At 04:50 AM 1/12/2006 +0300, you wrote:
>Dear Andy,
>
>.... Surely to realize its historical task as a revolutionary
>class working class needs to develop itself from the present only suffering
>state into active, self-conscious state in which it will acquire a
>historical role of the real subject of historical process.
>
>All this is quite correct.
>
>But how you see the very transition from the state without any subjectness,
>the state of “sea cucumber” to self-conscious, subjective state? It’s
>obvious that one can’t be force to be free, to be a subject. So if a working
>class is now subjectless “sea cucumber” he is doomed to stay in this
>pitiable state forever just as a S==>R marionette is doomed to stay a
>miserable wooden toy without any intention to become free.
The point is that the working class has failed to become a subject, despite
the fact that all wage earners are human beings, composed of living cells
and with conscious, thinking bodies, engaged in activity in bourgeois
society. The problem is therefore not one of the origins of living matter,
but of social relations.
I am the last person needing to be convinced that the insights of ancient
philosophers are useful in grappling with this task, but the fact is that
we have a problem with creatures who live semiotically, not only in the
ubiquitous sense in which CS Peirce understood semiosis, but also in the
narrower sense. Very few people make a living with their sleeves rolled up
struggling with "nature". The important relations are relations between
subjects.
The introduction of semiotics into the classical philosophy springing from
Hegel and Marx is an extremely productive and important innovation. It is a
remarkable thing (in my mind at any rate) that despite the encyclopedic
scope of Hegel's philosophy and the great breadth of Marx's vision, neither
of these thinkers developed a theory of semiotics. The enrichment of the
tradition of classical German philosophy and Marxism as its inheritor by
the semiotics of the early 20th-century Russians and Americans is a process
I find it exciting to be part of.
Andy
>I think that my assumption that the subjectness is deeply rooted in the very
>nature of substance, assumption which arises not from a handbook of college
>biology but from investigation both biological and psychological,
>investigation based on genius Il’enkovs interpretation of Spinoza, leaves us
>a little more hope.
>
>Anyhow I am persuaded that if we want to solve any real social problem, we
>have to be guided by the real scientific (in Marx’ and Il’enkov’s
>dialectical, not positivist sense) understanding of human nature and
>developed CHAT will give us for the purpose appropriate instrument.
>
>Cheers,
>
>Sasha
>
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
>Behalf Of Andy Blunden
>Sent: Thursday, November 30, 2006 10:57 AM
>To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>Subject: RE: [xmca] Empirical Evidence for ZPD
>
>
>
>Firstly, Sasha I recommended Lektorsky's book purely and simply because it
>
>is a book-length treatment of this very complex subject from within our
>
>shared tradition. I recognise the kinship of my ideas with both Lektorsky
>
>and AN Leontyev but nothing in what I have said was intended as a
>
>representation of the ideas of these two writers. It is all my own view. I
>
>have no bone to pick with Lektorsky, Leontyev or anyone else in this broad
>
>tradition of enquiry.
>
>
>
>Secondly, we are surely talking at cross purposes. Yes, a "subject" is *by
>
>definition* self-conscious and yes I do exclude plant life from
>
>participation in the subject-object relation in the role of subject. I am
>
>aware of the relation between any organism and "its" object and how this
>
>state of being can be seen as part of the biological evolution towards
>
>human life. But I am not giving lessons in Darwinism. I will leave
>
>speculations about the dialectics of nature for the biologists. (BTW, I
>
>have no time for the application of the notion of "emergence" outside of
>
>the narrow domain for which it is applicable. I don't know why you mention
>
>this.)
>
>
>
>Thirdly, not even a human individual is a subject actually, let alone a sea
>
>cucumber. It is also wrong to describe the working class as a subject,
>
>though for different reasons. If you want to label every form of life as a
>
>subject because it is active, then that's fine. The word 'active', in
>
>English at least, can be used that way, and may be useful for the study of
>
>biology. But such a notion contributes absolutely nothing to resolving the
>
>problem of the place of the individual in modern capitalist society, the
>
>design of experiments into learning, understanding the persuasiveness of
>
>neo-conservative scaremongering, the reasons for low levels of literacy
>
>among immigrant populations, etc., etc., etc..
