Can you provide a full reference for Liberali and Fuga (2006) and the source
of the Vygotsky quotation?
That way readers like me can track things down and (hopefully!) sort them
On 12/2/06, Fernanda Liberali <firstname.lastname@example.org> wrote:
> I suggest reading Spinoza's descripton of the Substance/ Nature and
> attributes. This quote from Vygotsky is almost exactly what Spinoza says in
> the Ethics.
> A quote form a discussion of Spinoza:
> "...the idea of a single Substance which is absolute, universal and
> infinite. It is an active and self-generating force, the cause of itself, in
> itself and by itself; hence, everything propagated by this force was
> generated since eternity. Therefore, this Substance cannot be constituted
> by distinct and separable parts, as dualist monotheists, based on binary
> logics, used to envisage. This single Substance consists of indefinite
> endless attributes. These attributes are conceived as modifications on the
> substance /Nature/ God, of which human beings can only distinguish two:
> extension and thought, inextricable and intricate, as they have to do with
> one and only indivisible Substance. From extension derives materiality,
> which means the bodies as infinite ways of extension; and, from thought,
> derive ideas and souls, its finite modes. Everything that takes place in the
> attribute of extension also happens in the attribute of thought, as things
> and ideas have the same origin and they follow the same laws and principles,
> though in a qualitatively distinct manner. These attributes are not
> deductible or dependent, but parallel, i.e., there is no kind of
> domination or submission of one over the other. In short, if the body is
> affected, so is the soul. Consequently, the long Cartesian hierarchic
> tradition, which defines the soul as superior to the body, is broken."
> (Liberali And Fuga, 2006)
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Martin Packer" <email@example.com>
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <firstname.lastname@example.org>
> Sent: Saturday, December 02, 2006 4:41 PM
> Subject: Re: [xmca] Empirical Evidence for ZPD
> Natalia, thanks very much. The cyrillic didn't come through, but I can
> together the English:
> "after all a cornerstone of materialism is a proposition about (that)
> consciousness and the brain are, both, a product (of nature), (and) a part
> of nature, (the one) that reflects the rest of nature"
> Might you be able to take a look at the other two excerpts in the original
> Let me think about this 'out loud' a little. This is the point in Crisis
> where Vygotsky is specifying what a truly Marxist psychology, a 'general'
> psychology, must study. A science, he insists, studies not appearances but
> what really exists. Optics, for example, studies mirror surfaces and light
> rays, not the images we see in the mirror, for the latter are phantoms. A
> scientific psychology must study the real processes that can give rise to
> such appearances, not (just) the appearances. [It's not clear to me how
> to go with this seeming analogy between the way a mirror reflects and the
> way the brain/Cs 'reflects the rest of nature'.] So any descriptive,
> intuitionist phenomenology must be rejected. What really exists? A
> materialist maintains that the brain exists, and consciousness too. V
> Lenin to the effect that what is matter, what is objective, is what exists
> independently of human consciousness. And, seemingly paradoxically,
> consciousness can exist outside our consciousness: for we can be conscious
> without being self-conscious. I can see without knowing that I see. So a
> general psychology must study consciousness, but to know the mind we can't
> rely on introspection, in part because in introspection mind splits into
> subject and object: a dualism arises in the act of self-reflection. We
> establish a psychological science only on the basis of what we experience
> directly (as Husserl tried to do); it must be based on knowledge, which is
> the result of analysis, not merely of experience. And what is analysis?
> Complicated answer put briefly: analysis lies at the intersection of
> methodology and practice: it is the exhaustive study of a single case in
> its connections, taken as a social microcosm. It involves what Marx
> (following Hegel) called abstraction.
> I'll confess I'm still not clear what V is proposing as the solutions to
> epistemological and ontological problems that he has distinguished. It
> to me as though he is saying that the epistemological problem - that
> concerning the relation between subject and object - arises only when one
> accepts uncritically the dualism that arises in introspection (or 'blind
> empiricism'?). So once one rejects introspection this problem dissolves.
> implication is that if one begins not with introspection but with
> one avoids any subject-object dualism. The ontological problem -
> the relation between mind and matter - is what he's trying to study, no?
> is a brain-in-a-body-in-a-social-world the basis for consciousness, then
> self-consciousness, then self-mastery and knowledge?
> > Hi Martin,
> > I found it --- in Russian, vol.1 of "Sobranie Sochinenii", on page 416.
> > It reads in Russian as very similar to the English quote your posted
> > "Âåäü -- after all-- ê›àåóãîëüíûì êàìíåì ìàòå›èàëèçìà -- a corneestone
> > materialism -- ÿâëÿåòñÿ ïîëîæåíèå î òîì, -- is a proposition about, ---
> > ñîçíàíèå è ìîçã åñòü ï›îäóêò --- (that) consciousness and the brain are,
> > both, a product (of nature),--- ÷àñòü ï›è›îäû, ---(and) a part of
> nature, --
> > îò›àæàﬂùàﬂöàÿ îñòàëüíóﬂ ï›è›îäó -- (the one) that reflects the rest of
> > nature"
> > Or something like this.
> > Hope this is helpful, and not making things more confusing.
> > Cheers,
> > Natalia.
> On 11/30/06 2:47 PM, "Natalia Gajdamaschko" <email@example.com> wrote:
> > On Thu, 30 Nov 2006 08:55:29 -0500 firstname.lastname@example.org wrote:
> >> A few pages later:
> >> ""After all, a cornerstone of materialism is the proposition that
> >> consciousness and the brain are a product, a part of nature, which
> >> the rest of nature" (327).
> >> The last sentence is not grammatical English, so something has clearly
> > gone
> >> wrong with the translation.
> >> If anyone has access to the original Russian and could comment,that
> >> would be
> >> great. (Page numbers are from the version in The Essential Vygotsky.)
> >> Martin
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