing independently from human
>>>>> consciousness and reflected by it" (original emphasis).
>>>>> I can't find the references from the Crisis anywhere in this book, but I
>>>>> have the Spanish translation now too, and the citation there is to
>> Lenin's
>>>>> Collected Works, vol 19, p. 275. In Spanish the word 'reflected' is
>>>>> translated as 'reflejada' and 'mirror image' as 'reflejo.'
>>>>> Martin
>>>>> On 12/2/06 10:40 PM, "Mike Cole" wrote:
>>>>>> Nothing sceptical, Martin. There are many imponderables here from
>>>>>> many
>>>>> sources. Trying to think with you.
>>>>> I would be greatly assisted, and I
>>>>>> assume I am not alone in this, if
>>>>> discussants would provide page numbers
>>>>>> and
>>>>> references so that those not "in the know" could pin down sources and
>>>>>> thus
>>>>> better triangulate on what the focus
>>>>> of discussion is.
>>>>> I am not versed
>>>>>> in Spinoza. I am barely versed in parts of Vygotsky. So when
>>>>> arcaine
>>>>>> references and partial information
>>>>> are floated out on xmca as if everyone were
>>>>>> an insider, when we are all
>>>>> border liners, it confuses me.
>>>>> mike
>>>>> On 12/2/06,
>>>>>> Martin Packer
>>>> wrote:
>>>>>> Mike, this sounds to me like a
>>>>>> skeptical Hmmmm. What strikes you as
>>>>>> dubious?
>>>>>> I'm happy to be
>>>>>> mediated.
>>>>>> Martin
>>>>>> On 12/2/06 6:03 PM, "Mike Cole"
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>> Hmmmm indeed.
>>>>>> mike
>>>>>> On 12/2/06,
>>>>>> Martin Packer
>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>> Natalia, thanks very much.
>>>>>> The cyrillic didn't come through, but I can
>>>>>>> piece
>>>>>>> together the
>>>>>> English:
>>>>>>> "after all a cornerstone of materialism is a
>>>>>>> proposition
>>>>>> about (that)
>>>>>>> consciousness and the brain are, both, a product
>>>>>>> (of
>>>>>> nature), (and) a part
>>>>>>> of nature, (the one) that reflects the rest of
>>>>>> nature"
>>>>>>> Might you be able to take a look at the other two excerpts in
>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> original
>>>>>>> Russian?
>>>>>>> Let me think about this 'out loud' a
>>>>>> little. This is
>>>>>>> the point in Crisis
>>>>>>> where Vygotsky is specifying what
>>>>>> a truly Marxist
>>>>>>> psychology, a 'general'
>>>>>>> psychology, must study. A
>>>>>> science, he insists,
>>>>>>> studies not appearances but
>>>>>>> what really exists.
>>>>>> Optics, for example, studies
>>>>>>> mirror surfaces and light
>>>>>>> rays, not the
>>>>>> images we see in the mirror, for the
>>>>>>> latter are phantoms. A
>>>>>>> scientific
>>>>>> psychology must study the real processes
>>>>>>> that can give rise to
>>>>>>> such
>>>>>> appearances, not (just) the appearances. [It's
>>>>>>> not clear to me how
>>>>>> far
>>>>>>> to go with this seeming analogy between the way a
>>>>>>> mirror reflects
>>>>>> and the
>>>>>>> way the brain/Cs 'reflects the rest of nature'.] So
>>>>>>> any
>>>>>> descriptive,
>>>>>>> intuitionist phenomenology must be rejected. What really
>>>>>> exists? A
>>>>>>> materialist maintains that the brain exists, and consciousness
>>>>>>> too. V
>>>>>>> cites
>>>>>>> Lenin to the effect that what is matter, what is
>>>>>> objective,
>>>>>>> is what exists
>>>>>>> independently of human consciousness. And,
>>>>>> seemingly
>>>>>>> paradoxically,
>>>>>>> consciousness can exist outside our
>>>>>> consciousness: for we can
>>>>>>> be conscious
>>>>>>> without being self-conscious. I
>>>>>> can see without knowing that I
>>>>>>> see. So a
>>>>>>> general psychology must study
>>>>>> consciousness, but to know the mind
>>>>>>> we can't
>>>>>>> rely on introspection, in
>>>>>> part because in introspection mind splits
>>>>>>> into
>>>>>>> subject and object: a
>>>>>> dualism arises in the act of self-reflection.
>>>>>>> We
>>>>>>> can't
>>>>>>> establish a
>>>>>> psychological science only on the basis of what we
>>>>>>> experience
>>>>>>> directly
>>>>>> (as Husserl tried to do); it must be based on knowledge,
>>>>>>> which is
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>> result of analysis, not merely of experience. And what is
>>>>>>> analysis?