>
>
>
>My interest in a notion of subjectivity is for the purpose and only for the
>
>purpose of resolving these kinds of questions.
>
>
>
>The problem of freedom is in fact posed at two distinct levels: (1) at the
>
>level of free-will vs Laplacian determinism. This was the problem which
>
>bothered Spinoza and still bothers people like John R Searle, for example,
>
>who are interested in finding the key to consciousness in neurons and
>
>electrons; and (2) the problem of humanism vs structuralism, or culturalism
>
>vs constructivism, liberalism vs communitarianism, etc., the problems
>
>raised by Anna Stetsenko and Stephen Billett about agency and
>
>individuality, all those questions about whether human beings really can
>
>determine their own lives, or on the contrary they are prisoners (not of
>
>biological or molecular forces, but) of social structures and historical
>
>forces.
>
>
>
>Andy
>
>
>
>
>
>At 03:30 AM 30/11/2006 +0300, you wrote:
>
> >Hi, Andy
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >I’m afraid but I think that just in this issue we have better to base our
>
> >analysis on Marx and Il’enkov themselves than on Lektorsky. If you are
>
> >retelling him correctly he doesn’t gives us an insight into the problem of
>
> >Subject and Object (Predmet) relation but simply shares the old mistake
>with
>
> >A.N.Leont’ev.
>
> >
>
> >If subject is “some self-conscious system of activity” it means that both
>
> >animals and plants can’t be estimated as subjects, surely, if we don’t
>
> >ascribe them some form of self-consciousness :-). So it means that all
>
> >living creatures (except the self-conscious humans) are mere objects (here
>
> >it doesn’t mean “predmet” but something passive). This is nothing but
>
> >ancient Cartesian formula.
>
> >
>
> >Let’s go ahead. You write: “subject arises out of some definite, objective
>
> >system of activity when it becomes self-conscious”. I will agree with this
>
> >statement if you (or Lektorsky) will explain us what makes your “definite,
>
> >objective system of activity” turn into self-conscious being? The
>
> >possibility of such a magical transmutation of something mechanical,
>passive
>
> >(“objective”) into self-conscious is looking like the popular among some
>
> >psychologists idea of emerging. According to this point of view we explain
>
> >something if we say that it suddenly emerges, or in old Soviet ideological
>
> >style if something appears as a result of transition of quantity into
>
> >quality. You probably know that Vygotsky scoffed at the very idea of
>
> >emergentism in his “Emotions teaching”.
>
> >
>
> >The main (Cartesian) mistake of CHAT classics was in their theoretically
>
> >fruitful attempts to jump from mechanic S==>R level to the level of
>
> >consciousness leaving out three necessary stages. It is clear that such
>
> >transition is possible only in fair tales where the fairy godmother gives a
>
> >soul to the ugly nutcracker.
>
> >
>
> >In reality to pass from mechanical to the consciousness level we have to
>
> >ascend to the levels of chemism and organism and only here on the stage of
>
> >organic life we will meet the real subject-object (predmetnoe) relation.
>The
>
> >birth of subjectness takes place here on the level of abstract life. But on
>
> >the first stage (including unicellulars and plants) we have only
>
> >subjectness, not subjectivness. We have no reasons to search here
>
> >self-consciousness because on this level we haven’t even psyche.
>
> >
>
> >Only on the next level when a living subject starts to relate to itself or
>
> >the predmet activity of living subject is realizing by means of self
>
> >directed, reflecsive activity we are coming to the level of psyche (zoo
>
> >psyche) or self-sensation (still now not self-consciousness).
>
> >
>
> >Thus we can go to the next level the level of consciousness and self
>
> >consciousness only standing on the level of zoo psyche.
>
> >
>
> >Only basing on such intermediate evolutionary levels separating the
>
> >mechanical (Cartesian) S==>R robot and still Cartesian bodiless soul with
>
> >free will we can acquire the rational, not magical understanding of free
>
> >bodily human being. On the contrary, if we will insist on our Cartesian
>
> >attempts we will at best have a chance to repeat after LSV the questionable
>
> >metaphor of triangle and sign mediation or after ANL the idea of activity
>
> >mediating the relation of stimulus and reaction.