>>>>>> Complicated answer put briefly: analysis lies at the intersection
>>>>>>> of
>>>>>> methodology and practice: it is the exhaustive study of a single case
>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>> all
>>>>>>> its connections, taken as a social microcosm. It involves what
>>>>>> Marx
>>>>>>> (following Hegel) called abstraction.
>>>>>>> I'll confess I'm still
>>>>>> not
>>>>>>> clear what V is proposing as the solutions to
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>> epistemological and
>>>>>>> ontological problems that he has distinguished. It
>>>>>> looks
>>>>>>> to me as though
>>>>>>> he is saying that the epistemological problem -
>>>>>> that
>>>>>>> concerning the relation
>>>>>>> between subject and object - arises only
>>>>>> when one
>>>>>>> accepts uncritically the
>>>>>>> dualism that arises in introspection
>>>>>> (or 'blind
>>>>>>> empiricism'?). So once one
>>>>>>> rejects introspection this
>>>>>> problem dissolves.
>>>>>>> The
>>>>>>> implication is that if
>>>>>>> one begins not with
>>>>>> introspection but with
>>>>>>> practice,
>>>>>>> one avoids any
>>>>>>> subject-object
>>>>>> dualism. The ontological problem -
>>>>>>> concerning
>>>>>>> the relation
>>>>>>> between
>>>>>> mind and matter - is what he's trying to study, no?
>>>>>>> How
>>>>>>> is a
>>>>>> brain-in-a-body-in-a-social-world the basis for consciousness, then
>>>>>> self-consciousness, then self-mastery and knowledge?
>>>>>>> Hmmm
>>>>>> Martin
>>>>>>>> Hi Martin,
>>>>>>>> I found it --- in Russian, vol.1 of
>>>>>> "Sobranie Sochinenii", on
>>>>>>> page 416.
>>>>>>>> It reads in Russian as very
>>>>>> similar to the English quote your
>>>>>>> posted
>>>>>>> above:
>>>>>>>> "à åÃÃπ --
>>>>>> after all-- êâºÃ åÓãîëÃπÃ&shy;ûì
>> êà ìÃ&shy;åì ìÃ
>>>> ÔåâºÃ¨Ã
>>>>> ëèçìÃ
>>>>>>> -- a corneestone
>>>>>>> of
>>>>>> materialism -- ÿâëÿåÔñÿ
>> ïîëîÃÃ¥Ã&shy;èå î Ôîì, -- is a
>>>>>>> proposition about, ---
>>>>>>> ÷Ôî
>>>>>>>> ñîçÃ&shy;à Ã&shy;èå è ìîçã
>> åñÔÃπ ïâºÃ®ÃÓêÔ ---
>> -
>>>> (that)
>>>>>>> consciousness and the
>>>>>> brain are,
>>>>>>>> both, a product (of nature),--- ÷à ñÔÃπ
>>>>>>> ïâºÃ¨âºÃ®Ãû, ---(and) a
>> ) a
>>>>>> part of
>>>>>>> nature, --
>>>>>>>> îÔâºÃ ÃÃ ï¬ Ã’Ã ï¬ Ã¶Ã Ã¿
>> îñ±Ã”à ëÃπÃ&shy;Óï¬
>>>> ïâºÃ¨âºÃ®ÃÓ
>> “
>>>>>>> -- (the one)
>>>>>> that reflects the rest of
>>>>>>>> nature"
>>>>>>>> Or something like
>>>>>> this.
>>>>>>>> Hope this is helpful, and not making things more
>>>>>> confusing.
>>>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>>>> Natalia.
>>>>>>> On 11/30/06 2:47
>>>>>> PM, "Natalia Gajdamaschko"
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>> On Thu, 30 Nov 2006 08:55:29 -0500
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>> A few pages later:
>>>>>>>>> ""After all,
>>>>>>> a cornerstone of
>>>>>> materialism is the proposition that
>>>>>>>>> consciousness and
>>>>>>> the brain are
>>>>>> a product, a part of nature, which
>>>>>>> reflect
>>>>>>>>> the rest of
>>>>>>> nature"
>>>>>> (327).
>>>>>>>>> The last sentence is not grammatical English, so
>>>>>> something has clearly
>>>>>>>> gone
>>>>>>>>> wrong with the translation.
>>>>>>>> If
>>>>>>> anyone has access to the original Russian and could comment,that
>>>>>>>> would
>>>>>>> be
>>>>>>>>> great. (Page numbers are from the version in The
>>>>>> Essential
>>>>>>> Vygotsky.)
>>>>>>>>> Martin
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