>
> >
>
> >We entirely agree with Vygotsky’s declaration that “the problem of freedom
>
> >is a central problem of psychology” (it was recently published in Russian
>
> >among other materials for Vygotsky’s archive). We insist that both Vygotsky
>
> >and Leont’ev belonged to one and the same theoretic school (you know some
>of
>
> >our colleges are denying this fact) because both they were trying to solve
>
> >the one and the same problem the problem of freedom. How a human can be
>
> >free from the mechanical S==>R causation of its body?
>
> >
>
> >So if we want not only repeat both true and erroneous words of Vygotsky and
>
> >Leont’ev being said long ago, but to do our part for development of CHAT we
>
> >have to go further than they in solving the same problem which was in the
>
> >focus of their theoretic interest, the problem of freedom. And we can do it
>
> >only abandoning the false Cartesian position identifying animals with
>
> >mechanical (exclusive of subjectness) S==>R causality, doesn’t
>understanding
>
> >them as a subjects, (not to say about subjectivness) but as a soulless
>
> >mechanical toys. We are stressing that transition from Cartesian tubes,
>
> >threads and valves to the modern conception of living body as a
>
> >biomechanical S==>R robot left us entirely inside Cartesian mechanism as a
>
> >specific logic.
>
> >
>
> >I realize that all this is hardly acceptable for those investigators who
>are
>
> >trying to develop the semiotic approach appreciating LSV’s idea of sign
>
> >mediation as his central and the most fruitful idea. It can't be helped.
>
> >
>
> >We have to choose the way: are we going to share Vygotsky’s way based on
>
> >ideas of sign mediation, or we are going to share Vygotsky’s way based on
>
> >ideas of Spinoza. Vygotsky had too little time to realize that two these
>
> >ways led him to the opposite sides, split the very logic of his
>
> >investigation. I am sure, and I share this position with Il’enkov who
>
> >fundamentally argued the absolute incompatibility, of semiotic and activity
>
> >approaches, that the semiotic way leads us to the dead end, while activity
>
> >approach gives us a chance to build a new dialectical psychology.
>
> >
>
> >And we have to realize finally that Vygotsky was not a God, so if we are
>
> >investigators, not believers we have to cease the protracted interpretation
>
> >of his “sacred” texts and start, or better to say continue after him
>
> >investigation of problems he formulated for himself and for all of us.
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >Sasha
>
> >
>
> >-----Original Message-----
>
> >From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
>
> >Behalf Of Andy Blunden
>
> >Sent: Wednesday, November 29, 2006 12:22 AM
>
> >To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>
> >Subject: RE: [xmca] Empirical Evidence for ZPD
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >Big question Michael.
>
> >
>
> >See http://www.marxists.org/archive/lektorsky/subject-object/index.htm for
>
> >
>
> >a book-length answer from Lektorsky.
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >Subject and object are always two distinct entities, but the subject (some
>
> >
>
> >self-conscious system of activity) arises out of some definite, objective
>
> >
>
> >system of activity when it becomes self-conscious, and the activity then
>
> >
>
> >constitutes (in AN Leontyev's words) the "intertraffic" between subject and
>
> >
>
> >object. The activity of the subject then is to objectify itself in the
>
> >
>
> >object, giving its activities material forms deposited in the objective
>
> >
>
> >world around it, vested with meanings by which the subject
>
> >
>
> >"institutionalises" itself.
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >So in the beginning there is no distinction, because the relevant system of
>
> >
>
> >activity has not yet become self-conscious, and in the end there is no
>
> >
>
> >distinction because the subject has "naturalised" its activity and become
>
> >
>
> >indistinguishable from the object. These are of course both tendencies, and
>
> >
>
> >not absolute truths, and the whole life of a subject exists between these
>
> >
>
> >two poles.
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >Andy
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >At 02:03 PM 28/11/2006 -0500, you wrote:
>
> >
>
> > >Andy and Paul,
>
> >
>
> > >
>
> >
>
> > >What is the argument that a dialectical approach, even dialectical
>
> >
>
> > >materialism, dissolves the difference between subject and object? I
>guess
>
> >
>
> > >we are all influenced by what we have been reading lately, but it seems
>
> >
>
> > >that it is difficult for a dialectic based perspective to escape the
>
> >
>
> > >idealism trap.
>
> >
>
> > >
>
> >
>
> > >Thanks,
>
> >
>
> > >
>
> >
>
> > >Michael
>
> >
>
> > >
>
> >
>
> > >-----Original Message-----
>
> >
>
> > >From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
>
> >
>
> > >Behalf Of Andy Blunden
>
> >
>
> > >Sent: Tuesday, November 28, 2006 5:09 AM
>
> >
>
> > >To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>
> >
>
> > >Subject: Re: [xmca] Empirical Evidence for ZPD (was= Does VygotskyAccept
>
> >
>
> > >the "Assistance Assumption"?)
>
> >
>
> > >
>
> >
>
> > >Paul, surely you overstate the matter.
>
> >
>
> > >
>
> >
>
> > >ZPD is, like all scientific concepts, a theory-laden object. To say that
>it
>
> >
>
> > >exists says that certain more or less well-defined procedures understood
>
> >
>
> > >within the Vygotskyan theory, will produce this or that verifiable
>result.
>
> >
>
> > >Otherwise what is the useof the concept and the theory of which it is a
>
> >
>
> > >part? While there are lots of concepts within the Vygotskyan theory which
>
> >
>
> > >are new and unique, or have a Marxist genealogy, there are also plenty
>
> >
>
> > >which are shared with all pedagogical theories and common sense. In fact,
>
> >
>
> > >all scientific theories must incorporate "common sense" concepts into
>their
>
> >
>
> > >framework in order to be truly scientific. "Empiricism" denies that
>
> >
>
> > >scientific objects are "theory laden" and that there is anything
>
> >
>
> > >problematic in the idea of a purely factual test for the existence of
>some
>
> >
>
> > >object. But to deny Empiricism is not to deny the validity and necessity
>of
>
> >
>
> > >empirical evidence.
>
> >
>
> > >
>
> >
>
> > >And surely it is wrong to say that in Marxism or Vygotsky "the subject
>
> >
>
> > >object distinction is dissolved". The absolute independence and
>
> >
>
> > >separateness of subject and object is certainly denied by Marx and
>
> >
>
> > >Vygotsky, but neither claim that "subject" and "object" are invalid
>
> >
>
> > >concepts, or concepts between which no distinction can be made. For
>
> >
>
> > >example, Marx does not claim that an object (e.g. ZPD) exists insofar as
>a
>
> >
>
> > >subject (Vygotskyan psychology) incorporates the concept in its activity,
>
> >
>
> > >so that empirical refutation of the concept is ruled out in principle. No
>
> >
>
> > >subject exists in absolute separateness from every other subject, all
>
> >
>
> > >subjects exist in a material and therefore infinitely interconnected,
>
> >
>
> > >world. So the identity of subject and object can only be relative, not
>
> >
>
> > >absolute.
>
> >
>
> > >
>
> >
>
> > >Andy
>
> >
>
> > >
>
> >
>
> > >At 12:26 AM 28/11/2006 -0800, you wrote:
>
> >
>
> > > > Isn´'t the idea of "empirical" evidence for the ZPD something of an
>
> >
>
> > > > oxymoron in itself? Didn{t Vygotsky develop his thinking within the
>
> >
>
> > > > framework of dialetical materialism, something that many north
>americans
>
> >
>
> > > > and others seem all too ready to forget? Isn't the concept of a ZPD a
>
> >
>
> > > > dialectical model in itself, which is to say, a model in which the
>
> >
>
> > > > subject object distinction is dissolved, a dissolution which defies
>the
>
> >
>
> > > > concept of empirical?
>
> >
>
> > > > Paul Dillon
>
> >
>
> > >
>
> >
>
> > > Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435,
>AIM
>
> >
>
> > >identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651
>
> >
>
> > >
>
> >
>
> > >_______________________________________________
>
> >
>
> > >xmca mailing list
>
> >
>
> > >xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>
> >
>
> > >http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
> >
>
> > >_______________________________________________
>
> >
>
> > >xmca mailing list
>
> >
>
> > >xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>
> >
>
> > >http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> > Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435, AIM
>
> >
>
> >identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >_______________________________________________
>
> >
>
> >xmca mailing list
>
> >
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> >xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
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> >
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> >http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
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> >
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> >_______________________________________________
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> >xmca mailing list
>
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> >http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
>
>
> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435, AIM
>
>identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651
>
>
>
>_______________________________________________
>
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